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have encouraged me in the endeavour. Above all my wife Janet has borne with 
fortitude the time spent in my study and the library and the long periods of 






 The associated ship and the jurisdiction to arrest such a ship created in terms of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 is a unique legal institution in the world of 
maritime law and jurisdiction. The sister ship arrest envisaged by the Arrest Convention, 1952 is 
encompassed by the associated ship but the concept of an associated ship goes considerably 
further than the sister ship in going behind the separate corporate personality of ship-owning 
companies to their controlling interests and, on the basis of common control, providing that ships 
are associated. This status subjects them to arrest both in order to obtain security for court 
proceedings or arbitration, usually elsewhere than in South Africa, and arrest in actions in rem 
against the associated ship. This is in respect of claims arising in respect of other vessels in 
separate ownership. Although tentative consideration was given to a similar innovation when the 
Australian Law Commission undertook a review of admiralty law in Australia their legislation is 
confined to a surrogate ship arrest substantially along the lines of the sister ship arrest of the 
Arrest Convention. A proposal to introduce a similar institution by way of the revision of the 
Arrest Convention has not yet resulted in anything similar being introduced elsewhere. 
 
 In South African maritime practice the associated ship jurisdiction has proved to be an 
important innovation, especially in conjunction with the power to arrest a ship for the purpose of 
obtaining security for proceedings in a foreign court or arbitration tribunal, and a substantial 
amount of maritime work involves associated ships. As an institution it has not hitherto been 
subjected to close scrutiny and the overall purpose of this work is to do that. It takes as a starting 
point the revision of South African admiralty procedure and jurisdiction leading to the enactment 
of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and the introduction of the associated ship. This 
task has been undertaken against the background of the general development of maritime law, the 
attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem under the Roman Dutch common law 
of South Africa and the action in rem available in South Africa under the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act 1890. The study reveals the common roots of these institutions in the Roman Law 
and the practice in maritime courts around Europe from the Middle Ages onwards and forms a 
 2
 
part of the foundation for the proposition in the final analysis that South Africa has created an 
institution that is distinct from the English action in rem and having its own particular features 
derived from both its English and Roman Dutch forebears. 
 
 The central analysis explores from a critical standpoint the justifications advanced at the 
time for the introduction of the associated ship jurisdiction and finds these wanting 
notwithstanding that they have tended to linger in statements in the judgments of the courts. 
Instead a policy-based justification is advanced that it is submitted provides a proper justification 
for the associated ship jurisdiction in the South African context. Being based upon policy 
considerations it is not suggested that this justification is universally applicable or demands the 
same response from all nations, as each will be influenced by different factors depending on the 
nature of the maritime interests of the country considering such an institution. This is likely to 
hamper attempts to obtain international agreement on a similar jurisdiction to arrest vessels going 
beyond the provisions of the Arrest Convention. 
 
 In the light of the suggested justification of the associated ship jurisdiction the Act itself is 
analysed and various difficulties of interpretation are addressed. These include a critical analysis 
of certain controversial decisions and a consideration of the constitutional implications of the 
associated ship. Finally the different threads are brought together in an analysis of the nature and 
consequences of the arrest of an associated ship and the action in rem against the associated ship. 
The fact that the jurisdiction has been harnessed to two distinct purposes having entirely different 
features is highlighted.   
 
 Although maritime law always has a significant international dimension the fact that the 
associated ship is a uniquely South African institution means that the analysis is largely driven by 
the underlying principles of South African law and principles. The view is taken that the statute is 
a South African statute governing matters of the jurisdiction of South African courts and as such 
falls to be construed in the light of South African legal principles. The too ready resort on 
questions of interpretation (as opposed to substantive law where it is mandated as being the 
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applicable law in certain cases) to English precedents is deprecated although recognition is given 
to the influence that English admiralty law has played in the development of South African law in 
this field. Overall the conclusion is that the associated ship has proved to be a useful innovation 
particularly to claimants in the maritime field and will continue to make South Africa a favoured 
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 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ASSOCIATED SHIP JURISDICTION 
 
 Surprisingly for a country with a lengthy coastline, a number of ports and a substantial 
trade by water, South African maritime jurisprudence was largely quiescent until the latter part of 
the 1960's with only a trickle of cases, principally cargo disputes and collisions. There were two 
jurisdictional regimes operating in parallel and applying two different systems of law in maritime 
cases. No attempt had been made to keep abreast of international maritime developments and in 
particular to apply international maritime conventions in South Africa
1
. Expansion of 
international trade and particularly the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 saw an increase in 
maritime traffic around the southern tip of Africa bringing with it an upsurge in potential 
maritime litigation. The need for reform rapidly emerged and after one abortive attempt2 the 
considered result of a process of review by the South African Law Commission
3
 was the 
enactment of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983.
4
   
 
 When the Act came into operation on the 1
st
 November 1983 it was generally well received 
by academic commentators.5 Unusually for a statute it received express and fulsome judicial 
approval, with Milne JP describing it as: 
                                                 
1 The exception was the Hague Rules (the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to Bills of Lading signed at Brussels on the 25th August 1924) that were largely incorporated into South 
African domestic law in terms of sections 306 to 310 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 57of 1951. 
2 The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 5 of 1972, which was never put into operation.  C Dillon and JP van 
Niekerk, South African Maritime Law and Marine Insurance: Selected Topics 28; H Booysen, Admiraliteitshowe in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1973 THRHR 241, 256-9. 
3 South African Law Commission, Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty, Project 32 (1982). 
4 Referred to hereafter as ‘the Act’. 
5 C Dillon and J P Van Niekerk, South African Maritime Law and Marine Insurance : Selected Topics (1983) 34; A 
Rycroft ‘Changes in South African Admiralty Jurisdiction’ [1984] 3 LMCLQ 417; H Staniland ‘Developments in 
South African Jurisdiction in Maritime Law’ 1984 Acta Juridica 271; H Staniland ‘The Implementation of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in South Africa [1985] 3 LMCLQ 462.  A lone voice of academic dissent was 
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‘... a model piece of legislation which would in many respects be an improvement on the 
admiralty legislation of other Western seafaring nations’.6 
 
and Friedman J, speaking extra-curially7, expressed the view that it is ‘an outstanding piece of 
legislation’. There can be little doubt that legal practitioners active in maritime work welcomed it 
as a long-overdue modernisation of the law that put an end to the unhappy dichotomy then 
existing of two separate courts (albeit consisting of the same judges) in maritime matters, 
commonly referred to as admiralty and parochial courts. The former of these exercised the 
jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of Admiralty8 and applied English admiralty law as at 18909 and 
the latter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of South Africa
10
 and applied Roman-Dutch 
law.
11
 With masterly understatement Innes CJ described as ‘not a satisfactory state of things’ a 
situation that had the result: 
 
‘... that in South Africa and wherever the common law differed from English maritime 
law, the issue of a dispute might sometimes depend upon whether it was brought before 
one tribunal or the other.’12 
                                                                                                                                                              
that of H Booysen ‘South Africa’s New Admiralty Act: A Maritime Disaster?’ (1984) 6 Modern Business Law 75 83.  
However his complaint appears to have been limited to the continued application of English law to many claims as 
he preferred the purist approach of applying Roman Dutch law to all claims. In taking this stance he failed to indicate 
the sources from which the Roman Dutch law was to be derived. 
6 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) 663C. 
7 In an address delivered at a seminar on maritime law and practice held in Johannesburg on the 4th October 1984 
under the auspices of the School of Law in association with the Centre for Continuing Education of the University of 
the Witwatersrand and published under the heading ‘Maritime Law in Practice and in the Courts’ in 1985 SALJ 45 
54. 
8 Under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (53 and 54 Vict. C. 27). 
9 The crucial date was the 25th July 1890.  Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation Ltd 1994 (1) 
SA 550 (A) 560A-C.  Statutory amendments after that date were not part of the law administered by the court sitting 
as a Colonial Court of Admiralty. The Yuri Maru, The Woron [1927] AC 906 (PC); Tharros Shipping Corporation 
SA v Owner of the Ship ‘Golden Ocean’ 1972 (4) SA 316 (N) 321-2; Beaver Marine (Pty) Ltd v Wuest 1978 (4) SA 
263 (A). 
10 Established under section 95 of the Union of South Africa Act 9 Edw. VIII Ch 9. 
11 Crooks & Co v Agricultural Co-operative Union Limited 1922 AD 423. 
12 Crooks & Co v Agricultural Co-Operative Union Limited, supra. Curiously H Booysen ‘Admiralty Jurisdiction’ 
1975 THRHR 387 394 seems to have viewed the overlapping jurisdictions with equanimity subject to the admiralty 
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This overlap frequently turned maritime litigation into a contest closely resembling a particularly 
intricate and subtle game of chess, where different parties selected their court and system of law 
in order to procure the perceived advantages of one system over the other13. The position was 
described thus by Friedman J: 
 
‘First, there was now something of an overlap in the jurisdiction of a division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, sitting, on the one hand, as a court of admiralty, and, on 
the other hand, exercising its common law jurisdiction.  The law to be applied by the 
court would depend on which jurisdiction it exercised and so, too, would the result.  
Perhaps the most significant effect of this anomaly was in the ranking of claims, since the 
admiralty law of England was not, in all respects, the same as the common law of South 
Africa in this regard.  Consequently the ranking of claims against the proceeds of a sale of 
a ship might depend upon the ‘accident’ of whether its eventual sale was effected 
pursuant to an order in admiralty or to a common-law sale in execution.’14 
 
 In the interests of their clients practitioners often wished to invoke the admiralty 
jurisdiction, which was wider than that of the parochial courts, because it was not restricted by 
whether the claimant was a peregrinus of South Africa nor, in general, by the fact that the claim 
had not arisen in a South African jurisdiction. However this desire was hampered by the fact that 
the law and jurisdiction was ossified as at 1890 and relevant legal materials were not readily 
accessible15. In addition from the perspective of foreign litigants the existence of potentially 
                                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction being updated from 1890.  In an earlier era when overlapping was identified in the Cape Colony by the 
decision in Smith v Davis (1878) 8 Buch 66 it led to the passage of Law 8 of 1879 (Cape) which replaced Roman 
Dutch law with English law in maritime and shipping matters where the Vice-Admiralty Court and the Supreme 
Court had concurrent jurisdiction.  That Act was in turn repealed by Act 3 of 1977. 
13 In the busiest maritime jurisdiction of Natal (as the province of KwaZulu-Natal was then known) where this legal 
manoeuvring could take place it was usually motivated by a desire to invoke or avoid the decision of the Full Court 
of the Natal Provincial Division in the case of The SS ‘Mangoro’ (1913) 34 NLR 67.  CF Forsyth ‘The Conflict 
between Modern Roman Dutch Law and the law of Admiralty as administered by South African Courts’ 1982 SALJ 
255. 
14 1985 SALJ 45 at 53. Peca Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and another v Registrar of Supreme Court, Natal N.O. and others 
1977 (1) SA 76 (N) provides an illustration of the unsatisfactory position that existed. 
15 In his speech in the Second Reading Debate on the Bill that became the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 5 of 
1972 the Minister of Justice claimed that no court in South Africa had a complete set of the Admiralty Rules and that 
a copy had only recently become available from the private documents of Harcourt J. Hansard, Vol 37, column 453. 
The writer doubts whether this was correct as his own copy of the Admiralty Rules was given to him in 1977 by a 
senior member of the Bar who had practical experience in admiralty matters and a number of advocates were 
certainly in possession of copies. It would be surprising to discover that the court libraries in maritime jurisdictions 
lacked copies of the Rules.  
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conflicting legal systems was not conducive to making South Africa an attractive jurisdiction and 
made litigation in this country a hazardous venture. Practitioners are generally concerned to have 
clarity regarding the content of the law, and wanted to be able to give advice expeditiously and 
desired (a sentiment not unmixed by the prospect of personal advantage in the form of increased 
quantities of work) to promote South Africa as a desirable admiralty jurisdiction. They were 
undoubtedly happy to shake off the ‘Victorian cobwebs’16 of the existing system. 
 
 The Act was, however, more than simply an updating of the law and an ironing-out of 
jurisdictional oddities. The modernisation undertaken in the Act was ‘radical’ in conception and 
scope and was aimed at many aspects of admiralty law and practice.
17
 Friedman J went on to 
describe it as ‘bold, innovative and comprehensive’18 containing provisions that are ‘novel, 
unusual and at times far-reaching.
19
 Amongst these provisions, and indeed as subsequent events 
                                                 
16 Advocate ‘Farewell Victoria Admiralty Law’ (1983) 13 BML 84. A Waring Charterparties, a comparative study 
of South African English and American law (1983) 4 expressed the hope that ‘... this neglected and unsatisfactory 
area of the law will be rectified shortly by a long-overdue, legislative overhaul of Admiralty law.’  In the first report 
by the President of the Maritime Law Association delivered on the 15thApril 1977 he said: ‘This Association was 
born out of, on the one hand a sense of frustration on the part of practitioners in having to comply with antiquated 
provisions of Admiralty Practice and the consequent confusion arising from the conflict between such practice and 
our common law, and on the other hand the realisation that our domestic maritime legislation was not keeping pace 
with developments in the rest of the world.’ Later in the same report he added: ‘This area of the law has bedevilled 
the work of attorneys for many many years quite apart from leading to inequities in the judgments of the courts and 
making us seem naive if not incompetent in the eyes of our clients and associates overseas. I think you will agree that 
we shall all be greatly relieved once the appropriate amendments to this outdated legislation become effective.’ See 
in general on the need for reform G Hofmeyr, Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa (2006), 11-
12. 
17 The description is that of Friedman J in an address delivered to the Maritime Law Association at Cape Town on 
the 18th July 1986 published under the title ‘Maritime Law in the Courts after 1 November 1983’ in 1986 SALJ 678. 
18 In the address referred to in footnote 7 above, 54. 
19 Katagum Wholesale Commodities Company Limited v The m.v. ‘Paz’ 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) 263A.  Friedman J’s 
enthusiasm for the legislation was not necessarily shared by all his colleagues. In his separate judgment in the same 
case Didcott J adverted to the Act’s potential to allow South African courts to be ‘transformed into some sort of 
judicial Liberia or Panama’ and to be ‘turned into a court of convenience for the wandering litigants of the world’ (at 
263H).  The metaphor, was couched in the striking language that so often characterised Didcott J’s judgments, but it 
hardly survives scrutiny, perhaps due to the fact, as he confessed, that he was ‘insufficiently steeped in shipping 
matters’. The analogy between the use of flags of convenience that conceal the identity of those operating ships and 
enable the beneficial owners of vessels to avoid the payment of legitimate debts, and jurisdictional provisions which 
enable a court to deal with that very situation at the instance of open and legitimate creditors, breaks down at every 
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have shown pre-eminent amongst them, were the provisions enabling an action in rem to be 
pursued by way of the arrest of an associated ship
20
 rather than the ship in respect of which the 
claim lay21. These were described as ‘novel and far-reaching’22 involving an ‘unprecedented 
extension’ of any jurisdiction existing elsewhere in the world under ‘sister ship’ provisions 
embodied in the law of those countries that had adhered to the 1952 Arrest Convention.
23
 
Friedman J, who was undoubtedly the Act’s most enthusiastic protagonist in print and the judge 
who at the time had the most extensive knowledge and practical experience in maritime matters, 
described these provisions as ‘a most progressive innovation in relation to actions in rem’.24  
 
 So much for the views of the associated ship jurisdiction at its inception. It spawned, as had 
been anticipated, a considerable amount of litigation some of which rapidly exposed difficulties 
with the language of the relevant sections. These and other teething problems with the Act 
(particularly with the provisions concerning the ranking of claims in section 11 thereof) led to a 
protracted debate within the ranks of the membership of the Maritime Law Association and 
                                                                                                                                                              
point, particularly when viewed in the light of the fact that since 1893 the South African courts, sitting as Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty, had always been entitled to entertain suits between peregrini. 
20 This is the general way of referring to any ship described in section 3(7) of the Act. However that section includes 
ships in common ownership or sister ships in terms of the Arrest Convention (footnote 28, infra). The true 
innovation of the Act lay in the power to arrest a ship other than the ship in respect of which the maritime claim had 
arisen and owned by a different juristic person. Such a vessel is hereafter referred to as a ‘true associated ship’. 
21 Contrary to the clear requirement of the English in rem jurisdiction as previously applied by the court sitting as a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty at least since the decision in The Beldis 1936 P 1; 18 Asp MLC 598 (CA).   D J Shaw 
Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa (1987) 27.  
22 By H Staniland, ‘The Implementation of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in South Africa’ [1985] 
LMCLQ 462, 467  
23 The International Convention relating to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships concluded in Brussels on 10 May 1952. 
This will be referred to as the Arrest Convention. The accuracy of this statement will be examined later. 
24 1985 SALJ 45 at 55. In the address published in 1986 SALJ 678 at 679 he said: ‘The fact, therefore, that the Act 
provides far-reaching and even revolutionary methods to prevent recalcitrant debtors from evading their legal debts, 
for example, by the simple ruse of creating ‘single-ship’ companies, is, in my view, something to be welcomed, not 
deprecated.’ That attitude clearly reflected the view at the time that there is something deceitful in a shipowner so 
arranging its affairs. 
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eventually to substantial amendments in 199225 that not only clarified certain issues but extended 
the scope of the associated ship jurisdiction
26
 and in some ways altered its thrust. Subsequent 
academic comment and critique has been muted.27 The high hopes expressed in the early years 
that other countries might follow the lead set by South Africa
28
 have not yet been realised.
29
 In 
                                                 
25 Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992. 
26  Particularly by way of the presumption that charterers are the owners of a chartered ship. s3(7)(c). 
27 Professor Staniland reviewed the amendments in an article ‘Ex Africa semper aliquid novi : Associated ship arrest 
in South Africa [1995] LMCLQ 561. The provisions are dealt with generally in their original form in D J Shaw, 
Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, pp 35-42; and as amended in J Hare, Shipping Law and 
Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) pp 103-114 and G Hofmeyr, Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and 
Practice in South Africa pp 66-76. Elements of the jurisdiction are touched upon in M J D Wallis ‘The associated 
ship jurisdiction in South Africa: Choice assorted or one bite at the cherry?’ [2000] LMCLQ 132 and more recently 
in an article by Graham Bradfield, ‘Guilt by association in South African admiralty law’ [2005] 2 LCMLQ 234. The 
only other academic writing of which I am aware are two un-published minor dissertations in the Faculty of Law, 
University of Cape Town presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an LLM. The one is by Michael 
Soltynski entitled ‘The South African associated ship provisions’ and the other by Craig Cunningham entitled ‘The 
Arrest of an Associated Ship in terms of section 5(3) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act No 105 of 1983 (as 
amended): The Burden of Proof’. The similarly unpublished LLM dissertation in the Faculty of Law, University of 
Natal, 1986, by A G Jeffery entitled ‘The Nature of the Action in rem’ expressly states that a detailed consideration 
of the associated ship provisions of the Act is beyond the scope of the dissertation. As will be apparent from the 
discussion later in this work I do not share the central thesis of Jeffery’s work that the English judges (particularly 
Lord Stowell and Dr Lushington), their Registrars and the practitioners from Doctors’ Commons who appeared in 
the Admiralty Court, erroneously confused the action in rem with an earlier procedure in which action was 
commenced by the arrest of any property of the debtor. I take the view that the original scope of the general form of 
action in Admiralty was cut down in consequence of the attacks of the common law courts on admiralty and this led 
to the evolution of what is now known as the action in rem. 
28 Australia, which like South Africa had an admiralty jurisdiction founded in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 
1890, reviewed its law in 1985 and considered whether to follow the example of South Africa.  H Staniland 
‘Developments in South African Jurisdiction and Maritime Law’ 1984 Acta Juridica 271 276; H Staniland and J S 
McLennan ‘The Arrest of an Associated Ship’ 1985 SALJ 148 152.   However, at the end of the day Australia 
contented itself with a ‘surrogate ship’ arrest on a similar basis to the ‘sister ship’ provisions of the 1952 Arrest 
Convention. Australian Law Commission 33 ‘Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction’ (1986), paras 138-141. See s 19 of the 
Admiralty Act 34 of 1988 (Australia). There is some recent academic writing suggesting that this should be 
reviewed.  S. Derrington ‘Ship Arrest and the Admiralty Jurisdiction of Australia and South Africa: Too Far or Not 
Far Enough?’ (2005) 11 J Int Mar L 409 and P. Glover ‘Sister Ship Arrest and the Application of the Doctrine of 
Attachment in Australia: a Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis in the Wake of the 1952 Arrest Convention’ (2008) 
22 A & NZ Mar LJ 99. 
29 I say ‘yet’ because in the deliberations concerning the revision of the 1952 Arrest Convention at the CMI in 1999 
the United Kingdom delegation, with the support of the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, Canada, Australia, France and 
the CISL proposed an ‘associated ship’ arrest provision modelled on the South African provisions. F Berlingieri 
Arrest of Ships 4th Ed., (2006) 576 and 580. However the proposal did not attract the support of the majority of 
delegations. See the Report of the United Nations/International Maritime Organisation Diplomatic Conference on 
Arrest of Ships, GE 99-52433 (19/7/99), Chap II, paras 8 and 12. The question whether this would be a desirable 
international solution to the perceived problem of ‘one-ship companies’ is beyond the scope of this study. It involves 
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the result South Africa has stood alone for a little over twenty-five years (at the time of writing) 
in exercising a jurisdiction to arrest vessels in actions in rem on a basis different from and more 
extensive than any jurisdiction exercised by any court sitting in maritime matters anywhere else 
in the world. This work seeks to analyse the nature of this novel action in rem. That involves a 
review of how the jurisdiction came about; its nature and impact; the problems to which it gives 
rise and the making of some modest suggestions concerning the road ahead. But first some 
consideration must be given to historical matters. 
                                                                                                                                                              
issues of policy that will vary from country to country and the attempt to introduce it exposed substantial rifts 




THE PREVIOUS LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
 The associated ship jurisdiction has two central elements. Firstly, within the framework of 
the action in rem, which South Africa has inherited from England and the days when Natal and 
the Cape Colony were British colonies, it permits the arrest of vessels other than those in respect 
of which the claim to be adjudicated arose. Whilst this extends the traditional basis of the action 
in rem as applied in South Africa until 1983
1
 the concept of arresting property other than that in 
respect of which the claim had arisen was not itself entirely novel. Under South African law all 
the property of a foreign debtor was liable to attachment to found jurisdiction, whether the cause 
was a maritime one or otherwise, and in principle all the property of a debtor was subject to 
seizure in most European jurisdictions, although this was now limited in the case of maritime 
claims in countries that subscribed to the Arrest Convention. Even in England the adoption of the 
Arrest Convention by way of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956
2
 permitted the arrest of a 
sister ship. The second element and the true novelty lay in the fact that the associated ship 
jurisdiction permits the arrest of property not in the legal ownership of the party who is liable for 
the debt. Here the reform steps beyond the confines of not only the Arrest Convention but also 
the conceptual scope of the Roman-Dutch jurisdiction based upon an attachment ad fundandam 
et confirmandam jurisdictionem. This latter element of the reforms embodied in the introduction 
of the associated ship jurisdiction is the truly radical innovation.  
 
                                                 
1 Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and practice in South Africa 27 suggests that until the decision in The Beldis 1936 P 
51 ‘it was by no means finally accepted’ that only the wrongdoing ship could be arrested.  See the judgment of Fry 
LJ in The Heinrich Bjorn (1885) 10 PD 44 at 53-4. W Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims (1997) 975-7. Some 
suggest that this should be a logical consequence of the acceptance of the procedural theory of the action in rem but 
G Price, The Law of Maritime Liens (1940) 15 notes that:  ‘For more than 150 years there is no record of any attempt 
to bring an action in rem by the seizure of property unconnected with the facts out of which the plaintiff’s cause of 
action arose.’ 
2 (1956) 4 to 5 Eliz 2 c 46. This change was a novelty in England. The St Elefterio 1957 P 179 185. This extended 
jurisdiction in rem was not part of South African admiralty law prior to the Act. Tharros Shipping Corporation SA v 
Owner of the Ship ‘Golden Ocean’ 1972 (4) SA 316 (N). 
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 It is helpful in order to place this novel development in context to examine the development 
of the legal landscape in South Africa up to 1983 and where they can be discerned the underlying 
reasons for that development. One can then determine whether the associated ship jurisdiction 
can be regarded as an extension of existing legal policy, a decisive break with the past or possibly 
a combination of the two. It will also identify the conceptual foundation on which the Act is 
constructed in order to determine the nature of the action in rem against an associated ship. In the 
first place this requires a consideration of the origins of the two procedures available in South 
African law prior to the Act namely the action based on an attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem and the action in rem.  
 
1 The Roman-Dutch law and the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem 
 
 In Roman law the central principle on which jurisdiction was based was summed up in the 
maxim actor sequitur forum rei, which required a plaintiff to sue a debtor in the court of the 
latter’s domicile. As such it has been said that the arrest to found jurisdiction was unknown to 
Roman law
3
 and Wessels locates the development of a jurisdiction based on arrest in ‘some 
Germanic or other custom, which was so inveterate that it survived the introduction of the Roman 
law and practice into Holland’.
4
 The origin of those customs is not clearly identified but it seems 
                                                 
3 J H Wessels, History of Roman Dutch Law, 678. Voet 2.4.18 (Gane’s translation, Vol 1, p 283) however appears to 
take a different view. He writes: ‘The detention and laying on of hands, taking place as it does merely in security of a 
creditor whose debt is in danger, and having its foundations in necessity, is so far from being opposed to either the 
theory or the practice of Roman law that it should rather be deemed to have been drawn from that law and transferred 
with the best of reason to our usages.’ In the context however he appears to be referring to a practice of arresting the 
person or property of a fugitive debtor, which is more akin to the arrest suspectus de fuga than an arrest to establish 
jurisdiction. Elsewhere he says simply that this type of arrest arises from custom (Voet 5.1.66). 
4 Wessels, op. cit, 675. This explanation was accepted by the Appellate Division (as it then was) in Thermo Radiant 
Oven Sales Limited v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Limited 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) 305 relying also on Bort, De Arresten, 1-
7. See also Siemens Ltd v Offshore Marine Engineering Ltd 1993 (3) SA 913 (A) 918E-G. However, there is room 
for some reservations whether it is correct. In considering the origins of the action in rem reference is made to the 
procedures laid down for the trial of maritime disputes in various tribunals, which undoubtedly had their origins in 
Roman civil procedures. If one compares these with the discussion of court procedures in Voet Book 2, Titles 4, 5, 6, 
8 and 11 (Gane’s Translation Vol 1), Huber, Book V, Chaps 1 - 3 (Gane’s Translation, p181 et seq) and Van 
Leeuwen’s Roman Dutch Law, Book V, Chapters XIII and XIV it will be seen that the latter reflect a procedure that 
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clear that with the fragmentation of Europe after the collapse of the Roman empire and thereafter 
the creation and collapse of the Frankish empire, courts in various places began to draw a 
distinction between those who lived permanently in a place - the incola or inwonende 
vreemdeling - and those who did not reside permanently but had only some temporary presence 
there - the peregrinus or uitwonende vreemdeling. The former enjoyed the same private law 
rights as a citizen whilst the latter did not. In various places in Germany, France and, most 
importantly from a South African perspective, in Holland and most of the provinces of the 
Netherlands (Friesland appears to have been an exception) the incola was permitted initially to 
arrest a peregrinus debtor in order to establish the jurisdiction of the local court, that is the court 
within whose area of jurisdiction the incola resided. At some stage after this initial development 
it was extended by permitting the debtor’s property to be arrested for the purpose of establishing 
jurisdiction. 
 
 Initially and particularly when the arrest was directed at the person of the debtor rather than 
his property it seems the arrest was not itself the source of jurisdiction but was intended to coerce 
the peregrinus into demanding to be brought before the local judge. This was an act which would 
be taken as a submission to the jurisdiction and would result in the debtor’s release from arrest 
provided security was given.5 The arrest of property appears to have become an alternative to the 
arrest of the person - initially probably when the person of the debtor was not available - and 
thereafter on a theory of contumacy. Either procedure served the dual purposes of compelling a 
                                                                                                                                                              
is markedly similar. Voet 2.4.13 refers to the original Roman method of compelling the defendant’s appearance and 
notes that this was replaced by a practice of asking for and obtaining security or bail for appearance. It may be that 
the old Roman practice resurfaced in a different form at a later stage and was adapted to meet the needs of the time. 
Van Leeuwen 5.7.2 says that: ‘This practice was formerly unknown, but it has been introduced among us everywhere 
by statue and custom, according to the rule already mentioned that arrest founds jurisdiction.’  
5 Peckius, De jure sistendi 2.6. Merula Manier van Procederen 4.2.25 refers to it in the following terms: ‘Ook op 
arresten  ... daar door de persoon word bekommert, over zulks Kommer-recht, of syne Goederen, toegeslagen, door 
dien Toeslag genaamt, ten einde hy door verdriet van t’Arrest eindelyk gedrongen zy te Comparen voor den Juge.’  
The third category of persons identified by him as subject to arrest includes a ‘vreemdeling’.  Bort, De Arresten 1,12. 
Wessels, op. cit. 678-679 cites this passage from Merula and translates the passage from Bort as: ‘Arrests have been 
introduced by us in order that the arrested person, affected by the worry of his arrest, may appear before the local 
judge and pay the debt or give security that he will appear before the court and pay the amount of the judgment, so 
that lawsuits may be cut short and the costs or expenses avoided which are necessarily incurred when a foreign 
debtor domiciled in another country has to be sued there.’ 
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submission to the jurisdiction and providing security for satisfaction of the judgment. Where the 
peregrinus sought to sue an incola he would be compelled to furnish security for the latter’s costs 
in defending the suit. Thus peregrini were placed at a disadvantage in relation to an incola on 
whichever side of the lawsuit they found themselves. 
 
 Whilst no doubt Wessels is correct in suggesting that a measure of antipathy towards 
foreigners, perhaps amounting to xenophobia, may have underlain these measures
6
, the more 
pragmatic commercial reason suggested by writers such as Peckius7 and Bort8, namely that it was 
to assist local citizens, particularly merchants, in securing payment of their claims without having 
to go to the trouble, inconvenience and expense of pursuing foreign debtors in the courts of their 
domicile, seems likely to have been the principal driving force underlying the development of the 
law in this direction. The ability of the incola to sue in his domestic court under procedures, laws 
and judges with which the incola would be familiar, when coupled with the savings in time, 
trouble and money attendant upon not having to travel to the forum of the other party, provide 
such an obvious and overwhelming advantage to the incola that it is not surprising that later 
writers such at Voet 9, Sande10 and Van Leeuwen11 all confirm the view that the foundation of the 
                                                 
6 Wessels, op cit, 679. 
7 Peckius, De jure sistendi  2.6 
8 Bort, De Arresten 1,12 et seq. 
9
 Voet 2.4.22 (Gane’s translation, Vol 1, 287) where it is said: ‘The object is to give creditors greater ease in suing 
their debtors living under another judge, and to enable them to litigate in the place of their own domicile with less 
expense and annoyance. If they lacked this remedy they would be bound as plaintiffs to seek the forum of a foreign 
defendant, and to be away from the place of their own domicile at the cost of their private estates and at heavier 
expense.’ He adds: ‘It appears to have been brought in firstly to favour and to meet the needs of commercial 
transactions in order that everyone might so contract more freely and generously with foreign merchants - a thing 
which would be more difficult for him if lacking this power of arrest he were bound to force them to payment in their 
own proper forum.’  This explanation was accepted by the Full Court in Springle v Merchants Association of 
Swaziland 1904 TS 163 and by Steyn J in Bradbury Gretorex Co (Colonial) Ltd v Standard Trading (Pty) Ltd 1953 
(3) SA 529 (W) 532.  
10 Sande, Decisiones Frisicae 1.17.3 
 
 16
rule was commercial convenience.  
 
 This practice of the courts of Holland appears not to have been universal. Thus Huber12, 
whilst accepting the rule as applicable in Holland ‘for the convenience and advantage of the 
creditor, to the end that he should not be obliged to pursue the debtor to a distance’
13
 makes it 
clear that it was not the general practice to permit such an arrest in Friesland in the absence of 
some other ratione jurisdictionis such as the fact that the contract had been concluded or the 
delict committed within the area of jurisdiction of the Frisian courts. Wessels14 understands 
Groenewegen
15





‘Every writer points out how peculiar and unusual this practice of the Dutch courts was, 
and how it was based on the theory that by worrying the foreigner by arrest you indirectly 
compel him to allow the local judge to try the dispute between the incola and himself.  
Why should the incola go to another country if the foreigner owned him a debt ex 
contractu alibi facto, when the whole doctrine of arrest is based on the ground that the 
incola must be protected against the foreigner?  It was to save the incola the expense of a 
costly law suit in a foreign country that the Court allowed him to obtain judgment and to 
levy execution in his own province.’ 
 
 As with many questions of Roman-Dutch law and practice, in the early days of South 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 Van Leeuwen, Het Roomsch Hollands Regt (Kotze’s translation) 5.7.2 which reads: ‘An arrest may also take place 
solely for the purpose of expediting the pleadings, so that finding my debtor in the place where I live I can sue him 
with greater convenience and less expense than proceeding against him before the judge of his own domicile.’   
12 Huber, Hedensdaegse Rechtsgeleerdheid (Gane’s translation) 4.31.6  
13 Huber, op cit, 4.31.3 cited in Maritime & Industrial Services Ltd v Marcierta Compania Naviera S A 1969 (3) SA 
28 (D) 32D-E. 
14 Wessels,op cit, 687. 
15 Groenewegen, De legibus abrogatis ad code 3.18.4. It is not clear that Wessels is correct in that approach as the 
relevant passage refers not only to the French practice but also to the practice in the Low Countries. It must be borne 
in mind that Groenewegen, who lived in Delft, was providing a commentary on the Corpus Iuris Civilis insofar as 
that was no longer applicable. In this passage, having referred to the general rule, he goes on to say: ‘And I have no 
doubt at all that this custom of ours has been the cause of the present day practice of arresting debtors and they are 
very common among us.’  See also Voet 2.5.22. 
16 Wessels, op cit, 687.  
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African jurisprudence differences arose between various courts as to the proper interpretation of 
the Roman-Dutch authorities. In the Cape the Supreme Court, in reliance on Voet and 
Groenewegen, took the view that arrest of the person or property of a peregrinus at in the 
instance of an incola was not a sufficient ground for the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
peregrinus in the absence of some other ratione jurisdictionis.
17
  The Transvaal court, however, 
held a different view.18 The views of the Natal court are unclear reflecting rather more the poor 
quality of that Bench in those days and its unfamiliarity (with the notable exception of Connor 
CJ) with the Roman-Dutch authorities19 than any profound insight. In its leading judgment on the 
topic
20
 the principal judgment by Bale CJ expressed the view that the process of arrest served two 
purposes of which the first was: 
 
‘... for the establishing, founding, confirming or strengthening of jurisdiction - I do not 
think that we are concerned in this case as to which is the right phrase, the question is to 
some extent an academic one.’21  
 
The question was by no means academic as a reference to the Cape and Transvaal cases show
22
 
but the Natal court dismissed the difference and arrived at the same result as the Transvaal in 
reliance inter alia on the Cape decisions. 
 
                                                 
17
 Einwald v The German West African Company (1887) 5 SC 86; Ex parte Kahn (1907) 24 SC 558; CP Van Zyl, 
The Judicial Practice of South Africa, 3 Ed. (1921), Vol. 1, 223. 
18 Cloete v Benjamin 1 SAR 180; Lecomte v W & B Syndicate of Madagascar 1905 TS 696. 
19 P Spiller, A History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal 1848-1910 quotes Bale CJ as saying about himself 
that he ‘lacked the great and inestimable advantage of a university education’ (p 39). On the same page Spiller 
comments that: ‘The limitations in Bale CJ’s background showed in his subsequent judicial career.’ The other two 
judges in that case were amongst those of whom Spiller writes (at 51) that they left the Supreme Court in a rather 
forlorn condition and lacked sufficient legal expertise ‘especially in the prevailing Roman-Dutch law’.  
20
 Dickinson & Fisher v Arndt & Cohn (1908) 29 NLR 206 
21 At 208. 
22 As indeed did a reference to the article by Wessels J in (1907) 24 SALJ 390 which was cited in the judgment and 
which is largely reproduced as Chapter 25 of Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch Law. 
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 This inter-provincial disagreement23 was resolved when the Cape court recanted and 
reversed its previous position.
24
 In the result in the first major work on the law of jurisdiction in 
South Africa Pollak was able to write: 
 
‘That an incola of the area to which the court belongs can secure the attachment of the 
property of a peregrinus to found jurisdiction even though the cause of action arose 
outside such area is well established.’25 
 
 Facilitating claims by South African claimants against foreigners was therefore something 
well established in our law before 1983. Provided the person of the foreigner or more probably its 
property within the court’s area of jurisdiction26 had been attached a South African court would 
exercise jurisdiction. Whilst arrest of the person remained feasible
27
 in most cases the type of 
debtor embroiled in this kind of dispute would be a foreign corporate entity and the attachment 
would be directed to its property. 
 
 Alongside this jurisdiction for the benefit of incolae there had also been developments that 
assisted peregrini to some degree. A peregrinus had always been entitled to sue an incola in the 
courts of the latter’s domicile. That was the necessary implication of the principle actor sequitur 
forum rei. Obstacles were placed in the path of the foreigner by the requirement that he furnish 
                                                 
23 HDJ Bodenstein, ‘Arrest to found Jurisdiction’ (1917) 34 SALJ 193 and 457 not only espoused the Transvaal 
position but went further and concluded that even a peregrinus could found jurisdiction by way of an arrest 
irrespective of whether any other ratione jurisdictionis was present.  However, Van Zyl op. cit, (1921) Vol. 1 222-
224 equally strongly espoused the prevailing Cape view. 
24 Halse v Warwick 1931 CPD 233.  By changing its view in this way the Cape court avoided the need for the issue 
to be resolved by the Appellate Division as had been the case in the even more famous disagreement between the 
two divisions over the doctrine of consideration resolved in Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 by a Bench 
consisting largely of Transvaal members. 
25 W  Pollak, Jurisdiction (1st ed.) 58. 
26
 Hare v Banimar Shipping Co. SA 1978 (4) SA 578 (C) approved in Estate Agents’ Board v Lek 1979 (3) SA 1048 
(A) 1062H-1063A.   
27 The arrest of persons has been outlawed as unconstitutional in Bid Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Strang and 
another (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, third party) 2008 (3) SA 355 (SCA). It now suffices to 
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security for the costs of the incola28 but access to the local court of the defendant was permitted.  
At some stage the peregrinus was afforded the further benefit available to the incola namely the 
right to arrest the person or the property of his debtor where that debtor was also a peregrinus and 
some other causa jurisdictionis existed for invoking the jurisdiction of the court such as that the 
contract had been concluded or the delict committed within the court’s area of jurisdiction. The 
origin of this practice is obscure29 but Kotzé JP stated the position as being that: 
 
‘... we must remember that strangers, as well as incolae could obtain an arrest in Holland; 
but there was this distinction between the two cases.  A stranger could only arrest another 
stranger, if there existed some ground justifying the granting of an arrest, as where, for 
instance, the claim or right of action was based on a contract made or to be performed 
within the jurisdiction of the place where the arrest was applied for; whereas an incola 
could arrest a stranger or peregrinus on any cause of action arising anywhere beyond the 
jurisdiction.’30    
 
 However, the distinction identified by Kotzé JP does not appear to have been drawn in that 
clear fashion by the Roman-Dutch writers. Professor Bodenstein in his well known article on the 
topic of arrests to found jurisdiction31 argued strongly that peregrini were in the same position as 
incolae insofar as arrests of person or property to found jurisdiction was concerned and that 
accordingly an arrest could take place at the instance of a peregrinus to found jurisdiction over 
another peregrinus even though no other ratione jurisdictionis existed. That view was not 
endorsed by the South African courts which held in a series of cases
32
 that the entitlement of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
obtain jurisdiction over a natural person that the summons was served whilst the defendant was in South Africa and 
there is an adequate connection between the suit and South Africa. 
28 Wessels, op cit, 677. 
29 For example whilst Voet deals extensively (2.4.30-2.4.58) with instances where arrest is impermissible he never 
specifically addresses the question of who is entitled to seek an arrest. The inference that this was permissible is 
drawn from a passage in Voet 2.4.45 that refers to two foreigners litigating where one has arrested the property of the 
other. 
30 Cape Explosives Works Ltd v South African Oil and Fat Industries Limited 1921 CPD 244 at 268. 
31 Bodenstein (1917) 34 SALJ 198, 457. 
32 The cases are collected in Pollak, op cit, 62 and Frank Wright (Pty) Limited v Corticas ‘B.C.M.’ Limited 1948 (4) 
SA 456 (C) at 465. The Natal court took a different view but eventually fell into line with the judgment in Maritime 
& Industrial Services Limited v Marcierta Compania Naviera SA 1969 (3) SA 28 (D). Pollak, op cit, 62-63 had 
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peregrinus to an order for the attachment of the personal property of another peregrinus 
depended on the existence of some other ground of jurisdiction namely that the contract in 
respect of which the claim arose was entered into or fell to be performed within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court or that the cause of action arose there. 
 
 Whilst one can well understand that the practice of permitting the arrest of the personal 
property of a peregrinus in order to found jurisdiction in a suit against the peregrinus at the 
instance of an incola would serve the local commercial interests of incolae, as indeed was 
asserted by the Roman-Dutch writers to be the reason for the practice, it is less easy to see why it 
should have been extended
33
 to foreigners at all or why, once it had been extended, a limitation 
should have been imposed on foreigners that did not apply to incolae. The obscurity which veils 
the circumstances in which peregrini came to enjoy this privilege does not permit an opinion to 
be expressed. It may have been that foreign merchants insisted on receiving the same benefit of 
approaching the courts as local residents, at least where the cause of action arose or the contract 
was concluded or fell to be performed within the court’s area of jurisdiction. It may be that it was 
thought unfair to exclude them in those circumstances whilst drawing the line at instances where 
neither litigants nor subject matter had any connection with the court.
34
 It may simply have been 
due to inadvertence. But all this is mere speculation. What it illustrates is that in relation at least 
                                                                                                                                                              
correctly written in 1937 that the Natal position was untenable in the light of the judgment in The Owners Master 
and Crew of the SS Humber v The Owners and Masters of the SS Answald 1912 AD 546. 
33 The word ‘extended’ may be misleading. It may be that peregrini were entitled to invoke this benefit alongside 
incolae at all times but the position is unclear. If Professor Bodenstein is correct then the South African courts have 
restricted the rights of peregrini. 
34 Pollak, op cit, 52-3 advances this suggestion when he says: ‘The distinction although it purports to be based upon 
the Roman-Dutch law, was apparently unknown to the Roman-Dutch law, but it can be justified on the grounds of 
fairness to litigants and on the further ground that the time of South African courts should not be taken up with 
disputes which are unconnected with South Africa when such disputes occur between people who themselves have 
no connection with South Africa.’ In Maritime and Industrial Services Ltd v Marcierta Compania Naviera SA, 
supra, 34H Van Heerden J expressed the view that : ‘There seems to be no good reason why by mere attachment 
peregrini defendants should be put to the inconvenience and expense of defending actions in South African Courts at 
the instance of peregrini plaintiffs and why in the process the time of South African Courts (which may have to 
apply foreign law in deciding such disputes) and State funds should be taken up with disputes which are unconnected 
with South Africa and between persons who have no connection with South Africa.’ The same underlying 
philosophy appears to have motivated the comments of Didcott J in Katagum Wholesale Commodities Companies 
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to practical matters such as the extent of a court’s jurisdiction the law does not necessarily 
develop along consistent lines nor does it necessarily flow from any central defining principle.
35
 
If Professor Bodenstein is right in his view that there never was a distinction between incolae and 
peregrini in regard to arrests to found jurisdiction then the search for a principle becomes 
fruitless because the law as laid down by South African courts proceeds on the basis of a 
misunderstanding of the Roman-Dutch law. If Professor Bodenstein is wrong then a right given 
to incolae, largely for reasons of commercial advantage, was afforded or extended to peregrini to 
some degree but not to the full extent and we have no means available to discern why this was so.  
At best it can be said that the law reflects some compromise between conflicting interests and 




 To sum up then the position at the 1
st
 November 1983 was that South African courts, sitting 
as such and not as Colonial Courts of Admiralty, could exercise jurisdiction in maritime matters 
in two broad classes of cases. Where the claimant was an incola of the court and the defendant a 
peregrinus of South Africa, jurisdiction could be established by attaching ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem the property of the defendant found within the area of jurisdiction 
of the court irrespective of whether the dispute between the parties had any other connection with 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ltd  v The mv ‘Paz’ 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) 263H and was echoed by Harms JA in MV Snow Delta: Serva Ship Ltd v 
Discount Tonnage Ltd 2000 (4) SA 746 (SCA) 755E-G. 
35 Pollak (1st ed.), op cit, 15-20 contended that the principle of effectiveness underlies the exercise of jurisdiction by 
our courts and this view has largely been accepted. Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Limited v Nelspruit Bakeries 
(Pty) Limited, supra, 307A-B; D Pistorius, Pollak on Jurisdiction (2nd Ed.) 4. However as Pollak himself pointed out 
in the original edition of his work and Potgieter JA in Thermo Radiant Oven Sales Limited accepted (at 309D-F) it 
has long been the practice in our courts to authorise attachments of property of trifling value to found jurisdiction 
even though the claim far exceeds the value of the item. It is clear that this undercuts the principle of effectiveness in 
the case where jurisdiction is established at the instance of an incola without any guarantee that the resulting 
judgment will be effective. If effectiveness were the only applicable principle there would be no good reason for the 
law denying a peregrinus the right to arrest valuable property such as a ship in order to found jurisdiction in 
circumstances where the fact of the arrest would give rise to every prospect that a judgment would be effective. If 
like counsel in Smit v Cramer 1913 OPD 123 127 this means that I have mixed up in my own mind jurisdiction and 
the exercise of jurisdiction that is a reproach to be borne with fortitude. 
36 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, 1 (Dover edition) claims that the origins of law can be found in: ‘The 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men …’ One would add, particularly in 
relation to statutory accretions, that inadvertence and lack of foresight of the full consequences of a particular 
measure may bring about surprising results when the law is applied to situations not contemplated by its authors. 
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that court. Where both parties were incolae of South Africa but the defendant was a peregrinus of 
the court or both were peregrini of South Africa, jurisdiction would only be exercised if the cause 
of action arose or the contract was concluded or fell to be performed within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court and, in the case of a  peregrinus defendant, provided property of the 




 Not surprisingly there were cases, largely of a maritime nature, where peregrini sought to 
exploit the favourable position of the incola by ceding their claims to an incola38 but the 
Appellate Division sounded the death knell of that practice in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S and others v 
Hartless (Pty) Limited
39
 where it held that the cession in question was a disguised transaction 
falling foul of the principle in Zandberg v Van Zyl.40 The court held that because the deed of 
cession required the cessionary to account to the cedent for any proceeds accruing from the 
successful pursuit of the claim the true characterisation of the relationship was that the ‘cedent’ 
constituted the ‘cessionary’ as its mandatary to recover the claim.
41
 Whether that judgment is 
correct
42
 in its analysis of the cession in question is now academic insofar as maritime matters are 
concerned, but it undoubtedly lent further urgency to the process nearing completion at that time 
                                                 
37 Whilst the person of the defendant could be arrested this was and is sufficiently rare in practice that it can for the 
purposes of this work be safely ignored. Whilst the old authorities refer to the arrest of property  for many years now 
the prevailing terminology has been to speak of an arrest of the person and an attachment of property. 
38 These were usually special purpose companies established by local attorneys for the purpose of receiving the 
claim, pursuing it by litigation and accounting for the proceeds. 
39 1982 (2) SA 710 (A). Prior to that the practice had been upheld in cases such as Bird v Lawclaims (Pty) Limited 
1976 (4) SA 726 (D) and Hare v Banimar Shipping Co. SA, supra. 
40 1910 AD 302 309. See also Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Bros. & Hudson Limited 1941 AD 
369 395. 
41 At 736A-C. 
42  In Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Limited v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 866 (A) 876A-H Nienaber JA distinguished the 
judgment in Skjelbreds, supra, and held that it had to be confined to its own particular facts.  He was considering a 
cession designed to render a person liable as surety for a debt for which they would otherwise have had no liability at 
all. The cession served a secondary purpose for the ultimate benefit of the cedent because no consideration was given 
for it and the cessionary was under a duty to account to the cedent for any proceeds recovered. It is hard to see why 
that should stand on any different footing from a cession designed to circumvent a jurisdictional impediment. 
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to reform the jurisdiction of the courts in maritime cases. 
 
 The implications of this for maritime cases in the parochial courts was that they exercised a 
jurisdiction that was in some respects wider and in others (as we shall see) narrower than their 
jurisdiction when sitting as admiralty courts. In maritime matters the property arrested was not 
confined to the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen but could extend to any property 
owned by the owner of that vessel. Thus a sister ship could be arrested without resort to the 
provisions of the Arrest Convention as could the freight due to a shipowner or the bunkers aboard 
a chartered vessel. In that sense the scope of potential jurisdiction was wider than in admiralty 
cases. However the restriction imposed by the fact that the claimant had either to be an incola, or 
in the case of a peregrinus that the claim had to have a jurisdictional connection with South 
Africa, severely limited the scope of the court’s jurisdiction and made it narrower than in 
admiralty. Against that background we turn to trace a similar historical route for the action in 
rem. 
 
2. English Admiralty law and the action in rem 
 
 Readers may well think that the origin of the attachment to found jurisdiction in Roman 
Dutch law is obscure and the reasons for the development of at least some aspects of this 
procedure unclear. They may also think that its reception into South African law is confusing, 
illogical and lacking any central organising principle. If so they are unlikely to find any solace in 
an investigation of the origins of the action in rem which superficially at least appears to be its 
counterpart in admiralty proceedings. Much ink and industry has been spent on matters relating 
to this investigation
43
. However, whilst the results of this research are fascinating to anyone 
                                                 
43 Fascination with the subject is endless. Most modern text books find it necessary - as has the present writer - to 
sketch at least some of the background to the development of admiralty law and jurisdiction particularly in England.   
See in this regard Benedict on Admiralty, 7th Ed (Revised) Vol. 1, Chapters 1-3; Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, 
Chap 701; G Gilmore and C L Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2nd Ed., (1957) pages 1-11 and 586-594; Shaw, op cit, 
25-31; 51-56; D R Thomas, Maritime Liens (1980), 1 - 9; T J Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (1987) 1-
18; W Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims, 2nd Ed (1997), 1-56; D C Jackson, The Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 
2nd Ed(1996), 10 -15; J Hare, op cit, (2009) 4-16; Halsbury’s Laws of England (Mackay Ed) (4th Ed. 2001 Re-Issue) 
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interested in maritime law few certainties emerge in regard to the key questions of when, where 
and how the action in rem developed and what the underlying rationale was for that development. 
The investigator may readily be tempted to abandon the search and claim that like Topsy the 
action in rem just growed
44
. Tempting though that approach may be - and remarkably accurate in 
the result - it is helpful to essay a brief historical survey by way of background to the changes 
wrought by the Act. This enquiry must precede any consideration of the introduction of English 
admiralty law into South Africa. 
 
 The difficulties facing the modern researcher seeking the roots of the action in rem and the 
reasons for its existence lie partly in the fact that one is seeking to penetrate the numerous veils 
that the passage of time draws across past events and partly in the fact that a large portion of the 
available material is concerned more with the origins and jurisdiction of admiralty courts and the 
law applied therein, particularly the source of the concept of the maritime lien, than with the 
nature and source of the proceedings in which that jurisdiction was exercised and that law 
applied.
45
 In addition until the time of Lord Stowell at the end of the 18
th
 Century there were no 
                                                                                                                                                              
Vol. 1(1) paras 301-306; Kennedy & Rose, Law of Salvage, 6th Ed (2002).  One of the more comprehensive 
considerations of the topic is by T L Mears in an article entitled ‘The History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction’ printed in 
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol 2 (1908) 312. An interesting survey is contained in 
Bourguignon H J, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell. (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1-30.  The author finds it 
unnecessary to mention either the action in rem or the maritime lien perhaps indicating that the concern with both of 
these is a later development of the Admiralty law.  
44 ‘Do you know who made you?’  ‘Nobody as I knows on’, said the child, with a short laugh. ... ‘I ’spect I growed.  
Don’t think nobody never made me.’  Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, chap. 20.  Wiswall, op cit, 166 in 
his chapter on ‘The evolution of the action in rem’ confesses an incapacity to express any firm view on the question. 
45 One of the most accessible sources of the general material on the development of maritime law, which includes the 
text (in English) of most of the more notable ancient maritime laws, is Benedict, op cit.   F L Wiswall, The 
Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800, is a helpful survey of the most significant period of 
development of English admiralty law. His central premise is not, however, one that I share . Tetley Maritime Liens 
and Claims (1997) likewise has a reasonably full survey of the history. Earlier books that may be less accessible are 
Williams and Bruce Admiralty Practice, 3rd Ed. (1902); E C Mayers, Admiralty Law and Practice in Canada (1916); 
G Price, Law of Maritime Liens (1940), E Roscoe, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice, 5th Ed. (1931); W 
Holdsworth, History of English Law, vols.1, 5, 8, 12, 15 and 16 (7th Ed, 1956, Reprinted 1971). Sir Walter 
Phillimore’s articles on The High Court of Admiralty and Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Vol 1 (1957) 171-174 (reprinted from the famous 1911 edition) are interesting as his father Sir Robert Phillimore had 
been the last Admiralty Judge. Roscoe incorporates Williams and Bruce, but departs from it in significant respects.  
Particularly helpful articles are those by PM Hebert, ‘The origin and nature of maritime liens’ (1929-30) 4 Tulane 
Law Review 381 and E Ryan ‘Admiralty jurisdiction and the maritime lien: An Historical Perspective’ (1968) 
Western Ontario Law Review 173. No consideration of the topic is complete without reference to A Browne, A 
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law reports of the decisions of the Court of Admiralty. However obscure and fragmentary this 
material is it is nonetheless possible to distil certain things from it that may be of assistance. In 
order to place it in appropriate perspective it is convenient to start at the very beginning of the 
development of maritime law. 
 
(a) The roots of maritime law 
 
 Ships and maritime commerce are part of the earliest history of humankind.46 With 
commerce came disputes and the need for these to be resolved by courts.   It is no surprise then to 
find reference to maritime matters in ancient codes of law such as those of Hammurabi
47
 and the 
Digest of Justinian.48 These were followed in the 7th or 8th Century CE by the Byzantine 
compilation known (inaccurately) as the Rhodian Sea-law and in the 9
th
 Century CE by that 
portion of the Basilica - the codification of Byzantine law undertaken at the instance of Emperor 
Basil 1 - that deals with maritime law. At a later stage with the development of maritime trade 
across southern Europe and the Mediterranean and along the western coastline of Europe a 
number of collections of maritime laws evolved and were assembled in the form of codes. The 
best known of those that survive are the Rôles (or Laws) of Oléron
49
, the Tablets of Amalfi;
50
 Il 
                                                                                                                                                              
Compendious View of the Civil Law and the Law of Admiralty, Vol 2 (1802). Of recent publications the introduction 
to Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction (Eds M J Prichard and DEC Yale)(Selden Society), Vol 108 (1992) 
makes a substantial advance in our understanding of the origins of the action in rem. 
46 Benedict, op cit, ss 2 and 3, pp 1-3 to 1-13; Gilmore and Black, op cit, s 1-2, pp 3-5; Schoenbaum, op cit. s 51-2. 
pp 2-3. 
47 Benedict, op cit, s 2, p 1-3 fn 1. 
48 D 14.1.1 to 7 and 14.2.1 to 14.2.10 (Mommsen, Krueger and Watson translation, Vol 1 , 415 -422).  
49 These exist in various forms in the 30 known manuscripts. The Black Book of the Admiralty (Ed. Twiss) contains 
The Laws of Oleron in Vol. 1, 88-131 and Vol 2,210-241 and has other documents from Oleron in Vols. 2, 244-397 
(the Customary of Oleron) and 3.  Tetley Maritime Liens and Claims 13-18 summarises the most recent scholarship 
by Mr James Shepherd in this regard.  In the introduction to Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction, xxxv, fn 
7, the editors comment favourably on the quality of this research. Notwithstanding this research and scholarship the 
old myth that these were brought to England by Eleanor, Duchess of Aquitane, as part of her dowry on her marriage 
to Henry II, is remarkably resilient. Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29,§ 701.01[1], fn 5.  
50  4 Black Book of the Admiralty 3. These date from the 11th Century. 
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Consolato del Mare;51 the Laws of Wisby52 and those of the Hansa Towns.53 
 
 Whilst this history is well established two things of relevance to the present study seem to 
be clear from a consideration of these ancient laws. The first is that although they developed and 
were published in different places they reflected in broad and general terms a lex maritima or 
customary law relating to maritime matters that generally transcended national divisions and was 
concerned to be of general application irrespective of where it was being applied. This common 
approach is reflected in the widespread use in the maritime courts that developed initially in the 
Italian city states in the Eleventh Century and subsequently in Barcelona and Valencia; 
Marseilles and French ports on the Atlantic coastline; England; the Hanseatic towns and 
elsewhere, of compilations of maritime laws and decisions such as the Rôles of Oleron and the II 
Consolato del Mare. These courts were usually separate from the ordinary courts and often 
staffed by persons chosen by the merchants themselves to adjudicate their disputes.54  Leaving 
legal theory aside, commercial reality and the requirements of trade would have dictated in those 
circumstances that the courts in different ports give similar answers to similar questions. 
Merchants and seafarers trading between England and France or Italy and the Levant would have 
required reasonable consistency in the resolution of the ordinary disputes that arise in the course 
of maritime trade. If a master were forced to jettison goods in the course of a storm it would have 
                                                 
51 3 Black Book of the Admiralty 37-657 under the heading Les Bones Costumes de la Mar.  According to Benedict, 
op cit, 1-27 these were first printed in 1494 but their origins are more ancient.  The Judicial Order of the Court of the 
Consuls is in 4 Black Book of the Admiralty 451. 
52 4 Black Book of the Admiralty 265. 
53 The Hanseatic league was a loosely-organised network of trading cities and was established in 1358.  It took its 
name from merchant guilds or Hansa and eventually became a loose network of anything between 70 and 170 cities. 
It was finally dissolved in 1862 but it had ceased to be a significant body by around 1600. It included cities such as 
Lübeck (where it started), Hamburg, Bremen, Brunswick, Cologne, Gdansk, Riga and Tallinn, of which the first 
three still call themselves ‘free and Hanseatic ports’. Benedict, op cit, s 11, p 1-28; Gilmore and Black, op cit, s 6, fn 
21.  
54 D M Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, (1980) 807 sv ‘Maritime Law’ writes that: ‘In the trading centres of 
southern Europe, distinct magistrates and courts administering maritime law arose, and this mode of administering 
the law was followed in northern Europe. But in England and France, maritime jurisdiction was vested in an 
Admiralty court.’  See The Judicial Order of the Courts of the Consuls of the Sea, 4 Black Book of the Admiralty 450 
where the process of selecting the consuls and the appeal judge in Valencia is set out in chapters 1 to 3. 
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been most unsatisfactory for the outcome of the resultant disputes to depend on whether this 
occurred on the outward bound or homeward journey. Consistency of approach is likely to have 





 The flavour of this sense (or spirit) of uniformity in maritime law is well captured by 
comparing the response in Digest 14.2.9 to the petition of Eudaemon of Nicomedia by the 
Emperor Antoninus namely: 
 
‘I am master of the world but the law of the sea must it be judged by the sea law of the 
Rhodians, where our own law does not conflict with it.’56 
 
with Lord Mansfield’s remark that: 
 




                                                 
55 Malynes, Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria, chapter 1, makes it clear that he, writing as a merchant, regards the law 
of merchants to be universal in its operation and the procedures of the courts and tribunals in different states to be in 
substance the same. Thus he writes of: ‘The Law of Merchants, hitherto observed in all countries.’ There is an 
autobiographical note in Holdsworth, infra, Vol V, 131-134.  According to CS Cumming ‘The English High Court of 
Admiralty’ (1992) 17 Tulane Maritime L J 209 Malynes copied both his ideas and some of the text of his work from 
a book published in 1590 by Professor Welwood, the professor of civil law at the University of St Andrews, entitled 
The Sea Law of Scotland. It is unclear whether this is an accurate title. W Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol 
V, 11 says that Malynes ‘borrowed largely but without acknowledgement’ from Welwood’s Collection of Sea Laws, 
which is included in the 1686 edition of Malynes work. Bourguignon in his biography of Lord Stowell cited supra at 
59, footnote 1,describes Welwood’s work as ‘a somewhat useful book for seamen, masters and merchants but not for 
a judge of the admiralty court’. At 21 he cites a passage from a seventeenth century writer making the point that 
international maritime commerce required a reasonably uniform treatment of common disputes in different 
jurisdictions in accordance with the civil law as used in countries other than England.   
56 The translation is that of Mommsen, Krueger and Watson. Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims,8 uses a different 
and more dramatic translation : ‘ I am indeed lord of the world, but the law is the lord of the sea. Let it be judged by 
the maritime law of the Rhodians, provided that no law of the sea is opposed to it.’  
57
 Luke v Lyde (1759) 2 Burr 882 897: 97 ER 614,617. Lord Stowell endorsed this in The Neptune (1834) 3 Hag,. 
129, 135; 166 ER 354. This trend towards uniformity is noted by HR Hahlo and E Kahn The South African Legal 
System and its Background 465-6. 
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Whilst separated by over a millennium both statements convey an understanding of maritime law 
and a sense of its universality that has always infused this area of the law. It persists in the aims 
of the Comité Maritime International (founded in 1897) the stated goal of which: 
 
‘... is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the unification of maritime 
law in all its respects.’58 
 
This ambitious view of the nature of maritime law has had much success and was probably 
universally shared until the latter part of the19th Century when it foundered (at least in England 
and countries that share its jurisprudential heritage) on the rock of the nation state and the sense 
of legal parochialism that it engendered, commencing with Brett MR’s statement that maritime 
law in England is: 
 
‘... not the ordinary municipal law of the country, but it is the law which the English 
Court of Admiralty either by Act of Parliament or by reiterated decisions and traditions 
and principles has adopted as the English maritime law.’59 
 
More recently Lord Diplock said: 
 
‘Outside the special field of ‘prize’ in times of hostilities there is no ‘maritime law of the 
world’ as distinct from the internal municipal laws of its constituent sovereign states, that 
is capable of giving rise to rights or liabilities in English courts.’60 
                                                 
58 The goal is stated on the CMI website at http://www.comitemaritime.org. which deals with its history, structure 
and organisation. 
59 The Gaetano and Maria (1882) 7 PD 137, 143, 4 Asp MLC 535, 538.  See also The Gas Float Whitton (No. 2) 
[1896] P 42 (CA) 47, 48; 8 Asp MLC 110 (CA) 110-1. In the United States, whilst the jurisdiction conferred upon 
the federal courts under the Constitution to hear all ‘cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction’ has always been 
widely interpreted, rejecting both the statutes passed in England to restrict the admiralty jurisdiction and the writs of 
prohibition, the Supreme Court has asserted that the maritime law is nonetheless only operative to the extent to 
which it is part of the law of the United States as derived from ‘our own legal history, Constitution, legislation, 
usages, and adjudications as well. The decisions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to 
the laws and Constitution are especially to be considered; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by 
which they have been governed.’ The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)  558 577; 22 L Ed 654 (1875). 
60
 The Tojo Maru [1972] AC 242, 290; [1971] 1 All ER 1110 (HL) 1133a-d. Professor Tetley remains a proponent of 
the view that there is a complete legal system of general maritime law separate from any national system. W Tetley, 
Maritime Law as a Mixed Legal System’ (1999) 23 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 317.    
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Nevertheless the aspiration to international uniformity is never far from the surface as illustrated 
by the judgment of Scott LJ in The Tolten
61
 with its references to: 
 
‘... the general law of the sea amongst Western nations, out of which our maritime law 
largely grew ...’ 
 
and his decision to follow ‘in the wake of Lord Stowell and Dr Lushington’ by resorting to ‘the 
general law of the sea’ in order to resolve doubt and ‘preserve international uniformity in 
maritime law’. 
 
 The second important feature of the old maritime codes is that they developed alongside the 
revival of the study of the Roman law that commenced at the University of Bologna from the 




 and led to the spread of the Civil Law throughout Europe that 
occurred thereafter. The result was undoubtedly that the law in regard to maritime matters was 
heavily influenced by the principles of the civil law and incorporated and adapted the principles 
and practices of civilian systems into the general body of maritime law. As Gilmore and Black 
put it: 
 
‘As maritime commerce grew in importance, its law attracted the attention of those 
Continental legal scholars and commentators who were re-working and adapting to their 
times the Roman or ‘civil’ law. Treatises and commentaries appearing during and after 
the Renaissance acquired status as classic systemisations of the subject.  Maritime law 
thus grew up and came of age under the tutelage of the civil law, and it still bears the 
imprint thus acquired even when administered in the courts of common law countries.’63 
                                                 
61
 The Tolten [1946] 2 All ER 372 (CA) 
62 Wessels, op cit, chap. XVI, 112-129; Hahlo and Kahn, op cit,  489-523. 
63 Gilmore and Black op cit, 8. Benedict op cit, s 15, 1-32 makes a similar point in the following terms: ‘The 
admiralty law is indebted for many of its characteristics to the circumstances of the countries in which it was first 
administered. The countries that earliest reduced the law of the sea to a system, and adopted codes of maritime 
regulations, having been countries in which the Roman or civil law prevailed, the principles of that great system of 
jurisprudence were incorporated with, and gave character to, the maritime law; and so much were pure reason, 
abstract right, and practical justice mingled in that system, and so important was it that the general maritime law 
should be uniform and universal that, in England, where the common law was the law of the land, the civil law was 
held to be the law of the admiralty, and the course of proceedings in admiralty closely resembled the civil law and 
practice.’ 
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 In the light of this cross-pollination between the revivified Roman law, local custom and 
the demands of maritime commerce it would be improbable to find that those devices, such as the 
ability to arrest the person or goods of a debtor, which proved so useful to merchants in pursuing 
their debtors before local rather than foreign courts, were overlooked or rejected. Indeed one 
imagines that the case of a disputed debt arising in the course of trade between a local merchant 
in one of the ports of Europe and a foreign trader whose vessel had put into port to engage in 
trade with local merchants would provide the quintessential occasion for the invocation of the 
local jurisdiction by way of arrest of the person or goods of the foreigner. Where the latter was 
also the master and owner of the vessel on which he travelled the arrest of the vessel itself could 
be expected. This expectation is reflected in the fact that in maritime courts on the Continent the 
arrest of vessels was a feature of proceedings as it became also in England. 
 
 The English Channel provided no barrier to these developments in the field of maritime law 
in Europe. It is certain that the foundations of English admiralty law are civilian
64
 and the special 
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts is ancient and probably arose almost concurrently with that of 
the various similar courts of the Mediterranean and Western Europe. In 1802 Browne65 wrote 
that: 
 
‘The court of admiralty is twofold: the instance court, which takes cognizance of 
contracts made and injuries committed upon the high seas; and the prize court ... The 
instance court is governed by the civil law, the laws of Oléron and the custom of the 
admiralty, modified by statute law.’66 
 
In regard to procedure Browne wrote: 
 
‘As to practice, how can the practice of the admiralty court be intelligible without 
                                                 
64 Wiswall, op cit, chap. 3 and footnote 76. 
65 A Browne, op cit, a most influential work in the revival of the admiralty jurisdiction in England according to 
Wiswall, op cit. 7. Browne was Professor of Civil Law in the University of Dublin. Bourguignon, op cit, 60, fn 1, is 
less enthusiastic describing it as being of more use to Browne’s students than to Lord Stowell to whom it was 
dedicated. 
66 Browne, op cit,Vol 2, 29. 
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knowing the practice of the civil law?  The Court of Admiralty ... always proceeds 
according to the rules of civil law...’67 
 
 Ignoring the Roman law roots of maritime law in the context of the development of the 
action in rem leads to much confusion. A proper understanding of that development is 
fundamental to the characterisation of the action, a matter that has been thrown into contention in 
recent times as the House of Lords has explained the foundation of the action in terms that have 
raised controversy68. It is suggested that two matters traceable back to these early roots will be of 
importance to a South African court in considering the nature of an action in rem arising from the 
arrest of an associated ship. The first will be that as the action in rem has a well-established 
character that is know to maritime lawyers around the world it will be slow to attribute to it 
qualities not shared by its predecessors in the field. This gives effect to the concept of a common 
maritime law in seeking to give consistent meaning to a concept known and used in many other 
jurisdictions. Secondly the court will recognise that both the law and the procedure have their 
roots in the civil law on which South African law is built and in areas of difficulty it is likely to 
turn back to the roots of that system as they manifest themselves in modern South African law to 
seek a principled foundation for the resolution of issues that arise.  In doing so the courts are 
likely to have regard to the fact that the action based on an attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem and the action in rem can trace their roots back to a common 
source and it is probable therefore that if problems arise in characterising the novel action in rem 
flowing from the arrest of an associated ship the courts may favour solutions that harmonise the 
effect of the two rather than one that further separates them.    
 
                                                 
67 Browne, op cit,Vol 2, 507. D M Walker, op cit, 807, s v ‘Maritime Law’ says: ‘[The] procedure was based on the 
principles of the civil law and was more understandable by foreign merchants than was that of the common law 
courts.’ In his famous judgment in De Lovio v Boit 7 Fed Cas 418 (No 3376) (C C Mass 1815) Justice Story wrote: 
‘The forms of its proceedings were borrowed from the civil law and the rules by which it was governed, were, as is 
everywhere avowed, the ancient laws, customs and usages of the seas. In fact, there can scarcely be the slightest 
doubt, that the admiralty of England, and the maritime courts of all the other powers of Europe, were formed upon 
one and the same common model; and that their jurisdiction included the same subjects as the consular courts of the 
Mediterranean...’  
68 In the case of the Indian Grace reported as Indian Endurance, The (No. 2), Republic of Indian and another v India 
Steamship Company Limited [1997] 4 All ER 380 (HL); [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL). 
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(b) The evolution of the action in rem in the English admiralty court 
 
 Turning specifically to the action in rem all studies show that little is certain about the 
development of the action by the English admiralty court. In regard to the court itself it is said 
that: 
 
‘It is impossible accurately to trace the history of the Court, for the early records relating 
to its origin are doubtful and obscure. The jurisdiction of the Crown concerning maritime 
matters seems to have been established at a very remote period, but it is difficult to 
ascertain to whom the exercise of this power was first entrusted, or in what manner it was 
originally exercised … At what period a regular tribunal for the exercise of the duties thus 
cast upon the Admiral was first erected is a question much debated among antiquaries, 
but it is certain that in the reign of Edward III, the Court of the Admiral was firmly 
established, and in the succeeding reign it was sufficiently powerful to assert prominent 
jurisdiction.’69 
 
 The development of the admiralty law in England did not progress smoothly. From an early 
stage the admiralty court became mired in conflict with the common lawyers and the common 
law courts commencing in 1389 with a statute of Richard II entitled ‘An act concerning what 
things the Admiral and his deputy shall meddle’!70 From then on the history is one which shows 
the admiralty court under fairly consistent attack, with intervals of truce, from the common 
lawyers who interpreted the statutes setting the limits of the admiralty jurisdiction in a restrictive 
manner so as to limit that jurisdiction and issued writs of prohibition to prevent the admiralty 
court from exercising jurisdiction in virtually every situation where a matter could be dealt with 
                                                 
69 Williams & Bruce, op cit, 2-3. Edward III died in 1377 and the first volume of Marsden’s Select Pleas of the Court 
of Admiralty is for the years 1390-1404. Marsden says that the origins of the Court can be traced with reasonable 
certainty to the period  between 1340 and 1357. Marsden, Select Pleas of the Court of Admiralty, Selden Society, Vol 
6, (1892), xiv. See also Benedict, op cit, chap. II.  Roscoe, op cit, 1-2 takes a more positive view of matters and 
suggests that: ‘The early history of the tribunal which at last became a recognised national Court under the name of 
the High Court of Admiralty is now clear through recent researches and publications ...’ However this appears to be 
somewhat optimistic especially as the research appears to be solely that of Marsden. Marsden (Introduction I) and 
the editors of Hale and Fleetwood, op cit, xxix, fn 5 quote Stubbs as saying that ‘the history of the jurisdiction … is 
as yet obscure’. 
70 13 Rich 2 st1 c5.  The conflict may have arisen earlier.  Wiswall, op cit 1, cites an instance in 1296 of the court of 
common pleas denying the authority of the Admiral to adjudicate disputes involving seizure at sea. The case is also 
referred to in Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29, § 701.01[2][c]. This would however date the origins of the 
court to a period earlier than that suggested by Marsden. 
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by the common law courts. The triumph of the common law courts might have been complete 
and the Court of Admiralty could have disappeared had there not been technical procedural 
difficulties that precluded the common law courts from exercising jurisdiction in certain maritime 
matters. Williams and Bruce summarise the position as follows: 
 
‘Had the system of common law procedure been more elastic than it was, doubtless it 
would have been made to embrace the whole jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and one great 
anomaly in our law would thus have been removed. But the technical process of the 
Courts of common law limited their jurisdiction, and hampered their procedure; and it 
was impossible with any show of justice, to prohibit suitors from resorting to the 
Admiralty in cases where that Court alone could afford a satisfactory remedy. So that, as 
matters at last adjusted themselves, the admiralty judges, although compelled to abandon 
all claim to general maritime jurisdiction, were yet suffered to exercise undisputed 
authority in all maritime cases where the common law could not give redress.’71 
 
 The action in rem is the product of this troubled time for the English admiralty court. When 
it was first used in something approximating its present form and what its original nature was are 
unclear but an examination of the historical record suggests that there was a process of evolution 
during which the original forms of civil process became constricted and restrained until by the 
early part of the 19th Century only the action commenced by the arrest of the vessel and its 
equipment remained and came to be treated as a unique form of action. Before that time 
proceedings in admiralty were proceedings ‘civil and maritime’ capable of being commenced in 
various ways but slowly this was eroded and it appears that the resultant form of proceeding 
came to be described as an action in rem. 
 
 As a general proposition it is certain that arrests of person and goods, including vessels, 
were part of the armoury of the admiralty court from an early stage. Marsden
72
 says that: 
 
                                                 
71 Williams and Bruce, op cit, 7. This passage is repeated in Roscoe, op cit, 8-9.  See also Mears, op cit, 335. 
Wiswall, op cit, 1-7 says that the civilians of the Admiralty were ‘out-numbered and out-gunned’. Detailed 
descriptions of this conflict are also to be found in Benedict, op cit, chap. 3 and Ryan op cit, 172-193. The history of 
prohibition is discussed in Hale and Fleetwood, op cit, xlix - lviii. 
72
 Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty (Selden Society), (1892) pp lxxi-lxxii. 
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‘The ordinary mode of commencing the suit [in the 16th century] was by arrest, either of 
the person of the defendant or of his goods. Arrest of goods was quite as frequent as 
arrest of the ship; and it seems to have been immaterial what the goods were, so long as 
they were the goods of the defendant and were within the Admiral’s jurisdiction at the 
time of arrest.’ 
 
Whilst arrest may have been a characteristic feature of the admiralty practice it is unclear what its 
purpose was and it is also doubtful whether the proceedings were of the same character as would 
now be regarded as an action in rem. In fact Marsden’s description is remarkably similar to the 
arrest of the debtor or the debtor’s goods that evolved in Roman-Dutch law into the attachment 
ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem. The cases cited by Marsden in the first volume of 
his work all appear to be cases against individuals cited either specifically or generally.73 It is true 
that there are passages in some of the early documents that hint at the concept of an action in rem 
albeit not necessarily referred to as such. Thus in the articles of agreement signed in the Privy 
Council on the 18th February 1632 by the common law judges, the attorney-general and the judge 
of the admiralty, Article 3 provides that: 
 
‘If suit shall be in the Court of Admiralty for building, amending, saving or necessary 
victualling of a ship, against the ship itself, and not against any party by name, but such 
as for his interest makes himself a party, no prohibition is to be granted, though this be 
done within the realm.’74(Emphasis added) 
 
There is similar language in the Ordinance of 1648 passed during the time of the Protectorate of 
Oliver Cromwell, which ordained: 
 
‘That the Court of Admiralty shall have cognisance and jurisdiction against the ship or 
                                                 
73 See for example ‘The John of Alen’, op cit, 191-2 and Cocke v Camp, op cit, 233-4..  The key portion of the 
warrant of arrest in the former case reads: ‘Moreover that you cite or cause to be cited peremptorily at the said ship 
and her tackle and goods and freight aforesaid that are now within the jurisdiction of the said Court the abovenamed 
John Alen in particular and in general all and singular others whomsoever having or pretending to have any right or 
interest in the said ship and her apparel and in the goods merchandise and freight aforesaid that each of them do 
appear  … at the accustomed judgment house …’ The condemnation of the goods arrested appears to be little more 
than an authority to execute against them. See Hall v Carowe, op cit, 194-5. The similarity between this form of 
process and the attachments of person or property to establish jurisdiction permitted in certain jurisdictions in Europe 
is apparent.  
74 Benedict op. cit, s 44 pp 3-11 to 3-13; Williams and Bruce, op. cit, 10, n (k) deals with. the authenticity of this 
resolution. Roscoe, op cit, 11-13. 
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vessel with the tackle, apparel and furniture thereof, in all causes which concern the 
repairing, victualling and furnishing provisions for the setting of such ships or vessels to 
sea, and in all cases of bottomry …’75(Emphasis added) 
 
 However, whilst there are a number of reported cases in the common law courts dealing 
with prohibitions against the Court of Admiralty, unlike other courts in England there are no 
reports of Admiralty decisions earlier than the time of Lord Stowell at the end of the 18
th
 
Century76 and Marsden’s work is referred to by Lord Esher77 in the following less than flattering 
terms: 
 
‘I will now turn to the cases cited in Mr Marsden’s book. I have looked at the original 
books and have come to the conclusion that they cannot be relied on; they are only 
equivalent to the notes taken by clerks of assizes of cases tried at assizes; and are not in 
any way reliable minutes of the actual decisions in the cases.’ 
 
It is difficult to trace the development of a special process or form of proceeding in a court if one 
does not have access to records of the cases tried in that court and the judgments in those cases, 
which are always the surest guide to its practice. One is at best able to identify certain features of 
that practice from writers on the practice and then seek to draw reasonable inferences from those 
features. The process is necessarily speculative to some degree.  
 
 A factor that may explain the relative paucity of material on this topic is the fact that it was 
uncommon for vessels to remain under arrest. As Ryan points out: 
 
‘A ship is a profit earning machine and has no value when lying idle by compulsion of 
process. A defendant ship owner would naturally urge upon the court some means 
whereby the vessel could be put underway before the wheels of justice began their grind. 
In addition, neither the merchants nor their growing international trade could tolerate any 
system that delayed goods and ships, and with them profits, after some cause of action 
                                                 
75 Benedict op. cit, s 46 pp 3-15 to 3-16. 
76 H C Coote, The New Practice of the High Court of Admiralty, (1860), v, notes that Lord Stowell regarded the 
volume of work of the Court as so insignificant that he had reservations as to the desirability of publishing reports of 
its decisions. However it appears that he and other members of Doctors Commons kept detailed notes of cases and he 
regarded himself as bound by precedent. Bourguignon, op cit, 243- 252.  
 77 R v Judge of the City of London Court and Payne (1892) 1 QB 273 (CA); 7 Asp MLC 140 (CA) 144 
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had arisen. The necessity of freeing trade and navigation from burdensome litigational 
delay and allowing them to proceed despite legal disputes must have exerted considerable 
influence upon the developing admiralty procedure … Thus it became expedient to allow 
the stipulation or bail to be substituted for the security provided by the ship, which was 
then free to go on its way. As far as the time of this procedural advance is capable of 
being ascertained, it is probable that it became generally available to litigants by or before 
1400, as an alternative means of securing the appearance of the owners.’78 
 
 There can be little doubt that the process of allowing a stipulation or bail was a very early 
feature of proceedings in the Court of Admiralty. Thus when the admiralty lawyers lodged their 
complaints with King James I
79
 in the Articuli Admiralitatis their third objection was: 
 
‘Whereas, time out of mind, the Admiral Court hath used to take stipulations for 
appearance and performance of the acts and judgments of the same court it is now 
affirmed by the judges of the common law that the Admiral Court is no Court of Record, 
and therefore not able to take such stipulations: and hereupon prohibitions are granted to 
the utter overthrow of that jurisdiction.’ 
 
Although this complaint was rejected on the grounds that the stipulation or bail was nothing more 
than a recognizance, which could only be given to a court of record, it appears that the admiralty 
court continued to take stipulations. On the basis of the civil law it asserted that these were not 
recognizances but solemn civil law promises or undertakings, without consideration, but 
nonetheless binding and capable of being supported by sureties.
80
 That the process of taking a 
stipulation from or on behalf of those interested in the arrested ship became of fundamental 
importance is apparent from the argument of counsel in Delgrave v Hedges
81
 where in dealing 
                                                 
78 Ryan, op. cit, 188-189. Stipulations are discussed in Fleetwood and Hale. op cit. lix -lxvi. 
79 Benedict op. cit, s 43 p3-5 where the Articuli Admiralitatis is set out says that this was in 1611. Ryan, op. cit p189 
footnote 94 says, in reliance on Blackstone, that it was in 1606. There is reference to the practice of taking bail or a 
recognizance in the Letters Patent appointing Dr Godolphin as judge of the Admiralty in 1658. See 167 ER 600-2. 
80 Ryan, op cit, 184-185. The giving of security by way of a guarantee similar to bail in the admiralty was known to 
Roman Law. D 2.6 and 2.8. Browne, op cit, 410 -2 and Vol 1, 357 - 362 points out that the origin of the stipulation is 
the special form of contract by a form of words known to the Roman Law - the contract verbis. See R Zimmerman, 
The Law of Obligations, 68 et seq on the Roman Law stipulatio. There is however no indication that any special 
form of words had to be used in giving a stipulation in Admiralty. In England, in order to evade prohibition, the 
stipulation was not given under seal but Browne, op cit, 96-8 notes that in Ireland it was usually given under seal.  
81 Delgrave v Hedges, 2 Ld. Raym. 1285, 92 ER 343 (KB) (1707). The facts of this case illustrate some of the 
problems facing the researcher. The case was a claim for prohibition in which no judgment was given and an 
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with a prohibition he said: 
 
‘... this was a matter of utmost consequence to the Admiralty… if a prohibition should go, 
that court would signify nothing, because most of their proceedings are by taking such 
stipulations.’ 
 
 One can detect in these passages elements of what we would now call an action in rem. In 
addition there were statements from an early stage that suggested that where the ship was arrested 
liability extended only to the value of the vessel. Thus in Greenway v Baker
82
 the following 
appears in the argument of counsel but not in the judgment: 
 
‘… by the civil law … execution ought to be only of the goods for the ship only is 
arrested; and the liability ought to be only against the ship and goods and not against the 
party.’ 
 
This theme was taken up in other cases and one begins to find references to the proceedings being 
in rem. For example Lord Kenyon said in Menetone v Gibbons83 that the admiralty court had 
jurisdiction over bottomry bonds and added: 
 
‘… indeed, it would be highly inconvenient if it were otherwise, because that court 
proceeds in rem, whereas the courts of common law can only proceed against the parties’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
expression of view from the judge appears to have resulted in the withdrawal of the proceedings. On the facts it 
involved a dispute between co-owners of a vessel. Six had wished to send the vessel on a voyage and two were 
opposed. The majority sought and obtained from the Admiralty Court an order compelling the minority to permit the 
vessel to undertake the voyage against a stipulation to compensate the minority if anything happened to the vessel. 
When the minority’s fears proved well-founded and the vessel was lost they sued the majority on the stipulation in 
Admiralty. One of the majority sought a prohibition against the action, no doubt with a view to asserting the 
invalidity of the stipulation in a common law court. A proceeding such as this arising from disputes between co-
owners in regard to the use of the ship, known as a cause of restraint (see Coote, op cit, 3 and form 2 at 193), is 
reflected in the rules of the court promulgated in 1859. Browne, op cit, 130-1 says that this was one of the chief 
controversies between owners that could come before the Court of Admiralty. It is described by N Meeson, 
Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice, 3rd Ed, 2.39 -2.42, 30-1. Most of the cases referred to are old but the procedure 
is still available and occasionally used. North Saskatchewan Riverboat Co Ltd v The ‘Edmonton Queen’ (Can F C) 
(1995) 96 F T R 166; The ‘Vanessa Ann’ [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 549. 
82
 Greenway v Baker Godb. 259, 260 (1577), 78 ER 151.  See also 3 Black Book of Admiralty 103 where it is said 
‘… the ship has to pay’ although it is not clear that this has anything to do with an action in rem. 
83 Menetone v Gibbons 3 Term Rep. 267; 100 ER 568 (KB) (1789). This is however at a relatively late stage of 
development. 
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Baron Parke said in regard to the practice of the Court of Admiralty: 
 
‘… that court proceeds in rem, and can only obtain jurisdiction by seizure and the value 
when seized, is the measure of liability.’84 
 
 None of this leads to any clarity concerning when precisely the action in rem emerged as an 
action specifically and solely directed against the ship or its appurtenances. Browne, who relied 
largely on Clerke for his description of the practice, distinguishes between an action in rem 
against the ship or its appurtenances and an action in personam commenced by the arrest of the 
person of the debtor. He adds that if the defendant did not appear, either because he could not be 
found or because he lives in a foreign country: 
 
‘… here the ancient proceedings of the admiralty court provided an easy and salutary 
remedy, though according to Huberus, not authorised by the example of the civil law; 
they were analogous to the proceedings by foreign attachment under the charters of the 
cities of London and Dublin. The goods of the party were attached to compel his 
appearance. By this means if a foreigner owed money in England, and any ship of his 
came into a British harbour, or any goods of his were found in these realms, it was 
seizable by his creditors; and by this means the English creditor had an easy remedy for 
his debt, and the foreign merchant acquired more credit in England, when it was so easy 
to find remedy against him; for this process of attachment of goods went not only against 
those in the actual possession of himself, his factors, or agents, but also against those in 
the hands of his debtors, since the maxim of Justinian’s Code was, debtor creditoris, est 
debtor creditori creditoris. This salutary proceeding has gone into disuse in England, and 
great is the mischief according to commerce from the want of it. It still prevails in many 
parts of Europe, and gives to foreigners an evident advantage.’85 
                                                 
84
 Brown v Wilkinson 15 M&W 391, 398, 153 ER 902. 
85 Browne, op cit, 434-5. The editors of Fleetwood and Hale, op cit, cxxxiii, question whether Clerke truly intended 
to say that the arrest of goods was only available when the arrest of the debtor was not possible as opposed to 
stressing its value in that case. This latter approach would accord with the form in which Dr Lushington subsequently 
reformed the rules in admiralty proceedings in 1860. Whilst Browne is correct in saying that in ancient times arrest 
of property other than the vessel or its equipment was permissible I think that he is in error in saying that this was a 
form of the action in personam. Historically the action in personam was the name given to proceedings commenced 
by the arrest of the person whilst proceedings commenced by the arrest of property was referred to as an action in 
rem. Wiswall, 164-6 built upon this error in suggesting that there is an admiralty arrest as a separate procedure from 
the action in rem in which the roots of the American arrest in admiralty proceedings (known as the procedure quasi 
in rem)are to be found. That theme has in turn been taken up by Professor Tetley in Maritime Liens and Claims, 973 
- 977 and 1032-3; International Maritime and Admiralty Law 408-9. The confusion is illustrated by footnote 36 on p 
408 of the latter work, where it is said: ‘A notable exception is South Africa, which, owing to its civilian 
Roman/Dutch (sic) law has the maritime attachment as well as arrests in rem’. This is confusing as the attachment ad 
fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem of South African law has common origins to but is otherwise very 
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All of this however was: ‘When the old doctrines and process of the civil law were followed, as 
they were when Clarke wrote his practice …’ 
86
 By the end of the 18
th
 Century any such 
proceeding in personam would have been subject to prohibition on the grounds that the 
underlying contract was not one made on the high seas with the result that the appropriate 
admiralty process by way of an action in personam could no longer be invoked.
87
 If in truth it is a 
proceeding in rem that he is describing it would have suffered the same fate, as it would have 
been impossible for the subject matter of the claim to have arisen on the high seas. 
  
 Accepting that Dr. Lushington is correct in saying that the last instance of an arrest in 
personam was in 1780
88
, then from that time all proceedings in the Court of Admiralty must have 
been based either upon the arrest of the vessel or upon the furnishing of a stipulation or bail to 
prevent such arrest or procure the release of the vessel. Whilst prior to this time no particular 
distinction was drawn in the Admiralty Court between proceedings which commenced by an 
arrest of the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen as opposed to proceedings commenced 
by the arrest of other property or the person of the debtor
89
 it seems probable that once these 
                                                                                                                                                              
different from the saisie conservatoire and is not confined to maritime cases but applies as a general ground of 
jurisdiction. The distinction is noted in Australian Law Commission Report 33, Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction, Chap 6, 
footnote 42. On saisie conservatoire generally see the helpful appendix in S Gee, Commercial Injunctions, 5th Ed 
(2004) 831-833. 
86 Browne, op cit, 105. 
87 Browne, op cit, 100 -107.  
88
 The Clara (1855) Sw 1, 3; 166 ER 986  
89 As suggested by Jeune J in The Dictator [1892] P 304, 7 Asp MLC 251, 254. There is some support for this in the 
judgment of Dr Lushington in The Volant 1 W Rob 383; 166 ER 616 where he points out that the form of the process 
was that: ‘It decrees the ship to be seized, and it cites all persons having or pretending to have any right, title or 
interest, to appear in a cause civil or maritime.’ (Emphasis added) Browne, op cit 398 also uses this expression. The 
reference to ‘causes civil or maritime’ appears in the 1782 Act that deals with the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Admiralty in Ireland (Browne, op cit, Vol 2, 517) and even earlier in the Act of Union between England and Ireland, 
40 George III (Browne, op cit, Vol 2, 518). The general reference to a maritime cause does not suggest that the 
subsequent distinction between the action in rem and that in personam was recognised at that time. In other words it 
related to the nature and subject matter of the suit rather than the procedure by which it was pursued. Mears, op cit, 
349 fn 4 says that the pressures of prohibition resulted in all actions being commenced by arrest of goods. In The 
Heinrich Bjorn (1885) 10 PD 44 54 Fry LJ referred to proceedings being commenced in all civil law jurisdictions 
‘either by an arrest of the person of the defendant if within the realm, or by the arrest of any personal property of the 
defendant within the realm, whether the ship in question or any other chattel’. 
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other forms of commencing proceedings fell into disuse the action in rem came to be recognised 
as a special form of action in the Admiralty Court. The action in personam may have remained as 
a notional possibility but if arrests of the person or other property of the debtor had fallen into 
desuetude this was purely academic. Accordingly at the beginning of the 19
th
 Century with the 
resurgence of the court under Lord Stowell and, after him, Dr. Lushington the action in rem 
assumed a form broadly familiar to modern lawyers although this appears to have been an 
evolutionary process rather than something that occurred at a precise point in time. 
 
 When Browne wrote in 1802 he refers to ‘Proceedings in Rem’ as proceedings against ‘the 
ship or cargo’. This was at a time when the concept of a maritime lien had not yet been 
mentioned in any judgment and before it came to influence views on the nature of the action in 
rem
90
. An examination of the statements by writers and in some of the cases indicates that the 
language used in characterising proceedings as being in rem or in personam was derived from the 
Roman Law concepts of a real and a personal action. However this is confusing because the 




 In the time of Lord Stowell and the early days of Dr Lushington’s term as the Admiralty 
judge, the position had been reached where the Admiralty Court had an accepted, albeit limited, 
jurisdiction in maritime cases. Its procedure was inevitably by way of the action in rem, 
                                                 
90 Browne, op cit, 396-7. 
91 In Roman Law the action in rem was an action to recover a specific thing that had to be specified. D 6.1.6. W W 
Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, (3rd Ed), 607 says that: ‘If what he complained of was that a right in rem 
which he claimed to have was disputed, to his injury, he would ordinarily bring an actio in rem, a vindicatio, the 
generic name of all actions to enforce such rights.’ The action was accordingly vindicatory and was the means of 
enforcing proprietary rights of property. Buckland, op cit, 181. J M Kelly, Roman Litigation, 12 notes that : ‘Before 
the days of the actio ad exhibendum the plaintiff in an actio in rem had equally to use his own force in order to 
secure the presence in iure of a disputed movable object. An action in personam was any other form of action against 
a particular debtor. The editors of Fleetwood and Hale, op cit, xxxix say that: ‘The historical relationship between 
the Admiralty action in rem and the Roman actio in rem may, however, be more apparent than real, and more 
apparent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than it was in earlier centuries.’ In my view the Roman law 
terminology was adopted as convenient without concern for historic accuracy. The ease with which someone coming 
from a different legal system can confuse unfamiliar terminology with something familiar is illustrated by M P 
Sclichting, The Arrest of Ships in German and South African Law, (1991) who in chapter III treats of the arrest of 
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commenced by the arrest of the ship and usually followed by the giving of bail. Its procedures 
continued to follow the models of the civil law. Having reached that stage of acceptance and 
avoided writs of prohibition for some years the time came for the tide to turn. Dr Lushington, 
who was also a member of parliament campaigned for an extension of the Admiralty Court’s 
jurisdiction and this was initially realised by way of the enactment of the Admiralty Court Act, 
184092, although it came at the price of having to give up his seat in Parliament in return for a 
higher salary. Claims arising in respect of mortgages; questions of title to or ownership in a ship 
or its proceeds arising in a cause for possession, salvage, damage, wages or bottomry and claims 
against foreign ships in respect of salvage, towage and the supply of necessaries were added to 
the list of permissible claims and Dr Lushington made good use of this to establish a growing 
reputation for the court. Twenty years later whilst he was still the Admiralty judge the 
jurisdiction was further extended by way of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861
93
. This added claims 
for the building, equipping and repair of ships; claims for necessaries; cargo claims in respect of 
cargo carried into England and Wales; claims for damage done by a ship; ownership and related 
questions; wages and disbursements and an extension of the existing jurisdiction in respect of 
salvage and mortgages. 
 
 Section 35 of the 1861 Act provided that the jurisdiction in the High Court of Admiralty 
could be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam and the new rules 
promulgated under the 1861 Act provided for both forms of action. The reform of the rules of the 
court94 by Dr Lushington in 1860 embodied the notion of proceedings in rem commenced by the 
arrest of goods or the vessel and proceedings in personam commenced by the arrest of the person 
of the debtor. However, as pointed out by Scott LJ in The Beldis, by that time lawyers in 
admiralty laboured under the misapprehension that a maritime lien had to underlie any action in 
                                                                                                                                                              
ships in Germany as if this is equivalent to the action in rem and in Chapter XI with the arrest of persons as if this is 
equivalent to the action in personam.  
92 3 & 4 Vict. C. 65.  The relevant text is conveniently set out in Shaw, op cit, 141-144 and Hofmeyr, op cit, 325-
327. 
93 24 Vict. c. 10. Again the text is set out in Shaw, op cit, 145-150 and Hofmeyr, op cit, 325-333. 
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rem and this view was inconsistent with the commencement of proceedings by the arrest of 
general property of the debtor. In practice, because of the advantage of security that it offered, the 
primary procedure remained by way of the action in rem95. In other words action would be 
commenced by the arrest of the vessel and this would either result in the sale of the ship and the 
creation of a fund in court or would be followed by the furnishing of bail or security to ensure 
that any judgment could be satisfied.  
 
 This then was the jurisdiction and procedure that South Africa acquired under its admiralty 
jurisdiction and which it still exercised in 1983. It provided for pre-action arrest and the obtaining 
of security for the claim. Its jurisdiction was not confined to actions arising in the jurisdiction and 
was available to peregrini. However the range of claims within the jurisdiction was subject to 
curious restrictions such as the requirement that cargo claims could only be brought in relation to 
cargo carried into a South African port. The sister ship arrest was not available to a claimant.  
The procedures of the Court were outmoded and the law often obscure. The jurisdiction sat 
uncomfortably alongside the parochial jurisdiction.  Like the latter it required reform and this was 
forthcoming. However from this synopsis of each system some common ground seems to 
emerge.   
 
3. Do the action in rem and the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem share common origins? 
 
 Viewed from the perspective of a Roman Dutch lawyer the description of the purpose and 
function of the action in rem in its older form as derived from Clerke’s Praxis96 and endorsed in 
                                                                                                                                                              
94 A reform that Coote, op cit, vi, says was necessary in view of the defective state of the Court’s procedures. 
95 An advantage recognised by Coote, op cit, 131-2 when he says that: ‘… no prudent person will hesitate to proceed 
in rem if the res be within the jurisdiction of the Court, so a personal proceeding is never adopted unless the res be 
inaccessible to arrest.’ 
96 Clerke’s Praxis Curiae Admiralitatis Angliae a work written by an admiralty proctor in the period of the 
Restoration and first published in 1667, with a second edition in 1743 and a number of editions thereafter. 
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The Dictator
97 bears a substantial resemblance to the arrest of either person or property to found 
jurisdiction that was a feature of the procedural jurisprudence of a number of places in Europe in 
the early days of the Admiralty Court in England.98 Just as the Roman Dutch jurists held that 
arrests were designed to induce the party arrested, particularly a foreigner, to give security and 
submit to the jurisdiction of the local court
99
 so Dr William Scott (later Lord Stowell) argued that 
in instance proceedings the Admiralty Court ‘… proceeds originally by arrest, in order to compel 
bail to be given to submit to the jurisdiction.’
100
 More recently the editors of Hale and Fleetwood 
on Admiralty Jurisdiction
101 have located the origins of the action in rem in the procedure known 
as the processus contra contumacem, discovered in article 20 of the Ordo Judiciorum, a 
description of civil procedure by an Italian civilian.
102
 That procedure is based on the notion that 
if the defendant fails to appear before the court and give security in response to an arrest of his 
goods he is in a state of contumacy and the goods may in due course be condemned to the 
claimant. An opportunity is furnished to the debtor to defend the case and secure the release of 
the arrested goods by putting up security (usually in the form of a personal surety which is in 
substance the same as bail in the Admiralty Court in England) failing which the goods arrested 
                                                 
97 Footnote 89, ante. 
98 Halsbury, op. cit para. 305, fn 1; The Banco [1971] 1 All ER 524 (CA) 531; The Monica S [1967] 3 All ER 740 
(QBD) 745-6. Shaw, op cit, 27 mentions the resemblance. 
99 See footnote 6, ante. 
100 Smart v Wolff 3 Term Rep 323 330; 100 ER 600  
101 Op cit, xxxviii-xlvii. Their view has received enthusiastic endorsement from Professor W Tetley, ‘Arrest, 
Attachment and Related Maritime Law Procedures’ (1999) 73 Tulane L R 1895 although it is debatable whether he 
is correct in saying in his subsequent book International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) 404, that their research 
supports the view that ‘jurisdiction in the Admiralty Court was exercised in one or both of two modes: in personam 
and/or in rem’. Whilst it is described in Fleetwood and Hale, op cit,xxxix as being ‘a process available in the middle 
ages not only in the actio in rem but also in the actio in personam’ I believe that this is importing into the earlier 
procedure a distinction that was not then recognised and is a later creation of English admiralty proceedings. In my 
view there was a single form of action that could be commenced either by arrest of the person or by arrest of 
property and these two became distinct in England because of the peculiar problems that the Admiralty Court 
experienced in that country. In European jurisdictions that in any event applied the civil law such problems could not 
have arisen.  
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would be adjudged to the creditor and sold in satisfaction of the claim. This is closely parallel to 
the procedure described by Clerke and Browne.
103
 It is also fundamentally the same procedure as 
is described by Voet104 and Huber105 as applying in Holland and Frisia. 
 
 There seems to be little reason to doubt that a procedure similar to the one described above 
and based on either the arrest of the debtor or the arrest of his property was in widespread use 
throughout Europe in matters of trade, including maritime cases, from the 14
th
 Century. That 
these procedures were known in England can also not be doubted. Two further examples from 
other jurisdictions will suffice. The first is taken from The Judicial Order of the Courts of the 
Consuls of the Sea
106
, which describes the procedures in the Courts of the Consuls of Valencia. 
These were annexed to Il Consolato del Mare because similar regulations were promulgated in 
respect of other courts in other parts of the dominions of the Kings of Aragon.
107
 The opening 
portion of Chapter XXX reads as follows: 
 
‘If it should be demanded by the Plaintiff by parole or in writing, that the defendant 
should give security to meet the judgment on his claim, otherwise that proceedings should 
be taken against him, if the defendant is a stranger, he must forthwith give security, 
otherwise he ought to be seized and set in the common prison and stay there until the 
claim is settled.’   
 
There is an obvious similarity between this and the process of arrest that manifested itself 
elsewhere in Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                              
102 1 Black Book of the Admiralty 178 - 220.  Sir Travers Twiss suggests in his introduction to this volume (at xxxiv) 
that this may be connected to the law school at Bologna and could be linked to a treatise on procedure by Bartolus. 
See also page178, fn 2 and 220, fn 2. 
103 The procedure is summarised in Mears op cit 343-8. It is also similar to the procedures used in the courts 
established under the ancient charter of the City of London. See John Strype’s Surveys of the Cities of London and 
Westminster, Book 5 Chap 28 sv ‘attachment’ available at www.hrionline.ac.uk/strype .. 
104 Voet, Book II, Titles 4, 5, 6, 8 and 1.1 
105
 Huber, Book V, Chaps 1-3.  
106 4 Black Book of the Admiralty 450 - 495. 
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 The second example is taken from the Consuetedo vel Lex Mercatoria published in 1685 by 
Gerard Malynes, a merchant, which displays an extensive knowledge of the law and practice in 
many parts of Europe at this time and earlier. He writes on the manner of proceedings in sea-
faring cases that: 
 
‘If the defendant do stand out, or commit a contempt by not appearing to defend himself 
or Ship, or things challenged; the Judges of the Admiralty may (after four defaults 
entered) deliver the possession of the said Ship, or any other thing, or part thereof to the 
Plaintiff, putting in Sureties for one year and a day; and if the party appear not within that 
time, then the property is finally adjudged to the Plaintiff. … Summons and Citation are 
not needful, where the Ship or goods in question are forthcoming, but may be done in the 
same places where it lieth, or goods are found. If any man be arrested or troubled for the 
like matters, he is presently to be discharged upon Sureties, and especially Mariners, 
because they shall not be hindered of their voyage. Which he may do with so much 
goods, or the value thereof, as he hath on Shipboard, at the Judges discretion: Because 
otherwise Traffick and Commerce is hindered.’108     
 
Again the process being described is one in which security for the claim has to be put up and may 
have its source in arrest of person or goods the release of which can be procured by the provision 
of security. The parallels between these descriptions of very similar processes are a clear 
indication that the relevant procedures in different countries were essentially similar and existed, 
                                                                                                                                                              
107 Twiss in 4 Black Book of the Admiralty 451, fn 1. 
108 G Malynes, Consuetedo vel Lex Mercatoria , Part 1, Chapter XVIII, 88. See also Part 3, Chapter XI, 290 where he 
comments that the common law of England does not use the course of attachments, although it is part of the custom 
of the Court of the City of London and ‘was borrowed from Merchants Actions observed in Foreign Countries’. 
Malynes refers in this to cases in Amsterdam and other parts of the Netherlands which suggests that he was familiar 
with the procedure of founding jurisdiction by the attachment of the person or property of the debtor. In Chapter 5 of 
Welwood’s Collection of Sea Laws, which was published together with Malyne’s work in 1686 (and from which he 
is said to have copied substantially) there is a description of the manner of proceeding in sea-faring cases. It reads: 
‘The Judge may order his Marshall or Officer by his sentence called primum decretum to put the Plaintiff in 
possession thereof, at least to the worth of the Suit. Providing notwithstanding that if the Party compeire within a 
year and a day after offering the expense made to the Pursuer and Caution to obey the Definitive, he shall yet be 
heard upon the propriety. Otherwise, that time having fully expired, the Judge may proceed and adjudge the 
Propriety of the Ship to the Plaintiff. 
Neither is it needful to execute Summons or Citations in such case, elsewhere but where the Ship or quarrelled 
Goods in question lies, or at the Port usual of their haunting.’ 
The reference to finding a caution was still in use in Scotland in 1896. Green’s Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, Vol 1, 
sv ‘High Court of Admiralty’. 
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with the support of the merchants, for the convenient conduct of commerce.  
 
 This similarity is to be expected bearing in mind the common civilian roots of maritime 
jurisprudence and procedure on both sides of the English Channel and the likelihood that English 
merchants would demand that their judges should be as protective of their interests as those in 
Europe were of the interests of their citizens.109 One should also not overlook the fact that from 
the Norman Conquest in 1066 until the loss of Calais in 1558 there were English pretensions to 
rule France and to a variable extent some suzerainty over parts of France throughout this period. 
Similarities in legal processes in relation to disputes between merchants trading across the 
Channel would be inevitable in those circumstances.
110
 It seems improbable that the only 
importation into England would be law French. 
 
 An appropriate description of the arrest ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem 
would be that it is a procedure commenced by the arrest of the person or property of the debtor 
for the purpose of compelling the debtor to appear and defend the claim whilst affording security 
to the creditor. It can hardly be entirely coincidental that those are the very features of the action 
in rem mentioned by writers such as Clerke and Browne and identified by the cases in England 
that have adopted the procedural theory of the action in rem. As both systems sought to apply the 
civil law, both as a matter of substantive law and as a matter of procedure, it is not surprising to 
find as a general proposition that the courts on both sides of the English Channel used similar 
                                                 
109 Precisely this concern is mentioned by Dr. Lushington in The Volant 1 W Rob 383, 166 ER 616 
110 From 1066 until 1204 most of the Norman barons who accompanied William the Conqueror had estates on both 
sides of the Channel. Normandy was annexed to England in 1106 but it was lost again a few years later. Henry II 
(1154-1189) became Count of Anjou and Maine and Duke of Normandy by inheritance and Duke of Aquitaine by 
his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine, who has historically been associated (although probably incorrectly) with the 
introduction of the Rôles of Oléron into England. In 1170 he added Brittany to his possessions. By 1214 Henry’s son 
King John had lost much of France to Philip Augustus and by the Treaty of Paris in 1259 England lost everything 
other than Gascony (Aquitaine) and the Channel Islands. The Hundred Years War (1337-1453) was characterised by 
a number of English victories (Crécy, 1346; Poitiers, 1356) and an extension of English dominions in France. In 
1420 Henry V was acknowledged as the heir to the French throne and Henry VI succeeded to it in 1422. However in 
1453 the English were defeated in the last battle of the Hundred Years War and lost all their French possessions 
other than Calais. That fell in 1558. (This brief sketch is taken from various entries in the Oxford Encyclopaedia of 
World History.) 
 47
procedures having similar consequences for the litigants. The same analogy between procedures 
on the Continent and those in England was afforded by the process of foreign attachment 
available under the charters of the courts of the cities of London and Dublin which is referred to 
by both Browne and Malynes and described as an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem.
111
, without any complications arising from its being described as a proceeding in 
rem. 
 
 It seems that what are usually regarded as fundamentally different legal conceptions may 
well have evolved from essentially the same elements. That evolution is a product of the very 
different pressures that were imposed upon practice in admiralty in England as opposed to 
Europe. Research into the origins of these procedures shows that the difference in procedures 
between England and Europe in maritime matters is more a matter of domestic circumstances 
impacting upon the legal system rather than any difference in principle. This illustrates a point of 
central importance to the analysis of legal concepts in different legal systems. Where legal 
concepts having common origins evolve differently that is almost inevitably a result of internal 
pressures in the countries concerned that causes them to move in different directions or acquire 
different characteristics. This highlights the fact that legal systems usually evolve in response to 
the needs of particular societies at particular times rather than in accordance with any outward 
logic. This is well illustrated by the developments that took place in England and Europe in 
regard to the procedures available to pursue maritime claims. 
 
 The significant difference that arose between the two sides of that narrow stretch of water 
                                                 
111 Browne, op cit, 434-5 bemoans the fact that this procedure has fallen into disuse. Dr Lushington noted the 
parallels between the two in The Johann Friedrich 1 W Rob 36, 37; 166 ER 487 (1839). See also The Bold 
Buccleugh, supra. It seems clear that this was the same procedure as was known to the Roman Dutch law if one 
looks at the authorities referred to by Lord Denning MR in Rasu Maritima SA v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak 
Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) and Government of Indonesia (intervening) [1977] 3 All ER 324 (CA) 331c-
332d where the procedure is described as saisie arrêt. See also Gee, op cit, 831-833. If one reads the description of 
the procedure given by Browne, Welwood and Malynes and compares it with the description in The Judicial Order 
of the Courts of the Consuls of the Sea or the description of procedures to be found in Voet, Huber or Van der Linden 
it is their similarities that strike one. There can be little doubt that all used a broadly similar form of procedure, which 
they derived from the Roman Law. In Europe this was the foundation for the attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem whilst in England it underlay the action in rem. 
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was that the Court of Admiralty characterised its proceedings based on arrest of the vessel as 
proceedings in rem, whilst in Europe it was always regarded as simply an action against a person 
(in personam). The source of this difference was that in England the Court of Admiralty, 
applying civil law principles and procedures, was confronted with the hostility of the common 
law courts to its jurisdiction and procedures. On the other side of the English Channel the civil 
law, based on the development of the re-discovered Roman law, applied in all courts. 
Accordingly no reason existed outside of England on the continent of Europe for a procedure to 
be developed equivalent to the action in rem.112 Nor was there any need to attach substantive law 
consequences to the ordinary procedure involving the arrest of the vessel, unlike the accretion of 
the maritime lien to the action in rem. Those consequences could be treated as arising from the 
inherent nature of a particular claim rather than from the nature of the action by which that claim 
was enforced. Thus in continental Europe the privileges afforded to particular claims were largely 
the same as those to which a maritime lien was said to attach in England, but without the 




‘The phrase ‘maritime lien’ was not the original expression in our admiralty diction.  We 
borrowed from the French, who had in their word ‘privilége’ a clearer and less ambiguous 
name: hence their telling phrase ‘créances privilégeés’ to describe the secured rights of 
the sea creditors …There is no difference of meaning, so far as anything in the present 
appeal is concerned, between the ‘privilége’ of Continental law and our maritime lien.  
And our judges in early cases used our word ‘privilege’ with the same meaning as that in 
which ‘maritime lien’ was subsequently used...’ 
 
                                                 
112 Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 406.  Jessel MR in The City of Mecca, supra, 112 said that: 
‘You may in England and in most countries proceed against the ship. The writ may be issued against the owner of 
such a ship, and the owner may never appear, and you get your judgment against the ship without a single person 
being named from beginning to end. That is an action in rem, and it is perfectly well understood that the judgment is 
against the ship.’ (Emphasis added) However this proceeds from an incorrect assumption of the availability of the 
English action in rem on the Continent. The true position had been set out many years before by Holt CJ in Enver v 
Jones 2 Ld Raym 934; 92 ER 124 that: ‘The sentence of a civil law court in a foreign realm shall be executed in a 
court of the same nature here, and proceeding after the same law … In other words courts applying the civil law in 
different countries recognised each other’s decisions irrespective of the precise nature of the procedure followed for 
the enforcement of particular claims. As the authorities cited in the court below by Phillimore J show (The City of 
Mecca 4 Asp MLC 187) this approach, which depends on the nature of the court rather than the nature of the 
proceedings before it, was the proper foundation of the Admiralty jurisdiction to enforce foreign judgments.  
Browne, op cit, 120-1.  
113 The Tolten, op. cit 149-150. 
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On the Continent these privileges could be enforced against the owner of the vessel without the 
need for an action in rem. The vessel would be arrested and either bail or some similar security 
would be furnished, or the vessel would be preserved as security to satisfy the judgment in due 
course, which is the origin of the modern saisie conservatoire. In those circumstances the 
privilege arises from the nature of the claim rather from the form of the proceedings whereby that 
claim is enforced. 
 
 By contrast with Continental jurisdictions, in England the initial procedures used in the 
Court of Admiralty, which had the same origin as the continental procedures, were restricted by 
the conflict between that court and the common law courts and the use of prohibitions. In seeking 
to defend their position and the existence of the court against these attacks great reliance was 
placed on the civil law heritage of the Court of Admiralty. Three features warrant particular 
mention. The first is that in relation to certain claims, such as bottomry, reference was made to 
the Roman law tacit hypothec and the actio hypotheca by which the creditor could approach the 
court to recover possession of the hypothecated property and sell it in execution of the claim. The 
second was the description of the security given in actions in the Court of Admiralty as a 
stipulatio even though there are no indications that these were given using the strict form of 
words required originally in Roman Law and abandoned at a later stage of development.114 Third 
the Roman Law distinction between real and personal actions was adapted to distinguish between 
actions commenced by the arrest of goods (including the vessel) and actions commenced by the 
arrest of the person of the debtor and these came to be described as actions in rem and in 
personam respectively.
115
 These features provided the elements that the American courts initially 
                                                 
114 Browne, op cit, Vol 1, 357. The importance of the stipulatio was that it was enforceable without consideration and 
hence unenforceable in the common law courts.  
115 In the copy of Browne kindly made available to me by Douglas Shaw QC there is a manuscript note in a different 
context by one of the previous owners of the book (not Mr Shaw) that: ‘There is a great danger of misapprehension 
in confusing English and Roman law terms.’ The truth of this wry observation is apparent from any study of the 
development of the English admiralty in which Roman Law terms were bent to use for a purpose almost wholly 
different from their original intent. Thus the real action of the Roman Law was vindicatory (Browne, op cit, Vol 1, 
439) which the action in rem is not. On the distinction in Roman Law between actions in rem and actions in 
personam see B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Clarendon Series)(1962), 99-108.  H Staniland, op cit, 
(1996) 2 Fundamina 285. 
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and thereafter the English courts used to forge the concept of a maritime lien and they also 
underlie the debate about the nature of the action in rem. 
 
 It was essential for the Court of Admiralty to distinguish its practice and procedures from 
those of the common law courts. When it sought to proceed in personam it faced prohibition on 
the grounds that claims in personam had to be based on contracts concluded elsewhere than on 
the high seas and were therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. It took refuge in 
the proceeding in rem which it was compelled to say was not an endeavour to implead any person 
as debtor but only the vessel. In the same way it claimed that the stipulation was not a 
recognizance, and, making a virtue of necessity, that the claim was restricted to the value of the 
res or the bail. These two elements became the foundation for the suggestion that the action in 
rem has a special status giving rise to what would ordinarily be regarded as substantive rights and 
obligations under which the claim is against the ship, is limited to its value and is divorced from 
the ownership of the vessel or the liability of the owners in respect of the claim. On that 
foundation the American courts erected the concept of the personification of the vessel.  There is 
however no reason in principle why that approach should be taken and in general English courts 
have eschewed it. 
 
 All this in turn illustrates the point that different circumstances may lead to different 
conceptions of the nature of an action in rem even where the basic legal system and therefore the 
starting point for a consideration of the problem is the same. In the context of a new system based 
upon statute it is not safe to assume that all of the elements of another legal system drawn from a 
different time period have been taken over into South African law. That is particularly the case 
with the wholly new concept of an action in rem brought by the arrest of an associated ship. In 
South Africa with its unique heritage derived from both the Roman-Dutch law and English 
admiralty law it is possible to discern the common roots of both. That history informed the 
conception of the Act and it is open to our courts in considering the nature of the action in rem to 





 From a South African perspective the action in rem evolved in England from civil law roots 
in which actions could be pursued by way of the arrest of the person or the goods of the debtor 
and particularly the ship. Those same roots evolved in parts of Europe into the attachment ad 
fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem and were imported into South Africa along with the 
general principles of Roman-Dutch law.
116
 As a result of the peculiar history of internecine 
warfare between the common law courts and the Court of Admiralty by the latter stage of the 18th 
Century only the action against the vessel remained available to the Court of Admiralty and this 
was called an action in rem because it lay against a thing, or the stipulation or bail given in place 
of the thing, rather than against any specific person. Such an action was available in respect of a 
limited class of claims some of which enjoyed particular privileges giving a preference over the 
vessel. With the revival of the Admiralty Court at the beginning of the 19th century and the 
extension of its jurisdiction this special form of procedure became available in respect of a wider 
variety of claims. At the same time the claims enjoying a special privilege came to be 
characterised as maritime liens first by American and then by English courts. Whilst these were 
enforceable by means of the action in rem the two were not coterminous so far as English 
admiralty law was concerned. By the time the Act came into force statutory developments in 
England, now replicated to some extent in South Africa, had cast the action in rem in a fresh 
light. 
 
 Prior to the Act the action in rem in South Africa was a special form of action only 
available in admiralty proceedings. The action was one derived from England where it had 
become confined in practice to one commenced by the arrest of the vessel, usually followed by 
the furnishing of bail in the form of a stipulation, or in some instances merely by the furnishing 
of bail. The action was available in respect of a limited class of claims having a particular 
connection with the vessel and the maritime adventure. Some of these claims were generally 
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recognised in all Western maritime jurisdictions as giving rise to special privileges in relation to 
the vessel and in the early to middle part of the 19
th
 century they came to be called collectively 
maritime liens. With the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty by way of the 
statutes of 1840 and 1861 the action in rem became available in respect of a far larger group of 
claim without those claims necessarily enjoying the status of a maritime lien.   
 
 The implications of the Act for the nature of an action in rem in South African law will 
need to be dealt with later in the particular context of the nature of such an action where it is 
pursued by way of an action in rem against an associated ship. The purpose of examining the 
history of the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem and the action in rem 
has been to see whether a fundamental underlying principle can be discerned which will cast light 
on the introduction of the jurisdiction to arrest an associated ship or its nature. It reveals that there 
is no such defining or organising principle. Instead they both evolved as practical responses to 
legal and extra-legal pressures. The nature of the action in rem in England is different from its 
nature in the United States of America
117
 and there is no apparent reason why it may not evolve 
differently in South Africa, with its Roman Dutch heritage. There are recent indications that this 
may occur with our courts looking to the Roman Dutch law for a solution to a problem of 
jurisdiction in admiralty proceedings.118  
                                                                                                                                                              
116 In The Heinrich Björn (1885) 10 P 44, 53-4; 5 Asp MLC 391 (CA) 395. Fry LJ described the action in rem by 
way of the arrest of the vessel pursuant to a claim under the 1840 Act as ‘only one of several alternative proceedings 
ad fundandam jurisdictionem.’ 
117 In the USA it is said that ‘Justice Story ... was to prove so influential in emancipating American admiralty from 
the restrictions of the English admiralty’.  Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29, § 701.02[2], p 701.23.  In the 
case of The Genesee Chief v Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)  443, 13 L Ed. 1058 (1851) Justice Taney extended the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to include navigable inland waterways, such as the Great Lakes. In this fashion, and 
largely as a result of judicial interpretation of the scope of admiralty jurisdiction the admiralty law of the United 
States is in certain respects markedly different from that of England as is its law governing. One can compare in this 
regard the differences between the English and American law in regard to the nature and functions of a bill of lading. 
M D Bools, The Bill of Lading: A Document of Title to Goods: An Anglo-American Comparison (LLP, 1997) 
especially the summary at 197-200  
118 MT ‘Argun’ v Master and Crew of the MT ‘Argun’ claiming under Case No AC 126/99 and others [2003] 4 All 
SA 139 (SCA) paras 31 to 33 although the link discerned by the Court between admiralty practice and the civil law 
‘… if the point presently under consideration had come up for decision’ is to say the least a tenuous one. It is 
debatable whether the judgment of Farlam JA in this case is compatible with the decision of the Supreme Court of 
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 Merely because no central principle can be identified as underlying the action in rem, this 
examination has not been a fruitless exercise in antiquarianism. Firstly, the common roots of the 
action in rem and attachment procedures that are embedded in our common law have been 
identified. Secondly it becomes apparent that the action in rem and the Court of Admiralty itself 
would not have survived had it not held out substantial advantages for the conduct of maritime 
litigation. That must be recognised in any future development of the action. Thirdly, the study 
demonstrates the inherent flexibility of the concept of the action in rem and its ability to be 
adapted to new situations. Such flexibility may be enhanced by the approach that treats the action 
as procedural in nature as it is always possible for courts to mould procedures to match what 
Holmes referred to as ‘the felt necessities of the time’
119
. Fourthly as a comparison of the English 
and American experiences shows different jurisdictions may take a different view of the nature 
and effects of an essentially similar form of proceeding. When South African lawyers consider 
the action in rem in the context provided by the Act and particularly in the light of the novel 
concept of the arrest of an associated ship they can do so without the analysis being stifled by the 
dead hand of history or determined by the outcome of long past conflicts between common and 
civil law. Whilst it is necessary to look at the history of the action in rem in order to identify the 
point from which the Act commences in providing for an action in rem we need to be open to the 
possibility, and in the case of the associated ship the certainty, that the South African legislature 
charted a new and different path for the action in rem in this country. It is submitted that the 
analysis of the two procedures suggests that a South African court should look at the common 
roots of the action in rem and the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem in 
                                                                                                                                                              
Appeal in MT ‘Cape Spirit’: Owners of Cargo lately laden on board the MT Cape Spirit v MT Cape Spirit and 
others 1999 (4) SA 321 (SCA) where the Court held (with Farlam AJA dissenting) that an action lapsed with the 
lapsing under section 3 (10)(a)(ii) of the Act. 
119 Holmes, The Common Law, 1.  In South Africa this is reinforced by section 173 of the Constitution which vests in 
the High Courts the inherent power to regulate their own procedure.  
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determining the effect in our law under the Act of such an action in the context of the action 
based upon the arrest of an associated ship.  
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 THE ACTION IN REM IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
 The action in rem followed the British when they occupied the Cape in September 1795 
and Governor Macartney established a Vice-Admiralty Court in 1799.
1
 This court only lasted for 
four years until the departure of the British in 1803 after the Treaty of Amiens, but was revived 
on the return of the British on a more permanent basis in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars.2 
Thereafter with the Charters of Justice of 1828 and 1832 the Vice-Admiralty Court was firmly 
established under the new Chief Justice Sir John Wylde.3 One unsuspected link between the 
English Admiralty Court and the Cape Colony is that in the successful battle for freedom of the 
press fought by Pringle, Fairbairn and Greig against Lord Charles Somerset, Dr. Lushington 
together with his then mentor and friend Lord Brougham intervened on the side of the colonists.4 
The first report of a decision in the Vice-Admiralty Court in an action in rem is to be found in 
1842.5 
 
 In August 1845 Natal was annexed as a district of the Cape Colony and Cloete J was 
appointed as Recorder in the single judge court at Pietermaritzburg subject to appeals to Cape 
Town.
6
 In 1856 Natal was created a Crown Colony by Royal Charter
7
 and presumably a Vice-
                                                 
1 Eric A Walker, A History of Southern Africa, 3 Ed. (1968) 126. The first Vice-Admiralty court had been established 
in Jamaica in 1662. Walker, Oxford Companion to Law, op cit, sv ‘Vice-admiralty courts’. 
2 E Walker, op cit, 141. 
3 E Walker, op cit, 163. 
4 E Walker, op cit, 161. Lushington and Brougham later fell out when Brougham ensured as a condition of the 
passage of the Admiralty Court Act, 1840 that the holder of the office of judge of the admiralty should not be a 
member of Parliament. This compelled Lushington to give up his seat and occasioned him not inconsiderable 
financial hardship. 
5 The Black Swan (1842) 2 Menz. 350. 
6 E Walker, op cit, 222-3. Spiller op cit, starts his admirable history of the courts in Natal at this point but nowhere 
mentions the Vice-Admiralty courts. 
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Admiralty Court was established in name at least at this stage. In 1863 when the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts Act
8
 was passed both the Cape Colony and Natal were listed in the schedule to the Act as 
colonies possessing such courts. The jurisdiction appears to have been invoked from time to time 
albeit only occasionally.9 It must be remembered that many maritime claims, such as cargo 
claims and collisions in South African waters, would have had an essentially ‘domestic’ flavour 
and provenance and could have been pursued satisfactorily in the ordinary courts on the basis of 
at most an attachment to found jurisdiction. Thus there would generally speaking have been little 
need to invoke the unfamiliar and slightly esoteric jurisdiction in admiralty. 
 
 The Vice-Admiralty Courts were replaced by Colonial Courts of Admiralty by way of the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 189010 which provided in section 2 thereof that: 
 
‘(1) Every court of law in a British possession, which is for the time being declared in 
pursuance of this Act to be a small court of Admiralty, or which, if no such declaration is 
in force in the possession, has their own original unlimited civil jurisdiction, shall be a 
court of Admiralty, with the jurisdiction in this Act, mentioned and may for the purpose 
of that jurisdiction exercise all the powers which it possesses for the purpose of its other 
civil jurisdiction, and such court in reference to the jurisdiction conferred by this Act is in 
this Act referred to as a Colonial Court of Admiralty … 
 
(2)The jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of Admiralty shall be over the like places, 
persons, matters and things, as the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in 
England, whether existing by virtue of statute or otherwise, and the Colonial 
Court of Admiralty may exercise such jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an 
extent as the High Court in England, and shall have the same regard as that Court 
to international law and the comity of nations.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 E Walker, op cit, 269. 
8 Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (26 Vict. C24). 
9 The only case reported in Natal is that of In re The Ship Myvanwy (1883) 4 NLR 43.  Whilst Smith v Davis, op cit, 
was not an Admiralty case, because the Plaintiff wished to take advantage of the more favourable Roman Dutch rule 
in regard to the apportionment of liability in collision cases, De Villiers CJ made the point that it could have been 
pursued in the Vice-Admiralty Court. The only reports of actions brought in that court in the Cape Colony prior to 
1890 appear to be those of the Black Swan, supra; Irvine & Co. v ‘Elise’ (1877) 7 Buch. 148 and Thomson, Watson 
& Co v Wieting and others (The Formica) (1883) 2 SC 197. 
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No pre-union South African court was ever declared to be a Colonial Court of Admiralty but all 
four of the colonies which in 1910 became the Union of South Africa were British possessions 
and the High and Supreme Courts of those colonies accordingly qualified as Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty although in the case of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony this was academic. 
Even in the coastal colonies there is, however, little evidence in the reported cases of the 
jurisdiction under this Act being invoked before Union in 1910. 
 
 The creation of the Union of South Africa did not affect the operation of the Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty Act in South Africa and the several divisions of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa became Colonial Courts of Admiralty upon their creation. The legal history was 
summarised in the following way by Botha JA in Trivett & Co (Pty) Limited v Wm. Brandt’s 
Sons & Co Limited
11: 
 
‘It is clear that the four British Colonies which in 1910 became the Union of South Africa 
in terms of sec. 4 of the South Africa Act …were British possessions within the meaning 
of that expression in sec. 2(1) of the Colonial Court of Admiralty Act, 1890, and that 
every court of law which in those colonies had unlimited civil jurisdiction, became, in 
terms of that section, a Colonial Court of Admiralty with the jurisdiction conferred by the 
1890 Act. 
The Union of South Africa was clearly also a British possession within the meaning of 
that expression in sec. 2(1) of the 1890 Act and it is, therefore, also clear that the several 
Divisions of the Supreme Court of the Union of South Africa also became Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty in terms of the said sec. 2(1), for they were Courts of law which had 
unlimited civil jurisdiction in a British possession. 
The jurisdiction exercised by them as Courts of Admiralty in the Union of South Africa 
being prescribed by the Act of 1890, that Act accordingly applied in the Union. It was 
accordingly not necessary to provide for its continuation in the Union of South Africa by 
sec. 135 of the South Africa Act, 1909, and it probably never was the intention to do so. 
Sec. 135 was concerned more with the continuation of existing Colonial laws in the 
respective Provinces of the Union, and not with the 1890 Act which, by reason of the 
definition of British possession, was applicable to the whole of the Union as a single 
British possession. 
The application in the Union of South Africa of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 
1890, was recognised by sec. 6 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (22 Geo. 5 C5), as 
read with sec. 3 of the Status of the Union Act, 69 of 1934, and by the proviso to sec.106 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vic. C27). 
11 1975 (3) SA 423 (A) 432H-433C. 
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of the South Africa Act, 1909, and … immediately prior to the commencement of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961, the 1890 Act was in force in the 
Union of South Africa.’ 
 
 The existence of the admiralty jurisdiction did not carry with it any great volume of work 
and very little substantive decision-making in Admiralty matters is to be found in the law reports. 
Certainly there was no consideration of the nature and effect of the action in rem and most of the 
reported cases deal either with procedural matters or with whether particular claims fell within 
the jurisdiction
12
 or with issues arising from the arrest of vessels such as the maintenance of the 
crew.13  
 
 If the course of the argument in The Owners, Master and Crew of the SS ‘Humber’ v The 
Owners and Master of the SS ‘Answald’
14 is any guide there appears to have been little 
understanding of the nature and scope of the admiralty jurisdiction. That was a collision case 
which the plaintiffs sought to pursue in the Supreme Court by way of an attachment ad 
fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem of the SS ‘Answald’. The parochial jurisdiction was 
invoked and the case failed on the basis that both parties were peregrini and the collision had 
occurred outside South African territorial waters. An endeavour to rescue the situation on appeal 
by equating these proceedings with an admiralty action in rem failed. The case is interesting for 
present purposes because it is clear that the claim could have been pursued by way of an action in 
rem before the same court sitting as a Colonial Court of Admiralty. The fact that it was not - as is 
                                                 
12 See for example The ‘SS Keratos’ v The ‘SS Fabian’ 1921 CPD 148; Ex parte Lampert & Holt Limited : In re mv 
Edouard Giroud 1933 CPD 138; Foss Launch & Tug Company v SV Commodore 1943 NPD 27. The arcane nature 
of the jurisdiction is illustrated by the fact that Searle J thought it appropriate to write and have reported a judgment 
on the straightforward issue of when a writ in an action in rem and a warrant of arrest could be issued.  Ex parte 
Government of the United States of America : In re SS Union Carrier 1950 (1) SA 880 (C). In the Cape the practice 
grew up of applying to court for the issue of a warrant of arrest notwithstanding that this was unnecessary in terms of 
the Admiralty Rules. See Foss Launch & Tug Company v SV Commodore, supra. 
13 See for example In re The ‘Gwydyr Castle’ (1920) 41 NLR 231; The Assouan (1921) 42 NLR 33; The Eros (1922) 
43 NLR 137. 
14 1912 AD 546. 
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perfectly clear from reading the judgments in the court a quo
15
 - is at least some indication that 
the bringing of maritime proceedings before the court sitting in the exercise of its admiralty 
jurisdiction was not an everyday occurrence at the time. Had it been, it is difficult to conceive 
that a substantial case of this nature would not have been brought before the court in the exercise 
of that jurisdiction. 
 
 In the result, until 1961 there were only four reported cases that dealt with substantive 
matters of maritime law in the context of an admiralty action in rem before a court sitting as a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty. Two that came from Natal were those of In re SS Mangoro
16
 and 
Crooks & Co v Agricultural Co-Operative Union Limited
17
 both of which dealt with questions of 
priorities in the distribution of a fund arising from the sale of a vessel by the court acting in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction. One case from the Cape dealt with sovereign immunity.18  
The last one from the Eastern Cape dealt with a collision in Port Elizabeth harbour19 but other 
than a passing statement that the action was one in rem it has no other trace of an admiralty 
provenance. 
 
 In 1961 South Africa became a Republic but there is little indication that this awakened the 
admiralty jurisdiction from its relatively somnolent state. A far more important date is 1967 when 
the Suez Canal was closed following upon the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt. Prior to 
that date, as Friedman J explained20 the position was that: 
 
‘[M]ost ships calling at our ports carried full insurance, consisting of hull insurance, 
                                                 
15 In re SS ‘Humber’ v SS ‘Answald’ 1912 NPD 208. 
16 (1913) 34 NLR 67. 
17 1922 AD 423. The judgment a quo is reported as In re SS ‘Beaver’ (1921) 42 NLR 216. 
18
 De Howorth v SS India:  Mann George & Co. (Delagoa) Limited v The SS India 1921 CPD 451. 
19 South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Company Limited 1958 (3) SA 419 (A). The judgment does 
not deal with any substantive issue of maritime law but with the effect of an exemption clause in a towage contract. 
20 DB Friedman ‘Maritime Law in Practice and in the Courts’ 1985 SALJ 45 46. 
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which covered the ship against most forms of physical damage, and the cover provided by 
their membership of the so-called P&I (i.e. Protection and Indemnity) clubs. The latter, in 
effect, provided the ship and its owner with whatever liability cover was not provided 
under the hull policy. Such cover included 25% of damage caused by collision with fixed 
and floating objects (the remaining 75% being covered by the hull policy), wreck removal 
and oil pollution liability, liability for death of and injury to crew, and perhaps most 
significantly, liability in respect of cargo claims. I say ‘most significantly’, since by far 
the greater part of maritime claims in practice concerns, in one way or another, loss of or 
damage to cargo. Nearly all, if not all, of this insurance was placed in London, and all the 
P&I clubs were controlled and administered in England. On the other side of the coin, the 
insurance cover effected by cargo, was likewise effected with insurers based in England. 
 
In other words, most shipping claims arising in South Africa concerned English insurers 
and, in particular cargo claims, were, in essence, claims by an English underwriter against 
a P&I club. Consequently most shipping claims were dealt with in London, usually on a 
‘knock for knock’ basis and often by means of arbitration before English arbitration 
tribunals. The role of the South African lawyer in relation to such claims was confined, 
by and large, to that of investigating claims with the assistance of marine surveyors and 
insurance assessors and reporting to his instructing solicitors in London. Other than this, 
his work consisted of participating at maritime enquiries into collisions; and occasional 
litigation against the South Africa Railways and Harbours arising out of the alleged 
negligence of those in control of tugs, in relation to collision claims, and of crane 
operators and stevedores, in relation to cargo claims.’ 
  
 Other factors were also relevant. The mass of shipping litigation to which we are now 
accustomed was less present at that time even in a centre of maritime litigation such as London.21  
Generally speaking before 1967 levels of litigation internationally were relatively low if 
compared with the current position. Virtually everywhere in the world there has been an 
explosion of litigation since that time reflected in the enormous pressures placed on courts 
throughout the world, congestion of court rolls and, in most countries, a very substantial increase 
in the number of members of the judiciary. Whilst it is correct therefore that the level of maritime 
litigation in South Africa was relatively low prior to 1967 that was part of a wider phenomenon.  
 
 This increased litigiousness was accompanied in the period from the end of the Second 
World War to the mid to late 1970's by a period of profound change in world shipping. At its 
commencement major shipping lines based in a small group of Western countries conducted most 
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of the world’s shipping trade. During this period that oligopoly was broken. Changes that 
commenced prior to the Second World War escalated after the war. Entrepreneurs took advantage 
of post-war conditions and seized the opportunity of increasing trade, such as the expanding trade 
in oil and the consequent development of fleets of tankers for the transport of oil. In the process 
the face of international shipping changed radically.   
 
 This change in the shipping industry was reflected in a substantial change in the manner in 
which ship owners conducted their affairs. There were considerable shifts in patterns of ship 
registration from the traditional position where vessels were registered in the state of their owners 
and flew the flag of that state, to the use of flags of convenience, where the link between the 
vessel’s owners and the state in which it is registered is minimal or non-existent. Although there 
are earlier historical examples, for modern purposes the use of flags of convenience starts with 
the creation of the first open ships’ registry, that is one which permitted non-citizens to own and 
control vessels carrying its flag. Legislation enabling this to happen was enacted in Panama 
in1925 under pressure from American shipowners seeking to avoid the impact of Prohibition and 




 describes the growth of 
flags of convenience in the 1930's as follows: 
 
‘During the same period the United Fruit Company’s fleet of banana vessels was 
transferred from the United States flag to that of Honduras.  
The worsening political situation in Europe in the 1930s provided considerable impetus to 
the flags of convenience. In 1935, the 25 vessels forming the Esso Baltic fleet were 
transferred from the flag of the Free City of Danzig to that of Panama. During the Spanish 
Civil War a number of Spanish vessels made use of the Panamanian flag and many Greek 
owners re-flagged their ships in Panama to avoid the non-intervention blockade imposed 
by Great Britain and other powers. High crewing costs under the Greek flag in the pre-
war years also led to growing use of the Panamanian flag by Greek operators. In 1932, 
Manuel Kulukundis registered the Mount Athos under Panamanian flag; this was followed 
                                                                                                                                                              
21 Wiswall, op cit, 148 notes that in 1946 according to figures furnished to him by the Admiralty Registrar there were 
only 100 cases brought before the Admiralty Court in England and this had grown to 350 in 1966. Even allowing for 
arbitrations that is not a vast body of litigation, but it does indicate the beginning of the trend to more litigation. 
22 M Stopford, Maritime Economics (2nd Ed), 434 - 440. 
23 N P Ready in R Coles, Ship Registration: Law and Practice (4th Ed), 18-19. B A Boczek, Flags of Convenience, 
(1962), 9 - 12 
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by a number of vessels in the Onassis fleet. 
Following the outbreak of war between the European powers in 1939, the Panamanian 
flag saw a further influx of United States tonnage seeking to avoid the provisions of the 
United States Neutrality Act preventing the carriage in American ships of cargoes 
destined for belligerents on either side. The transfers to the Panamanian flag were in 
many cases made with the connivance of the United States Government which saw to the 
arming of American-owned Panamanian flag vessels and the extension of war risk cover 
to such vessels. There seems also to have been some Axis use of the Panama flag during 
the hostilities....’ 
 
 Notwithstanding these developments the principal growth in the use of flags of 
convenience as a major component of world shipping occurred only after the Second World War. 
In 1949 Liberia was established as a flag of convenience registry operating through a Liberian 
Trust Company with offices in New York and Zurich24 and Costa Rica followed soon 
afterwards.25 In 1952 there were 4 million gross registered tons under Panlibhonco flags.  By 
1954 this had grown to 6 million gross registered tons and by 1956 to 11 million tons.  In 1967 
Liberia surpassed the United Kingdom as the largest ships’ registry in the world.26 By 2000 
Liberia and Panama accounted for 7741 ships and more than 165 million gross register tons, 
which was over a quarter of all world tonnage27. Figures suggest that more than half the world’s 
shipping is now registered under flags of convenience with a number of smaller countries using 
an open registry as a means of attracting foreign exchange and foreign business.
28
 
                                                 
24 Boczek, op cit, 12. Details can be found on http://www.offshore-manual.com/taxhavens/liberia/html.  The impetus  
to establish this registry came from America. Cole, op cit paras 2.18, 19. Stopford, op cit, 434 points out that after 
the United States government sold off Liberty Ships to American owners in terms of the Merchant Sales Act, 1946 
some 150 ships were registered in Panama to take advantage of the liberal registration and tax benefits available with 
that registration.  
25 The expression Panlibhonco is used as a collective description of the Panamanian, Liberian, Honduran and Costa 
Rican flags of convenience. According to Boczek, op cit, 14 the Costa Rican registry commenced in 1949 and 
peaked in 1958 after which it declined. 
26 http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/flagcov.html. 
27 Cole, op cit, 19.In the three years between the second and third editions of this book the number of vessels 
registered in these two countries had increased by more than 600 and the tonnage by 32 million gross registered tons. 
Stopford, op cit, 436 - 437, identified the principal registries as those of Liberia, Panama, Cyprus, Bahamas, Malta, 
Bermuda and Vanuatu. Boczek, op cit, 16-25 has a number of tables showing the growth in flag of convenience 
registrations from 1954 to 1961. 
28 The International Transport Workers’ Federation, which has long conducted a campaign against the use of flags of 
convenience, in 1997 had designated Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Burma, 
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 The rights and wrongs of this change in the pattern of worldwide ship ownership are not 
relevant for present purposes.29 Three effects that are relevant to the associated ship jurisdiction 
should however be noted. Firstly ship ownership became more diverse and international and 
ceased to be confined to a relatively small group of shipowners predominantly located in Western 
Europe and North America. Secondly, the fragmentation of ship ownership by placing each 
vessel in a separate ship-owning company was relatively inexpensive and held out tax and other 
financial advantages to shipowners, particularly the powerful benefits of anonymity, separate 
corporate personality and limited liability. Thirdly, whilst not necessarily a universal truth 
applicable to all shipowners who made use of flag of convenience registrations and certainly one 
that has diminished as such use has become more widespread30, there are grounds for thinking 
that, in the initial phases of this development, standards of seaworthiness and safety and the 
quality and qualifications of crew were generally lower and the level of regulatory supervision 
considerably less with the flags of convenience vessels. This was inevitably something that 




 The upsurge in marine traffic around the coast of South Africa after 1967 occurred against 
this background. A greater number of ships, some of debatable seaworthiness, passed our shores 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu and Vanuatu as flag of 
convenience registries.   
29 Cole, op cit, 19-25. The subject is considered in depth in Boczek, op cit, 26-90. 
30 Cole, op cit, 20-21. Stopford, op cit, says (at 438): ‘Although open registries developed a mixed reputation in the 
1980s, the commercial pressures to ‘flag out’ have continued and many large shipping corporations eventually and 
often reluctantly, abandoned their national flag in favour of open registries. In some cases the national flag responded 
by setting up its own open register. Thus, in the 1990s open registers have, for the main part fallen in line with 
regulatory practice and this form of ship ownership has become accepted practice.’  
31 Cole, op cit, 20 notes that casualty records of open registry vessels reveal a considerably higher rate of losses than 
in the traditional maritime countries and sets out the reasons identified by UNCTAD for vessels on these registries 
having lower safety standards. It is no surprise to find that one of the leading websites dealing with flag of 
convenience vessels is entitled http://www.stoptherustbuckets.info/engels/flaghtm Cole, op cit, 20-23 further says 
that this is a criticism that is increasingly regarded as  unjustified.  It is undoubtedly true however that at the time the 
Act was under development there was a widespread view amongst maritime lawyers in South Africa that there were 
many ‘rustbuckets’ amongst the vessels passing through South African waters.  
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and called at our ports.32  This increase in traffic in conjunction with a more litigious 
environment led increasingly to litigants seeking resort to South African courts. In view of the 
jurisdictional limitations of the parochial courts, which limited access to South African plaintiffs 
and foreigners where the litigation had some South African connection, lawyers turned to the 
admiralty jurisdiction and the action in rem as a means of pursuing claims on behalf of foreign 
clients. The awakening of the somnolent admiralty jurisdiction prompted the riposte that since 
South Africa had become a Republic in 1961 and was no longer a British possession the status of 
South African courts as Colonial Courts of Admiralty had fallen away completely33. That 
contention was, however, rejected when first raised34 and in due course was laid to rest by the 
Appellate Division,
35
 which held that the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act had been specifically 
preserved by the statute under which the Republic of South Africa was constituted.36 
 
 Free from any threat to its existence the admiralty jurisdiction flourished as the rapidly 
expanding list of cases published in the law reports demonstrates.37 Of course many more cases 
                                                 
32 Friedman J, op cit, 46 described the position in the following terms: ‘After the closure of the Suez Canal, as most 
of you probably recall, the volume of traffic to South African ports increased enormously. This traffic included ships 
which had previously been employed carrying cargo from port to port along the Mediterranean and through the 
Canal to the Persian Gulf area. Many of them were not fit to undertake the more lengthy voyage around the Cape, 
were owned or managed by undercapitalised companies, and were not always fully insured. A consequence of this 
was that the South African ship-repair industry boomed when these ships were forced to call at South African ports 
for essential repairs; but the repair bill was not always met, and thus started a series of attachments and delays to the 
ship which, because of the owner’s parlous financial state, led to large-scale legal work locally.’ 
 33 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961. In the Second Reading debate on the Bill that became the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, 5 of 1972 the question was raised whether there was any point in the Act in 
view of the possibility that the effect of South Africa becoming a republic had been to abolish the jurisdiction of the 
courts sitting as colonial courts of admiralty. Hansard, Vol 37, columns 450 - 452 and 543.  
34 Tharros Shipping Corporation SA v Owner of the Ship ‘Golden Ocean’ 1972 (4) SA316 (N) 319F-321A 
35
 Trivett & Co (Pty) Limited v Wm Brandt’s Sons & Co. Limited 1975 (3) SA 423 (A) dismissing an appeal from the 
judgment in Wm Brandt’s Sons & Co. Limited v The ‘Waikiwi Pioneer’ and others 1974 (4) SA 351 (N). 
36 The relevant provision was section 107 which read as follows: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, all laws 
which were in force in any part of the Union of South Africa or in any territory in respect of which Parliament is 
competent to legislate, immediately prior to the commencement of this Act, shall continue in force until repealed or 
amended by the competent authority.’ 
37 Peca Enterprises (Pty) Limited and another v Registrar of Supreme Court, Natal N.O. and others, supra; Ex parte 
The Crew, m.v. ‘Caracas Bay’ 1977 (4) SA 945 (C);  Beaver Marine Limited v Wuest 1978 (4) SA 263 (A); Owners 
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were dealt with without attracting the attention of the law reporters. At the same time there was a 
corresponding increase in maritime cases heard by the courts in the exercise of their ordinary 
jurisdiction. South African insurers were moving into the market previously dominated by 
English insurers and preferred litigation in this country to foreign litigation or arbitration. The 
opening of the Richards Bay harbour for the handling of various commodities in bulk saw the 
entry into the market of Far Eastern shipping interests and international commodity traders
38
, 
whose involvement was connected with attempts by the then South African government to avoid 
the effects of international sanctions against this country.39 The effect was to increase the volume 
of maritime legal work in South Africa.  
 
 As it became apparent that the lawyers and courts in South Africa were capable of handling 
this increased body of litigation there were increasing endeavours by foreign claimants to invoke 
the jurisdiction of South African courts. This was facilitated by the expedient of foreign 
claimants ceding their claims to South African companies, usually companies controlled by 
South African attorneys and established for the very purpose of taking cession of, pursuing and 
accounting for the proceeds of such claims.
40
 The usual reason for ceding a claim rather than 
proceeding in admiralty was that the claim fell outside the limited list of claims in respect of 
which the Colonial Court of Admiralty enjoyed jurisdiction under the 1840 and 1860 Acts. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
and/or Master of the m.v. ‘Motoria’ and others v Omnipex Overseas SA 1979 (3) SA 616 (C); Kandagasabapathy 
and others v m.v. Melina Tsiris 1981 (3) SA 950 (N); Agencia Nasionale de Freite E Navegaco v The m.v. ‘Enrique 
de Asquinado’ 1981 (2) PH M52 (N); Magat and others v m.v.  Houda Pearl 1982 (2) SA 37 (N); Intercontinental 
Export Company (Pty) Ltd v m.v. Dien Danielsen  1982 (3) SA 534 (N);.  Quick & Louw & Moore (Pty) Ltd and 
another v SS Almoural and others 1982 (3) SA 406 (C); Owner of m.v ‘Aegean Sun’ v Caisse Generale de 
Perequation Aif de Prix BP 1982 (4) SA 625 (C); Magat and others v m.v. Houda Pearl 1983 (3) SA 421 (N); 
Alahaji Mai Deribe & Sons v The Ship ‘Golden Togo’ 1986 (1) SA 505 (N).  
38 Friedman, op cit, 47. 
39 It is no co-incidence that the first major litigation under the Act, once it came into force, arose from the collapse of 
the Eddie Hsu shipping line, which consisted of relatively modern bulk carriers, at least four of which were arrested 
and sold by order of South African courts. The Marc Rich organisation based in Switzerland was a frequent litigant 
in South African courts in cases involving commodity trading - especially coal.   
40 Bird v Lawclaims (Pty) Limited, 1976 (4) SA 726 (D); Hare v Banimar Shipping Co SA 1978 (4) SA 578 (C). The 
practice was halted by the decision in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S and others v Hartless (Pty) Limited 1982 (2) SA 710 (A) 
but that decision was soon overtaken by the Act coming into force thereby doing away with the need to resort to such 
expedients. 
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fact that resort was had to such a device illustrates the pressure to broaden the scope of South 
African Courts’ jurisdiction in respect of maritime claims. 
 
 This massive increase in maritime litigation in South Africa served to highlight the 
anomalies attendant upon its dual jurisdiction and the outdated nature of its maritime law and 
procedure. The need for reform became pressing. That reform came with the passing of the Act in 
1983 and with it the introduction of the jurisdiction based upon an associated ship arrest. How 





THE ROAD TO THE ASSOCIATED SHIP. 
 
1 THE PROCESS OF REFORM : 
 
 The increasing volume of marine traffic around South Africa and the concomitant growth 
in maritime litigation in the latter part of the 1960's highlighted the difficulties inherent in South 
Africa’s dual maritime jurisdiction.
1
 As Durban and Richards Bay are the busiest ports in South 
Africa the bulk of maritime litigation took place in Natal and there was constant jockeying for 
advantage between the two jurisdictions, as litigants sought either to take advantage of, or avoid, 
the decision in The SS ‘Mangoro’2. It was impermissible for the court sitting as a Colonial Court 
of Admiralty to take account of international developments in maritime law during the previous 
seventy-five years.
3
 With a jurisprudence ossified at 1890 the relevant legal materials for 
admiralty proceedings were relatively inaccessible.   
 
 The parochial jurisdiction remained parochial in character and was as a result inaccessible 
(and incomprehensible) to many potential litigants. The Roman Dutch law, like the English 
admiralty law at 1890, had not developed in the light of international developments, save for the 
incorporation of certain provisions governing limitation and the Hague Rules in the Merchant 
                                                 
1 Mr D J Shaw QC, ultimately the principal author of the Act, described the position in the following terms in a 
report to the AGM of the Maritime Law Association on the 29th September 1978: ‘… the law itself is not only 
antiquated [but] difficult to find and contradictory between the two main maritime provinces’. He went on to say: ‘‘If 
one could get the law straight then I think that one has made a great advance because the law, as everyone knows in 
the Cape we have the English law, in Natal we have the last outpost of the Roman-Dutch law in the Admiralty field 
and in neither case is the law readily available because in each case we are dealing with outmoded statutes. We are 
well behind in the field of any development.’ 
2 (1913) 34 NLR 67. The jockeying was confined to Natal because in the case of conflict between the two systems 
the law in the Cape Province was by statute English law. However this created the absurdity that in the two principal 
maritime jurisdictions in South Africa the law was different so that an arrest in Cape Town might have different 
consequences from an arrest in Durban. 
3 The Yuri Maru and Woron [1927] AC 906 (PC); Tharros Shipping Corporation SA v Owner of the Ship ‘Golden 
Ocean’ 1972 (4) SA 316 (N). 
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Shipping Act.4 The relevant legal material in the form of writings by Roman Dutch writers and 
the various ordinances touching upon maritime affairs to be found in the Groot Placaat Boek
5
 
was neither readily available nor, bearing in mind that it was written in either Latin or High 
Dutch and much of it had not been translated into either English or Afrikaans, accessible or 
comprehensible to the majority of practitioners, much less potential litigants. Helpful though that 
material may be in exploring the history of the development of maritime law it was not sufficient 
to constitute a coherent body of legal principle appropriate to the determination of maritime 
disputes in a Twentieth Century environment of international trade. Not surprisingly pressure for 
reform mounted and one of the purposes of establishing the Maritime Law Association in 1974 




 The first attempt to reform South African maritime law occurred with the passage of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 5 of 1972. However, this was a misconceived attempt 
because it did not seek to address the real difficulties relating to jurisdiction, procedures and the 
applicable law. Claire Dillon described it thus: 
 
‘A half-hearted attempt at reform was made … when the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 5 of 1972 was passed. The Act was doomed to failure as it did not attempt 
to amend comprehensively the jurisdiction and law of admiralty courts in South Africa ...  
It repeals the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890 insofar as it applies in South 
Africa and vests the ‘powers and jurisdiction’ of admiralty courts in the provincial and 
local divisions of the Supreme Court. The admiralty jurisdiction of the various divisions 
is seemingly still to be that of the English Admiralty Court as in 1890, an assumption 
confirmed by the fact that the jurisdiction was transferred to those divisions 
‘notwithstanding the repeal’ of the 1890 Act. No provision is made for the law to be 
applied in the Supreme Court when exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, but presumably 
‘powers and jurisdiction’ will include the substantive admiralty law of England as fixed at 
                                                 
4 Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951, ss 261-263 (limitation) and ss 307-310 (Hague Rules).  
5 Assuming those to have been incorporated into South African law. R v Harrison and Dryburgh 1922 AD 320. In 
Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) 665C Leon J correctly described the 
Roman Dutch law as applied in maritime cases as ‘largely fragmentary and relatively undeveloped as a modern 
system of mercantile law’. 
6 At the inaugural meeting of the MLA on the 21st February 1974 it was agreed at the outset that one of  its aims 
would be: ‘To promote legislation for the elimination of the archaic aspects of the shipping laws of the Republic and 
the introduction of laws conforming to modern practice throughout the world and to consolidate all such laws.’ 
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1890.  The overlapping jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, when exercising its ordinary 
jurisdiction and when exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, is not removed. The Act 
therefore merely vests outdated admiralty jurisdiction in all the divisions of the Supreme 
Court and makes no serious attempt at reform.’7   
 
Fortunately the shortcomings of this Act were recognised relatively rapidly and it was never 
brought into operation.  
 
 The broader review that was clearly necessary commenced in 1977 when the South African 
Law Commission was requested to undertake a review of the law of admiralty
8
 after the Maritime 
Law Association of South Africa had made representations to the Department of Justice. On the 
15
th
 September 1982 the Law Commission published its Report
9
 together with a draft Bill. After 
                                                 
7 C Dillon and J.P. van Niekerk, South African Maritime Law and Marine Insurance : Selected Topics, 21. See also 
H Booysen, ‘Admiraliteitshowe in the Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’, 1973 THRHR 241 256-259.  He concluded that the only 
intelligible construction to put upon the Act was that it preserved two separate courts. At a meeting of the executive 
of the MLA on the 15th November 1974 it was decided: ‘… that as a prerequisite to establishing rules regulating 
procedures in Admiralty in the Republic it was essential to bring about an amendment of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act No 5 of 1972 to define precisely the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts in South Africa.’ A two 
person committee was established to undertake the task of motivating amendments to the Act, defining the proposed 
jurisdiction and preparing rules. The committee reported on the 15th April 1977. In the Report of the President of the 
MLA of the same date it was recorded that the committee’s report would be sent by the Department of Justice to the 
Law Commission for consideration   
8 For that purpose Mr. D.J. Shaw QC was appointed as an additional member of the Commission and paragraph 9 of 
its report reflects his role in the following terms: ‘Mr. D.J. Shaw QC was appointed an ad hoc member of the 
Commission for the purpose of this project because of his specialised knowledge of the subject.  He has done most of 
the research on behalf of the Commission. He has also drafted the proposed legislation. Mr. Shaw has indeed 
rendered invaluable services to the Commission through all stages of the investigation.’ It appears that the MLA may 
have suggested that this appointment be made as the Report of its President in April 1977 records that: ‘The Minister 
has requested that the Commission give the matter priority and if necessary, engage the services of persons other 
than members of the Commission so as to ensure that the amendments to the Act are introduced to Parliament during 
the next session.’. Mr Shaw was appointed in December 1977. It was reported at the executive committee meeting on 
the 29th September 1978 that pursuant to the developments in regard to the 1972 Act Mr Shaw had been appointed. 
On the following day Mr Shaw reported on progress thus far to the AGM of the MLA. It became apparent at that 
stage that there would not simply be a revision of the 1972 Act but an attempt to produce ‘a statute which will 
comprehensively deal with the rules and procedures relating to the Admiralty Law’, something which he recognised 
would be a ‘very large task’. 
9 South African Law Commission, Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty, project 32 (1982). In addition to 
the Report I have had access to Mr. Shaw’s initial draft of the Act, prepared at the end of 1979, and an accompanying 
explanatory memorandum furnished by him to the Law Commission (‘the 1979 memorandum’); a revised draft and 
somewhat fuller explanatory memorandum (‘the 1980 memorandum’) prepared in October 1980; proposed 
amendments to the Act dated the 9th December 1980 arising from discussions at a meeting of the Law Commission 
on the 1st December 1980 and a general meeting of the MLA; a further draft dated October 1981 and two further 
drafts in 1983 after the publication of the Report.  he 1979 and 1980 memoranda and the accompanying draft bills 
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some further debate and re-drafting the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 was 






 From the outset it is apparent that the process of reform would involve an amalgam of the 
existing jurisdiction and procedures of both the Colonial Courts of Admiralty and the Supreme 
Court in combination with an adaptation of the old terminology from English admiralty 
proceedings to the new regime. In the 1979 memorandum the following is said about the action 
in rem: 
 
‘Among the most important procedural matters is the preservation and extension of the 
present procedure in rem which exists in the Courts of Admiralty in the Republic which 
sit by virtue of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. Experience shows that the 
procedure in rem is the most and frequently the only effective method of enforcing 
admiralty claims.  It has greatly increased in importance certainly in the United States of 
America and, I believe in the United Kingdom with the reduction, in some cases almost to 
the point of disappearance, of companies carrying on a regular, that is liner, service. In 
the present situation the most frequent need in the Admiralty Court is to provide a remedy 
against the owner of a vessel which is the only asset of the company which owns it. 
Common law proceedings by way of attachment to found jurisdiction are frequently 
ineffectual to enforce the claimant’s rights because many jurisdictions do not recognise a 
judgment founded on attachment.  In those circumstances it seems to me to be essential to 
preserve and to bring up to date the provisions relating to proceedings in rem.’ 
 
 
 The accompanying draft Bill also provided for an action in personam. Whatever may be 
said about the continued existence of an action in personam in admiralty it is clear that the action 
in personam in the draft came from the ordinary form of action in the Supreme Court, as the High 
                                                                                                                                                              
are contained in appendices 1 and 2. The initial draft Bill and the 1979 memorandum were circulated to the Judges 
President of the proposed Maritime Divisions, individual judges and practitioners and the Maritime Law Association.  
The 1980 second draft and 1980 memorandum were similarly circulated in October 1980 as were the proposed 
amendments arising from the December 1980 meetings, which were circulated in February 1981. See paragraphs 8.2 
to 8.4 of the Report.  I have also had access to the minutes of the MLA which reflect the history and contain several 
reports by Mr Shaw to the members of the MLA concerning progress on the Bill. 
10 Even the title of the Act was a late change introduced by the very last draft in which both the short and long title 
were amended. In all earlier drafts including the draft annexed to the Law Commission Report the Bill’s short title 
was either the Admiralty Courts Jurisdiction Act or the Admiralty Courts Act. Notwithstanding what appeared in the 
various drafts of the Bill the MLA minutes persistently refer to it as the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and 
perhaps this influenced the final title. The other possibility is that it had become apparent that the scope of the Bill 
was limited to courts and their admiralty jurisdiction and was thus of more limited scope than had initially been 
intended. 
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Court was then known. With an incola defendant an action in personam would be available on 
relatively conventional grounds. With a peregrinus the proposed action in personam was 
essentially the common law action based upon the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem as appears from the following passage from the 1979 memorandum: 
 
‘5(b)(ii) In actions in personam I have thought it desirable to preserve the rules with 
regard to attachments to found jurisdiction but to do away with the necessity that the 
Plaintiff should be an incola, a requirement which has produced the practice of ceding 
claims to companies set up for the purpose only of receiving cession and enforcing claims 
chiefly maritime claims.11 As the peregrinus may be required to give security for costs it 
does not seem to me that any hardship is involved. As attachment in personam is itself a 
feature originally of admiralty actions and as I understand it still prevails in the United 
States I can see no need for doing away with this requirement.’ 
 
 Outwardly the ambit of these reforms did not appear to be extensive. The action in rem 
taken from English admiralty proceedings was retained but applied to a greater range of claims 
and extended by the availability of sister ship arrests. Whilst a considerably more extensive 
jurisdiction than that enjoyed by the courts sitting as Colonial Courts of Admiralty it went little 
further than any regime established in England or Europe as a result of the Arrest Convention. 
The proposed action in personam was drawn directly from the Roman Dutch law and had no 
immediate equivalent in English law.  Its scope was broader inasmuch as the remedy was now 
available to everyone, both incolae and peregrini. The effect of removing the restrictions that had 
previously existed in the case of peregrini, namely that the cause of action required some 
connection with South Africa in order for jurisdiction to be established by way of attachment, 
substantially extended the potential availability of this procedure as a means of founding 
jurisdiction in South Africa. However, as the procedure in rem was to be available to the same 
class of claimants in respect of the same class of maritime claims this departure from the 
traditional restrictions that South African law imposed in an action in which jurisdiction was 




 The proposals departed from the English position and other common law jurisdictions that 
applied English admiralty law because in those countries an action in personam supported by an 
attachment of property was not feasible. It also departed from the position in Europe, where the 
action in rem did not exist. Its closest parallel was with the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in 
the United States of America.
12
 In the exercise of its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
13
 the 
action in rem had become part of American admiralty law. However in an early judgment14 the 
concept of the maritime lien emerged (or was endorsed) and the action in rem was held to be 
linked inextricably to the existence of a maritime lien. The result was that in the USA the action 
in rem diverged from its English roots. This distinction is apparent from Supplemental Rule C(1) 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 This was written at a time when the validity of such cessions had been upheld by lower courts and before the 
judgment of the Appellate Division in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S and others v Hartless (Pty) Limited 1982 (2) SA 710 
(A). 
12 A full description of the practice in admiralty and maritime matters is set out in Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, 
Vol 29 particularly chapter 702. Supplemental Rule B deals with in personam actions and Supplemental Rule C with 
in rem actions. 
13 This jurisdiction is recognised under the Constitution of the United States of America and was the subject of early 
statutory regulation by way of An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, Act of September 29, 
1789, 1 Stat, Ch. 21 and an Act for Regulating the Processes in the Courts of the United States and Providing 
Compensations for the Offices of the said Courts and for Jurors and Witnesses, Act of May 8, 1792 Stat, 1 Ch. 36, 
both of which provided that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction would be in accordance with civil law and the 
principles, rules and usages of courts of admiralty. From an early stage and under the influence of Justice Story that 
jurisdiction was taken to be extensive. His seminal judgment in De Lovio v Boit 7 Fed Cas 418 (No 3376)(C C Mass 
1815) involved a reconsideration of English admiralty jurisdiction and a rejection of the approach by the English 
common law courts. Story concluded: ‘In all the great maritime nations of Europe, the terms ‘admiralty jurisdiction’ 
are uniformly applied to the courts exercising jurisdiction over maritime contracts and concerns. We shall find the 
terms just as familiarly known among the jurists of Scotland, France, Holland and Spain, as well as England, and 
applied to their own courts, possessing substantially the same jurisdiction as the English admiralty in the reign of 
Edward the Third.’ His conclusion was that: ‘The language of the constitution will therefore warrant the most liberal 
interpretation; and it may not be unfit to hold that it had reference to that maritime jurisdiction which commercial 
convenience, public policy and national rights have contributed to establish, with slight local differences, over all 
Europe; that jurisdiction which under the name of consular courts, first established itself upon the shore of the 
Mediterranean, and, from the general equity and simplicity of its proceedings, soon commended itself to all the 
maritime states; that jurisdiction, in short, which collecting the wisdom of the civil law, and combining it with the 
customs and usages of the sea, produced the venerable Consolato del Mare, and still continues in its decisions to 
regulate the commerce, the intercourse, and the welfare of mankind...’ NJ Healy and DJ Sharpe, Admiralty: Cases 
and Materials (2nd Ed, 1986) 13 say that Justice Story had written the judgment in advance as an essay on the proper 
scope of American admiralty jurisdiction and simply awaited an opportunity to deliver it. The subject matter of the 
decision was whether a claim based on marine insurance fell within the admiralty jurisdiction. The answer was in the 
affirmative.    
14 The Nestor 18 Fed Cas 9 (No 10126)(C C Me 1831); 1 Sumner 73. It is unclear whether the term was coined in 
that judgment or was taken from an early edition of Abbott on Shipping. 
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which provides that an action in rem may be brought to enforce a maritime lien or whenever a 
statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding analogous 
thereto. Not surprisingly in a jurisdiction where the availability of the action in rem is so heavily 
dependent upon the existence of a maritime lien, ‘The scope of maritime liens is broader under 
United States law than in almost any other jurisdiction.’15 
 
 The United States has also retained the admiralty action in personam. Where there is 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in such an action either on the basis of valid service 
upon the defendant or where it has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the local forum there is no 
need for an attachment of property.16 Where, however, jurisdiction cannot be established on that 
basis but the defendant has property within the jurisdiction of the court an action in personam can 
be founded upon the maritime attachment of that property.17 This procedure is said by some 
writers on American admiralty proceedings to give rise to ‘quasi-in rem jurisdiction’.18 In 
adopting this description they regard the American courts as preserving an ancient procedure by 
way of an admiralty attachment.19 
                                                 
15
 Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29, § 705.01[1], p 705.8.  A summary of the liens recognised in the United 
States appears in § 705.02[2].  There are important statutory extensions of the classes of liens under the Federal 
Maritime Liens Act 46 U.S.C. §§ 31341-31343 and by way of the extension of the maritime lien to include preferred 
mortgages under 46 U.S.C. § 31322.  
16 Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 426. 
17 Under Supplemental Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29, § 
702.02[2][a], p 702-8; 
18
 Moore’s Federal Practice, 3rd Ed, Vol 29, § 705.04; Wiswall, op cit, 165; Tetley, International Maritime and 
Admiralty Law, 408-409. To a South African lawyer there seems to be a considerable resemblance between this 
procedure and the action in personam commenced by an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem 
under the Act. There are however differences at least of concept if not of effect in that in the United States it is said 
that in this form of proceeding jurisdiction is established by service - not the attachment - and the attachment merely 
serves to provide a fund from which any judgment can be paid. Moore, supra, 705.04 sed contra 706.02[10][a][iii], p 
706-35. 
19 Browne, op cit 434-5; Wiswall, op cit, 17. Wiswall draws a distinction between what he terms admiralty arrest and 
foreign attachment on the basis that the former involves the seizure of property in the possession of the defendant, 
whilst the latter is said to involve a seizure of a defendant’s property while in the possession of a third party. It is 
unclear on what material he bases that distinction. However there is no doubt that he is correct in saying that 
American courts have always asserted as part of their admiralty jurisdiction a right to arrest property in support of an 
action in personam. Munro v Almeida 10 Wheat (23 US) 473, 490 (1825); Miller v United States 11 Wall (78 US) 
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 The passing reference in Mr Shaw’s 1979 memorandum to a practice that ‘I understand … 
still prevails in the United States’ does not justify a conclusion that it was intended to model the 
proposed procedures in South Africa upon those applicable in the United States of America. In 
any event they are by no means identical. Unlike the United States the South African proposal for 
an action in rem was not based upon the existence of a maritime lien. In addition it followed the 
Arrest Convention in allowing for the arrest of a sister ship, whereas in the United States sister 
ship arrest is not available.
20
 That necessarily follows from the American approach that the action 
in rem must be based upon a maritime lien. South Africa was eventually to go beyond the sister 
ship arrest in permitting the arrest of an associated ship. The similarities are far more between the 
procedure for the commencement of an action in personam by way of an attachment ad 
fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem and the American procedure of establishing 
jurisdiction in an action in personam by way of the attachment of property under Supplemental 
Rule B where the defendant is not available within the court’s area of jurisdiction.21 
 
 Overall therefore the proposal was not an imitation of any jurisdiction existing anywhere 
else in the world. The proposed Act sought to merge the two broad streams of jurisdiction and 
procedure in maritime matters already existing in South Africa. These were to be incorporated in 
a unified system of admiralty jurisdiction with the one being conveniently described as the action 
in rem and the other as the action in personam. The range of claims to which they were both 
                                                                                                                                                              
268 (1870).  The position was summarised in a modern judgment in the following terms: ‘[T]he use of the process of 
attachment in civil causes of maritime jurisdiction by courts of admiralty … has prevailed during a period extending 
so far back as the authentic history of those tribunals can be traced’. Aurora Maritime Co v Abdullah Mohamed 
Faheri & Co 85 F 3d 44, 47 (2d Cir 1996) 
20 Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 408. 
21 The most important differences between the procedure under Supplementary Rule B and an action in personam in 
South Africa are the following. Firstly they lead to different forms of action with differing consequences. Secondly 
the South African procedure based on attachment of property is available both in admiralty and in the ordinary 
courts, whilst the American procedure requires the claimant to have an in personam claim cognisable in admiralty. 
Thirdly a judgment in accordance with the South African procedure is a general judgment in personam against the 
defendant and, irrespective of whether the defendant appears in the action, the judgment can be executed against all 
of the defendant’s property. In America it is only where the defendant appears that this is the case and in other 
situations the plaintiff’s judgment is enforceable only against the property attached. Fourthly this form of proceeding 
in America does not extinguish any maritime lien but that may not be the situation in South Africa under the 
provisions governing the sale of the property arrested and the distribution of the proceeds in accordance with the 
appropriate system of priorities. 
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applicable was extended and existing limitations, based upon the place of origin of the claimant 
or the place where the claim arose, were removed. Arrests of sister ships in actions in rem were 
permitted. The net effect, even at this stage, was to propose a jurisdiction that was at least as 
wide, if not wider, than that then existing anywhere in the world. In seeking to catch up with the 
rest of the world South Africa chose to place itself firmly in the vanguard as far as the scope of its 
admiralty jurisdiction was concerned.
22
    
 
 There is no reference in either the 1979 draft or the 1979 memorandum to an associated 
ship. In dealing with the definitions of the phrase ‘maritime claim’ it was pointed out in the 
memorandum that the primary sources for these definitions were the United Kingdom 
Administration of Justice Act, 1956
23
 and its progenitor the Arrest Convention. Then it is said, 
almost in passing that: 
 
‘Section 6 provides for actions in rem and in subsections (3) to (5) incorporates the 
provisions as to the so-called ‘sister ship’ arrests and the limitations of the 1952 
Convention to which I have referred.’24   
 
The section in the initial draft Bill read as follows: 
 
‘6(3) An action in rem may be brought by the arrest not only of the particular ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose but also against any other ship which is owned 
                                                 
22 I have been unable to discover in any of the South African material any of the concerns reflected in the report of 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (Report 33) on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction over adopting too expansive a 
jurisdiction. In para 96 of that Report there appears the following: ‘Excessive regard to the interests of plaintiffs may 
carry the risk that Australia will be unattractive to foreign shipping, and that freight rates will be adversely affected. 
Australian admiralty jurisdiction needs to remain within generally acceptable limits, to ensure recognition of 
judgments and judicial sales in admiralty and to maintain the position of admiralty as an exceptional and special 
jurisdiction.’ If South African experience is any guide the concern seems to have been misplaced. In any event the 
Australian concern appears to have dissipated as in 1999 they supported the United Kingdom proposal that the Arrest 
Convention should be extended by revising the sister ship jurisdiction to encompass associated ships. Berlingieri, 
Arrest of Ships, 4th Ed, 583. See also S. Derrington ‘Ship Arrest and the Admiralty Jurisdiction of Australia and 
South Africa: Too Far or Not Far Enough?’ (2005) 11 J Int Mar L 409 and P. Glover ‘Sister Ship Arrest and the 
Application of the Doctrine of Attachment in Australia: a Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis in the Wake of the 
1952 Arrest Convention’ (2008) 22 A & NZ Mar LJ 99. 
23 4 & 5 Eliz 2, C46. 
24 1979 memorandum, para. 5(c). 
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by the person who was at the time when the maritime claim arose the owner of the 
particular ship. 
(4)(a) Ships shall be deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares therein are 
owned by the same person or persons. 
(b) A person having beneficial ownership of a ship or a share in a ship shall be deemed to 
be the owner of such ship or share notwithstanding that he is not registered as the owner. 
(c) ‘Owner’ shall not include a charterer who has taken the ship on a charter by demise.’ 
 
 An interesting feature of this is that the proposal immediately involved a small but 
important departure from the language of the Arrest Convention as can be seen if one compares 
the draft section 6 with Article 3 of the Convention which reads as follows: 
 
‘1.Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article and of Article 10, a claimant 
may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, or any 
other ship which is owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim 
arose, the owner of the particular ship ... 
2  Ships shall be deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares therein are 
owned by the same person or persons.’25 
 
The change lies in the provisions in section 6(4)(b) of the draft, which distinguish between 
beneficial ownership of a ship or a share in a ship and the registered ownership thereof. The 
source of this change is clearly section 4(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956, which 
provided: 
 
‘In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in paragraphs (d) to (r) of subsection 1 of 
section 1 of this Act, being a claim arising in connection with a ship, where the person 
who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam was, when the cause of action 
arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of, the ship, the Admiralty 
jurisdiction of the High Court … may (whether the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on 
the ship or not) be invoked by an action in rem against: 
(i) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought it is beneficially owned as respects 
all the shares therein by that person; or  




                                                 
25 Berlingieri op. cit, 324. 
26 Berlingieri, op cit, 166 fn 15. 
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In this respect the draft went beyond the Arrest Convention in making it clear that registered 
ownership of a vessel would not be decisive in determining whether it was a sister ship in relation 
to another vessel. 
 
 Whilst the intention to expand the possible scope for a sister ship arrest in rem is clear, it is 
not clear whether the reference to beneficial ownership was intended to bear the same meaning in 
South Africa as it bore in England. In The ‘Aventicum’
27
 Slynn J, whilst accepting that the 
reference to beneficial ownership entitled the court to go behind the registered or legal 
ownership, appears to have contemplated something narrower than a simple identification of the 
ultimate beneficiary of ownership. Thus he said: ‘Certainly in a case where there is a suggestion 
of trusteeship or a nominee holding, there is no doubt that the court can investigate it’.  Similarly 
Robert Goff J had said in the ‘I Congreso Del Partido’28 that the concept of beneficial ownership 
referred only to cases of equitable ownership, whether or not accompanied by legal ownership. 
These notions, whilst not entirely unknown in South African legal parlance,
29
 could not be easily 
transplanted to this country, where the concept of beneficial ownership is more likely to involve a 
broad enquiry into the identity of the person or persons who enjoy the benefit of ownership. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the introduction of the concept of beneficial ownership, which 
conflated the provisions of the Arrest Convention and the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 
was deliberate but the reasons for this are not explained in the memorandum accompanying the 
                                                 
27 The Aventicum [1978] 1 Lloyds Rep. 184 187. 
28 ‘I Congreso Del Partido’ [1977] 1 Lloyds Rep 536 at 560 and 561; [1976] 3 All ER. This case is specifically 
referred to in the 1979 memorandum. 
29 Trollip JA in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company Limited 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 666C - 667A dealt 
with the concept of a nominee shareholder but queried whether it included a trustee for the transferee company. He 
held that a nominee shareholder in terms of the Companies Act is a person nominated by the owner of shares to hold 
the shares for the owner but in the name of the nominee, holding them only ‘nominally’. A South African trust is not 
the same as an English trust and the concept of equitable ownership is unknown to our law. Braun v Blann and Botha 
NN.O. and another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859E-F. 
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1979 draft.30 The original draft was widely circulated and debated within the ranks of the 
Maritime Law Association. As a result the concept of an associated ship was born. The second 
draft of the Bill in 1980 provided in section 6(3) thereof that: 
 
‘An action in rem may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship’. 
 
This is laconically explained in the following way in the 1980 memorandum accompanying that 
draft Bill: 
 
‘Clauses (3) and (4) deal not only with the sister ship arrests which are referred to in the 
United Kingdom Administration of Justice Act and the International Convention relating 
to arrest but also to what I have referred to as an associated ship. Sister ship arrests make 
it possible for a vessel in the same ownership to be arrested.  Since these provisions came 
into force there has been a tendency towards the formation of so-called ‘one-ship 
companies’, that is to say a company owning one-ship only.  It has been suggested to me 
by the Secretary of the Maritime Law Association that it would be desirable to endeavour 
                                                 
30 In fact both memoranda are remarkably terse in spelling out the consequences of the proposals. In the 1980 
memorandum it was said that: ‘I have, therefore, drafted the Act on the basis that the action in rem is to be retained. I 
have proceeded on the basis of endeavouring to identify what are generally regarded as the proper subjects of 
maritime jurisdiction, have made provision for procedure, the solution of conflicts of jurisdiction in the South 
African courts and the priority of claims.  In the remainder of this memorandum I propose to deal with the draft Act 
clause by clause and indicate the source of the proposals if they are derived from elsewhere or the object which I 
have set out to try to achieve whether or not derived from elsewhere.’ (1980 memorandum p 4). Whilst this is correct 
there is no hint that the changes being wrought by that process to South Africa’s admiralty law were profound and 
far-reaching and would give it the most extensive maritime jurisdiction in the world. Perhaps at a time when South 
Africa was politically extremely isolated and nearing the end of a singularly chauvinistic period in our legal history 
and scholarship, both academic and judicial, it was thought sensible not to stress unduly the English and international 
elements of the proposal and the full reach of the jurisdiction being assumed. Mr Shaw in his report to the MLA on 
the 29th September 1978 expressed the view that ‘… there is a possibility of getting legislation through if you put it 
in with sufficient unobtrusiveness …’ Political difficulties are hinted at in paragraph 7.2 of the Law Commission’s 
Report and there can be few legislative changes of similar magnitude in which a Law Commission Report took a 
mere ten pages to identify the problem and the need for reform, one and a half pages to justify the approach to reform 
and only four pages to explain the reforms themselves. (The point is illustrated by a comparison with the report on 
the corresponding topic by the Australian Law Reform Commission, which runs to 12 chapters with appendices and 
hundreds of pages.) Brevity has not however proven detrimental to the quality of the product! As regards legal 
chauvinism Bamford, ‘Admiralty courts: A short reply’ op. cit 451 records that prior to the introduction of the 1972 
Act there had been discussion in Government legal circles concerning the simple scrapping of Admiralty Courts in 
South Africa. (The author of that note was at the time a Senator in the South African Parliament and was perhaps 
sensitive to political nuances.) In the political climate at the time this may have led those who were seeking to move 
in the opposite direction and bring about a substantial expansion of that jurisdiction to tread warily and not proclaim 
their intentions too loudly.    
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to deal with this situation.
31 I have done so in clause (4). I appreciate that some of the 
phrases may seem somewhat indefinite. Clause (4)(b)(iii) has its origin in the definition 
of controlling company in the Companies Act. Beneficial ownership of shares is, I think, 
a concept which is recognised in South African law and is the phrase used in the United 
Kingdom Act.’32  (Emphasis added)   
 
The provisions relating to associated ships in the draft Act accompanying the 1980 memorandum 
were as follows: 
 
‘6(4)(a) For the purposes of subsection (3) an associated ship shall mean a ship other than 
the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose being : 
(i) A ship owned by the person who was the owner of the particular ship at the time when 
the maritime claim arose. 
(ii) A ship owned by a company the shares in which are owned by or controlled by a 
person who, when the maritime claim arose, owned the shares in or controlled the 
company which owned the particular ship. 
(b) For the purpose of paragraph (a): 
(i) Ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if all the shares in the ship are 
owned by the same persons. 
(ii) A person having beneficial ownership of a ship or a share in a ship or a share in a 
company shall be deemed to be the owner of the ship or the share notwithstanding that he 
is not registered as the owner. 
(iii) A person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or 
indirectly, to control the company.’ 
 
It will be seen from this that all of the essential elements of the ultimate associated ship arrest 
were embodied in these proposals. Thus a suggestion for dealing with ‘one-ship’ companies gave 
rise to a broad jurisdiction not expressly available anywhere else.
33
 
                                                 
31 The Secretary of the Maritime Law Association at the time was Mr. S.M.S. Dwyer who confirms that the 
suggestion was his. It is interesting to note that when the English delegation suggested that the concept of an 
associated ship should be introduced in the revision of the Arrest Convention their argument was also based on the 
proposition that the purposes of the Arrest Convention and the introduction of the sister ship provisions had been 
defeated by the proliferation of one-ship companies since 1952. Berlingieri, op cit, 577 and 580. See also the views 
of Belgium at 563 and 583; the Netherlands at 581; France and the CISL at 582. 
32 1980 memorandum, pages 7-8. 
 33 I say ‘expressly’ available because the approach of some French courts to the concept of ownership under the 
Arrest Convention has been to arrest vessels, which to a South African lawyer would be associated ships, on the 
basis of a ‘communauté d’intérêts’. Berlingieri op cit 168 fn 28 and paras 52.456 to 459, p170. There is no reference 
in the memorandum to the French approach and the cases cited by Berlingieri all post-date the Act. Whether this 
played any role therefore cannot now be determined. Similarly the courts in Belgium and Spain have held that 
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 Whilst the memorandum furnished to the Law Commission and circulated to various judges 
and practitioners may have been terse there was certainly no illusion either on the part of Mr 
Shaw or on the part of members of the MLA as to the significance of this proposal. In an address 
to the Annual General Meeting of the MLA on the 27th 1980 Mr Shaw said: 
 
‘I have also at the suggestion of this Association, gone rather further than the 
present European legislation relating to the so-called ‘sister ship arrests’. As you 
know the European legislation makes it possible to plead in rem not only against 
the ship which actually did the damage but against any ship owned by the same 
company. The net result of that of course has been the splitting of the ownership 
into one-ship companies and the Act provides for proceeding against what I must 
admit is a singularly horrible phrase ‘an associated ship’ which is a ship, the 
shares in the company owning which are owned by the same person as owns the 
shares or the ship which was actually concerned. This is a substantial extension. 
Whether it will commend itself to the powers that be, I don’t know, but I think it 
is a useful suggestion.’(My emphasis.)  
 
 There is no indication in the subsequent drafts of the Bill that these provisions were viewed 
as being controversial. Minor changes were made to the relevant sections and their placement in 
the Bill changed. At a very late stage
34
 the reference to ‘beneficial ownership of a ship or a share 
in a ship or a share in a company’ was removed. During the process a provision was inserted into 
the fourth draft that expressly provided for the arrest of more than one associated ship but it was 
removed in the very next draft. Otherwise from a drafting point of view the innovation of the 
arrest of an associated ship was introduced without either fanfare or controversy.35 The matter-of-
                                                                                                                                                              
vessels were sister ships in terms of the Arrest Convention in circumstances that would in South Africa give rise to 
an associated ship arrest. Berlingieri, op cit, para 52.441, pp164-5 and paras 52.473 - 52.474, pp 174-5. 
34 The change was made only in the final draft.    
35 In a discussion with Mr. Shaw in January 2003 he indicated that in the deliberations of the South African Law 
Commission the proposal was accepted without any great philosophical analysis of its jurisprudential underpinnings 
and implications. It was suggested that the approach should be adopted as a matter of policy and that was accepted. 
This is a view shared by others who were interested in the process at the time. In a private communication to the 
author, Friedman J, who had by then retired from the Natal Bench, wrote: ‘I do not believe that there was any 
philosophical debate, nor was there any profound philosophical reason, for these provisions. They were considered to 
be of pragmatic value or importance, no more, no less.’ Professor Tetley makes the point that statute law is the 
creation of parliaments who are rarely moved by issues of legal theory or philosophy.  Maritime Liens and Claims 
36. 
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fact explanation for the introduction of associated ship arrests in the South African Law 
Commission Report was: 
 
‘7.3 In view of the retention of the action in rem it is necessary, as has been 
done in clause 5, to set out the circumstances in which an action in rem may be 
brought.  Provision has also been made for the bringing of an action in rem 
against an ‘associated ship.’ The International Convention with regard to the 
Arrest of Sea-going Ships, to which reference has been made above, makes 
provision for the arrest to found an action in rem of a sister ship, that is to say, a 
ship in the same ownership as the guilty ship. The provisions of the Bill are an 
extension of this notion based on the fact that since the conclusion of the 
Convention its provisions have been defeated by the proliferation of ‘one-ship 
companies’, that is to say, companies owning only one-ship and therefore 
avoiding the Convention. The extension is, it is thought, a logical extension of the 
Convention, but the broad notions upon which the Convention is founded have 
been preserved.’36 
 
The last statement contains some elements of exaggeration, as the discussion in the next section 
will reveal, but the fact of the matter is that associated ships entered the South African legal 
lexicography with overwhelming support from the maritime legal community and no objection 
from anyone. Its origins were clearly founded in practical policy and directed at overcoming the 
problems that plaintiffs encountered in maritime proceedings as a result of the proliferation of 
single ship companies from the Second World War onwards. 
  
2 THE ARREST CONVENTION 
 
 In view of the references to the Arrest Convention in the explanations for the introduction 
of the associated ship arrest it seems appropriate to consider the Convention to determine to what 
extent it can properly be regarded as the source of this innovation, or perhaps more accurately, to 
what extent the associated ship arrest can be regarded as a natural development of the sister ship 
                                                 
36 The Arrest Convention was concluded in 1952. As the discussion in Chapter 3 above demonstrates, whilst the flag 
of convenience registrations, which developed in parallel with the use of the one-ship company, were known prior to 
1952, their use only became widespread after that date. The suggestion in Hare, op cit 104 that the impetus for the 
use of one-ship companies was the ‘Torrey Canyon’ disaster can hardly be correct. That only occurred in 1968 (not 
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arrest and hence preserves the foundations of that Convention. By way of background to this 
question it is helpful to examine the history leading up to the conclusion of that Convention and 
give some consideration to its terms. 
 
 The Arrest Convention was in gestation for over twenty years before it was finally adopted 
at the Brussels Diplomatic Conference in May 1952.37 It started as an investigation by the CMI of 
the general topic of arrest and in particular the questions of who is entitled to arrest a ship; which 
ships may be arrested; where can an arrest be made and how can a ship be released from arrest?38 
It evolved into an endeavour to achieve a compromise between the civil law jurisdictions that 
recognised a procedure for pre-judgment arrest (saisie conservatoire) as a general remedy not 
confined to maritime claims, under which any property of a debtor was susceptible to arrest to 
secure a claim
39
, and the common law countries that permitted the arrest of a vessel in admiralty 
proceedings in rem, but beyond that did not recognise any similar procedure. 
 
 From 1930 until 1947 little progress was made in reconciling these differences.
40
 The 
breakthrough came at the Amsterdam conference of the CMI in 1949 with the suggestion that a 
                                                                                                                                                              
the late 1950's) by which stage the use of one-ship companies was already widespread. At most the disaster may 
have added impetus to an existing trend although no evidence is put forward in support of that proposition. 
37 Berlingieri op cit, 7. 
38  Berlingieri, op cit, 4.  
39 The common roots in the early civilian process of this procedure and the attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem will be immediately apparent although they serve different purposes, the former being 
directed at obtaining security (Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims, op cit, 962) and the latter at confirming 
jurisdiction in some cases and in many others at establishing an otherwise non-existent jurisdiction. According to 
Lord Kilbrandon speaking of the same jurisdiction in Scotland, jurisdiction established by attachment ‘has always 
been regarded as exorbitant’. Alexander Ward and Co Ltd v Samyang Navigation Co Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 424 (HL) 
431 c-e. In the 1979 memorandum Mr Shaw referred to this as a reason for preserving in South Africa the English 
admiralty procedure by way of an action in rem. He wrote: ‘Common law proceedings by way of attachment to 
found jurisdiction are frequently ineffectual to enforce the claimant’s rights because many jurisdictions do not 
recognise a judgment founded on attachment. In the circumstances it seems to me essential to preserve and bring up 
to date the provisions relating to proceedings in rem.’  
40 Berlingieri op cit 5, footnote 37 quotes the summary of progress (or more accurately lack of progress) by Mr. 
Asser, one of the delegates to the 1947 CMI conference in Antwerp as follows:‘A curious thing happened in regard 
to that (Leopold Dor’s) draft.  Article 1 of the first draft provided that each creditor of the owner of a ship may arrest 
her. According to the report presented by Maitre Dor on that occasion, this article was intended to mean that any ship 
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system be adopted that limited the arrest of vessels to claims of a maritime nature but permitted 
the arrest of any ship in the same ownership.41 This is the compromise adopted in the Arrest 
Convention which defines in article 1(a)-(q) seventeen claims in respect of which the arrest of a 
vessel may be permitted and provides in article 3.1 that: 
 
‘...a claimant may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim 
arose, or any other ship which is owned by the person who was, at the time when the 
maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular ship...’42  
 
Under article 3.2 ships are deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares therein are 
owned by the same person or persons. The result is universally accepted as a compromise 
between the different arrest regimes in the two major legal systems.43  The purpose of that 
                                                                                                                                                              
might be arrested in respect of any debt of her owner whether maritime or non-maritime. In other words, this first 
draft reproduced what is called the Continental system of the law of arrest. 
 This draft met with a great deal of opposition on the part of the British delegates who stated that they were reluctant 
to abandon, in favour of the Continental system, the British system of a very restricted possibility of arrest. As a 
result of this opposition article I was redrafted several times the article was gradually amputated more and more and 
the text finally adopted at the Paris conference stated no more than that ‘Any creditor of an owner of a ship, by 
reason of collision, might operate the arrest of such ship’. Consequently, whilst the first draft had incorporated the 
Continental notion of the widest scope of arrest, providing for the arrest in respect of all claims, the final draft was 
based on the English conception of the action in rem, dealing mainly with collision claims, the question of arrest in 
respect of all other claims being left to the respective municipal laws. So what was intended to be international 
uniformity became merely a reproduction of the law of England. If I may be permitted to say so, this was a rather 
meagre result.’ 
41 Berlingieri op cit 6. It is interesting that the basis of the proposal was said to be similar to the law of Scotland and 
the United States. In the latter jurisdiction the arrest of vessels other than that in respect of which the claim arises is 
not permitted because of the link between the action in rem and the maritime lien. In Scotland there was, as in South 
Africa in 1983, an entitlement to arrest in admiralty following the English law and an attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem in accordance with the Roman Dutch law as applied in Scotland. The compromise was 
accordingly an attempt to meld two separate systems on the basis of a misunderstanding of both used as an example. 
42 Berlingieri, op cit, 324. The full text of the Convention is at 323-7. 
43 The Banco [1971] 1 All ER 524, 532b.  Lord Diplock said in his speech in The Jade The Escherheim: Owners of 
the motor vessel Erkowit v Owners of the ship Jade, Owners of cargo lately laden on board the motor vessel Erkowit 
v Owners of the ship Escherheim [1976] 1 All ER 920 (HL) 923 h-i that: ‘The provisions of art 3 represented a 
compromise between the wide powers of arrest available in some of the civil law countries (including for this 
purpose Scotland) in which jurisdiction to entertain claims against a defendant could be based on the presence within 
the territorial jurisdiction of any property belonging to him, and the limited powers of arrest in England and other 
common law jurisdictions, where the power of arrest was exercisable only in respect of claims falling within the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the court and based on a supposed maritime lien over the particular ship in respect of which 
the claim arose.’ The complexities that arise in the United Kingdom as a result of the failure to make the Convention 
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compromise was to balance the interests of shipowners and operators on the one hand and cargo 
interests on the other by avoiding arrests of vessels and the consequent interruption of voyages 
and disruption of trade where the claims had no connection with the operation of the vessel.44 In 
civil law countries the scope for the arrest of vessels was limited to the specific claims mentioned 
in the Convention and confined to vessels in the same ownership.  In accepting this limitation the 
civil law countries sought to secure the benefit for their own vessels and cargo that they would 
only be vulnerable to arrest in other Contracting States for the same set of claims and to the same 
extent. In the common law countries the adoption of the Convention would result in the possible 
scope of arrest in admiralty actions in rem being extended to include a sister ship but otherwise 
limited to the same set of claims. With the Convention being ratified or acceded to by seventy- 
seven countries45 including most major maritime nations46 its adoption or incorporation into 
national law has provided a reasonably consistent framework within which the arrest of ships can 




                                                                                                                                                              
a part of municipal law are dealt with in The ‘Nordglimt’ [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 470 (QB (Adm Ct)) 478-480.  See 
also for similar problems in other jurisdictions Kirchner A, Maritime Arrest:Legal Reflections on the International 
Arrest Convention and on Domestic Law in Germany and Sweden (2001), 2-3. This is a thesis submitted for the 
degree of Master of International Law in the University of Stockholm and available at 
www.andreekirchner.de/pub/arrest.pdf 
44 Report of the Chairman of the CMI international sub-committee to the Lisbon Conference of the CMI printed in 
Berlingieri, op cit 482 et seq. 
45 CMI year book 2001 
46 As with most international conventions the USA is the most notable exception. South Africa is also not a party to 
the Convention  
47 Kirchner, op cit, 54 is a little more reserved in his assessment. He says: ‘The development of unification of law 
connected to maritime arrest, however, is not only insufficiently established, but rather unwanted by most States.  
The preparatory works of both the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Convention show that most states are not willing to 
sacrifice their legal practice to the benefit of a common legal practice. Hence  the lex fori is still applicable.’ His 
concern is that many States have incorporated the Arrest Convention subject to domestic reservations or 
qualifications and that courts are inclined to interpret it subject to domestic norms thereby leading to different 
applications of the same provision and hence a lack of uniformity. There is undoubtedly merit in this view but it 
perhaps exaggerates the areas of difference without paying sufficient regard to the great areas of uniformity arising 
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3. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ARREST CONVENTION: 
 
 Prior to the process of reform leading up to the passage of the Act in 1983 there is nothing 
to suggest that South Africa contemplated accession to the Arrest Convention. Whether this was 
due to inertia; the relatively quiescent state of maritime law and practice or political issues, or 
possibly a combination of the three is unclear.
48
 However, when the process of reform got under 
way local legal practitioners in the maritime field were keen to ensure that the system of 
admiralty law and jurisdiction that would ultimately result would reflect the provisions of the 
Arrest Convention in a form recognisable to their overseas clients. It was natural therefore that it 
would be in the forefront of the thinking of the draftsmen of the Act49 and this is evident from the 
first draft of the legislation with its reliance on the maritime claims covered by the Arrest 
Convention and its express incorporation (albeit in amended form) of the provisions of a sister 
ship arrest. 
 
 However the influence of the Arrest Convention in the drafting of the legislation did not 
necessarily mean that it would lead to the introduction of any novel concept in South African law 
or any departure from existing well-established principle. Sister ship arrests extended to the 
admiralty action in rem something that was already possible under the Roman Dutch law as 
applied in South Africa by way of an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem. 
Whilst they extended the scope of the action in rem it was nonetheless the property of the same 
debtor that was being rendered subject to arrest. It must be borne in mind that in the application 
of English common law it is not a novel concept that all the property of a debtor is available to 
                                                                                                                                                              
from the Convention, particularly as a result of the development of an agreed list of maritime claims and the 
exclusion of arrests in many areas where they would otherwise have been permissible. 
48 Accession to the Convention was probably not politically feasible at the time given the suspension of South Africa 
from the General Assembly of the United Nations and its pariah status in world politics.  These difficulties are noted 
in paragraph 13 of the Law Commission Report.  In any event it is highly debatable whether an insular government 
obsessed with internal political issues and engaged in endeavours to resist what it described as a ‘total onslaught’ 
from abroad, would have been minded to seek accession to such a Convention. 
49 The Arrest Convention is referred to in both the 1970 and the 1980 memoranda as well as in the Law Commission 
Report. It was particular relevant to the formulation of the list of maritime claims in the Act. Katagum Wholesale 
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satisfy a claim against that debtor, once the claim is reinforced by a judgment. The essential 
difference between Continental and common lawyers in regard to the arrest of property related to 
the timing of that arrest and the circumstances in which an arrest was permissible. In Europe all 
proceedings were directed against the debtor and all property of the debtor was subject to 
conservatory arrest (saisie conservatoire) prior to judgment and execution after judgment. The 
English common law did not in general permit conservatory arrest50 but all property of a 
judgment debtor was available for the purposes of execution. In admiralty proceedings in rem, 
however, an initial arrest of the specific vessel in respect of which the claim had arisen was 
permitted but, in general, only that vessel was available for the purpose of execution.51 The effect 
of the Arrest Convention was to agree upon a single list of claims for which vessels could be 
arrested; to extend the liability to arrest in rem to sister ships in England and other jurisdictions 
applying English admiralty law and to confine civil law jurisdictions to the arrest of a single 
vessel. Whilst the precise combination of these elements was different in the proposal for a 
revision of South African admiralty law and jurisdiction none of it involved the adoption of a 
novel legal principle so far as South African lawyers were concerned. 
 
 The departure from well established principle in South Africa came with the suggestion that 
not only vessels in the same legal ownership should be subject to arrest in proceedings in rem, 
but also all vessels in which the benefits of ownership were centred in a single person or persons 
even though those vessels were operated and control over their operations was exercised through 
corporate structures that meant that they were not in law owned by the same person. Sister ship 
arrests did not raise this issue because the identity of the debtor remained the same even though 
the range of potential targets of arrests was expanded. However, the proposal in regard to 
associated ships not only meant that the vessel to be arrested need have no connection with the 
maritime claim, but also that the legal owner of the vessel need not be the debtor in respect of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Commodities Company Limited v The m.v. Paz 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) at 267D. Staniland ‘Developments in South 
African Admiralty Jurisdiction and Maritime Law’ 1984 Acta Juridica 271 273. 
50 This was the case until the development of the Mareva injunction. 
51 This statement is subject to the decision in The Dictator [1892] P 304. 
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claim. This distinction was clearly recognised in the judgments in The Berg.
52
  In the Full Bench 
decision Milne JP said: 
 
‘There is no doubt that s 3(6) and (7) do create a new remedy and give in fact a more 
effective remedy to marine claimants. Where however, that new remedy is given to a 
marine claimant in respect of an entirely new party who was not, when the claimant’s 
cause of action arose, liable in contract or delict to the marine claimant, what has been 
created is not merely a more effective remedy, but a new right: or to put it another way, a 
right to sue a person who could not, on any basis, have been sued before the Act was 
passed.’53 
 
Miller JA echoed this in the Appellate Division when he said: 
 
‘It is true that s 3(6) read with s 5(3) describes a method for recovery of money 
due to one who has suffered injury or loss for which he has a maritime claim, but 
it does much more than that; it gives to the claimant a right which he never had 
before, namely to recover what is due to him from a party who was not 
responsible for the damage suffered by him. It provides the claimant not only with 
a method for recovery but with an additional or alternative defendant. And by that 
token it is creative of new liabilities or obligations in owners of ships, or the 
potential thereof, of which such owners, if the claims arose prior to the 




 These two judgments highlighted the fact that when the associated ship provisions of the 
Act are used to arrest not a sister ship but an associated ship in the extended sense given to that 
expression by the Act, this is not simply a means of bringing the same claim against a different 
target but a means of bringing a claim against a juristic person which does not, apart from the 
availability of this procedure, owe any liability to the claimant in respect of the claim.55 
                                                 
52 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) and 1986 (2) SA 700 (A). 
53 At 661H-I. 
54 At 711 G-I. 
55 The fact that a person other than the debtor becomes liable for the maritime claim in the case of a true associated 
ship arrest going beyond the case of a sister ship raises the constitutional question of whether such a procedure is 
compatible with the constitutional guarantee of property rights embodied in section 25 of the Constitution as 
analysed by the Constitutional Court in First National Bank Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Services and another 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). That case dealt with provisions in the Customs and Excise Act 
91 of 1964 that rendered the property of a person other than the customs debtor liable to be attached and sold as a 
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 As pointed out above insofar as the associated ship provisions merely cover the same 
ground as the sister ship arrest under the Arrest Convention they do not involve any significant 
departure from existing principle either nationally or internationally. However, where the 
associated ship arrest provisions go beyond this they breach two of the fundamental principles of 
company law. These are firstly the principle of corporate personality that a company or similar 
corporate entity is a juristic person separate and distinct from the natural persons who stand 
behind it and enjoy the ultimate fruits of corporate endeavour and, secondly, the principle of 
limited liability. These two central principles provide the pillars on which much of the world’s 
commerce rests.56 They were encapsulated in the speech of Lord MacNaughten in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co.
57
 where he said: 
 
‘The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers … and, though 
it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and 
the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is 
not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers, as 
members, liable in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by 
the Act.’ 
 
That passage admirably sums up both the separate legal personality of the company and the 
limited liability of its members. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
means of recovering the customs debt. This question will be considered later together with other constitutional 
questions raised by the Act. 
56 An interesting and readable history of the development of companies and their influence on the world economy is 
to be found in J Micklethwait and A Wooldridge, ‘The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea’ (2003).   
The first and most influential economic analysis is that by A A Berle and C G Means The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1933; reprint 1968). The technical legal background is set out in P L Davies, Gower’s Principles 
of Modern Company Law, 6th Ed (1997), chapters 2-5, 18-91. For a South African perspective see Blackman et al, 
Commentary on the Companies Act, Vol. 1, 4-108 to 4 -114. 
57 [1897] AC 22 (HL) 51. Gower, op cit 77 refers to this as a ‘justly celebrated’ case. The principles in that judgment 
were approved and adopted in South Africa in Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 
530 550. 
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 Where the Act permits the arrest of a true associated ship
58
 these principles are breached 
because the maritime creditor is thereby enabled to go behind the corporate structure to identify 
the person or persons who own or control the corporate entity and then to pursue its claim either 
against a vessel owned by that person or persons or more frequently against a vessel owned by 
another company altogether. In other words the disregard of corporate personality can occur in 
both directions - upwards to the controlling interests of the corporate entity owning the ship 
concerned and then downwards from those controlling interests to a ship owned by another 
corporate entity controlled by the same interests. This does more than pierce the corporate veil. It 
disregards entirely the separate corporate existence of the different companies in the group and 
renders the assets of those companies, that is, all the ships in the fleet, vulnerable to arrest at the 
instance of creditors of any of the companies in the group. 
 
  Although the South African Law Commission report described this as an ‘extension’ of 
the sister ship jurisdiction under the Convention on closer analysis it is difficult to accept this as 
wholly accurate. The Arrest Convention did not extend the scope of liability for maritime claims 
but aimed at finding a via media between two existing arrest regimes in the field of modern law, 
both of which survived in South African maritime practice, but neither of which rendered the 
property of any person other than the debtor in respect of the maritime claim vulnerable to arrest. 
As the Arrest Convention had limited the scope of arrest in civil law jurisdictions logically an 
extension of its limits would have involved the removal of the constraint introduced in article 
3(1) that restricted arrest to either the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose 
or any other ship. In that way the existing liability of a particular shipowner would be capable of 
being pursued by expanding the jurisdiction to arrest vessels owned by that shipowner not only to 
the particular ship or a single sister ship but to any sister ship. In other words a logical extension 
of the sister ship provisions of the Arrest Convention would be a movement towards the 
                                                 
58 That is a ship other than a sister ship separately owned by a person or corporation other than the owner of the ship 
concerned, that is, the ship in respect of which the claim arose. The expression ‘true associated ship’ is used to 
denote such a vessel. 
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traditional civil law view of arrest as being available in respect of any property of the maritime 




 Ordinarily when something is described as an extension of a pre-existing situation the 
notion that is being conveyed is that of engaging in a process of sequential progression along a 
particular path. An extension of the sister ship arrest provisions of the Arrest Convention would 
involve a broadening of those provisions but without introducing a new and entirely different 
basis of liability on the part of a different person. It is difficult to see any natural progression 
from provisions that in civil law countries restricted the ambit of pre-judgment arrest and in 
countries that apply English admiralty law expanded it, to a provision that attaches liability not 
on the basis of ownership of the ship in respect of which the claim arose or on the basis of an 
arrest of the property of the debtor, but on the basis of the far more amorphous concept of 
common control of vessels or the corporate entities through which ownership of vessels is 
exercised. As Professor Berlingieri points out60, save in the unusual case of a maritime lien, it is 
fundamental to the operation of the Arrest Convention that the person liable in respect of the 
maritime claim is the owner of the vessel to be arrested. It is correct that article 3(4) of the Arrest 
Convention provides a limited exception to this in the sense that in some circumstances the arrest 
of a ship is permitted where that ship was at the time the claim arose chartered by demise and the 
demise charterer is liable for the claim. However, that does not support the notion that the true 
associated ship provisions in the South African legislation are merely an extension of the 
provisions of the Arrest Convention as the article goes on to provide that ‘any other ship in the 
ownership of the demise charterer’ may be arrested in respect of such a claim.  In other words the 
application of the sister ship provisions in the context of a demise charter are restricted to vessels 
owned by the party liable in respect of the maritime claim. A proposal that permits the arrest of 
property owned by someone who is not liable for the maritime claim involves a substantial 
                                                 
59 Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 37. MV Fortune 22: The Owners of the MV Fortune 22 
v Keppel Corporation Ltd 1999 (1) SA 162 (C). The correctness of that judgment will be discussed later. See M.J.D. 
Wallis, ‘The Associated Ship Jurisdiction in South Africa: Choice Assorted or One Bite at the Cherry?’, [2002] 
LCMLQ 132 
60 Berlingieri, op cit. 52.363 -366, p128-9. 
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departure from the basic principles embodied in the Arrest Convention in a direction that finds 
little impetus from the Convention itself.  
 
 Whilst it is true that in the drafting process leading up to the enactment of the Act the 
associated ship provisions, insofar as they went beyond sister ship arrests (the ‘true associated 
ship’), were treated as being merely an extension of the provisions of the Arrest Convention, it is 
submitted on closer analysis that this proposition is not justifiable and that it leads one astray to 
try and interpret these provisions in a manner consonant with the provisions of the Arrest 
Convention. There can be no doubt that the draftsman of the Act was well aware of the 
implications of these proposals and their broad scope. That is why he described them as being ‘a 
substantial extension’ of the sister ship provisions.
61
 However, a closer examination of these 
provisions against the text of the Arrest Convention suggests that the link between them is 
limited and extreme caution must be exercised in drawing parallels between the associated ship 
provisions and those of the Convention even where there are linguistic similarities between them. 
The context is so wholly distinct that it is preferable to seek the meaning of the South African 
statute without using the Arrest Convention as either a map or compass. Certainly if the roots of 
and justification for the true associated ship provisions of the Act are to be properly identified the 
enquirer must look beyond the terms of the Arrest Convention. 
 
4 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL? 
 
 Rather than taking the Arrest Convention as the starting point and seeking to extrapolate 
from there to the arrest of and proceedings in rem against the true associated ship62 it is helpful to 
examine the basis upon which the suggestion to adopt this extended jurisdiction was proposed. 
That was the changing pattern of ship ownership that had seen an ever-growing proportion of 
shipowners moving away from national registries and registering their vessels under flags of 
                                                 
61
 Supra, p 17. 
62 That is not a sister ship or a vessel in common ownership. 
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convenience, usually in ‘one-ship companies’.63 This had started a few years before the 
conclusion of the Arrest Convention and it was more a matter of coincidence than one of cause 
and effect that the trend in this direction existed in parallel with the implementation and operation 
of the Convention. After all sister ships had always been liable to arrest in respect of maritime 
claims in civil law jurisdictions and that had not previously caused owners to seek to insulate one 
vessel from arrest in respect of debts owed in relation to another vessel. That is not to say that an 
awareness of this commercial advantage would not have been a factor in weighing up the benefits 
of moving to a flag of convenience registry. In England, which during this period was probably 
the leading maritime jurisdiction in the world in terms of the volume of maritime litigation dealt 
with by its courts, the sister ship arrest represented an extension of the remedy available in an 
action in rem in courts applying English admiralty law.64 It is therefore certainly feasible that 
shipowners took into account this added vulnerability to arrest in the world’s leading maritime 
jurisdiction in weighing up the commercial advantage of moving to a flag of convenience 
registry. However there is nothing to indicate that this was the driving force behind the move to 
these registries and those who have investigated the question do not suggest any such causal link 
or indeed any connection at all.65 As a matter of logic the favourable tax and regulatory regimes 
                                                 
63 1980 Memorandum, para. 6. The growth in flag of convenience registrations is traced in Chapter 3. 
64 In addition to litigation before the courts it was also the leading centre of maritime arbitration but this was not a 
relevant factor because the United Kingdom did not adopt the provisions of the Arrest Convention (Article 7, paras 1 
to 4) that each country should make provision in its domestic law for ships to be subject to arrest in respect of claims 
referable to arbitration. The Cap Bon [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 543 (Adm); The Rena K [1979] 1 All ER 397 (QBD): 
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545 [QB (Adm Ct)]; The Maritime Trader [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 153 [QB (Adm Ct)].  Unlike 
the case of the choice of a foreign jurisdiction where the court would take into account in deciding whether to order a 
stay whether the claimant would thereby lose any security established in England (The Eleftheria [1969] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 237 (Adm)) these cases held that a similar route could not be followed in the case of arbitration clauses.  
65 Boczek, op cit, 26-27 cites the conclusion of the OEEC study (1958) that ‘there are two main motives actuating 
those shipowners who have adopted the practice of registering under flags of convenience, viz opportunities for 
avoiding taxation on the earnings of ships registered under these flags and in some cases relief from high crew 
standards and consequent operating costs.’  In testimony before the United States House of Representatives in 1957 
the Maritime Administrator listed seven advantages flowing from the transfer of US ships to foreign flags, namely: 
‘1) Transfer to a foreign flag increases the market value of a ship. 2) Transfer reduces operating costs, particularly 
the wages and maintenance of good working conditions, due to lower standards permissible under foreign flags.  3) 
Transfer makes possible operating in world trade with easy currency conversion. 4) Transfer allows the owner to 
avoid United States Coast Guard requirements concerning the condition of his vessel. 5) The owner may effect 
repairs abroad at less cost than the same repairs in the United States. 6) The owner can save money by avoiding 
United States income tax. 7) And ultimately, as a result of increased earnings, the owner’s financial ability to acquire 
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that they provided in conjunction with their ability to cast a cloak of anonymity over those who 
stood behind the ‘one-ship companies’ would have provided far more powerful incentives to 
move in this direction.66 
 
 Nonetheless with these changes in the pattern of ship ownership it was apparent by the time 
the South African statute was being debated that the introduction in South Africa of a sister ship 
arrest provision in accordance with the Arrest Convention would add little that would be of 
advantage to claimants to the existing jurisdiction to arrest the ship in respect of which the claim 
had arisen. The reason was that fewer and fewer sister ships existed and the result was that the 
sister ship arrest jurisdiction arising from the Arrest Convention was largely ineffectual.67 This 
posed a problem to those who saw the Act as providing an opportunity to develop South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                              
new tonnage is improved.’ Boczek, op cit, 30. He goes on to say that for Europeans savings in operating costs were 
less relevant. In the case of Greek shipowners, who formed a substantial part of the movement to flags of 
convenience, he gives political instability in Greece after the Second World War, the risks of nationalisation by a 
socialist government and heavy taxation as the principal issues. As regards other European shipowners the benefit of 
liberal taxation regimes and the competitive advantage enjoyed by American shipowners who had moved their 
vessels to flags of convenience are given as reasons. In other words the principal motives were a desire to reduce 
costs - perhaps not unmixed by a desire to sap the power of powerful maritime trade unions - and avoid tax. What is 
significant is that there is not the slightest indication that a desire to avoid the sister ship provisions of the Arrest 
Convention played any role whatsoever in this process. Similarly in the conclusions of the 1981 UNCTAD report 
cited by Coles and Ready, op cit, 2.21, 20 there is no reference to this as a problem although there is a statement that 
‘Real owners can change [conceal?] their identities by manipulating brass-plate companies and consequently avoid 
being identified as repeated sub-standard operators or risk-takers.’  This has nothing to do with the matter under 
consideration. G W Keeton, ‘Lessons of the Torrey Canyon: English Law Aspects’ (1968) 21 Current Legal 
Problems 94 110 says that ‘a proliferation of one-tanker companies’ was a ‘reply’ to the introduction of sister ship 
arrests in England in 1956 in terms of the Administration of Justice Act and this is sometimes cited as authority for 
the proposition that one-ship companies were a response to the altered arrest regime introduced by the Arrest 
Convention. However it is not clear that he meant to suggest that there was a causal link between the two phenomena 
especially as he had noted on the previous page that the reasons for oil companies registering oil tankers under flags 
of convenience were ‘mainly financial’. That is consistent with the more extensive study by Boczek. It is interesting 
to note however that Keeton’s remedy for the problems posed by the one-ship company bears a close resemblance to 
the associated ship when he says that sister ship arrests should be available ‘to reach the company which effectively 
controls the subsidiary, and to make the ships of any subsidiary effectively controlled by the same company liable to 
arrest.’  
66 The delegate of the International Chamber of Shipping to the discussions leading up to the 1999 Convention said 
in regard to a proposal by the United Kingdom to introduce an associated ship arrest: ‘Some of the delegations have 
given the impression that the sole purpose of single ship companies is to circumvent the sister ship provisions and we 
feel that this is really not the case. The main reason for the growth in single ship companies is an economic one; it is 
really to reduce the shipowner’s operating costs’ Berlingieri, Arrest of Ships, 584.  
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as a desirable maritime jurisdiction. Apart from cargo claims in respect of inward-bound cargo 
and a limited number of claims arising from the hazards of navigating the oceans off the coast of 
South Africa or simply the rigours of a lengthy journey round the Cape in a less than seaworthy 
vessel, maritime litigation in South Africa had little to offer that was not available elsewhere. In 
addition it was situated at some considerable distance from the world’s major commercial centres 
and was at the time in the process of acquiring a political status as a pariah in world affairs.  Its 
legal system was respected at a commercial level but largely untried when it came to dealing with 
matters of international trade. None of this was conducive to its establishment as a major centre 
of international maritime litigation.  However a considerable number of vessels passed the South 
African coast and called at its ports. By and large, however, they were not vulnerable to arrest or 
attachment in South Africa because of the separate legal ownership of the vessels, 
notwithstanding the fact that they may have been operated as part of a single fleet under the 
control of a well known and identifiable shipowner. If South Africa was to become an attractive 
maritime jurisdiction it would have to provide a broader basis for claimants to pursue and secure 
their claims and the obvious route was to attack the practice of operating a single fleet - 
sometimes even one operating as a liner service - by means of a number of vessels owned by one-
ship companies. 
 
 All the indications are that this was the key consideration underpinning the introduction of 
the broader associated ship jurisdiction rather than a simple incorporation of the sister ship 
provisions of the Arrest Convention and some extension of those provisions. Inherent in the 
suggestion put to the South African Law Commission by the MLA was a bias in favour of 
claimants rather than defendants. At that time it is doubtful whether there was a strong lobby on 
behalf of shipowners in South Africa and no such voice appears to have made itself heard either 
within the MLA or in representations to the Law Commission. The thrust of those representations 
                                                                                                                                                              
67 An attempt to suggest that ships owned by separate one-ship companies under common control were sister ships 
for the purposes of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the successor to the Administration of Justice Act 1956 which gave 
effect in England to the Arrest Convention, was rejected in The Evpo Agnic [1988] 3 All ER 810 (CA). 
 95
and the pressures in favour of innovation came therefore from the side of maritime claimants and 
their underwriters to whom any extension of the ability to recover of a claim would appeal.68  
 
 In the process the suggested link between the formation of one-ship companies and 
avoidance of the sister ship provisions of the Arrest Convention was elevated into a justification 
for this extension of the powers of arrest in admiralty proceedings. This was not a link that was 
made at first.  he explanatory memorandum
69
 merely drew attention to the tendency towards the 
formation of ‘one-ship companies’ in the years since the inception of the Arrest Convention so 
that few vessels were now available to be arrested as sister ships. The suggestion ‘that it would be 
desirable to endeavour to deal with this situation’ was given form in the associated ship 
provisions and that was an end to the matter. Clearly, however, the perception was that the 
tendency towards registering vessels in one-ship companies was driven in some substantial 
measure by a desire to avoid the sister ship provisions of the Arrest Convention. This is reflected 




‘The International Convention with regard to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships ... makes 
provision for the arrest to found an action in rem of a sister ship, that is to say, a ship in 
the same ownership as the guilty ship.  The provisions of the Bill are an extension of this 
notion based on the fact that since the conclusion of the Convention its provisions have 
been defeated by the proliferation of ‘one-ship companies’, that is to say, companies 
owning only one-ship and therefore avoiding the Convention.’  (My emphasis) 
 
That notion was echoed by other commentators for example those who wrote in regard to the 
sister ship arrest provisions of the Convention that: 
 
‘However, a stratagem was adopted in order to defeat this provision.  A proliferation of 
‘single-ship’ companies - variously described as ‘asset-poor’ or ‘brass-plate’ concerns - 
occurred.  Because of the separate legal personalities of such companies, the claimant 
                                                 
68 H Staniland and J S McLennan ‘The Arrest of an Associated Ship’ 1985 SALJ 148 149 comment that: ‘It has been 
rumoured that the provision was welcomed by underwriters in London on the basis that it could lead to a drop in 
insurance claims.’ 
69 1980  Memorandum, para. 6. 
70 South African Law Commission Report, para. 7.3 
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could proceed against only the ‘guilty ship’.  But such ships are notoriously elusive, and, 
even when one is arrested, it usually happens that the amount of the claim exceeds the 
value of the ship.’71 
 
 This perception that the creation of one-ship companies and the accompanying 
fragmentation of ship ownership is somehow improper or an abuse was and remains 
widespread72. Shaw says that it was ‘often referred to in such pejorative terms as a scheme or 
device.’
73
 It is understandable therefore that in justification of the associated ship jurisdiction 
resort was had to the language of company law and the ability of courts in appropriate 
circumstances to lift or pierce the corporate veil. Indeed this was the very justification advanced 
by the Minister of Justice for this innovation in his speech on the Second Reading of the Bill
74
 
where he claimed that it extended the principle of South African law which he expressed as 
following: 
                                                 
71 Staniland and McLennan, op cit, 148. The same point is repeated in H Staniland ‘the Implementation of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in South Africa’ 1985 LCMLQ 462 468. Shaw, op cit, 36 writes: ‘As the result 
of the Convention, many shipowners took the step of registering so-called ‘one-ship’ companies which had, among 
other advantages, the advantage that their vessels would not be subject to arrest for claims against ships owned, not 
by the same company but by what can loosely be called sister companies, in which the shares were either 
immediately or ultimately controlled by the same person as owned the shares in the company owning the ship in 
question.’  (My emphasis). Hare, op cit, 104 strikes the same note by suggesting that: ‘In fact, it was this self-same 
legitimation of the sister ship procedure in the eyes of the international community which contributed to its downfall 
as an effective means of recovering debts of one-ship from another: ship owning companies were quick to limit the 
exposure of their fleets by re-financing their ships into one-ship companies.’ 
72 The difficulty of escaping from such a widespread perception is apparent when one reads the same explanation for 
the rise of one-ship companies in the recent work by Derrington S C and Turner J M, The Law and Practice of 
Admiralty Matters (2007), para 5.24 citing as their authority for this proposition the South African Law Commission 
Report. The authors appear to recognise in para 5.25 that the associated ship jurisdiction is a policy driven response 
to the widespread use of one-ship companies. It is similarly repeated as a correct statement of matters by P Glover 
‘Sister Ship Arrest and the Application of the Doctrine of Attachment in Australia: a Jurisdictional Comparative 
Analysis in the Wake of the 1952 Arrest Convention’ (2008) 22 A & NZ Mar LJ 99 
73 Shaw op cit 37.  The writer can vouch for this from his own experience at the time and there are references to it in 
the cases. The majority judgment in MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Maritime Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 
(3) SA 1083 (SCA), para [10] p 1106 exemplifies the view that these provisions are aimed at people who are 
‘presenting a false picture to the outside world’. The same point is to be found in other judgments and in academic 
articles. Friedman J in 1986 SALJ 678 679 said that: ‘The fact, therefore, that the Act provides far-reaching and even 
revolutionary methods to prevent recalcitrant debtors from evading their legal debts, for example by the simple ruse 
of creating ‘single-ship’ companies, is, in my view, something to be welcomed, not deprecated.’  These references to 
‘recalcitrant debtors’, ‘evading their legal debts’ and ‘ruse’ are very different from his stance in a case where it was 
sought to pierce the corporate veil on this basis. Like the English and certain other courts he rejected that attempt on 
the basis that the structure was a legitimate use of corporate personality.  See footnote 80 post.  
74 House of Assembly debates (Hansard) 11 August 1983, column 11172 
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‘Although the principle of the sanctity of a separate corporate personality of a company 
distinct from its members was enshrined in Salomon v Salomon and Company [1897] AC 
22 (HL), our courts should brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and time again 
where fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality.’75 
 
 
 Once again, however, close examination suggests that the foundation is lacking for this 
resort to company law for a justification of the associated ship arrest provisions in their broadest 
significance. Even a brief consideration of the relevant principles of company law demonstrates 
that this is so. The starting point is the doctrine that the company is a separate juristic person 
from its shareholders and that the latter can lay no claim to its assets, which vest in the company 
not them. The notion of the company as a distinct legal person is not lightly to be disregarded.  
As one of our greatest judges, Innes CJ said: 
 
‘This conception of the existence of a company as a separate entity distinct from its 
shareholders is no merely artificial and technical thing. It is a matter of substance; 




That view was echoed by Corbett CJ nearly seventy-five years later when he said: 
 
‘... it is of cardinal importance to keep distinct the property rights of a company and those 
of its shareholders, even where the latter is a single entity ...’ 77 
 
 That central principle of company law forces us to confront the circumstances in which the 
court can go behind the legal personality of a company either to attach a liability to its 
shareholders that they would not ordinarily bear or to render susceptible to attack assets that 
would otherwise be inviolable. Those circumstances are limited as Corbett CJ made clear in the 
same passage when he went on to say that:- 
                                                 
75 Quoted by Staniland and McLennan op cit, 148. 
76
 Dadoo Limited and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 550-1. 
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‘… the only permissible deviation from this rule known to our law occurs in those (in 
practice) rare cases where the circumstances justify ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate 
veil... I do not find it necessary to consider, or attempt to define, the circumstances under 
which the court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice it to say that they would generally 
have to include an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use 
of the company or the conduct of its affairs, in this connection the words ‘device’, 
‘stratagem’, ‘cloak’ and ‘sham’ have been used....’78 
 
 This is not the occasion on which to explore in any great detail the ambit of the concept of 
piercing or lifting the corporate veil79. In any event the law in that regard is far from settled.80 
Some principles are, however, reasonably clear. Firstly the court does not have a general 
discretion simply to disregard a company’s separate legal personality whenever it considers it just 
                                                                                                                                                              
77
 Shipping Corporation of India Limited v Evdomon Corporation 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) 566C-D. See also Francis 
George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank and others 1992 (3) SA 91 (A) 102F-H. 
78
 Shipping Corporation of India v Evdomon Corporation, supra, 566D-F. The usefulness of these epithets has been 
questioned and the Court of Appeal of New South Wales said in ICT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd [1995-96] 39 
NSWLR that: ‘The theory which justifies the piercing of the corporate veil is not explained by the use of such 
epithets as ‘sham’ or ‘device’.’ See the discussion in Loh Siew Cheang and William M F Wong, Company Law: 
Powers and Accountability, (2003), 18-23. The problem with these expressions is that they suggest a situation of 
unreality whereas all too often the endeavour to invoke the doctrine arises in circumstances where the relevant 
parties have deliberately structured their transaction in a particular way in order to achieve or avoid a particular 
result.  
79 There are comprehensive discussions in the leading textbooks on company law.  See for example Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act (5th Ed), Vol 1, 53-55; Blackman et al, op cit, 4-133 to 4-150; Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law, (7th Ed) 181-190; Loh Siew Cheang and William M F Wong, op cit, 4-41; B Hannigan, 
Company Law, 63-88; Cheong-Ann Png, Corporate Liability: A Study in Principles of Attribution, 142-148. J.T. 
Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the Cases, 6th ed. (1999), contains references to a 
number of articles, both South African and foreign, on the topic. The two concepts may be different. In Atlas 
Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd The Coral Rose (No 1) [1991] 4 All ER 769 (CA) 779f-h Staughton LJ said: 
‘Like all metaphors, this phrase [the corporate veil] can sometimes obscure reasoning rather than elucidate it.  There 
are, I think, two senses in which it is used, which need to be distinguished.  To pierce the corporate veil is an 
expression I would reserve for treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or 
activities of its shareholders.  To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should mean to have 
regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.’  
80 Cape Pacific Limited v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited 1995 (4) SA 790  (A) 802H. Friedman J 
described it as ‘the rather nebulous principle of company law of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ ‘. D B Friedman 
‘Maritime Law in Practice and in the Court’ 1985 SALJ 45 56.  The case to which he refers in the article is the 
unreported case of Sanko Steamship Company Ltd v Bear Ships Incorporated and others, Case No 4080/84 (DCLD).  
It involved a contention that the operation of a fleet of ships, each of which was owned by a separate one-ship 




 The basic reason for piercing the corporate veil or disregarding the separate legal 
personality of a corporate entity is that the circumstances reveal fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct.82 The nature of the impropriety on which reliance is placed will depend upon 
the situation but it must reveal an abuse or misuse of corporate personality, which can take place 
either at the time of establishment of the company or thereafter in the course of conduct of its 
affairs.
83
 The mere fact that the use to which corporate personality is put in a particular case may 
result in very odd situations indeed, such as the case where a company’s sole beneficial 
shareholder, was also its sole employee and in the former capacity contracted with himself in the 
latter capacity, does not of itself justify disregarding the corporate personality of the employer 
company.84 In summary it is probably correct to say that the court: 
 
‘ ... [will] not permit the notion of legal entity to be used to ‘justify wrong, protect fraud 
or defend crime’.85    
 
However, it is also undoubtedly true, as Lord Keith of Kinkel has said: 
 
‘ ... that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances 
exist indicating that it is a mere facade concealing the true facts.’86 
                                                 
81 Cape Pacific Limited v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited, supra, 803A-B; Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n 
Ander 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) 524A; Blackman et al, op cit, Vol. 1 4-133 
82
 The Shipping Corporation of India Limited v Evdomon Corporation and Another, supra, 566C-F; Cape Pacific 
Limited v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited, supra, 803H-J. 
83
 Cape Pacific Limited v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited, supra, 803J-804E. 
84
 Lee v Lee’s Farming Limited [1960] 3 All ER 420 (PC). Professor Gower refers to a case during the Second World 
War when all of the shareholders of a private company were killed by a bomb but the company itself survived 
(presumably with the estates of the deceased as shareholders) and an Australian case where both shareholders in a 
private company were killed in a motor collision. See the review of this situation in Neufeld v Secretaryof State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] 3 All ER 790 (CA). 
85 Van den Heever JA in Cape Pacific Limited v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited, supra, 810D quoting 
United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit 142 Fed 247 (1905) 255, which is in turn quoted by Domanski 
‘Piercing the Corporate Veil - A New Direction?’ (1986) 103 SALJ 224 232. 
86
 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 SLT 159 161, quoted in Adams and Others v Cape Industries plc 
and Another [1991] 1 All ER 929 (CA) 1022c and again with approval by Van Heerden JA in Cape Pacific Limited v 
Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited, supra, 811. 
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 The maritime context against which these principles fall to be considered is the operation 
by an individual shipowner
87
 of more than one vessel and sometimes a substantial fleet of vessels 
the operations of which are managed and conducted centrally, although each is owned by a 
separate corporate entity. In other words the problem is one of a group of companies, each of 
which owns a vessel, operating co-operatively in the field of maritime endeavour. From an 
economic perspective the group of companies may be viewed as a single economic unit and the 
appearance they give to the world is that of a single economic unit. However, the law has 
generally been reluctant to disregard the separate legal personalities of the companies constituting 
the group in favour of a concept more attuned to economic reality. Thus in R v Milne and Erleigh 
(7)
88
 Centlivres CJ said:- 
 
‘There is no persona which is the group, and there are no interests involved except the 
interests of the companies and the interests of the controllers.  This is not mere legal 
technicality... no businessman would be deceived into thinking that in a group there is, in 
effect, a pooling of assets and a right in the controllers to deal with assets belonging to the 
companies without regard to their respective interests.’ 
 
Of course that was in the context of a criminal case where the controllers of the various 
companies had done precisely what the court held no businessman would be deceived into 
thinking was the situation with a group of companies, namely a pooling of their assets and 
permitting the controllers to deal with assets belonging to the different companies without regard 
to their respective interests. The passage in question was not a statement that this could not occur 
                                                 
87 The expression is intended to go beyond the notion of legal ownership to beneficial ownership. In other words it 
comprehends the person or persons who ultimately profit from the operation of the vessel. It is in this sense that the 
expression is used in all the discussions concerning the use of flags of convenience. 
88 1951 (1) SA 790 (A) 828. This approach is not unique to South Africa. Lord Morton in Harold Holdsworth & Co 
(Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 All ER 725 (HL) 734 h-i said that: ‘ … each company in the group is, in law, a 
separate entity, the business of which is to be carried on by its own directors and managing director, if any …’ In a 
maritime context Roskill LJ (as he then was) said that it was a fundamental principle of English law long established 
and now unchallengeable by judicial decision that: ‘… each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern 
concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities so that the rights of one company 
in a group cannot be exercised by another company in that group even though the ultimate benefit of the exercise of 
those rights would enure beneficially to the same person or corporate body irrespective of the person or body in 
whom those rights were vested in law. It is perhaps possible under modern commercial conditions to regret the 
existence of these principles. But it is impossible to deny, ignore or disobey them.’ The  Albazero [1975] 3 All ER 21 
(CA) 28h-29a.  Hannigan, Company Law, 74-82. 
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but a reiteration of the principle that if it did occur criminal consequences might follow.  It might 
also be added that in accordance with the general principles governing piercing of the corporate 
veil in such circumstances a court might be willing to pierce the corporate veil. Whatever care 
must be taken in considering that passage it nonetheless reflects a broad reality in regard to the 
approach that courts will adopt towards the operations of a group of companies. The espousal in 
England of a more flexible approach
89
 appears to have been short lived.
90
  As a general 
proposition it is submitted that the mere fact that there are a number of separate companies within 
a group consisting of a holding company and various subsidiaries is no basis for disregarding 
their separate existence. Ordinarily they are to be treated as separate legal entities in the absence 
of some substantial reason for disregarding their separate juristic existence. In the maritime 
context the mere fact that a number of separate ship owning companies pool their assets under a 
single system of management in order to secure benefits of scale, does not justify treating the 
assets as being in common ownership.91 
 
 Even the most cursory consideration of these principles reveals that they provide no 
justification for the true associated ship jurisdiction unless one is willing to tar with the brush of 
                                                 
89 By Lord Denning MR in DHN Food Distributors Limited v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 3 All ER 
462 (CA) 467 where he cited with approval a passage from the 5th edition of Gower’s Principles of Modern 
Company Law to the effect that ‘there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of 
various companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole group’ and added ‘this is 
especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the subsidiaries, so much so that it can control 
every movement of the subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do 
just what the parent says.’  The passage was also cited with approval in Ritz Hotel Limited v Charles of the Ritz 
Limited 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) 314-316, but it appears to be of more relevance in the context of the power of a holding 
company to represent and act on behalf of its wholly owned subsidiaries than in imposing liability where it would not 
otherwise exist.  It is not repeated in later editions of Gower. The situations where authority to represent a company 
can be inferred from this type of structure are reflected in cases such as Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Company Limited 1921 AD 168 and De Villiers and another NN.O v BOE Bank Ltd 2004 (3) SA 1 (SCA). 
90 That approach was effectively rejected in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1991] 1 All ER 929 (CA) as was the 
United States approach of asking whether someone is the alter ego of the company, an approach which has been 
used in some American cases to overcome the difficulties posed by ‘one-ship’ companies. Berlingieri, op cit, 52-481 
to 52.483, pp177-8. See the general discussion in Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, op cit 
181-190; Loh Siew Cheang and William M F Wong, Company Law: Powers and Accountability, op cit,23-28. 
91
 Wambach v Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669 (A) 675B-E where the court approved of those 
passages in the decision in Adams and Others v Cape Industries plc and Another, supra, where the approach of Lord 
Denning in DHN Food Distributors Limited v London Borough of Tower Hamlets, supra, was rejected. 
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fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct every shipowner who elects to cause a fleet of ships to be 
registered in the ownership of one-ship companies incorporated in flag of convenience 
registries92. That is a conclusion at which even the most vigorous opponents of flag of 
convenience registries would probably balk. The fact of the matter is that a decision to register 
vessels on that basis is a perfectly legitimate business decision entirely justified by the 
commercial advantages that can flow therefrom.93 International marine transport is probably the 
quintessential example of the phenomenon now known as globalisation. The nature of the 
industry is such that from an operational viewpoint shipowners are highly mobile and in a 
position to take advantage of fiscal benefits and cost savings that arise if they move their base of 
operations from one jurisdiction to another. There is no reason why their vessels should remain 
registered in a high-cost, high-tax jurisdiction when they can with equal ease and no disadvantage 
be registered in a low-cost, low-tax jurisdiction, particularly if their base of operations for the 
purposes of management can remain the same. When the jurisdiction in which they wish to 
register conveniently operates in their own country or one readily accessible to them and poses no 
problems of access or inconvenience
94
 it makes commercial sense to follow that route.  
 
 It is no doubt because shipping enterprises that elected to register their vessels in one-ship 
companies in flag of convenience jurisdictions did so, as a general proposition, for perfectly 
legitimate and genuine commercial reasons, that endeavours to pierce the corporate veil in 
relation to shipping groups operated on this basis do not appear to have succeeded on the 
                                                 
92 Bradfield, Guilt by association in South African admiralty law, [2005] LCMLQ 234 at 240 says that fraud or 
improper conduct is ‘simply presumed’ in the associated ship provisions, but this is incorrect and flows from the 
endeavour to fit these provisions into the straitjacket of ‘piercing the corporate veil’. As he recognises earlier in the 
same article (at 239) the associated ship provisions ‘undermine the, for the most part, perfectly legitimate use of the 
corporate form to limit risk in commercial undertakings generally and in shipping in particular.’  
93 The ‘Maritime Trader’ [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 153 (QB (Adm Ct) ). See the comment on that decision by A M 
Tetterborn, ‘The Time Charterer, the One-Ship Company and the Sister-Ship action in rem’ [1981] LMCLQ 507 509 
where he wrote that the ‘one-ship company is a widespread maritime institution with sound other commercial 
reasons behind it: proving its use with the specific intention of evading s 3(4) would be a quite exceptional feat …’ 
94 Such as the Bahamas and Marshall Islands registries which operate in London and New York; Vanuatu which is 
based in New York or Liberia, which is based in New York, but has regional offices in Hong Kong, Piraeus, 
Monrovia, Tokyo, London and Zurich. See the relevant entries in Coles, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, 61-2, 
234-5, 287 and 185-7.    
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occasions that this has been attempted. Reference has been made above to an unreported case in 
South Africa shortly before the inception of the Act where such an attempt was made and 
failed.95 Attempts to follow the same or a similar route failed in England96, Hong Kong97 and 
Australia
98
. Undoubtedly the reason for this is that whilst such business practices may earn the 
disapprobation of some they do not involve fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct in the sense in 
which those expressions are used in the cases. 
 
 It follows that the reliance initially placed on the concept of piercing or lifting the corporate 
veil to justify the introduction of the true associated ship arrest was misplaced. Resort was had to 
the concept as a justification for this legislative provision but the underlying circumstances in 
which that doctrine of company law can be invoked were not in general present in shipping 
enterprises that operated as a single enterprise but registered their vessels in separate one-ship 
companies. That is not to say that in certain instances there might not have been scope for its 
application but it was not as a general rule capable of being applied to all. As a justification for 
the wholesale departure from fundamental principles of company law embodied in the true 
associated ship arrest it is almost entirely lacking.
99
 It is a myth that should be laid to rest and it 
would be highly desirable to stop using this language to describe the purpose or nature of the 
associated ship arrest provisions. Unfortunately in the absence of a reasoned alternative it is 
language that our courts continue to use, whether as a result of habit, a failure of analysis or as fig 
                                                 
95 See footnote 73, ante.  
96
 The ‘Maritime Trader’, supra, 157, right hand column. 
97
 China Ocean Shipping Co v Mitrans Shipping Co Ltd [1995] 3 HKC 123; 
98 ICT Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995-96) 39 NSWLR 640 
99 This appears to have been the view of the Australian Law Commission which in para 141 of its report (ALRC 33, 
op cit) concluded: ‘… differing views were expressed to the Commission about the desirability of a corporate veil 
provision, either confined to the identification of surrogate ships, or applying more generally.  The predominant view 
was that a special provision in the legislation was undesirable … [T]he fundamental consideration in the 
Commission’s view, is the undesirability of making special provision with respect to the corporate veil in legislation 
dealing with admiralty jurisdiction.  If questions of the liability or indebtedness of corporate groups are to be 
addressed this is properly done through company or insolvency law rather than in specific legislative contexts such 
as admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly there should be no special provisions dealing with the corporate veil, or 
defining ‘related’ or ‘associated’ companies in the proposed legislation.’  
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leaf to cover the otherwise inexplicable is difficult to tell. One would have thought that more than 
twenty-five years of the associated ship jurisdiction being invoked against perfectly respectable 
groups of companies that are plainly not constituted through one-ship companies for any 
dishonest or dishonourable purpose would have cause courts to pause for reflection before 
repeating this tired old mantra, but there is no sign in their judgments that they have done so.  
 
5 A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ASSOCIATED SHIP ARREST 
 
 Once the grounds advanced for the introduction of the jurisdiction by way of the arrest of a 
true associated ship are seen to be less substantial than they possibly appeared at the time, the 
question inevitably arises whether there is nonetheless a justification in principle or policy for 
this innovation, which provides a sound reason for retaining the jurisdiction. Alternatively does 
one accept the Australian criticism that it is an anomalous exception to general principles of 
company law lacking any principled legal justification and dependent on a pragmatic one. 
Experience and inclination, which provide the pragmatic justification, suggest that it has been a 
valuable innovation that has had few detrimental side effects, unless one regards the payment or 
settlement of a number of otherwise irrecoverable claims as detrimental. The very few cases in 
which such an arrest has lead to proceedings to recover damages under s 5(4) of the Act does not 
suggest that there has been any widespread abuse of the jurisdiction. At a practical level its 
retention seems desirable. This may, but does not necessarily, suggest the existence of a 
defensible underlying rationale for the jurisdiction, upon the simple basis that if something works 
there are usually sound reasons therefor capable of being reconciled with either legal policy or 
legal principle. The difficulty is to identify those reasons. 
  
 Part of the problem with the original explanations for the extended associated ship arrest 
jurisdiction is that they did not explore the fundamental reasons for the existence of companies 
and groups of companies. In the result they painted with too broad a brush, thereby obscuring the 
true significance of the corporate structures underlying fleets operated on the basis of one-ship, 
one company. They are too dependent upon assumptions as to the appropriate legal principle and 
the scope of the Arrest Convention to be entirely satisfying. There is a connection between the 
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Arrest Convention and the need for this jurisdiction but at the time the connection was not fully 
explored and articulated. This is not surprising because those engaged in discussions about the 
proposed Act were concerned with broader questions of the future shape of admiralty law and 
jurisdiction in South Africa rather than something that was then viewed as incidental. 
 
 In the various exchanges concerning the terms of the Act the most vigorous debates 
concerned its provisions in regard to the law to be applied in maritime cases.
100
 The absence of 
debate over the concept of the associated ship arrest has already been noted101 and resulted in 
broad and ostensibly plausible reasons being given for it without those reasons being subjected to 
close scrutiny. That in turn leads critics - although these have been few in number in South Africa 
- to make the obvious point that the jurisdiction in relation to true associated ships involves a 
fundamental departure from basic principles of company law that requires to be considered more 
generally than in the maritime context alone. It is that approach that caused the Australian Law 
Commission to reject suggestions that a similar jurisdiction should be introduced in Australia.
102
 
However this ignores the possibility that the particular context of maritime litigation may 
exacerbate a more general problem existing in the field of company law and justify special 
treatment. It is suggested that exploration of this possibility leads to an acceptable justification of 
the true associated ship arrest jurisdiction although not necessarily one that all nations will think 
                                                 
100 The early proposals would have enabled the courts to develop a South African maritime jurisprudence with a 
good deal of flexibility based on Roman Dutch law, English admiralty law and the general concept of the law of the 
sea. However, pressure to establish a more definite legal regime prevailed so that the ultimate compromise embodied 
in section 6(1) of the Act has aligned our substantive law in dealing with maritime claims substantially with that of 
England and Wales, with very little resort being had to Roman Dutch law or other sources.  A curious feature of the 
subsequent jurisprudence has been the resort to section 6 in order to construe the Act itself.  See for example the 
court’s approach to determining the nature of a maritime lien in Transol Bunker BV v m.v. ‘Andrico Unity’ and 
others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A). This inverts the enquiry. Until a vessel has been properly arrested under the Act, which 
in that case required that the claimant have a maritime lien over the vessel, there is no ‘matter’ in respect of which a 
court sitting as a Colonial Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction. The question of whether a vessel can be arrested 
under the Act is in my view clearly not such a question. This approach contrasts markedly with the robust attitude of 
the Australian courts that: ‘The Admiralty Act is, however, a creature of the Australian Parliament and must be 
construed in accordance with the laws of Australia.’ Kent v SS ‘Maria Luisa’ (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 12, para 38, 27. 
101 Footnote 28 ante. 
102 Footnote 92 ante. There is a measure of irony in the fact that when the revision of the Arrest Convention was 
under consideration Australia was one of the countries that supported the United Kingdom the introduction of a 
jurisdiction along the lines of the South African associated arrest. See Chapter 1, footnote 29, ante.  
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it appropriate to adopt and that the proper starting point is to have regard to the reasons why legal 
recognition was in the first place accorded to the notions of separate corporate personality and 
limited liability.  
 
 The company as an institution is in legal terms a relatively recent invention.
103
 By creating 
an entity separate from the natural persons engaged in the business and limiting the liability of 
those persons a number of purposes can be achieved which are in general conducive to the 
promotion of investment and entrepreneurial activity. That in turn is regarded as being generally 
beneficial to the welfare of society as a whole in a world that espouses a capitalist free market 
economic system. (In a system that rejected the notion of free enterprise and private property the 
problem being explored would be treated as further evidence of the dysfunctional nature of 
capitalism.) These different purposes depend upon the company having separate legal personality 
and limited liability. The view is that if companies have limited liability this facilitates the raising 
of capital and promotes entrepreneurship by fixing at the outset the maximum liability of 
participants in the venture. This can widen the pool of potential investors and enable investment 
to be sought from persons who want no role in the activities of the enterprise but are willing to 
provide (or stand good for) a limited amount of capital to the business provided they do not 
thereby expose themselves to any risk greater than the amount of the capital they are willing to 
provide.104 The underlying argument was originally and remains that by enabling investors to 
separate their other assets from those of the business and from attack by the creditors of the 
business or, to a lesser extent, by enabling the business to separate its assets from the assets and 
liabilities of its investors, the raising of capital is facilitated as the risks involved in the venture 
                                                 
103 Gower (6th Ed), op. cit, 36-91 provides a short history. For the history in South Africa see LAWSA, Vol. 4, part 1 
(First Re-Issue), paras. 2-5; Blackman et al, op cit, Int-4-6,. J.T. Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s South African Company Law 
through the Cases, 6th Ed. (1996) 1-9 contains a number of useful background references on the development of the 
company as a legal institution. Png, op cit, 2-9 outlines the history and refers to the principal theories of corporate 
personality with reference to the extensive writing on this topic. 
104 The risks of unlimited liability had been highlighted in England by the consequences of an economic slump from 
1845 to 1848 (Gower (6th Ed), ante, 40) and featured prominently in the debates surrounding the passage of the 
Limited Liability Act 18 &19 Vict c.133. In a more modern context those risks have been highlighted by the disaster 
at Lloyds in the 1980's and early 1990's arising principally out of underwriting practices in respect of pollution and 
asbestosis claims. For a general account of that disaster see A Raphael, Ultimate Risk. 
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are clearly defined at the outset. This in turn promotes entrepreneurial activity for the general 
benefit of the economy and creates investment markets in which investors can participate secure 
in the knowledge that the financial soundness of their fellow investors is in large measure 




 Valid though these arguments may be in the context of large business entities that offer 
their shares to the public in order to raise capital for their business ventures, Professor Davies 
points out that they have little application in the context of businesses, having a limited number 
of participants or even only a single shareholder
106
 that may vary greatly in the scale of their 
operations but will very frequently be smaller and often much smaller than public listed 
companies. There the advantage to be gained by incorporation is limited liability for the 
participants although even that may be more illusory than real where the company is financed by 
way of borrowings and the bank or other financial institution insists on the shareholders signing 
as sureties for the due performance of its obligations. In those circumstances small creditors and 
those who are injured by conduct for which the company is delictually liable will bear the brunt 
of the consequences of limited liability, whilst those who provided the finance to enable the 
company to conduct business in the first place are better able to protect themselves and their 
interests.107 In the maritime context banks that finance the operations of fleets of vessels will 
                                                 
105 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 7th Ed (2003) 176 -180, deals with the 
original rationale for limited liability and stresses that in the context of England at the time this was an attractive 
argument as there were then many large projects contemplated that would require considerable sums by way of 
capital in particular the extension of the railways. Cheang and Wong, op cit, 39 refer to these original purposes in 
supporting the theory that the proper ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality of a company is that 
it is being used for a purpose inconsistent with the intended functions of a company in terms of the relevant 
legislation. 
106 As in the case of Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1960] 3 All ER 420 (PC). Gower and Davies op cit, 177. This 
refers to beneficial shareholders as for many years company legislation in various parts of the world required that a 
company have a minimum number of shareholders. This was commonly circumvented by having an appropriate 
number of nominee shareholders holding a limited number of shares. Davies, Introduction to Company Law, 28. 
107
 Gower and Davies, op cit, 179. In Davies, Introduction to Company Law, 76-77 this is referred to as secured 
creditor opportunism.  Hannigan, op cit, 78 writes: ‘Typically, a bank will require each subsidiary company to 
provide security and guarantees that it will meet its own liabilities to the bank and the liabilities of any other 
company in the group to the bank.. These contractual devices ensure that the bank is able to ignore the separate legal 
entities and in effect to lend to the group and to recover from the group.’ 
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frequently insist that they be separately owned and will secure their own lending to the operators 
of the fleet by way of cross-mortgages, cross-guarantees and personal guarantees from the 
individuals who control the enterprise. The result is that the banks can avoid or mitigate the 
consequences of limited liability whilst leaving the day to day creditors of the shipping enterprise 
to fight for payment from the proceeds of a vessel the value of which is usually considerably less 
than the total of the claims arising from its operations. Whilst the financial institutions claim for 
themselves the ability to have resort to assets beyond the one in respect of which the loan may be 
advanced their insistence on that asset being held separately from other assets in the group also 
serves to protect the lender against other creditors. 
 
 A further area of concern arising from the doctrine of separate corporate personality is its 
application in the area of groups of companies. As we have seen this is, at least potentially, an 
issue that is particularly engaged in the maritime field. If the reason for conferring the advantages 
of corporate personality and limited liability are those set out above it is in many instances 
unclear why every company in a group of companies should enjoy those advantages separately 
from every other company in the group. This is not to say that every instance of a group of 
companies arranging its commercial and economic activities through subsidiaries is unacceptable. 
It has been pointed out that:- 
 
‘A company can have many varied business interests and it may be that in modern 
commercial times the pursuit of those interests can be most effectively carried out 
individually through a group of companies. There is nothing wrong in law for a company 
to arrange its economic or commercial activities and to allocate risks and liabilities in that 
process in a manner which it considers to be the most advantageous in modern 
competitive times … [T]here may be a good commercial purpose for having separate 
companies in a group performing different functions even though the ultimate controllers 
would very naturally lapse into speaking of the whole group as ‘us’.’108 
                                                 
108 Cheang and Wong, op cit, 23.This was the approach of the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc 
[1991] 1 All ER 929 (Ch D and CA) which dealt with the case of involuntary creditors of a company forming part of 
a wider group of companies. Davies, Introduction to Company Law. op cit, 105 describes the effect of that decision 
in the following terms: ‘In a robust judgment the court was clear that the fact that a group of companies was in fact 
conducted as a single economic entity did not mean that the normal operation of the principles of separate legal 
personality and limited liability were to be set aside. Cape was not to be exposed to liability on the grounds that it 
'ran a single integrated mining division with little regard to corporate formalities as between members of the group'. 
So, the parent company could make the other members in the group dance to its tune without losing the benefits of 
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 However, not every case involving a group of companies and a multitude of wholly owned 
subsidiaries can be justified on this basis. Whilst it is usually correct to say that a multi-national 
conglomerate operating in a variety of fields and having a number of subsidiaries each of which 
conducts different aspects of its business involves a wholly legitimate use of the separate 
corporate personality of companies, not all cases are that clearcut. In the case of all such groups 
the usual response of the legislature, both in South Africa and elsewhere, is to require 
consolidated group annual financial statements that reflect the affairs of the group as a whole.
109
 
However, this does not suffice to address the real problem. Writing in 1997, Professor Davies 
commented that:  
 
‘Indeed British company law has failed, unlike German or US law, effectively to come to 
grips with the problems posed even by purely domestic groups of companies. We still 
commence with the proposition that all the companies in a group are separate legal 
entities, and only in the realms of tax law and financial reporting has any significant 
attempt been made to deal with the group as a whole. Nor … is this an area where the 
Community as a whole has had any greater success.’110    
 




‘The second matter which is apparent about the rationales for limited liability, identified 
above, is that they work better, perhaps even assume, that the shareholders are natural 
persons.  However, very many businesses are today carried on through a group of holding 
and subsidiary companies rather than through a single company. This raises the question 
of whether the doctrine of limited liability should apply only as between the holding 
company and its shareholders or also within the group i.e. between the holding group and 
the subsidiaries and among the subsidiary companies. In fact, the doctrine does apply 
within groups, a conclusion which the courts have arrived at without any deep 
                                                                                                                                                              
limited liability as against those companies. Moreover a questionable motive did not deprive Cape of these benefits: 
it retained them even if  'the purpose of the operation was in substance that Cape would have the benefit of the 
group’s asbestos trade in the United States, without the risk of tortious liability'. It was the court thought, a legitimate 
use of the group structure to bring this result about. With respect all that the judgment demonstrates is that the 
traditional and limited ability of courts to go behind corporate structures mandated by the legislature does not suffice 
to address all opportunistic uses of those structures.’ 
109 See ss 289 and 290 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973, as amended. Png, op cit, 143 points out that the metaphor 





 Ed) op cit, 69-70. 
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consideration of the matter as an inevitable consequence of the doctrine of separate legal 
personality. However, a rationale for limited liability has been advanced which would 
justify its application within groups and, to some extent, to small companies.  This is the 
‘asset partitioning’ rationale. What limited liability facilitates, it is said, is the segregation 
of groups of assets, between investors and the company, in the case of a single company, 
or as among different companies in corporate groups. Although this situation is normally 
presented as one which hinders the enforcement of claims by creditors, it can be argued 
that it works to their benefit. Just as a creditor of a company, or of one of a number of 
companies in a group, cannot assert its claims against that company’s shareholders, 
individual or corporate, so also the creditors of a shareholder, individual or corporate, 
cannot assert their claims against that company. In other words, our first creditor obtains 
protection from the shareholder’s creditors, in exchange for the limited liability of the 
company to which he or she has advanced credit, and thus may confine his monitoring 
efforts to the company to which he has advanced the credit and does not have to monitor 
the activities of whole group or of individual shareholders. Of course, the proponents of 
this rationale do not deny that the operation of limited liability within corporate group 
(sic) may give rise to possibilities for abuse, which the law should control, but they do 
argue that the application of limited liability within groups is in principle justified.’ 
 
 Whatever the general merits of the suggested rationale for the recognition of separate 
corporate personality within groups of companies it does little to justify the situation of a 
shipping fleet which is operated as a single entity for the benefit of a particular individual or 
individuals but in which each vessel is owned by a separate company. The ‘asset partitioning’ 
that occurs in that situation serves little purpose insofar as protecting the interests of creditors is 
concerned. In fact quite the opposite may be true. It serves the interests of the individual who is 
the beneficial shareholder of the whole group and possibly facilitates one or two secured 
creditors, usually banks or other financial institutions, in obtaining advantages that by the nature 
of the enterprise cannot be available to all. In general, creditors’ interests depend upon the 
provisions that dictate the order of priority amongst different claimants to the proceeds accruing 
from the sale of the particular vessel.112 The effect of the ‘asset partitioning’ inherent in a fleet 
operated on the basis of a number of ‘one-ship companies’ is not to protect creditors but to limit 
the assets of the fleet against which they may pursue their claims to the particular vessel in 
respect of which those claims arose. Virtually the only creditors that will be able to enforce their 
                                                 
112 These are dealt with in s11 of the Act the broad effect of which is to subordinate ‘associated ship’ claims against a 
vessel to a relatively lowly status.  See s 11(11) and Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the Fund 
Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the m.v. ‘Jade Transporter’ 1987 (2) SA 583 (A). 
 111
claims on a broader basis will be banks and similar entities whose claims are secured by fleet 
mortgages and cross-guarantees. 
 
 The asset partitioning theory may have merit when one is dealing with a successful group 
of companies that is contemplating entering into a new field posing risks for the survival of the 
group itself. In that situation it is appropriate to strike a balance between the interests of all 
stakeholders in the group - shareholders, employees, creditors and even the State, which looks to 
the company for tax revenue and the provision of employment and is concerned about the social 
security implications of business failure - and the creditors who come into existence only because 
of the new venture. One can there appreciate that there may be a socially useful result flowing 
from permitting the group to undertake the new venture whilst protecting its existing assets 
against claims if the venture proves unsuccessful113. However in the typical shipping group 
operating through one-ship companies this is not the reason for adopting this type of group 
corporate structure. 
 
 Structures of the type we are concerned with are not established in order to secure the broad 
general benefits for which separate legal personality and limited liability is conferred upon 
companies by company law. One-ship owning companies do not ordinarily seek investment from 
the general public, although there are some groups that facilitate investment by wealthy 
individuals, usually solicited through brokers or personal contact with those running the group, in 
the financing of the group operations or particular ships. They may seek finance from banks but 
the banks avoid the consequences of separate corporate personality and limited liability by 
requiring cross-collateral security across the fleet and from the natural persons who stand behind 
the various corporate entities. Nor is the corporate structure intended to protect the business of 
the one-ship company from the creditors of its shareholders.  In the ordinary course of events the 
financial position of those individuals will depend upon the successful operation of the fleet 
rather than the reverse. It is difficult to think of a situation where the unrelated activities of the 
shareholders in a shipping company resulted in the creditors of the shareholder seeking redress 
                                                 
113 P Davies, Introduction to Company Law, op cit, 102-3. 
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against the vessel. In any event, the asset partitioning theory in that sense only holds good when 
there are a multiplicity of shareholders in the corporate entity.  Where one is dealing with a single 
controlling shareholder, who runs into financial difficulty, unsatisfied creditors can always 
pursue the shareholder by way of sequestration proceedings and, as the shares in all the ship-
owning companies are assets in that individual’s estate, the corporate structure can be stripped 
away through the conventional processes of sequestration. This is probably true as well in any 
instance where the group has only one or two major controlling shareholders or a family- 
controlled group whose fortunes are tied up with the overall fortunes of the group so that in 
colloquial parlance they sink or swim together. 
 
 It is submitted that the dilemma of reconciling traditional views about companies with these 
difficulties can be resolved by recognising that neither separate corporate personality nor limited 
liability are in all circumstances such overriding legal values that they cannot be departed from in 
particular situations in order to give effect to other socially useful goals, such as the need to hold 
individuals responsible for their actions or, in the case of the true associated ship, the 
economically desirable purpose that people should wherever possible pay debts when they are in 
a financial position to do so. Where the advantages of separate corporate personality and limited 
liability are not in place to serve the purposes for which they were intended and are exploited for 
different purposes that are socially or economically undesirable, then it is legitimate for there to 
be intervention, whether by the courts or the legislature, to address that situation. As it is not for 
courts to undermine institutions that are established through the legislative process and have their 
foundation in law this is most usually done by way of legislation. As Devlin J wrote, ‘the 
legislature can forge a sledgehammer capable of cracking open the corporate shell’114 
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 The need for legislative intervention is greater where the use being made of corporate 
personality is such as to undermine the basic principles applicable to companies because they are 
perceived to be exploitative of that status. Professor Davies115 expresses matters thus: 
 
‘First, the values which underlie the core features cannot be presented as overriding 
policy objectives which must defeat in all circumstances countervailing values. Take, for 
example, the doctrine of limited liability, that is, the rule that creditors’ claims are limited 
to the company’s assets. As we shall see ... one powerful argument in favour of limited 
liability is that it encourages the purchase of shares by people who do not want to get 
involved in the management of the company. However, it is also a doctrine which may 
permit, or even encourage, opportunistic behaviour on the part of the controllers of the 
company as against its creditors, for example, by spiriting out of the company assets 
which the company was represented as owning when the credit was advanced to the 
company. It is not in the interests of companies in general for limited liability to be used 
in this way, because such behaviour may make it more expensive for them to raise credit. 
For example, if abuse of the doctrine of limited liability were rife, banks lending to 
companies might be prepared to do so only at higher interest rates than would obtain if 
the shareholders’ liability was not limited. So, the task for company law is not simply to 
implement limited liability. The task is not even necessarily to balance the interests of 
investors and creditors, though it may come to that if no better strategy can be identified. 
The most challenging task is to design a set of rules which achieves the benefits of 
limited liability (encouraging shareholder investment) while reducing or even eliminating 
the occasions for opportunistic behaviour as against creditors which those rules might 
otherwise generate.’   
 
 It is submitted that in the situation of a fleet of ships being operated as a single trading 
entity with each individual vessel being separately owned by a one-ship company it is difficult to 
justify the grant of separate legal personality and limited liability to each company in the group 
by resort to any of the conventional justifications for that status. Certainly strong views to this 
effect were expressed by a number of delegates at the 1999 CMI Conference reviewing the Arrest 
Convention. Professor Davies points out that the traditional arguments in favour of limited 
liability ‘seem weakly applicable’ in the context of groups of companies.
116
 As that is the case 
there is a general argument in favour of saying that it is appropriate to treat the use of separate 
corporate structures in a group as at least potentially exploitative or as an opportunistic use of the 
advantages of corporate personality or to take steps to prevent such use being exploited for 
                                                 
115 P Davies, Introduction to Company Law, 2004 (Clarendon Press), 33. 
116 P Davies, op cit, 108. 
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unacceptable purposes. That might justify separate treatment of groups of companies and 
possibly intervention to prevent reliance upon the conventional rules governing companies. 
However it is not necessary to explore the general shape and form which such intervention could 
take as we are here concerned with a specific rather than a general problem. The narrower issue is 
whether in the maritime context the problem has distinctive features that are widely apparent and 
susceptible to a solution. 
 
 The general problems of groups of companies are of course not specific to the maritime 
context. What serves to differentiate the latter from other group situations is that it takes the 
concept of asset partitioning to an extreme that is not ordinarily available elsewhere. In the 
conventional land-based business operation each subsidiary will ordinarily constitute a definable 
business unit that may be established wholly separately from the group. In the case of shipping 
groups, however, the establishment of one-ship companies is asset-based rather than 
operationally based. In other words the creation of the separate corporate entities is undertaken 
for the purpose of segregating assets rather than for the purpose of segregating operational 
business entities. Whilst each vessel in the fleet is separately owned by a one-ship company the 
operations of the fleet are conducted as a unified business operation.  This is reflected in the day 
to day trading activities of the fleet being conducted by a separate management company, usually 
forming part of the same group. In such situations all activities regarding the management of the 
affairs of the fleet are centralised in the ship manager.  It is responsible for securing employment 
for the vessel. The ordering of bunkers, provisions and supplies and the obtaining of crew is 
undertaken by the manager or through agents appointed by the manager.  Insurance cover is 
obtained for the fleet as a whole and it will be entered as a fleet entry with its P&I Club. The 
manager will make all the arrangements for the maintenance of the vessels, dry-docking and 
repairs and the undertaking of regular surveys. No doubt in commercial negotiations the fact that 
the parties are dealing with a fleet of vessels is exploited to secure better terms of trade.  
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 Where that is the case the one-ship owning company has no operational significance.
117
  
Ordinarily it does not employ anyone other than the crew of the vessel itself and all decisions 
concerning its business activities are taken by someone else. Very often it will not even have a 
bank account of its own. In many flag of convenience countries its shareholders and directors will 
be nominees and its record of directors’ meetings and general meetings of shareholders will be 
purely formal in nature. The company exists solely for the purpose of owning the vessel and as an 
accounting entity. As a trading operation it exists only in the minds and records of its 
accountants.  
 
 Such a situation is almost impossible to replicate in any other form of business activity.  
Even in groups of companies with a rigidly hierarchical management structure, such as those that 
exist in the mining industry, it would be unusual to find subsidiary companies whose existence 
was so entirely nominal. The nearest comparable situation would be provided by special purpose 
vehicles set up as part of complex financial and financing structure, particularly with a view to 
securing tax advantages.118 However, the nature of the business undertaken by a shipping fleet, 
involving as it does a trading activity, is fundamentally different from financing activities.  If, for 
example, the activities of such a fleet are compared with land-based trading activities one does 
not in practice encounter comparable business structures. Transport companies might have 
separate branches in different places and operate each branch under a separate subsidiary 
company, but they would not operate each vehicle as a separate company. 
 
 These differences arise from the peculiar nature of the shipping industry and can properly 
be recognised as setting it apart from other forms of business. They have over many years led to 
the establishment internationally of special legal regimes governing maritime matters, some 
aspects of which were explored earlier. The special nature of that industry is what has enabled 
                                                 
117 The Belgian delegate to the conference leading to the conclusion of the 1999 Convention described the ship-
owning companies as ‘more or less fictitious companies’ and Belgian cases summarised on the CMI website suggest 
that Belgian courts share that scepticism. Berlingieri, op cit, 583. 
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persons engaged in the business of shipping to exploit the advantages that flow from the one-ship 
company. For the reasons set out above it is suggested that the extent of asset partitioning that 
can be achieved by the use of one-ship companies in the context of the operation of otherwise 
unified fleets is considerably greater than is ordinarily the case in respect of other industries and 
can as such be regarded by policymakers as an exorbitant and opportunistic use of the advantages 
of separate corporate personality and limited liability. That in turn can legitimately attract a 
policy-based response from the legislature designed to curb such opportunistic use. The existence 
of a consistent pattern of the use of corporate personality and limited liability in groups of 
companies operating fleets of vessels in such a way as to prefer certain secured creditors and 
limit the ability of smaller and involuntary creditors to recover on their claims, whilst the 
beneficial owner of the group enjoys the benefits of operating their business as a single entity, is 
not in principle either dishonest or fraudulent, but it can nonetheless be characterised as 
opportunistic behaviour designed to achieve purposes other than those intended to be conferred 
by such separate corporate personality and limited liability. There are no indications that similar 
patterns of conduct are replicated in other forms of business or industry and accordingly a 





 The nature and form of such a legislative response is dictated by the high level of 
international mobility of ships. This is what has given rise over many years to the international 
development of legal regimes for the arrest of vessels. The purpose of such regimes is to assist 
                                                                                                                                                              
118 Re Polly Peck International Plc [1996] 2 All ER 433 (Ch D). Such endeavours are not always successful in 
obtaining the sought after advantages. See Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes (Inspector of Taxes) [1992] 2 All 
ER 275 (HL) and Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1996 (4) SA 942 (SCA). 
119 Staughton LJ in Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd, The Coral Rose (No 1)[1991] 4 All ER 769 (CA) 
779 remarked that: ‘The creation or purchase of a subsidiary company with limited liability, which will operate with 
the parent’s funds and on the parent’s directions but not expose the parent to liability, may not seem to some the 
most honest way of trading.  But it is extremely common in the international shipping industry and perhaps 
elsewhere.’ This passage not only recognises that the use that can and is sometimes made of these structures to avoid 
liability for the payment of claims is opportunistic and not directed at achieving the purposes for which limited 
liability was intended but also highlights the fact that this is a particular issue in the context of international shipping.  
Interestingly Staughton LJ did not identify any other sphere where the same situation prevails and expressed it as a 
mere possibility. 
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creditors to enforce legitimate claims. What is apparent is that the international framework within 
which such arrests at present take place, namely the Arrest Convention, is inadequate to deal with 
the phenomenon of the one-ship company. The reason for that is not that this phenomenon has 
arisen as a device to circumvent arrest under the Convention but because the Convention is not 
directed at addressing the consequences that legal systems around the world attach to companies, 
namely the recognition of their existence as separate legal entities and the fact that they enjoy 
limited liability. The relevance of the Arrest Convention lies not so much in what it does but in 
what it does not do. What it does is provide an internationally acceptable regime for the arrest of 
vessels in instances where defined maritime claims lie against the owners of such vessels or their 
demise charterers. What it does not do is address the use of corporate personality and limited 
liability that enables natural persons to segregate assets that for all practical purposes are part of a 
single business operation in such a way as to render it more difficult for creditors of that business 
operation to pursue claims for the recovery of amounts due to them.  In the absence of provisions 
that enable courts to circumvent the rules of company law that give rise to these difficulties the 
problems occasioned thereby must attract a legislative response, either domestically in particular 
countries or internationally through changes to the Arrest Convention, if they are to be addressed 
at all. 
 
 Whether such a legislative approach is adopted will of course depend heavily upon the 
weight given to different policy considerations in any particular country. In one where there are 
substantial ship-owning interests one would expect the policies adopted by government to be 
such as to promote those interests and to facilitate the acquisition and operation of ships. It is 
unlikely that such countries will welcome or adopt measures that enable creditors of ship-owning 
companies to have a broad scope for relief against other companies in a fleet or against those who 
stand behind such companies. They are likely to oppose any measure designed to facilitate claims 
against ship-owners or to make their vessels more vulnerable to arrest.
120
 In countries that have 
relatively small ship-owning interests but are significant importers of goods by sea or have large 
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insurance markets or are otherwise more concerned about the interests of claimants than those of 
ship-owners, there will be pressure to have a generous jurisdiction favourable to the interests of 
claimants in shipping cases. These are the primary voices that will be heard in any debate over 
the issue and it must be recognised that in differing contexts both perspectives have their merits 
and principled arguments can be made for both. Whilst these are the most obvious interests the 
voices of those who provide finance for the acquisition of ships will need to be heard as well as 
those who insure both vessels and cargo. Trade unions representing crew will also have a view 
that will need to be taken into account. In any one jurisdiction the arguments that will prevail are 
ultimately not legal arguments but broader political and economic arguments. In practical terms 
they boil down to whether the country in question is concerned that maritime claims be paid and 
is willing to disturb corporate structures to achieve that end or whether it is less concerned about 
the payment of claims and regards the health and continuation of its ship-owning industry and 
related interests as of greater importance and hence is desirous of maintaining the structures that 
provide support to that industry in full force. Few countries are overly concerned with moral 
imperatives regarding the obligation to pay debts.  In this field commercial pragmatism 
reinforced in some instances by the advantages to the fiscus are the ones most likely to prevail. In 
countries that have established a profitable business as ships registries it is unlikely that there will 
be any great enthusiasm for regimes that undercut or disturb their corporate activities. In a 
country such as South Africa, seeking to establish itself as a favourable destination for maritime 
litigation, the establishment of a generous and claimant-friendly arrest regime will be viewed 
favourably. Any debate over this issue at an international level will require that there be trade-
offs between countries the precise nature of which is not necessarily foreseeable. 
   
 Internationally there is a sufficiently widely expressed concern over the widespread use of 
one-ship companies that it can properly be considered a matter of concern. In order to address the 
perceived inadequacies of the Convention as a mechanism to assist creditors in the enforcement 
of claims, where those claims have arisen in respect of ships owned by one-ship companies, one 
                                                                                                                                                              
120 An examination of which countries opposed international attempts to include some form of associated ship arrests 
in the 1999 revision of the Arrest Convention reveals that all the major ship-owning countries that had no 
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needs not an extension of the Arrest Convention but a fundamentally altered legal regime 
directed at overcoming the problems of company law that are not addressed by the Convention. 
That is what is provided by the true associated ship arrest jurisdiction in South Africa.  It must be 
borne in mind that this is not simply a jurisdiction that enables the creditor to pursue assets other 
than those owned by its debtor. Whilst in some instances this will be the effect, as where the 
vessel in respect of which the claim arose is no longer available to satisfy the claim and the 
company itself no longer has any assets, where that is not the case the effect of invoking this 
jurisdiction will be to bring before the court the persons who stand behind the actual debtor. 
Rather than treating this as an example of piercing the corporate veil it is more appropriate to say 
that the true associated ship arrest is based on a disregard of separate corporate existence within 
groups of companies operating fleets of vessels in maritime trade. Whereas piercing the veil is 
usually invoked to render the members of the company liable for the actions of the company, in 
the case of a true associated ship arrest it is not the members of the ship-owning company who 
are rendered liable for the debts of the company. Rather it is the assets of other companies in the 
group that become vulnerable to arrest and potentially execution and even then only after the 
creditors of the associated ship have been satisfied. In effect the ships making up the fleet are 
treated as being owned in common and their strict legal ownership by the separate companies is 
disregarded, save where questions of priority in the distribution of a fund arising form the sale of 
a vessel are involved. In economic terms the group replaces the company as both debtor and 
owner of assets for the purposes of recovering debts although thiscannot be taken too far in that it 
is only ships within the group that are made vulnerable to arrest for this purpose. No judgment 
ensues against the group or against the ship-owning companies in the absence of personal 
liability and for example there would be no power to execute against a bank account on a 
judgment in rem against an associated ship. 
 
 It needs to be emphasised that it is not the purpose of the true associated ship jurisdiction to 
render liable for claims those who have absolutely no connection with the incurring of the 
relevant debt. Its purpose is to go behind the corporate curtain and to identify those who are the 
real beneficiaries of the company that owns the vessel in respect of which the claim arises and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
countervailing interests were opposed to this.    
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commercial operations of that vessel. Those are the persons who benefit from this use of separate 
corporate personality and the jurisdiction is directed not at rendering those individuals personally 
liable but at depriving them of that opportunistic advantage. The issue for present purposes is 
whether it is possible to articulate a principled justification for the true associated ship arrest and 
its underlying policy of disregarding the asset partitioning that occurs in shipping groups in 
consequence of the use of one-ship companies. The answer must lie in the policy choices of 
different countries. Once this is recognised it becomes a matter of balancing the interests of 
shipowners in such asset partitioning against the interests of creditors in having an extended 
ability to secure payment of their claims. 
  
 In that balancing exercise the argument in favour of a more generous arrest regime has as 
its starting point the proposition that in general the law and economics should favour and 
facilitate the payment of claims rather than their non-payment. Market economies are based upon 
the principle that promises that are seriously made in the course of the conduct of business should 
be fulfilled. This is what enables business to operate. Responsibility for their fulfilment must 
ultimately rest with the natural persons who benefit from those business activities. Foremost 
among the promises that are made in the daily exchanges of commercial life is that payment will 
be made in return for the provision of goods and services. No legal system operating in the 
context of a market economy fails to provide for mechanisms for enforcing these promises and 
extracting penalties (usually by way of damages) for non-performance. By recognising corporate 
personality and limited liability the law enables the beneficiaries of commercial activities to 
avoid those consequences insofar as they go beyond the limits of their liability as embodied in the 
founding documents of the company. It does so for sound reasons namely that in general the 
results are advantageous to society as a whole because of the economic benefits that flow from 
the corporate form as a means of undertaking business. Where the advantages to the beneficial 
shareholders are regarded as exorbitant in relation to the societal benefits attributable to separate 
corporate personality and limited liability legislatures will intervene. 
 
 The other side of the balancing exercise is to examine the extent to which the infringement 
of the basic principles of company law in this situation may undermine those principles in such a 
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way as to pose a threat to their generally recognised usefulness. In order to understand this it is 
necessary to examine the situations in which the true associated ship jurisdiction will be invoked. 
Firstly it has no bearing on any group of shipping companies that secures that all the companies 
in the group pay their debts. As such it does not pose any obstacle to shipowners making use of 
this type of corporate structure for reasons relating to cost effectiveness, taking advantage of 
beneficial tax regimes or the like. The shipowner who has reasons other than the avoidance of 
creditors for operating under such a regime remains entitled to do so and the right to do so will be 
recognised in all courts including those of South Africa. In many instances the jurisdiction is 
invoked solely for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction and obtaining security for a claim or 
even solely for the latter purpose. In neither event does the invocation of the jurisdiction destroy 
the corporate structure. All that it requires is for the actual debtor, that is the company that owns 
the vessel in respect of which the claim arose, to provide the security and defend the claim. As 
security is usually provided by the P & I Club with which the entire fleet is entered the risk can 
be satisfactorily allocated within the group without disrupting the overall corporate structure. 
 
 Where the group of companies is deliberately using the corporate structure of one-ship 
companies in order to avoid paying debts, for example, by operating the vessels in jurisdictions 
where they are less likely to be susceptible to arrest at the instance of unpaid creditors, it is 
submitted that this use by the group and its beneficial shareholders of separate corporate 
personality and limited liability is self-evidently opportunistic and unacceptable. Similarly if a 
vessel in respect of which claims have arisen has been disposed of so that it is unavailable for the 
purpose of securing jurisdiction by arrest or to be attached and sold in discharge of legitimate 
claims and both the legal and the beneficial owners have failed to make arrangements to meet 
legitimate claims arising in respect of the operations of that vessel that is conduct that is 
commercially unacceptable and not warranted by any legitimate purpose linked to the concepts of 
separate legal personality or limited liability. Equally if the vessel has become a total loss and the 
proceeds of the insurance are held elsewhere within the group or placed in the banking account of 
the holding company or the managers - it has already been noted that many one-ship companies 
will not have their own banking account - creditors may be left with an empty shell to sue, with 
neither a vessel nor the proceeds of the insurance over the vessel available to pay legitimate 
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claims. Where those claims include personal injury or dependants’ claims, both instances of 
involuntary claimants, the exorbitant nature of the use to which the beneficial shareholders have 
put the benefits of separate legal personality and limited liability is apparent. No argument can be 
advanced that such persons have submitted to the risk of non-recovery arising from the 
fragmentation of corporate structures and the separation of assets inot separate companies. 
 
 It may be argued that these results also occur in land-based commercial operations and 
accordingly that the maritime world does not provide a special case deserving of special 
treatment. However in land-based operations there are commercial and practical restraints that 
limit the extent to which trade can be conducted on this fragmented basis insofar as the 
ownership of assets is concerned. One is not concerned with a situation where the available assets 
are insufficient but with as situation where available assets can be sequestered and insulated form 
attachment in payment of debts incurred in relation to other assets in the group. In the field of 
international shipping, because of the nature of the operations and the fact that the principal 
business asset of any ship owning company is the vessel itself, which is capable of being 
redeployed to almost anywhere else in the world at short notice, the ability of shipowners to 
exploit the corporate form in this fashion is far greater. In fact it is difficult to think of any other 
industry that operates on this basis.121 Even assuming that there are one or two other industries 
that are capable of exploiting corporate form in this way and in fact do so, it is suggested that this 
rather provides a reason for legislative interference in relation to those industries to prevent like 
abuses rather than an argument against the true associated ship jurisdiction in maritime matters.  
 
 One argument against the jurisdiction that may require more serious attention arises in the 
case of a shipping line that has fallen upon difficult times and is seeking to restructure its 
operations by disposing of vessels that cannot be operated profitably. In that case the effect of the 
availability of the true associated ship jurisdiction may hamper reconstruction of the group if it is 
intended to trade the remaining vessels to South Africa or generally if the proponents of change 
along the lines of the South African example have their way. The reason is that it will be difficult 
                                                 
121 Possibly the airline industry but that operates under an international convention governing liability that is distinct 
from ownership of assets so it is not entirely comparable 
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for the group to protect the remaining vessels from arrest in respect of debts incurred in relation 
to the vessels being disposed of. However that problem is less likely to occur than one where the 
entire group ceases to be viable and what occurs is an endeavour by the beneficial shareholders to 
salvage something from the wreck of the group at the expense of some of the creditors. The true 
associated ship jurisdiction has been invoked in a number of such situations to provide some 
protection to creditors and secure a more equitable realisation of assets for the benefit of all 
creditors than would otherwise be the case. Also there is nothing in the existence of this particular 
jurisdiction that precludes the group from entering into a conventional compromise or scheme of 
arrangement or debt moratorium with its creditors to enable it to restructure its affairs and survive 
any temporary crisis. 
 
 It is important to note that the existence of the jurisdiction does not give an advantage to 
creditors, whose claims have arisen in respect of vessel A at the expense of creditors whose 
claims have arisen in respect of vessel B, because in any situation of competing claims against 
the proceeds of the sale of a vessel the direct claims against that vessel are always preferred to the 
associated ship claims.
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 Hence the effect of the jurisdiction is not to advantage one group of 
creditors at the expense of others. This illustrates the fact that the remedy is reasonably narrowly 
tailored to the problem that is being addressed namely the exorbitant use of the benefits of 
incorporation to the detriment of creditors of a commercial enterprise that is operated as a single 
entity for the benefit of the beneficial shareholders thereof, but which seeks to exploit the 
advantages of separate incorporation of the ship-owning companies when it comes to meeting the 
claims of creditors. The operation of the jurisdiction is only triggered in that situation and it 
otherwise leaves shipowners to enjoy the benefits of incorporation in the operation of their 
businesses. It is inadequate as a criticism of the jurisdiction to say that it undermines the essential 
nature of companies. Those benefits remain available to shipowners provided they are not 
exploited for the purpose of avoiding obligations incurred in the process of operating the ships in 
question.     
                                                 
122 Such claims fall under s 11(4)(f) of the Act. Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the Fund 
Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the MV ‘Jade Transporter’ 1987 (2) SA 583 (A).  
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 In those circumstances it is submitted that the true associated ship jurisdiction represents a 
legitimate legislative response to a perceived exorbitant and opportunistic use of the benefits of 
corporate form.123 It undoubtedly is a response that favours the creditor against the ship-owner at 
the level of fundamental policy and is accordingly one that is unlikely to appeal to countries 
whose economies have a significant ship-owning industry. Beyond doubt there are substantial 
arguments in favour of addressing the problems posed by the widespread existence of one-ship 
owning companies in this way. It may be argued that the reasons for so contending involve a 
departure from pure legal principle into the realms of economics and as one English judge said 
‘we are not concerned with economics but with law.’124 However there are two responses to this. 
The first is that corporate form is itself a creation of legislation in response to economic forces, 
not a construct of basic legal principle that underlies our (or any other) legal system. What the 
legislature has created and given legal status and recognition to, the legislature can also undo. 
The issue is not in that sense one of legal principle but one of the appropriateness of the policy 
choices of the legislature. The second response is that the purpose of creating corporate form is 
grounded in the perceived economic advantages flowing from the entrepreneurial use of that 
form. Where those advantages are not being secured or are being distorted because of the use to 
which corporate form is being put legislative intervention is a proper response to restore a proper 
economic balance. At the end of the day the proper workings of international maritime trade may 
be better served by putting in place systems that encourage and support the payment of debts 
rather than systems that enable participants to avoid their lawful obligations. Whilst not 
articulated in those terms at the time of the inception of the associated ship jurisdiction it seems 
                                                 
123 Professor Berlingieri in a recent article which came to my notice after this was first written appears to think along 
the same lines. He wrote: ‘Maritime law is an area of the law that has always enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy 
from the general law. Suffice it to mention limitation of liability and general average. If it is in the interest of 
maritime trade to adopt specialised rules, this should be done. But perhaps it is not entirely correct to state that this is 
a problem that involves general principles of corporate law. The problem of single ship companies is a purely 
maritime problem, and may deserve an ad hoc regulation, irrespective of the solution of the general problem of 
piercing the corporate veil.’ F Berlingieri, The 1952 Arrest Convention revisited, [2005] LMCLQ 327, 336.  
124 Lord Justice Robert Goff (as he then was) in Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon and another [1986] 3 All ER 468 (CA) 
486e-f. The statement was made in the context of an argument regarding piercing the corporate veil and the judge 
said: ‘Counsel suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent and subsidiary in 
this context; economically, he said, they were one.  But we are concerned not with economics but with law. The 
distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.’   
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probable that those sentiments were what underlay it and resulted in its acceptance. It is 
submitted that they provide a proper basis for it as an institution in South Africa founded in legal 
principle and that it would be desirable for this to be recognised by our courts in cases involving 
the associated ship arrest rather than a formulaic repetition of the pejorative expressions that have 
hitherto found expression in their judgments.   
 
 Whether other countries will adopt the same or similar measures or whether they will 
obtain wider purchase on the world stage is not within my purview although inevitably the South 
African experience will provide an example of how such a measure can work in practice. That 
makes it more important still that the South African courts should seek to articulate a principled 
basis for the associated ship arrest as their reasoning can then be the subject of scrutiny on the 
international stage. The difficulty in arriving at an internationally acceptable approach is apparent 
from the debates that took place at the CMI Conference on the revision of the Arrest Convention 
in 1999.
125
 A fairly clear distinction emerged between those countries that have a high 
concentration of ship-owning interests and are accordingly reluctant to expose those interests to a 
more extensive regime in relation to the arrest of ships and those whose interests lie 
predominantly on the trading side of the maritime equation, where the ability to arrest vessels and 
enforce claims may be taken to have a higher priority. Once the availability of the institution is a 
matter of policy rather than intrinsic legal principle these considerations come to the fore and it is 
difficult to see on what basis they can be reconciled. No trade-offs are immediately apparent that 
would enable the gap between these interests to be bridged and unless those can be found it 
seems unlikely that a jurisdiction akin to the South African associated ship jurisdiction will win 
international adoption. As to the countries that would like to pursue that route they will, for the 
reasons already discussed above in considering the Arrest Convention in relation to South Africa, 
probably only be able to do so by renouncing that Convention. To forego a uniform regime so 
hardly won over such a long period is not something that any country will undertake lightly. In 
                                                 
125  The United Kingdom delegation, with the support of the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, Canada, Australia, France 
and the CISL proposed ‘associated ship’ arrest provisions modelled on the South African provisions. F Berlingieri 
Arrest of Ships 4th Ed., (2006) 576 and 580. See the Report of the United Nations/International Maritime 
Organisation Diplomatic Conference on Arrest of Ships, GE 99-52433 (19/7/99), Chap II, paras 8 and 12. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 




 The Act was not an attempt to codify the maritime law of South Africa.  As was noted in 
the course of the work of the South African Law Commission that task was initially 
contemplated, but would have required a far more extensive process than could then be 
undertaken and would not have addressed the immediate problems arising from the existing 
regime with the requisite degree of urgency.
1
 Accordingly the general scope of the Act is limited. 
The jurisdictional confusion between the court sitting as a Colonial Court of Admiralty and the 
court exercising its parochial jurisdiction was addressed by the expedient of transferring the old 
admiralty jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of South Africa
2
 whilst extending the range and 
scope of that jurisdiction. This was achieved in two ways. Firstly there was a considerable 
                                                 
1 In an address to the annual general meeting of the MLA on the 29th September 1978, Mr. Shaw QC noted that the 
terms of his appointment were to ‘investigate and draft modernised rules for the Admiralty Courts and Procedure’  
He added: ‘Now the first thing that becomes perfectly obvious to anyone who has anything to do with this matter is 
that modernised rules are going to get us nowhere because the law itself is not only antiquated (but) difficult to find 
and contradictory between the two main maritime provinces, and therefore most of those rules will be, if they are 
going to do any good, ultra vires.  Therefore in a fit of what I am beginning to feel is rash and boyish enthusiasm, I 
suggested to the South African Law Commission that what was really required was a code of maritime law and that 
we should try to take the step of putting into one statute what we regard as necessary for the statute …’ However, 
having said that, he went on: ‘I believe therefore that if we apply ourselves sufficiently to the task, it is possible to 
produce a statute which will comprehensively deal with the rules and procedures relating to the Admiralty Law.’ In 
the Report on the review of the law of Admiralty of the South African Law Commission paragraph 6.1 notes that: ‘If 
it could be done, obviously the best method of reform would be to enact a complete code of admiralty law that would 
apply to all maritime matters. Clearly, however, the preparation of any such code would take many years. Reform 
with regard to jurisdiction and procedure is urgently required and, in those circumstances, the postponement of 
reform until a complete maritime code has been drawn up cannot be regarded as a practical course.’ The problems 
inherent in any attempt at codification of a system of law were dealt with by Lord Halsbury in his introduction to the 
First Edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England reprinted in Halsbury’s Laws of England: Centenary Essays 2007,xxi to 
xxvi and appears to have been shared by his distinguished successor Lord Mackay of Clashfern in his own 
contribution to that volume from xxvii. 
2 As the High Court was then known. 
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extension of the type of claim that qualified as maritime claims.3 Secondly the existing 
limitations in regard to parties and the place where a claim arose were removed. 
 
 The complex problems arising from the fact that in the then Cape Province the English law 
applied in admiralty cases, whilst in Natal there was a potential conflict between English 
admiralty law and Roman Dutch law depending upon which jurisdiction was invoked, as well as 
the fact that in both areas the law was outdated, was ultimately resolved by a compromise. As 
with most compromises the ideal of a clear statement of the law of admiralty fell by the wayside 
in the process of compromise.4 The compromise in effect preserved two streams of law. With 
regard to matters in respect of which a court of admiralty in South Africa, sitting in the exercising 
of its jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, had jurisdiction immediately 
before the commencement of the Act, the law is said to be that which the High Court of Justice of 
the United Kingdom5 would have applied at the date of commencement of the Act. In all other 
matters Roman Dutch law was to apply. The effect of this in many cases was to update the law 
applied in admiralty matters in South Africa by ninety years. The result may be a need in some 
cases to research the more arcane corners of the old jurisdiction in order to apply the modern law 
                                                 
3 This is reflected in the long title of the Act which records that it is an Act: ‘To provide for the vesting of powers of 
the Admiralty Courts of the Republic in the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and 
for the extension of those powers …’ The claims included are by and large taken from the list of claims in the Arrest 
Convention.  See paragraph 7.1 of the Report. 
4 In the same address where he confessed to a ‘rash and boyish enthusiasm’ Mr. Shaw said: ‘What I have in mind is 
try to lay down in one statute, first of all obviously the law that should be applied. Obviously I think that we must 
proceed on the basis that we ought to incorporate in the statute the results of many of the conventions, treaties which 
have been entered into, to which South Africa is not in many cases a party. I don’t see any reason why the rules 
which have been laid down in those conventions should not be incorporated into the statute on the basis that they 
must form part of the law and can be readily amended if the convention itself is amended.’ Some at least of these 
ambitions were subsequently realised with the passage of the Carriage by Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986.  
5 It is accepted that this refers to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales.  Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Practice in South Africa, 73; Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co and others v mv Kalantiao 1987 (4) SA 250 (D) 253D-
E; MV Stella Tingas: Owners of mv Stella Tingas v mv Atlantica and another (Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet and another,  
third parties) 2002 (1) SA 647 (D); MV Stella Tingas: Transnet ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the mv Stella Tingas and 
another 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA) 479H; Swire Pacific Offshore Services (Pte) Ltd v MV ‘Roxana Bank’ and another 




 Although this compromise was hotly debated prior to the Act’s commencement it has by 
and large caused very few problems. The compromise was subject to criticism at the time of its 
enactment7 and no doubt those with a taste for academic ingenuity are able to devise situations 
where it could potentially give rise to substantial legal difficulties. There is an ongoing debate 
within the ranks of the Maritime Law Association spurred by some who would like to see these 
provisions amended and amendments were prepared for debate at the annual general meeting in 
2007, but at present there is little indication that this will result in any change to the present 
position. The absence of any significant problems identified in the cases reported in the law 
reports suggests that the compromise has worked reasonably well. A more significant problem 
lies in the too ready resort to English law to construe the Act itself.8   
 
 The balance of the Act is devoted to providing ‘the framework within which maritime 
disputes are brought to court and decided, and whereby claims are ultimately satisfied’.9 To this 
end it provides for two forms of procedure, namely an action in personam
10
 and an action in 
rem,
11 both of which are available for the enforcement of any maritime claim, subject to one or 
                                                 
6 An example of this is provided by the judgment in Weissglass N.O. v Savonnerie Establishment 1992 (3) SA 928 
(A). The court’s caution in approaching its task is reflected in its unwillingness (at p 942G) to read the word 
‘bankers’ as a typographical error for ‘bunkers’ in considering a document setting out a list of expenses for a vessel! 
7 H. Booysen ‘South Africa’s New Admiralty Act: A Maritime Disaster?’ (1984) 6 Modern Business Law 75 84, 
where the criticism is primarily a constitutional and political one on the basis that: ‘The incorporation by one 
independent State of another’s legal system with which no constitutional links, apart from cool diplomatic relations, 
any longer exist, is not only an extraordinary step but also reflects unfavourably on a State’s sovereignty and its 
Parliamentary, judicial and administrative ability to develop its own laws.’ 
8 The criticism that the courts have been too ready to have recourse to English law in order to resolve difficult issues 
is founded in cases such as those dealing with maritime liens or the nature of the action in rem. This had the curious 
result in dealing with the statutory concept of a maritime lien that the court, when faced with the question whether it 
had jurisdiction in an action in rem, applied section 6(1)(a) and the English law in order to determine what the 
expression ‘maritime lien’ meant in the Act. Transol Bunker BV v m.v. ‘Andrico Unity’ and another 1989 (4) SA 325 
(A). See Chap. 4, fn 100, ante.  
9  D B Friedman, ‘Maritime Law in the Courts after 1 November 1983’ 1986 SALJ 678. 
10 s3(1) of the Act provides : ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act any maritime claim may be enforced by an action 
in personam.’ 
11 s3(4) of the Act provided that : ‘Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to a claimant or to 
the rules relating to the joinder of causes of action a maritime claim may be enforced by an action in rem : (a) if the 
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two exceptions arising from the particular nature of the action in rem. The apparent difference 
between the two that immediately appears is that the former is directed at a natural or juristic 
person whilst the latter is outwardly directed at property, usually a ship, but also possibly its 
equipment, furniture, stores or bunkers, cargo or freight.12 However, save in the case of some 
claims giving rise to a maritime lien, if one goes behind the property arrested in an action in rem 
to the cause of action in most cases the party liable for the claim is also the owner of that 
property.
13
 That is reinforced by the second circumstance justifying an arrest in rem namely that 
the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam 
in respect of the cause of action concerned.14 In that case the property could equally be attached 
ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem.
15
 From a reading of the sections providing for the 
two forms of procedure the only clear instance where the in rem jurisdiction would be more 
                                                                                                                                                              
claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested; or (b) if the owner of the property to be arrested would 
be liable to the claimant in an action in personam in respect of the cause of action concerned.’ In Great River 
Shipping Co v Sunnyface Marine Ltd 1994 (1) SA 65 (C) it was held that this section is not definitive of all the 
circumstances in which an action in rem can be instituted.  
12 Containers and a fund in court arising from a sale in terms of section 9 of the Act were added to the original list of 
property that could be arrested in an action in rem by way of the amendments effected by the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Amendment Act, 87 of 1992.  Whether it can be said from the outward appearance of the action in rem 
that it follows that property and not a person is thereby brought before the court is debatable. This proposition was 
asserted by Conradie J (as he then was) in The m.v. Zlatini Piasatzi : Frozen Food International Limited v Kudu 
Holdings (Pty) Limited and others 1997 (2) SA 569 (C) and followed by Knoll AJ (as she then was) in m.v. Rizcun 
Trader (3): Manley Appledore Shipping Limited v m.v. Rizcun Trader 1999 (3) SA 966 (C) 972A-B.  However, there 
is no indication that the point was argued in the former case and the apparent adoption of the American 
personification theory can hardly be regarded as definitive. The point had been left open by Milne JP in Euromarine 
International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ and others 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) 654G-655A.  As the discussion of the 
theorie regarding the nature of the action in rem in chapter 11 demonstrates the simple personification theory that 
holds that it is property and not the persons having an interest in that property who are brought before the court by 
way of an action in rem is highly contestable. 
13
 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197 (CA); 4 Asp MLC 234, 245. 
14 It is intriguing that the expression used in s3(4)(b) of the Act is ‘cause of action’ rather than ‘maritime claim’. That 
expression is narrower and more technical than the concept of a claim as emerges from cases such as Sentrachem 
Limited v Prinsloo 1997 (2) SA 1 (A) 15B-16D; Drennan Maud and Partners v Pennington Town Board 1998 (3) 
SA 200 (SCA) 212G. There is no apparent reason for the use of the narrower expression and it is submitted that no 
significance should be attached thereto. 
15 s3(2)(b) of the Act read with s2(1) thereof, the effect of which was to abolish in maritime matters the common law 
limitation on such an attachment that it is only available at the instance of a peregrinus if the contract giving rise to 
the claim was concluded or fell to be performed in the area of jurisdiction of the court or if the delict was committed 
or the cause of action otherwise arose within the area of jurisdiction of that court. Maritime & Industrial Services 
Limited v Marcierta Compània Naviera SA 1969 (3) SA 28 (D). 
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extensive than the in personam jurisdiction is in the case of a claimant having a maritime lien in 
circumstances where the owner of the vessel is not the party against whom the underlying claim 
lies.16 
 
2 THE ORIGINAL ASSOCIATED SHIP PROVISIONS 
 
 The provisions relating to the establishment of jurisdiction in an action in rem by way of 
arrest of an associated ship fall to be considered against that background. In their original form 
these appeared in section 3(6) and 3(7) of the Act which read as follows:- 
 
‘6 Subject to the provisions of subsection (9) an action in rem, other than such an action 
in respect of a maritime claim contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition 
of ‘maritime claim’, may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship 
in respect of which the maritime claim arose. 
7(a) For the purposes of subsection (6) an associated ship means a ship, other than the 
ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose:- 
(i) owned by the person who was the owner of the ship concerned at the time when the 
maritime claim arose; or 
(ii) owned by a company in which the shares, when the maritime claim arose, were 
controlled or owned by a person who then controlled or owned the shares in the company 
which owned the ship concerned. 
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a):- 
(i) ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if all the shares in the ships are 
owned by the same persons; 
(ii) a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, 
to control the company. 
(c) If a charterer or sub-charterer of a ship by demise, and not the owner thereof is alleged 
to be liable in respect of a maritime claim the charterer or sub-charterer, as the case may 
be, shall for the purposes of subsection (6) and this subsection be deemed to be the 
owner.’ 
 
 The scope of the old admiralty jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction in personam had 
already been extended by way of the significant increase in the number and type of claims that 
now fell within the revised jurisdiction. Now the jurisdiction in rem was further extended by the 
introduction of the notion of an action in rem being instituted by the arrest of what was termed an 
                                                 
16 S 3(4)(a) in a situation where the owner of the vessel would not, apart from the lien, be liable in personam in 
respect of the maritime claim in question. Other than that relatively narrow case the jurisdiction in rem and the 
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‘associated ship’ instead of the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen. An examination of 
this expression as defined in section 3(7) reveals that two different situations are contemplated.    
 
 The first situation as set out in section 3(7)(a) is the ‘sister ship’ arrest contemplated by the 
Arrest Convention. This is where not only the ship in respect of which the claim arose
17
 but also 
another ship owned by the same owner is liable to arrest in order to institute an action in rem18. It 
matters not whether the owner is in fact the same person, whether individual or juristic, or a 
number of persons provided those persons own both vessels. The reference to ‘shares’ in a ship 
harks back to the days before companies when groups of investors would jointly own a vessel in 
defined shares an historical reference that continues to this day in the world’s ships registries. 
The deeming provision in section 3(7)(b)(i) replicates article 3.2 of the Convention and the effect 
is that in any case where a ship is owned in different shares by more than one person another ship 
will be an associated ship in relation thereto provided it is owned by the same persons 
irrespective of whether the shares in which they own the second ship are different from those in 
which they own the first. It is necessary that as a whole it is the same persons otherwise there is 
no association. The introduction of one more person or the exclusion of one defeats the 
association. However the fact that almost all ships today are owned by corporate bodies so that 
the interests of the natural persons who invest in that vessel will be determined not by their shares 
in the ship itself but by their respective interests in the corporate body that owns the vessel 
renders this provision largely academic. Indeed the history of the past twenty-five years reveals 
that sister ship arrests are not a practical area of controversy.19  
  
                                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction in personam overlap.  
17 Commonly called ‘the ship concerned’ an expression that will be used hereafter. 
18 s3(6) says that an action in rem can be ‘brought’ by the arrest of an associated ship whilst s3(5) speaks of an action 
being ‘instituted’.  It is not apparent that there is any difference intended as a result of this change of wording. 
19 There are no reported cases dealing with sister ship arrests and none of the large body of unreported judgments 
circulated by the MLA or reported in private sets of reports of maritime cases deal with them. Whilst certain national 
fleets may be operated in this fashion it is relatively rare 
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 Section 3(7)(b) is the provision that introduced the true associated ship.  Given the nature 
of the concerns that underlay its introduction the language of the section was and remains 
pertinently directed at fleets of vessels in which all the ships are owned by single ship companies 
and where either ownership or control of the shares of those companies lies with a particular 
person. The person exercising such ownership or control may be either a natural person or itself a 
company or other corporate body.
20
 However, this does not affect the central principle which is 
that where a person owns or controls the shares in a number of single ship companies all of the 
vessels owned by those companies will be liable to be arrested in respect of the debts incurred in 
respect of any one of them. In that paradigm situation the Act generally achieved its purpose 
although, as will be seen below, on the original language there were issues regarding the timing 
of the association and whether it was the company or its shares that had to be the subject of 
ownership or control in determining whether any association existed.  
 
 Both the sister ship provisions of section 3(7)(a)(i) and the true associated ship provisions 
of section 3(7)(a)(ii) were subject to extension in relation to a situation where the maritime claim 
lay against the demise charterer of the vessel and not against its owner. The deeming provision in 
section 3(7)(c) of the Act had the effect of expanding the scope of the jurisdiction to enable an 
associated ship arrest to take place where the person originally liable for the debt was not the 
owner of the ship concerned but only the charterer or sub-charterer by demise of the vessel in 
respect of which the claim arose. The extension was not an extensive one21 and was consistent 
with the principle identified as underlying the associated ship provisions generally namely that if 
a claim arose in respect of a particular vessel then other vessels owned by the person liable in 
respect of that claim or owned by companies the shares of which were owned or controlled by the 
person who owned or controlled the shares of the company owning the ship concerned should be 
liable to be arrested in an action in rem to recover that claim. Where the person identified as 
being liable in respect of the maritime claim was the demise charterer and not the owner of the 
ship concerned, which excluded the case of a maritime lien, no maritime claim could be being 
                                                 
20 See the definition of ‘person’ in section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957. 
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pursued against the ship concerned. Accordingly it would be impermissible for there to be an 
arrest of another vessel ‘instead’ of the ship concerned. The presumption overcame this in the 
case of a demise charterer by deeming the demise charterer to be the owner of the ship 
concerned. The deeming was absolute and irrebuttable.22  Whilst it did not say so expressly the 
deeming was clearly operative at the time that the maritime claim arose because that was the time 
at which ownership of the ship concerned was relevant for the purposes of association. 
 
 The presumption was an adaptation of the provisions of article 3.4 of the Arrest 
Convention, which permitted both the demise chartered vessel and any other vessel owned by the 
demise charterer to be arrested.
23
 It appears that in drafting the Act and referring to the ‘owner’ of 
a vessel without defining that expression attention was paid to views in other jurisdictions that for 
certain purposes equated the demise charterer with the owner of the vessel.
24
 The original 
approach had been to exclude the possibility of the demise charterer being regarded as owner 
because the 1979 memorandum25 reflects an intention to incorporate the decision in I Congreso 
de Partido
26
. The initial draft that accompanied that memorandum in 1979 contained the 
following provision: 
 
‘(4)(a) Ships shall be deemed to be in the same ownership when all the shares in a ship 
are owned by the same person or persons.  
                                                                                                                                                              
21 The current deeming provision relating to charterparties is far more extensive.  
22
 Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Another 1911 AD 13, 33 - 4; S v Rosenthal 1980 (1) SA 
65 (A) 76 
23 Shaw, op cit, 40 where the point is made that the English provisions contained in the Supreme Court Act 1981 
(4&5 Eliz 2 Cap 46) permitted the arrest of the ship concerned where the claim lay against its charterer and such 
charter was a charter by demise.  
24 Thus in Sir John Jackson Ltd v SS Blanche (Owners), The Hopper No 66 [1908] AC 126 it was held that for the 
purpose of limitation under sections 502 and 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 a demise charterer is 
encompassed by the words ‘The owner of a British sea-going ship or share therein’.  See also I Congreso de Partido 
[1978] 1 All ER 1169 (QBD) 1200-3; Shaw, op cit, 33. 
25 See Appendix 1. 
26
 I Congreso de Partido [1978] 1 All ER 1169 (QBD) 1200-3; (1977) 1 Lloyds Law Reports 536, 561-2 
 135
(b) A person having beneficial ownership of a ship or a share in a ship shall be deemed to 
be the owner of such ship or share notwithstanding that he is not registered as the owner. 
(c) Owner’ shall not include a charterer who has taken the ship on a charter by demise.’ 
 
This express exclusion in relation to the demise charterer survived in the next two drafts of the 
Act but in the final draft prior to the publication of the Law Commission Report the position was 
changed and a provision substantially similar to section 3(7)(c) in its original form replaced it. 
Unfortunately there is no explanatory memorandum that throws light on the reason for this 
change. One can only speculate that it was thought appropriate to incorporate some provision that 
would enable the associated ship arrest provisions to be used against a demise charterer, itself 
liable for a maritime claim, if that person either owned another vessel or owned or controlled the 
shares in a company that owned another vessel. It is perhaps important to stress that the deeming 
provision does not enable the vessel in respect of which the claim arose and the demise charterer 
incurred the debt to be arrested. Its sole purpose is to enable an action in rem to be pursued 
against a vessel owned by the demise charterer or a company the shares in which were owned or 
controlled by the demise charterer, when that would otherwise not have been possible.27 At one 
level therefore it did not go as far as the Arrest Convention in that it did not permit the demise 
chartered vessel to be arrested for the debt of the demise charterer. At another it went much 
further in subjecting vessels not owned by the demise charterer to be arrested. 
 
3 THE BERG: 
 
 The novelty of the true associated ship arrest provisions28 was such that it was inevitable 
that its invocation would generate litigation raising complex questions concerning the new legal 
                                                 
27 In other words the purpose of the provision is to enable the claimant creditor to pursue assets the beneficial 
ownership of which lies with its debtor.  In Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 (4) 
SA 210 (D) 216H-I Leon J quoted from an article by Hazelwood ‘Gaps in the Action in Rem’ (1982) 2 LCMLQ 20 , 
210 where the author said of the corresponding English provision that it: ‘… will not permit the arrest of a ship 
which is merely possessed or controlled by a wrongdoer, no matter how complete may be that possession or control.  
This is eminently proper. Were it otherwise an innocent beneficial owner could be deprived of his vessel in answer to 
the wrongs of the vessel’s charterer.’ 
28 Professor H Booysen in South Africa’s New Admiralty Act ‘ A Maritime Disaster?’ 1984 MBL 75, 83 refers to it as 
‘a revolutionary idea’. 
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dispensation. Perhaps the only surprise lay in how quickly that occurred..A mere five weeks after 
the Act came into force
29
 an application was brought
30
 for the arrest of the Berg, a vessel owned 
by a South African company, in order to furnish security for an arbitration in London. The 
validity of the arrest was challenged and the resulting arguments concerning the applicability of 
the security arrest provisions of the Act and what may broadly be termed the possible 
retrospective operation of the Act’s provisions are illuminating as to the nature of the associated 
ship arrest provisions and warrant close examination. The matter was initially referred
31
 for 
decision by a Full Court of the Natal Provincial Division and was subsequently taken on appeal 
to the Appellate Division.32 The effect of the two judgments is analysed below. 
 
 As always with the consideration of any judgment it is helpful to deal at the outset with the 
facts.
33
 The claimant (Euromarine) had time chartered a vessel called the Pericles from its 
owners, the second respondents in the application. On the 24th December 1978 and during the 
subsistence of that charterparty an explosion occurred on board the Pericles, which was then 
berthed in Durban harbour. The explosion, which the claimant alleged was due to the 
unseaworthiness of the Pericles in breach of the obligations of its owners under the charterparty, 
caused the claimant to suffer substantial damages. It was seeking to recover these from the 
owners of the Pericles in arbitration proceedings in London. Those proceedings had commenced 
                                                 
29 1st November 1983 
30 Under s 5(3) of the Act 
31 Under s 13(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959. The same procedure had been adopted in the case of 
Katagum Wholesale Commodities Company Limited v The m.v. Paz 1984 (3) SA 271 (N). Hare, Shipping Law and 
Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, 94, footnote 116 is wrong to suggest that there was a ‘judgment a quo’ in this 
latter case. To go on to describe this non-existent judgment as ‘the low watermark’ of the parochial views of some 
judges in the early days of the Act is likewise wrong, although the concurring judgment of Didcott J might be so 
described. See Chapter 1, footnote 19, ante.  
32 The decision by the Full Court is reported as Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg and others 
1984 (4) SA 647 (N) and that of the Appellate Division as Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg and 
others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A). For convenience the two judgments will hereafter be referred to as the NPD judgment 
and the AD judgment.  
33 The facts are taken from the NPD judgment at 650F-I. 
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in 1981 but were not yet due to be heard at the time of the arrest of the Berg.
34
 The purpose of the 
arrest of the Berg was to enable Euromarine to obtain security for the arbitration proceedings in 
London. This set of facts caused Milne JP to remark that:  
 
‘This is, on the face of it, rather a remarkable proceeding. The applicant, which is a 
foreign company, seeks an order that the Berg, a vessel owned by a local company, be 
arrested, and that it be held as security for the claim of the applicant against another 
foreign company in respect of damages allegedly suffered by the applicant, arising out of 
the alleged breach of a time charterparty of another vessel, which claim is subject to 
arbitration proceedings in London.’35 
 
Remarkable or not those facts set the stage for the consideration of two fundamentally important 
legal issues. 
 
(a) The separate nature of proceedings commenced by the arrest of an associated ship  
 
 One of the novel provisions in the Act was the provision in section 5(3) which permitted 
the arrest of a vessel solely for the purpose of providing security for proceedings, either in a court 
or by way of arbitration, whether contemplated, pending or proceeding and whether in the 
Republic or elsewhere.
36
 The relevant section then read:- 
 
‘(3)(a) A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction order the arrest of any 
property if:- 
(i) the person seeking the arrest has a claim enforceable by an action in rem against the 
property concerned or which would be so enforceable but for arbitration or proceedings 
contemplated in sub-para. (ii); 
(ii) the claim is or may be the subject of an arbitration or any proceedings contemplated, 
pending or proceeding either in the Republic or elsewhere and whether or not it is subject 
to the law of the Republic. 
(b) Unless the court orders otherwise any property so arrested shall be deemed to be 
property arrested in an action in terms of this Act.  
                                                 
34 Whether the delay in pursuing the arbitration to a conclusion was due to the absence of security does not appear 
from the reports of the case.  
35 NPD judgment 649A-B 
36 All the commentators on the Act remark on the novelty of this provision. Friedman, op cit. 56; Staniland, 1985 
LCMLQ 462-473; Booysen. op cit. 82. 
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(c) A court may order that any security for or the proceeds of any such property shall be 




 It is a requirement of section 3(a)(i) that the party seeking the arrest must have a claim 
enforceable by an action in rem against the vessel to be arrested. The owners of the Berg 
contended that this requirement was not satisfied. Their argument was that the claim was not one 
enforceable by an action in rem against the Berg.  They accepted that Euromarine had a claim 
and that the claim was one that could have been enforced by an action in rem against the Pericles. 
They also accepted that the Berg was an associated ship in relation to the Pericles and 
accordingly that the claim could have been pursued in an action in rem in South Africa instituted 
by the arrest of the Berg as an associated ship. However, they contended that such an action 
would remain an action in rem against the Pericles and was accordingly not an action in rem 
against the Berg itself.
38
 This contention was expressed by way of the submission that:- 
 
‘What the Act has achieved is to permit the institution of the action in rem against the 
Pericles by the arrest of the Berg.  The right to bring such proceedings by way of the 
arrest of the Berg as an associated ship is not in itself an action in rem, it is merely an 
available alternative to the arrest of the Pericles in circumstances where arrest is required 
in terms of the Act in order to enable the Act (sic) to be instituted.’ [Presumably ‘action’ 
was intended rather than ‘Act’].39 
 
A slightly different formulation of the point was in the following terms:- 
 
                                                 
37 In Katagum Wholesale Commodities Company Limited v The m.v. Paz 1984 (3) SA 271 (N) 263E Friedman J said 
that: ‘The section, in effect, empowers a Court to arrest, at the instance of a foreigner, a ship, owned by a foreigner, 
as security for a claim pending in some foreign country which is based on a foreign cause of action and is subject to a 
foreign law.’ 
38 It is interesting to note that in a draft of the Act distributed in early 1983 after the publication of the Law 
Commission report a fresh section 5(3)(b) was incorporated reading as follows: ‘An associated ship may be arrested 
as if it were the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, and shall be deemed for the purposes of 
this Act to be the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose.’ The origin of this provision and the 
reasons for its incorporation and subsequent disappearance are not apparent. Similar deeming provisions had 
appeared in two drafts circulated in 1981 but had been deleted from the draft attached to the report. Had such a 
provision found its way into the final version of the Act the nature of the action in rem against an associated ship 
would have been fundamentally different. 
39 NPD judgment 651G-I. Author’s insertion. 
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‘... in order to commence proceedings, an applicant may arrest an associated ship, but the 
maritime claim and the action in rem in terms of which it is sought to be enforced is still 
against the ship (and therefore the owners of it) against or in respect of which the 
maritime claim arose.’40 
 
 The answer to this point was by no means self-evident notwithstanding the reference in 
section 11(8) of the Act
41
 to ‘an action in rem against an associated ship’. However, the language 
of section 3(6), which creates the right to arrest an associated ship is more ambivalent in saying 
merely that an action in rem may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship ‘instead of’ the 
ship in respect of which the claim arose. That language does not necessarily foreshadow that an 
action in rem commenced by means of the arrest of an associated ship is something distinct from 
an action in rem against the ship concerned. 
 
 The argument that the action instituted by the arrest of the associated ship is nonetheless an 
action in rem against the ship concerned gains some support from a reference to sections 3(4) 
and (5). Under section 3(4) a maritime claim may be enforced by an action in rem in two 
circumstances, namely where the claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested or 
where the owner of that property would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam in 
respect of that claim.
42
 The section therefore identifies the necessary conditions for bringing an 
                                                 
40 NPD judgment 651I. 
41 The section then read : ‘Where the fund arises by reason of an action in rem against an associated ship, the ranking 
of claims set out in this section shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3(6), apply with regard to claims in 
respect of the associated ship, and claims in respect of the ship concerned shall be paid thereafter in the order set out 
in this section.’  In the NPD judgment at 656D-657D some considerable reliance is placed upon the words ‘an action 
in rem against an associated ship’ and on the fact that s11(8) provided that where a fund arises in consequence of the 
sale of an associated ship, claims lying against that ship by virtue of its own activities are to rank before claims 
against the fund arising by virtue of the fact that it is an associated ship. However it was necessary for section 11 to 
make provision for the distribution of a fund arising from the sale of an associated ship and in doing so to deal with 
the ranking of direct claims relative to claims advanced on the basis of the ship being an associated ship in relation to 
some other vessel.  The obvious policy decision was that direct claims against the fund arising from the activities of 
the associated ship should rank ahead of claims against the fund by virtue of its status as an associated ship. The 
existence of the section in the Act is therefore a neutral factor. The fact that the associated ship is a different vessel 
from the ship concerned - a self-evident and necessary proposition (although the contrary wasargued in mv ‘Bavarian 
Trader’: Pancoast Trading SA v Orient Shipping Rotterdam BV A253/2009, unreported - is not a ‘notion’ inherent in 
the language of s11(8) as was said at 656H-I, but something that flows from the very concept of an associated ship. 
42 There is some additional scope for the bringing of an action in rem. Great River Shipping Inc v Sunnyface Marine 
Limited 1994 (1) SA 65 (C); October International Navigation Inc v mv Fayrouz IV 1988 (4) SA 675 (N) 678J-
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action in rem. Section 3(5) deals with the manner in which such an action is to be brought, 
namely by the arrest:- 
 
‘... of property of one or more of the following categories against or in respect of which 
the claim lies:- 
(a) the ship, with or without its equipment, furniture, stores or bunkers; 
(b) the whole or any part of the equipment, furniture, stores or bunkers; 
(c) the whole or any part of the cargo; 
(d) the freight.’ 
 
 
An arrest, or a deemed arrest in terms of section 3(10)(a) is an essential element of the process 
whereby an action in rem is to be brought to court.43 If, as has been held44 the meaning of the 
words ‘instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose’ is: ‘in place of, in lieu of, 
in room of; for, in substitution for’
45
 then the associated ship could be treated as simply being 
arrested in place of the ship concerned, but without otherwise altering the nature of the action in 
rem thereby instituted. That action would then be an action in rem against the ship concerned not 
an action in rem against the associated ship. The action would be instituted by the arrest of the 
associated ship ‘instead of’ the ship concerned, but would remain an action in rem against the 
ship concerned. 
 
 Such a construction, whilst excluding the possibility of arresting an associated ship as 
security in terms of section 5(3), would have had important consequences. If the action remains 
an action in rem against the ship concerned then presumably its effect will be to extinguish any 
maritime lien attaching to the ship concerned as a result of the maritime claim in question. If a 
                                                                                                                                                              
679D. However the scope is limited.  MF v ‘Atlantic Pride’ Siyadoba Fishing (Pty) Limited v Marine Radio Acoustic 
Devices CC, AC 146/2003 (Cape), SCOSA B224.  Whatever its ambit it is not relevant for present purposes. 
43 m.v. Jute Express v Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board the m.v. Jute Express 1992 (3) SA 9 (A) 19H-I.   
44
 m.v. Fortune 22 : Owners of the m.v. Fortune 22 v Keppel Corporation Limited 1999 (1) SA 162 (C) 163I-J 
45 In the NPD judgment 655G Milne JP says that: ‘Where an arrest is effected in terms of s3(6) of the Admiralty Act, 
it is quite clear that it takes the place of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, and the vessel arrested 
would ordinarily speaking be the only defendant.’ (Emphasis added.) 
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question of tonnage limitation arises in the action
46
 it will be clear that the court is concerned 
with the tonnage of the ship concerned and the fault and privity of its owners, not with the 





 would have been resolved more easily. More particularly an arrest 
of an associated ship in order to furnish security for a claim against the ship concerned would not 
have been permissible. 
 
 Notwithstanding points such as these, which are not necessarily reflected in the arguments, 
the Full Court unanimously rejected this contention.
49
 In approaching the problem Milne JP 
analysed in general terms the nature of an action in rem and concluded50 that the essence of the 
action is the right to arrest a ship and satisfy any judgment from the proceeds of the sale of the 
ship or any bail or security provided to prevent its arrest or secure its release. Having done so he 
concluded that an arrest of the Berg would clearly have been permissible for the purposes of 
enforcing the maritime claim in question by way of an action in rem. In regard to the nature of 
that action he said:- 
 
‘As that action would be commenced by the arrest of the Berg, and as any judgment in 
that action would be satisfied from the proceeds of the Berg, I cannot conceive that the 
action could be said to be anything other than an action in rem against the Berg .51 
 
                                                 
46 Under s261 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 57 of 1951. 
47 This question will be discussed in Chapter 13 in considering the nature and consequences of an action in rem 
against an associated ship. A number of problems arise in invoking tonnage limitation in such a situation.  Although 
my ultimate conclusion is that limitation can be invoked in an action in rem against an associated ship and that the 
computation of the limitation amount and questions of fault and privity are dealt with as if the action was one against 
the ship concerned, had the Full Court upheld the contention under discussion this would have been reasonably clear 
which is by no means the present situation.   
48 Including the issues raised in the m.v. Fortune 22, supra, and the effect of an arbitration clause in the contract on 
which the maritime claim is founded.  
49 In the case of Leon J only after ‘some hesitation’.  NPD judgment 664I. 
50 NPD judgment 564I-655A 
51 NPD judgment 654F-G. 
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That sentiment was subsequently repeated at a later point in the judgment in the following terms:- 
 
‘... I do not see how it can be said that the applicant would not have had the right to 
enforce its maritime claim arising out of the explosion of the Pericles by bringing an 
action in rem against the Berg .’52 
 
 With respect this put the cart before the horse. Subject to the point about retrospectivity it 
was never in issue that an action in rem could have been instituted in South Africa by the arrest 
of the Berg to enforce the maritime claim arising from the explosion on the Pericles.
53
 The issue 
was not whether that could be done but what was the nature of the resultant proceedings. Were 
they an action in rem against the Berg or an action in rem against the Pericles instituted by the 
arrest of the Berg as an associated ship? Unless they were an action in rem against the Berg the 
arrest of that vessel in order to provide security for the claim that was the subject of the 
arbitration proceedings was not permitted. The associated ship jurisdiction would then have been 
limited to actions proceeding in South Africa, which would have substantially impaired its 
usefulness. 
 
 The court dealt with that question only after reaching the conclusion set out above. The 
result is that the reasoning that follows suffers from the ostensible flaw that the learned judge had 
already reached and expressed his conclusion before considering the real issue. In fairness 
therefore it is appropriate to set out the relevant passage in full. It reads:- 
 
‘Mr. Gordon, for the third respondent, however submits that, although procedurally the 
action might be instituted by arresting the Berg, the action would remain one against the 
Pericles. I do not think this correct. It is true that the cause of action, but for one 
important difference, remains the same. The mere fact that the applicant elected to arrest 
the Berg instead of the Pericles could not affect the nature, amount or enforceability of 
the applicant’s claim. It is inconceivable, for example, that the legislature could have 
intended to deprive the owners of the Berg of any defence which would have been open 
to the owners of the Pericles. Mr. Gordon referred to the decision in Freightmarine 
Shipping Limited v S Weinstein & Co (Pty) Limited and others 1984 (2) SA 425 (D) as 
authority for the proposition that, since the third respondent is not a party to the 
                                                 
52 NPD judgment 655C. 
53 NPD judgment 651B. 
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arbitration clause contained in the charterparty between the applicant and the owner of the 
Pericles, it could not have referred the dispute to arbitration, and therefore could not have 
applied for a stay of action under the Arbitration Act. That case is clearly distinguishable. 
It concerned the liability of an agent in terms of s311 of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 
1951, and furthermore the party applying for a stay was not the only party to the 
proceedings. Where an arrest is effected in terms of s3(6) of the Admiralty Act, it is quite 
clear that it takes the place of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, and 
the vessel arrested would ordinarily speaking be the only defendant.’(My emphasis) 
 
 The key to this passage lies in the words ‘but for one important difference’ in the 
highlighted sentence. With respect the reasoning concerning an arbitration clause seems 
fallacious and avoids the issue raised by the submission. The question posed by the argument was 
this. If a bill of lading or charterparty provides for arbitration or the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
foreign court, but the claimant pursues its claim by way of an action in rem in South Africa 
commenced by the arrest of an associated ship, can the owners of the associated ship seek a stay 
of the South African action on the basis of the arbitration or foreign jurisdiction clause? The 
Freightmarine case suggested that they could not on the simple grounds that the owners of the 
associated ship could not claim to be parties to the arbitration agreement. Similarly they could not 
claim to be parties to a contract embodying a foreign jurisdiction clause. In that case there would 
be the further difficulty that their vessel would not be liable to be arrested in proceedings before 
the foreign court. Whilst the Freightmarine case was distinguishable on its facts it raised a 
similar problem and appeared to suggest that the owner of the associated ship would not be 
entitled to invoke the benefit of the arbitration or foreign jurisdiction clause. The significance of 
this is that in section 7(1) the Act contains express provision for the enforcement of such clauses 
and the tendency has been for the courts to enforce them.54 If it is not open to the owner of an 
associated ship to invoke the benefit of such a clause then it is not correct to say, as had been said 
immediately before, that it was inconceivable that the legislature could have intended to deprive 
the owners of the associated ship of any defence (or at least any advantage) which could have 
been open to the owners of the ship concerned.   
 
                                                 
54
 m.v. Spartan Runner v Jotun-Henry Clark Limited 1991 (3) SA 803 (N); m.v. Achilleus v Thai United Insurance 
Company Limited 1992 (1) SA 324 (N). The latter case illustrates the manifold advantages that may accrue from the 
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 The reason for saying that the key to this passage and the ultimate decision on this point 
lies in the words ‘but for one important difference’ is apparent from the following portion of the 
judgment.  It reads:- 
 
‘As I have already mentioned, however, there is a vital distinction between an action 
commenced by arresting the Berg in terms of s3(5) and an action commenced by arresting 
the Pericles in terms of that section.  It is, quite simply, this, that the action is against a 
different defendant.  This is not a mere matter of form.  If the Berg is arrested in terms of 
s3(5) read with ss(6) and (7), then, at any rate, if the action is undefended, and is 
successful, it is only the fund derived from the sale of the Berg which can be used to 
satisfy the judgment.  In what sense can it be, one might ask, that the action instituted by 
arresting the Berg would remain one against the Pericles?  If the American approach is 
adopted to actions in rem, then the Berg is the defendant and not the Pericles.  If the 
British approach is adopted, then the only sense in which it can be said that an admiralty 
action in rem is against a particular vessel is in the sense that it is the proceeds of that 
vessel that are used to satisfy the judgment, and in this sense clearly the action 
commenced by arresting the Berg remains one against the Berg.  Even if an action 
commenced by arresting the Berg were to be defended by the second respondent [the 
owners of the Pericles] or the third respondent [the owners of the Berg], that would not 
automatically render the Pericles liable to attachment.  If a judgment were eventually to 
be obtained which would have the effect of a judgment against the second respondent, 
then presumably it would only be the assets of the second respondent at the time that 
execution was levied on the judgment that could be attached and, if the Pericles had been 
sold in the meanwhile, it would not be liable to attachment, not having been arrested or 
attached and not being the subject of a maritime lien.’55  (My emphasis and insertions.) 
 
 A fair reading of this passage reflects that the central issue for the court as far as the nature 
of the action was concerned was that an action against the associated ship involves a different 
defendant than an action against the ship concerned.  This is more than simply a matter of form 
arising from an adoption of the American theory of personification of the vessel, and the court 
was careful not to accept or reject this theory.  It is the following portion of the judgment that 
matters.  There the heart of the matter is said to lie in the fact that if the claimant is ultimately 
successful and obtains a judgment the ship that is sold in order to satisfy that judgment is not the 
ship concerned but the associated ship.  In other words property belonging to a legal person other 
than the owner of the ship concerned is sold to satisfy the debt of the ship concerned and its 
                                                                                                                                                              
enforcement of such a clause. See also Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board the m.v. Nantai Prince v Nantai 
Line Company Limited, Case No. A137/96 (Durban), SCOSA A12. 
55 NPD judgment 655H-656D. 
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owner. That will be so even in the situation, which the court postulated,
56
 of the judgment being 
effectively a judgment against the owner of the ship concerned. There is nonetheless ‘an 
additional, or rather alternative defendant’ from whom payment of the claim can be sought and 




 This reasoning is not only compelling but, it is submitted, is inescapable. Whatever the 
strength of the arguments for the opposite contention and the criticisms that can be addressed to 
the refutation of those arguments in the judgment, the reality is that if the matter proceeds to 
judgment and the vessel is sold a claim lying against A will be enforced against the property of 
B. If one accepts, as English courts have accepted from at least the latter part of the 19th Century, 
that the action in rem has the effect of ‘impleading the owner of property to answer to the 
judgment of the court to the extent of his interest in the property’,58 then it is the owner of the 
associated ship who is impleaded by the arrest of that vessel, not the owner of the ship concerned. 
If the American approach is adopted the fact is that the action is directed at a different vessel. It 
necessarily follows that the proper characterisation of the action instituted by the arrest of the 
associated ship is that it is an action in rem against the associated ship, not an action in rem 
against the ship concerned. 
 
 The owners of the Berg did not pursue this point when the matter went on appeal.
59
 
However, it is clear that the Appellate Division endorsed the central premise of the Full Court’s 
judgment. That much is apparent from the following passage from the judgment of Miller JA:- 
 
‘Such provision, it was said, in effect provided the legal machinery by which a claim 
could be enforced.  It is true that s3(6) read with s5(3) describes a method for recovery of 
                                                 
56 NPD judgment 656B-C. 
57 NPD judgment 659E. 
58
 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197 (CA); 4 Asp MLC 234.  It matters not whether one speaks, as did Brett MR 
in that case, of ‘indirectly’ impleading the owner. The distinction between being directly or indirectly impleaded is 
unlikely to occur to or console an owner whose ship is sold.  
59 AD judgment 709E-G. 
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money due to one who has suffered injury or loss for which he has a maritime claim, but 
it does much more than that; it gives to the claimant a right which he never had before, 
namely to recover what is due to him from a party who was not responsible for the 
damage suffered by him. It provides the claimant not only with a method for recovery but 
with an additional or alternative defendant. And by that token, it is creative of new 




 In the result the judgment in The Berg established from the very inception of the Act that an 
action in rem against an associated ship is something separate and distinct from an action in rem 
against the ship concerned. Whilst the action in rem traditionally impleads the owner of the ship 
concerned it can now be used to implead a third party, albeit one closely connected to the owner 
of the ship concerned. That immediately raises the question whether the traditional consequences 
of an action in rem can apply to such an action and if not in what way they fall to be adapted to 
this novel situation. For example the English Courts have adopted a procedural theory of the 
nature of the action in rem based on the proposition that whatever its form it is in substance an 
action against the owner of the vessel. Is that explanation adequate in the case of an action in rem 
against an associated ship? Questions arise as to whether there is some sort of incipient liability 
which is crystallised when the associated ship is arrested?
61
 Does the owner of the associated ship 
stand in precisely the same position as the owner of the ship concerned? What is the position in 
regard to arbitration clauses, exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses and tonnage limitation? What 
is the effect of an action against an associated ship on the continued existence of a maritime lien 
over the ship concerned? Does a statutory provision that attaches liability on this basis pass 
muster in terms of the Bill of Rights? These and other questions will be addressed at a later stage. 





                                                 




 The underlying claim in The Berg had arisen in 1978, some five years before the 
commencement of the Act. The arbitration proceedings had commenced in 1981, two years 
before the Act’s commencement.62  In those circumstances a question that arose was whether the 
novel provisions governing arrests of associated ships could be invoked to commence actions in 
rem against vessels other than the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen. The question was 
not entirely novel in that it had been raised and considered two months before the argument in the 
Berg in a case involving a vessel called the MV Kyoju Maru.
63
 The decisions in the two cases 
highlight some of the problems created by this new maritime institution. 
 
 In The MV Kyoju Maru the Court (Leon J) stated the general rule that ordinarily statutes are 
not to be construed as having retrospective effect, but as operating on cases or facts that come 
into existence after the passing of the statute. However procedural statutes are treated differently 
and usually operate in relation to all procedural issues arising after they come into force, unless 
their effect is to interfere with vested rights. The ultimate task is always to ascertain the intention 
of the legislature as it emerges from the statute in question. The judge accepted that it would not 
have been possible prior to the Act coming into operation to have arrested the MV Kyoju Maru in 
an action in rem or to have caused it to be attached ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem. However he did not accept that the effect of these provisions was to create any 
new right vested in claimants. The pertinent part of the judgment reads as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
61 The similarity between this language and that traditionally used in regard to the attachment of maritime liens will 
be apparent. Harmer v Bell: The Bold Buccleugh 7 Moo PCC 267; 13 ER 884 (PC); Transol Bunker BV v MV 
Andrico Unity and others Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A).. 
62 The handing down of an arbitration award after the commencement of the Act in respect of a claim that arose 
before the Act’s commencement would have raised a similar, but distinct, issue in view of the fact that the 
enforcement of an arbitration award is a maritime claim in its own right. See para (x) of the original definition of 
‘maritime claim’ now para (aa) of the current definition. This issue arose in MV Yu Long Shan: Drybulk SA v MV Yu 
Long Shan 1998 (1) SA 646 (SCA). 
63
 Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 (4) SA 210 (D) 
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‘The fallacy in the … argument is to treat the new right as a new cause of action. The 
plaintiff’s claim is a claim for disbursements and cash advances. That is a ‘maritime 
claim’ in terms of the definition is s 1(1) of the Act. Section 3 of the Act, which is headed 
‘Form of proceedings’ is manifestly procedural in nature. … Subsection (6) provides that 
certain actions in rem (which includes that in this case) may be brought by the arrest of an 
associated ship instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose. ... In my 
opinion ss 3(6) and 3(7) are clearly procedural in nature in that they merely provide a 
remedy whereby an existing claim may be enforced leaving the merits of the claim 
unaffected. The subsections do not involve any interference with existing rights and 
obligations, inasmuch as they do not affect the nature and validity of the claim, but 
merely provide a procedure for enforcing it.’64 
 
It will be seen from this that the court’s approach was that it was concerned only with a matter of 
procedure. This view did not however find favour when the point was argued before the Full 
Court. Even its author, Leon J, whilst coming to the same conclusion, disavowed this line of 
reasoning on the basis that ‘The matter does not seem to me now as it appeared to me then.’65  
 
 The approach of the majority in the Full Court continued the theme sounded earlier in the 
judgment of Milne JP on the question whether an action in rem instituted by the arrest of an 
associated ship was to be treated as an action against that ship or a procedural device for bringing 
an action in rem against the ship concerned. It recognised that no action would have lain against 
the Berg by way of proceedings in rem prior to the Act and no claim could have been instituted 
against its owner founded on an attachment of the vessel. In those circumstances the majority 
held that: 
 
‘No such rights existed either at common law or under the admiralty jurisdiction of this 
Court prior to the coming into operation of the Admiralty Act. A new right is clearly 
created, and, correspondingly, a new obligation. … Nor is the right a merely procedural 
one. In effect the legislature has given the maritime claimant an additional, or rather 
alternative, defendant from which to satisfy his claim which arose against the original 
guilty defendant.’66 
 
                                                 
64 At 213G-214E. 
65 NPD judgment 667D quoting Bramwell B in Andrews v Styrap (1872) 26 LT 704 at 706. 
66 NPD judgment 659E-F. 
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On appeal to the Appellate Division that court adopted the same stance. It accepted - and indeed 
this was accepted in the argument of counsel - that the provisions under consideration constituted 
a new development that could expose the owners of associated ships to a greater risk of liability 
than had been the case prior to the Act’s enactment. The purpose, of the provisions, as explained 
by counsel and accepted by the Court is ‘to make the loss fall where it belonged by reason of 
ownership, and in the case of a company, ownership or control of shares.’
67
 However the Court 
understood the argument to be that notwithstanding its novelty and potential effects the 
invocation of this remedy was permissible because ‘because it is in essence a provision relating to 
procedure rather than to substantive or vested rights’.
68
 This contention it rejected in no uncertain 
terms. Miller JA said: 
 
‘The contention on behalf of the appellant was, however, that the new provision enabling 
a claimant to bring an action in rem by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship 
in respect of which the maritime claim arose should be taken to have retrospective effect, 
because it is in essence a provision relating to procedure rather than to substantive or 
vested rights. Such provision, it was said, in effect provided the legal machinery by which 
a claim could be enforced. It is true that s 3(6) read with s 5(3) describes a method for 
recovery of money due to one who has suffered injury or loss for which he has a maritime 
claim, but it does much more than that; it gives the claimant a right which he never had 
before, namely to recover what is due to him from a party who was not responsible for 
the damage suffered by him. It provides the claimant not only with a method for recovery 
but with an additional or alternative defendant. And by that token, it is creative of new 
liabilities or obligations in owners of ships, or the potential thereof, of which such 
owners, if the claims arose prior to the commencement of the Act, would have been 
wholly unaware and unsuspecting.’   (My emphasis) 
 
 The importance of this finding lies in that part of the decision where it is held that by 
permitting an action in rem against an associated ship the legislation creates substantive rights in 
the claimant and imposes obligations, actual or potential on shipowners. This in turn goes to the 
                                                 
67 AD judgment 712A-B. It is hardly surprising that the court accepted counsel’s explanation as counsel for the 
appellant was Mr Shaw QC whose role in drafting the Act has already been mentioned. 
68 AD judgment 712B-C.  This was a misunderstanding as Mr Shaw noted in footnote 74 at page 42 of his book 
Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa. His complaint (as the counsel whose argument was 
misunderstood) is borne out by a perusal of the heads of argument from which it is plain that his contention was that 
the internal indications in the Act revealed an intention that the new provisions should apply to claims arising before 
they came into operation. However in fairness to Miller JA who delivered the AD judgment he also dealt with and 
rejected this contention at 710J-711D. 
 150
heart of the action in rem against an associated ship and affects the formulation of a theory of that 
action that treats it as procedural. It is one thing to say that an action in rem is a form of 
procedure that impleads the owner of the vessel because at the end of the day it is the owner who 
stands to lose the vessel against which the action is brought.69 The conclusion that the action is 
purely procedural is then at least to some extent dependent on the underlying concept that the 
claim is one against the owner of the ship and Lord Steyn was careful to say that he was not 
considering the case of a maritime lien where in certain circumstances the owner may not be 
liable on the claim 70. However when it is clear that the person who will bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the claim is someone other than the person who is responsible for the loss or 
damage giving rise to the claim this approach requires reconsideration. The question then is 
whether it is the invocation of those means by way of the arrest of a true associated ship that 
gives rise to the liability that rests on the owner of the associated ship or whether that liability is 
inherent in the Act and given effect by the arrest of the associated ship. That the liability is 
imposed as a matter of substantive law seems clear.  
 
 The conclusion in The Berg on the question of retrospectivity and flowing from that the 
substantive elements of these provisions does not stand in isolation. A similar problem of 
retrospectivity has arisen subsequently in two cases arising out of the amendments to the Act 
brought about in 1992.71 In the first case the relevant amendment had the effect of altering the 
scope of the jurisdiction to arrest an associated ship
72
 and in the second the effect of an 
amendment to the presumption in section 3(7)(c) was to broaden the circumstances in which a 
ship could be characterised as an associated ship, thereby broadening the scope of the 
                                                 
69 As Lord Steyn said in The IndianGrace (No. 2), Republic of India and another v India Steamship Company 
Limited [1997] 4 All ER 380 (HL); [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL). 
70 At 387D-F. 
71 By the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act, No 87 of 1992. 
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 In the first case the effect of the amendment was to enable the vessel to be arrested 
even though it could not have been arrested prior to the amendments. The Court held that an 
arrest was impermissible in respect of the claim on the grounds that: 
 
‘... it would operate in a manner which prejudiced shipowners by creating burdens or 
obligations that did not exist before.’74 
 
It also said that on the authority of its decision in The Berg ‘the provisions in question cannot be 
regarded as purely procedural’. 
 
 In the second case it was common cause that the underlying claim under a charterparty 
could not have been pursued by way of an associated ship arrest prior to the amendments to the 
Act.  On the authority of The Berg and The Pericles that would have prevented an arrest after the 
amendments either to commence an action in rem or to provide security for proceedings 
elsewhere. What was said by the claimant to make a difference was that the dispute had been 
determined by arbitration proceedings and an award had been made in its favour after the 
amendments came into effect. If upheld that would have created the curious result that an arrest 
for the purpose of providing security for the arbitration would have been impermissible but an 
arrest to enforce the resultant award would not. The court avoided this result by holding that the 
arbitration award constituted a derivative cause of action in the sense that it owed its existence to 
the underlying claim and could not be divorced from it. To permit the arrest would: 
 
‘... amount in substance, if not in form, to saddling ships and persons with retroactive 
liability in respect of breaches of contract and the commission of delicts for which they 
were not liable at the time when they occurred.’75 
 
 Both of these decisions strengthen and fortify the impact of the judgment in The Berg on 
the issue of the nature of an action in rem against a true associated ship. Whilst they accept that 
                                                 
73 MV Yu Long Shan v: Drybulk SA v MV Yu Long Shan 1998 (1) SA 646 (SCA)  
74 At 484G-H. 
75
 MV Yu Long Shan, supra, 653 I-J. 
 152
the statutory provisions providing for such an arrest are procedural in form they do not accept 
that they are purely procedural in character. The reason for this lies in the fact that the action so 
instituted is distinct from an action against the ship concerned and accordingly must be viewed 
on the basis that the liability of the vessel arises not from any liability of its owners but from the 
fact of association and the application of the South African legislation. The recognition of 
companies as having separate corporate personality leads inexorably to the conclusion that this is 
a new and separate type of action from the conventional action in rem, which provides for a new 
and different liability from any that existed prior to the action being commenced. The common 
feature is the form in which the claim is pursued but an analysis of the underlying liability reveals 
that this type of action in rem is markedly different from any that has previously existed in other 
jurisdictions. That fact is recognised by the courts in these judgments but its implications for a 
consideration of the nature of the action in rem thereby commenced has not yet been worked out, 
either by the courts or in academic writing. It is a topic to be dealt with later.76   
 
4 THE ASSOCIATED SHIP IN PRACTICE  
 
 The definition of an associated ship encompassed both the sister ship, a concept already 
well-known through the Arrest Convention, and the true associated ship.  In practice however the 
sister ship is of little relevance.  It may be the case that some sister ship arrests have occurred and 
there are certainly still some fleets that operate with a single owner particularly those national 
fleets that are still owned by governments.77  However the relevant provisions do not appear to 
have occasioned any difficulty.
78
  This is a reflection of the changing patterns of ship ownership 
that rendered the provisions of the Arrest Convention largely redundant as a practical measure.  It 
is also indicative of the value of a provision that goes beyond the limits of the Convention and 
                                                 
76 In Chapter 12. 
77 I understand that this is true of the Indian national fleet and it was also true of the national fleets of a number of 
socialist countries although that has changed in recent years with political changes in most of those countries. 
78 There are no reported cases in which the court has had to consider these provisions nor do any of the unreported 
judgments circulated by the MLA or reported in certain private commercial reports consider them.  
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addresses the de facto modern day pattern of ship ownership.  It seems that international maritime 
law is confronted with a choice.  Either it accepts that the effective use of corporate structures 
will protect all but the ships in respect of which claims arise or it must go beyond that to a new 
paradigm where those corporate structures will be disregarded in the interests of providing 
maritime claimants with more effective means of enforcing their claims.  As explained in the 
previous chapter whether a State adopts the one course or the other will be a policy choice based 
on that state’s own commercial and political interests.  The true associated ship provisions 
emphatically follow the second course.  
 
 By contrast with the sister ship provisions of the Act the provisions relating to the true 
associated ship rapidly became a source of legal disputes.  Four fundamental issues can be 
identified as having arisen at an early stage. All of these arose either at the initial stage of action 
proceedings where a vessel was arrested in an action in rem and the validity of that arrest was 
challenged or where an order for its arrest was sought in terms of section 5(3) of the Act and that 
application was opposed. In each instance the essential questions were the same. First what 
burden of proof must the party seeking such an arrest discharge in order to obtain or maintain the 
arrest? Second, what did the provisions of section 3(7)(a)(ii) of the Act mean when they referred 
to control of the shares in a company that owned the ship? Third, when had the association to 
exist?  Lastly what evidence would be admissible and relevant to enable an applicant for arrest to 
prove the requisite association between two vessels? These questions arose under the terms of the 
Act as they stood at its inception. Some of the problems that arose in answering these questions 
underlay the amendments effected in 1992 and a discussion of those problems will indicate why 
the amendments took the form that they did. Most importantly, however, it is necessary to 
consider to what extent the early decisions continue to provide a guide to the interpretation and 
application of the Act. 
 
(a) The burden of proof  
 
 In considering this issue a distinction needs to be drawn between various different burdens 
that an arresting party or an applicant for arrest may bear. In accordance with the general rule that 
 154
the person who alleges must prove79 it has never been disputed that the applicant seeking the 
arrest is obliged to show its entitlement to that relief. 
80
 The more important question is what 
must be proved? Here the form of the proceedings, namely whether it is an arrest pursuant to an 
action in rem or a security arrest, may affect, if not what must be established by the applicant, at 
least the stage at which the burden of proof must be discharged. What is common to both 
proceedings is the need to establish a claim and the need to prove that the vessel is susceptible to 
arrest, in other words that it is an associated ship in relation to the ship concerned, in respect of 
which the maritime claim is alleged to have arisen. In addition, when the arrest is sought under 
section 5(3) to obtain security for proceedings elsewhere or for arbitration proceedings it is 
necessary for the applicant to demonstrate a genuine and reasonable need for the security that it 
seeks81. 
 
 Differences arise in relation to each of these separate elements. An arrest is only 
permissible if the applicant has a maritime claim enforceable by an action in rem against the ship 
concerned. Insofar as such claim is concerned it would subvert the entire purpose of the 
jurisdiction if the applicant had to establish the merits of the claim at the stage of the arrest. There 
would then be no need for the trial or arbitration as the case might be. Accordingly in order to 
obtain and maintain an arrest the test is set lower than the conventional test in civil cases of proof 
on a balance of probabilities. Initially the view was taken that the applicant should show prima 
facie that it had reasonable prospects of success in the main proceedings.82 However the 
Appellate Division decided that the test should be the same as that applied in the case of 
applications for an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem namely whether 
the applicant had shown a prima facie case in the sense that there is evidence which, if accepted, 
                                                 
79
 Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946. 
80
 Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV ‘Kyoju Maru’ 1984 (4) SA 210 (D) 214H relying upon 
American Cotton Products Corporation v Felt and Tweeds Ltd 1953 (2) SA 753 (N) and Lendalease Finance (Pty) 
Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola and others 1976 (4) SA 464 (A) 489. 
81 As to what constitutes a genuine and reasonable need for security see mv Orient Stride: Asiatic Shipping Services 
Inc v Elgina Marine Co Ltd 2009 (1) SA 246 (SCA) 
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will establish a cause of action.
83
 This is a relatively easy hurdle to surmount. A dispute of fact 
between the parties, even where the probabilities strongly favour the ship and its owners, will not 
suffice to prevent the applicant from discharging the burden of proof. It is accordingly rare, but 




 By contrast the test in regard to the association of the two vessels - the ship concerned and 
the putative associated ship - is much higher namely the usual test in civil cases of proof on a 
balance of probabilities. Just as the court ‘will not order the attachment of the property of another 
for the purpose of founding jurisdiction because to do so would be futile and of no effect’
85
 so it 
has been held it will not order the arrest of a vessel or permit such an arrest to stand unless the 
applicant has proved on a balance of probabilities that the vessel to be arrested is an associated 
ship in relation to the ship concerned.86 By parity of reasoning between the case of an arrest in 
admiralty and an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem, this has always been 
accepted to be the case. However it is by no means clear that the two situations are strictly 
comparable. In the case of an attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction the sole purpose of the 
attachment is to establish the jurisdiction of the court. Potential liability is distinct from 
jurisdiction and is measured against a lesser standard. Once jurisdiction has been founded or 
confirmed the case on the merits proceeds without any reference to the prior attachment.  In other 
words the question of liability is wholly distinct from the question of jurisdiction and the latter 
question is determined at the outset. That is only partly the case with an action in rem 
commenced by the arrest of an associated ship and it is not the case at all in the case of a security 
arrest of an associated ship in terms of section 5(3) of the Act. 
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 Katagum Wholesale Commodities Co Ltd v MV Paz 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) 268A. 
83 Cargo laden and lately laden onboard the MV Thalassini Avgi v MV Dimitris, supra, 831G-832C. 
84 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v MV Kapetan Leonidas 1995 (3) SA 112 (A); SA Marine Corporation SA v mv 
‘Maritime Valour’ and another, Case No 03/2003 (Durban), SCOSA B293.     
85 Corbett JA in Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola and others 1976 (4) SA 464 (A) 
489. 
86
 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A) 581C-F. 
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 With the arrest of an associated ship in an action in rem the determination of the question of 
association goes firstly to the central issue of liability and only consequentially to jurisdiction. If 
there is no association there is no liability and therefore no entitlement to arrest.  It is otherwise 
when the claim of association arises in an application for the arrest of a vessel as security for a 
claim elsewhere in terms of section 5(3) of the Act. In that event the association founds the arrest 
and determines the liability to provide security but the question of liability in the proceedings for 
which security is sought is unaffected by the association. The distinction has not however been 
reflected in the case law on this topic which holds that in both cases the association must be 
proved on a balance of probabilities if the arrest is to be maintained. It is convenient initially to 
examine the issue from the perspective of an associated ship arrest in order to commence an 
action in m in South Africa. Then it can be decided whether the test or approach is or should be 
different when association is invoked in an application for a security arrest.  
 
 In accordance with the decision in The Berg discussed above the action in rem against an 
associated ship is a different action from that against the ship concerned because it attaches 
liability to a person other than the person against whom the claim originally arose. In those 
circumstances proof of the association is an essential element giving rise to liability. The 
jurisdiction of the court flows in turn from the provisions of section 2 of the Act that vest it with 
jurisdiction to determine any maritime claim irrespective of the place where it arises. The 
exercise of that jurisdiction is based upon the arrest of the associated ship because an action in 
rem can be commenced by the arrest of either the ship in respect of which the claim arose or an 
associated ship. In the absence of an association there is no liability and the vessel cannot be 
arrested so that liability and the exercise of jurisdiction go hand in hand.   
 
 Once that is recognised it is legitimate to ask why at the stage of applying for the arrest (or 
maintaining it when the arrest was granted without a court order or only after a hearing ex parte) 
the applicant should have to discharge the more onerous onus in regard to association when in 
relation to the balance of the elements of its claim it suffices for it to produce evidence that if 
accepted would give it a cause of action? In other words why is it that at the stage of justifying its 
arrest it is compelled to prove on a conventional balance of probabilities the fact of association, 
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which is an essential element of its cause of action, without the advantages such as discovery that 
flow from a trial action? There is no difficulty with its having to do this at the stage of trial in the 
same way in which it has to prove the other elements of its claim on a balance of probabilities at 
that stage. The problem only arises at the stage of arrest and its ability to justify the arrest at that 
stage. Another way of looking at it is to say that the claimant has to prove the same thing for 
different purposes but bears a different burden of proof depending on whether the concern is the 
liability of the defendant, in which event a prima facie case of association will suffice, or 
jurisdiction, in which event proof on a balance of probabilities is demanded. Such a bifurcated 
approach to a question of onus in relation to the same issue is unusual if not completely unknown 
in any other context87. This issue has never been addressed because of the assumption that it falls 
to be dealt with on the same basis as the requirement of proof of ownership of property sought to 
be attached in a common law attachment without any consideration of its dual function and 
relevance.88 
 
 The problem is one of considerable practical importance because of the difficulties 
confronting an applicant in establishing association.  In the case of an associated ship the matters 
that have to be proved stand at one remove from the question of registered ownership (which is 
easily ascertainable) and are usually obscured by inaccessible or opaque company registers 
designed to enable the true identity of those who control the company to remain confidential. In 
addition the applicant for such an arrest usually does not have access to documents that would 
tend to establish the association and in practice the shipowner is usually reluctant or unwilling to 
disclose such documents and does so in an incomplete fashion. Thus it is not unusual for the 
applicant to be confronted with bearer share certificates produced in the offices of the shipowner 
                                                 
87 Certainly the author is not aware of any other situation where the situation can arise that for different purposes in 
the same litigation the onus on a single issue may differ. 
88 The question did not arise in Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd, supra, because it was common cause in 
that case that the two vessels were associated ships. In both cases cited by Corbett CJ as authority for this 
proposition, namely Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 (4) SA 210 (D) 214I and 
Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) 497A-B the judgments record that this was common 
cause between counsel. The author was responsible for the concession in the first case and can only confess that he 
made the assumption that he now questions. 
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and a self-serving but incomplete set of documents designed to suggest the absence of common 
control, with elements such as cross-mortgages being explained on the basis of family 
membership or long-standing friendship.89 This is accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits from 
the protagonists on the side of the shipowner denying common control and attributing the 
appearance, or even the public proclamation, of it to other factors. Discharging the onus of 
proving association on a balance of probabilities in motion proceedings without the benefits of 
discovery or cross-examination is a truly formidable task. However in principle the difficulty or 
otherwise of establishing matters by evidence is not a reason for moderating or departing from 
the ordinary rules governing the proof of matters in legal proceedings. The present concern is 
whether it is appropriate to burden an applicant seeking to obtain or maintain an arrest with the 
obligation to prove the association on a balance of probabilities at that stage. Some consideration 
therefore needs to be given to the appropriateness of the analogy with an attachment to found 
jurisdiction and the underlying reason in such a case for the differences between the burden of 
proof insofar as proof of ownership and proof of a prima facie case is concerned. The aim is to 
see whether it is possible to discern a principle that will help to resolve the point. 
 
 Three propositions emerge from the judgments on the onus of proof in regard to 
attachments. The first is that the application is treated as a precursor to a trial on the merits of the 
dispute between the parties limited to the question of whether the court will exercise jurisdiction. 
Accordingly it is thought inappropriate for such preliminary proceedings to be turned into a trial. 
The second is that to permit debate on the merits of the case, other than at the most superficial 
level, would defeat the main purpose in permitting such an attachment namely the convenience of 
the incola in litigating in its home jurisdiction against a peregrinus.90 The third is that already 
                                                 
89 In the Asian Hope this extended to the production, at a late stage of an application to set aside an arrest, of a 
resolution purporting to emanate from the directors of a holding company in which they purported to divide the 
vessels in a fleet among themselves in breach of the conditions upon which mortgages had been granted over the 
vessels. Even more extraordinarily they claimed to have done this prior to the arrest but had failed to disclose it in 
their application papers. The curious feature of the case is that the judge did not apparently find this curious. The 
Asian Hope: Asian Hope Shipping Ltd v Ocean Trade SA SCOSA, C115 (D). 
90 ‘To require a degree of proof of the cause of action which might prevent an incola from proceeding against a 
peregrinus in a case in which he would have been able to do so, had the peregrinus been within the jurisdiction, 
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referred to namely that it would be futile and of no effect to permit an attachment of the property 
of one person in order to secure jurisdiction over another. None of them are self-evidently 
applicable to arrests of associated ships.  
 
 The fact that vessel A is an associated ship in relation to vessel B means that the owner of 
vessel A is liable in South African law for the debts of the owner of vessel B. That liability is 
imposed by the terms of the Act and is a matter of substantive law. Very often, where the 
indebtedness of the owner of B cannot be seriously disputed, the question of association is the 
crucial issue in the case and will determine liability. It is submitted that it is inappropriate in 
those circumstances for the court to approach an issue of association on the basis that it is a 
purely preliminary issue of jurisdiction. It is far more than that especially if one has regard to the 
fact that the associated ship jurisdiction at present has no parallel elsewhere in the world so that a 
refusal to permit an arrest, or the setting aside of an arrest already made, will be a final 
determination of the question of liability adverse to the claimant.
91
 Unlike the case of an 
attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction the issues of liability and jurisdiction are inextricably 
linked. In South African proceedings it is not customary to determine liability in disputed cases 
without a trial and evidence being lead and challenged yet this is what occurs if an arrest is set 
aside in application proceedings without a reference to evidence on the basis that the party 
seeking the arrest has failed to discharge the onus of proving a disputed association. 
 
 Couched as it is in the narrow chauvinistic terms of convenience to incolae in seeking to 
sue peregrini the second reason favouring a lower burden of proof can have little application in 
the context of arrests in admiralty. Most proceedings in admiralty are between parties, both of 
whom are peregrini, so that the convenience of incolae has little resonance in relation to the 
arrest of associated ships. (That is even more the case in relation to the even more common 
situation of an arrest under section 5(3) of the Act to obtain security for legal proceedings in 
                                                                                                                                                              
would be out of keeping with the purpose of and reason for the procedure by way of attachment.’ per Steyn J in 
Bradbury Gretorex Co (Colonial) Ltd v Standard Trading (Pty) Ltd 1953 (3) SA 529 (W).  
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another jurisdiction.) In addition it is suggested that, whilst legal chauvinism may have driven the 
evolution of the attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction, there is a simpler and more practical 
reason for accepting a lower burden of proof in attachment proceedings. Where the purpose of 
those proceedings is truly preliminary to the determination of the claim by way of a trial, to 
require that the applicant discharge a more stringent burden of proof at a preliminary stage is to 
pre-empt the trial process, with all the safeguards that it contains to ensure that there is a fair 
adjudication of the claim. There is a copious body of authority in South Africa warning against 
the determination of disputed factual issues in application proceedings on a weighing up of the 
probabilities.92 The reason is that the normal form of proceedings in our adversarial system is by 
way of trial action (rauw actie) which is a procedure directed at the proper resolution of factual 
disputes.  In South Africa, as in many other jurisdictions, it is only after hearing oral evidence 
and requiring the disclosure of all relevant documents that it is thought appropriate to make a 
determination of disputed issues. Accordingly it seems inappropriate to require a person who is 
seeking the opportunity to prove a claim at a trial to establish a fundamental aspect of that claim 
on affidavits on the conventional balance of probabilities before a trial. Such an approach 
imposes a more severe burden of adducing evidence on the claimant at the preliminary stage than 
rests upon it at the subsequent trial, where it will have had the benefit of access to the other 
party’s documents. Indeed it disposes entirely of the need for a trial on that issue and an adverse 
finding leads to the claimant losing its case. To do that in preliminary proceedings is 
unsatisfactory. 
 
 This examination of the relevance of the factors underpinning our courts’ approach to 
attachments ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem to an associated ship arrest shows 
                                                                                                                                                              
91 This in turn is linked to the ability to arrest another associated ship in relation to the same claim, as to which see 
Chapter 8 below, and the nature and status of an action in rem against an associated ship, which forms the subject 
matter of Chapter 10. 
92
 Sewmungal and Another NNO v Regent Cinema 1977 (1) SA 814 (N), a judgment that has repeatedly been cited 




that the analogy between the two is false and it is submitted that it points towards applying the 
lower burden of a prima facie case to the question of association. The reasons are twofold. Firstly 
the issue is not a true preliminary issue. It is primarily an issue of the liability of the owner of the 
associated ship for the claim against the ship concerned and its owners. Accordingly as an issue 
of liability it is appropriate to apply the lower burden of proof at the stage of arrest. Secondly the 
issue is one which demands resort to evidence that the very nature of the institution of the 
associated ship recognises is not readily available to a claimant. In those circumstances to deny 
the claimant the benefits of a trial is effectively in most disputed cases to impose upon them a 
more stringent burden of adducing evidence than would be the case at a trial. They are required to 
prove on affidavit, in the face of opposition that may well be dishonest, something in regard to 
which it is highly improbable that they will have any direct evidence. In doing so they will 
usually have to contend that the deponents on behalf of the shipowner are not to be believed on 
their oath something which the court is reluctant to do in application proceedings.93 Insofar as the 
application of the burden of proof always involves a consideration of such practical issues it is 
desirable that this type of disputed question should be resolved in the conventional way by way 
of the hearing of evidence at a trial.
94
 The very reasons that point in the case of an attachment to 
the requirement that proof of the claim at a prima facie level is all that is required seem to point 
to the same conclusion on the question of association. 
 
 The third reason given for requiring proof of ownership on a balance of probabilities in 
cases of attachments, namely that the attachment of property not owned by the defendant will 
prove futile and of no effect is a little obscure. If it transpires after a trial that the property is not 
owned by the defendant - and indeed the named defendant may not participate in the trial in that 
                                                 
93 Peterson v Cuthbert & Co Ltd 1945 AD 420; Da Mata v Otto NO 1972 (3) SA 858 (A). 
94 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde and another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) paras 55 and 56 Didcott J referred to the fact that 
there is no general principle applicable in determining where the onus of proof lies and quoted with approval - as our 
courts have done before - the passage from Wigmore on Evidence in which it is said: ‘The truth is that there is not 
and cannot be any one general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience 
in the different situations.’ There seems to be no reason in principle why the same issues of policy and fairness 
should not dictate the weight of the burden at an interim stage of proceedings provided the ultimate burden of proof 
on a balance of probabilities is the test at the stage of any final determination. 
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event - then the claim will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. That does not mean that the 
proceedings have been futile any more than any other proceedings that result in the dismissal of 
the claim without resolving its merits. This occurs whenever a defence of prescription, or 
limitation of actions or want of jurisdiction is upheld. If it is intended to suggest that the arrest 
will not result in the defendant being before the court that is by no means necessarily the case. 
The true owner may well be in a position to compel the defendant to appear or furnish security 
for the claim as frequently occurs as between shipowner and charterer. In any event if the 
property is valuable the true owner is likely to enter the lists in order to protect its interests in the 
property. It is only where the property attached has limited value that the action is likely to go by 




 Examining this proposition in the context of the arrest of an associated ship it appears less 
than compelling. A vessel will ordinarily have some reasonable value to its owner and very often 
also to its mortgagee. It is improbable that there will be no foundation for the claim to association 
as in that event the arrest can be set aside on even the more limited standard of proof. 
Accordingly the owner of the associated ship will usually be in a position to influence the giving 
of security to secure the release of the vessel arrested. The probability of the owner and 
mortgagee walking away from the vessel is much reduced in this situation particularly because 
the owner will not be liable at all if the vessels are in truth not associated vessels. Usually what 
happens in these cases is that security is provided to procure the release of the vessel and the 
claimant can then pursue the case in the knowledge that if successful it will be paid. In the result 
there is little prospect of disputed proceedings over a question of association proving futile and if 
the plaintiff is successful in establishing the association the ship or any security provided to 
secure its release will be available to satisfy the judgment. 
 
                                                 
95 Even where property is relatively worthless there may be a number of reasons why the defendant will enter the 
fray. The author was involved in cases where a cardboard model of a ship was attached and one where a life jacket 
from a wreck was attached and the owners nonetheless incurred the considerable expense of participating in the 
litigation, albeit in each case on certain preliminary matters that resolved the case in their favour.   
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 All of this provides a proper basis for questioning the received wisdom that an applicant for 
arrest of an associated ship must prove the fact of association on a balance of probabilities at the 
stage of obtaining or seeking to maintain the arrest. However whilst there is much to be said for 
the proposition that the analogy between associated ship arrests and attachments to found or 
confirm jurisdiction has been pressed too far, it is probably too late at this stage to succeed in 
mounting an argument that the courts should reconsider their approach to the question of onus of 
proof of association when the arrest of an alleged associated ship is challenged, save perhaps on 
constitutional grounds96. An appreciation by courts that the analogy is unsound may, however, 
prompt them to adopt a different and more amenable approach to the question of referring to trial 
applications to arrest alleged associated ships or applications to set aside such arrests where the 
arrest is made to commence proceedings in South Africa. It is submitted that the reluctance of 
courts to do so, at least in the case at present under discussion of an arrest for the purpose of 
commencing an action in rem in South Africa, is ill founded and subversive of the associated ship 
jurisdiction. Provided the Court faced with a challenge to an associated ship arrest based on an 
absence of the alleged association, forms the view that there is a real and substantial dispute in 
this regard, it is submitted that the proper approach for it to adopt is to refer the matter to trial, 
either together with the merits or as a separate issue, rather than to set aside the arrest on the basis 
of a failure to discharge the onus. Such an approach leaves the claimant with the burden of 
proving the association on a balance of probabilities, but in a conventional trial well suited to 
resolving disputes of fact.  
 
 There are two other reasons why the courts should be reluctant to alter the requirement that 
association be proved on a balance of probabilities when an arrest is sought, or sought to be 
maintained, in response to a challenge to its validity. Firstly the issue usually arises in 
applications for the arrest of vessels as security in proceedings elsewhere than South Africa. Here 
the argument that association is a component of liability falls away because, whilst it is a 
necessary element for obtaining the arrest, it is irrelevant in the arbitration or court proceedings 
                                                 
96 See Chapter 9. Such a challenge would need to be based on the right of access to courts and issues of the 
rationality of the present view of the onus. 
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for which security is being sought because the claim there will not be based on the association 
but on the liability of the named defendant, whether the ship or its owner, for the maritime claim. 
In such a case the proceedings are truly a precursor to the main litigation and have no bearing 
upon it. Accordingly there are good grounds of policy for saying that a party seeking to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the South African court to obtain what is to all intents and purposes final relief, 
namely the furnishing of security, should be held to the stricter standard of proof on a balance of 
probabilities. It is far more debatable however whether it is correct to say as did Corbett CJ in 
Bocimar that the dispute has no connection with South Africa and on policy grounds it is 
undesirable for the time and resources of our courts to be taken up with preliminary issues in 
foreign proceedings. Parliament has vested our courts with the power to make orders that will 
enable foreign litigants to obtain security for proceedings elsewhere. It has done this in a special 
category of case arising in the sphere of maritime activity that is of fundamental importance to 
South African trade. In doing so it recognised the desirability in maritime matters of enabling 
litigants to obtain security in order to facilitate the payment of legitimate claims and the 
resolution of maritime disputes. It is not for the courts in those circumstances to relegate 
proceedings directed at obtaining such relief to some kind of second-class status having a lesser 
priority than other matters that come before them. The occasional resort to an insular 
parochialism, which one from time to time encounters in regard to admiralty cases, is undesirable 
and contrary to the whole purpose of the Act in expanding the scope of the jurisdiction of our 
courts to deal with such cases. 
 
 Secondly it is undesirable that the standard of proof in relation to these issues should vary 
depending upon whether the claimant is intending to pursue proceedings in South Africa or 
merely seeking security for foreign proceedings. The essential issue remains the same in each 
case and it is desirable therefore that the court’s approach should be the same in each instance. 
Where there is scope for a difference in approach is in the attitude of the court to cases where 
there is an irresoluble dispute of fact on the papers and the claimant seeks the discovery of 
documents or the reference of the issue of association to oral evidence or trial. However in this 
area there is a practical difficulty. As Bocimar and a number of other cases demonstrate in 
applications for security arrests under section 5(3) the attitude of our courts has been one of 
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reluctance to order discovery or refer disputes over association to oral evidence because of its 
preliminary nature and the fact that the main litigation has no connection with South Africa.  
 
 It is submitted that this reluctance is misplaced. It flows from a perception that South 
African courts are involving themselves in foreign litigation and that the litigation concerns 
incidental issues rather than the core of the dispute between the parties. However that is not 
correct. In dealing with a security arrest under section 5(3) South African courts are exercising a 
jurisdiction vested in them by statute to afford relief in the form of an order that property be 
arrested to constitute security in proceedings either in South Africa or elsewhere
97
. In exercising 
that jurisdiction they are not involved in the foreign litigation because the situation is a fortiori 
one where the foreign tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought namely an order that 
security be furnished as is the case with most arbitral tribunals and many courts in the absence of 
an arrest of the vessel in respect of which the claim arises. This has long been felt to be a defect 
in other jurisdictions and resulted in England in parties having resort to the expedient of 
commencing proceedings in that jurisdiction and resisting a stay on the grounds that they had 
secured the legitimate juridical advantage afforded by the security they had obtained.
98
 It is a 
problem that the South African legislature set out to address in section 5(3) and the clear 
intention of the section is to provide assistance to litigants, both domestic and foreign, in the form 
of security arrests. That intention should not be undercut by a reluctance on the part of courts to 
become involved in this type of litigation or to dismiss it as being either foreign or essentially 
over peripheral issues. As practical experience demonstrates the ability to obtain security may be 
fundamental to the ability to resolve the dispute. From a South African perspective the only issue 
is whether or not an entitlement to security has been established and that is a matter of South 
African substantive law. It cannot be shrugged off as not being a proper concern of our courts. 
                                                 
97  A similar jurisdiction is vested in Australian courts under s29 of the Admiralty Act 1988. 
98The Eleftheria (1969) 2 All ER 641 (PDA). At present claimants are making use of the jurisdiction available in the 
USA under Federal Supplemental Rule B to obtain security in an exercise in which the courts effectively go behind 
corporate identity to attach funds as security. However a recent decision in New York appears to have put an end to 
that practice. 
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 It is accordingly submitted that the reluctance our courts have displayed to becoming 
involved in disputed issues of association, whether in relation to security arrests or otherwise, is 
misplaced. The only question should be whether the claimant has raised a proper case in which to 
seek an appropriate order from the court to facilitate a resolution of the dispute, whether by way 
of discovery, oral evidence or otherwise. At the very least where the probabilities on the papers 
favour the party seeking the arrest or where they are at least evenly balanced the court should not 
rely on the onus to dismiss the proceedings but should make an order that would be appropriate 
in any other case where a dispute of fact arises. It is submitted that there should be even less 
reluctance where the purpose of the arrest is to commence proceedings in South Africa at which 
all issues of liability will be determined. In that situation there is no need to deal with the issue of 
association separately and it can and should simply be disposed of as part of the trial or separated 
from the main case if it is thought appropriate to do so. It is submitted that the court should 
examine the case advanced by the party resisting the arrest to see whether there has been a full 
and frank disclosure of the relevant facts and production of documents from independent sources 
to support its contentions. If there is reason to doubt whether it has been completely frank and 
open the court should not hesitate to direct that discovery be made or that a witness be cross-
examined or that the matter go to trial or oral evidence. After all it lies within the powers of the 
party resisting arrest to make the position clear to the court and if it fails to do so or is evasive in 
putting up evidence it has only itself to blame if it then finds that it has to address issues of 
association in a trial.100 We should not permit our court procedures to work in a manner that 
facilitates, encourages and rewards dishonesty and untruthfulness in litigation, where deponents 
                                                 
99 This is reinforced to some degree by the consideration that an order for security is a final order and appealable as 
such. Ecker v Dean 1937 SWA3 at 4 approved in Shepstone & Wylie and Others v Geyser NO 1998 (3) SA 1036 
(SCA) at 1042A - H 
100 The Kadirga 5 (No 1): J A Chapman & Co Ltd v Kadirga Denizcilik ve Ticaret SCOSA C 12 (N); The Leros 
Strength: Roza v MV Progress SCOSA C 20 (D). 
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feel free to lie on oath in the relatively certain knowledge that their lies will not be tested and 
exposed and will probably achieve their purpose of defeating a legitimate arrest. 
 
 There is a further reason of public policy for adopting this approach and it relates to the 
international standing and credibility of our courts. South Africa is one of the world’s leading 
jurisdictions in maritime matters and the associated ship arrest and the ability to obtain security 
for proceedings elsewhere has played a major part in achieving this position. That this is 
beneficial not only to the lawyers who practice in this area but also to the economy generally in 
terms of inflows of foreign currency is apparent. In addition there is the intangible benefit that 
arises from an international belief that our courts are attuned to the problems arising in the sphere 
of international trade and willing and able to address these problems in accordance with 
principles well understood in the commercial community. That is a necessary foundation for our 
ability to attract foreign investment to South Africa. Where our courts are dismissive of the 
statutory jurisdiction afforded to them by legislation and say that the dispute has no connection 
with South Africa or that on policy grounds it is undesirable for the time and resources of our 
courts to be taken up with preliminary issues in foreign proceedings, so that foreigners are 
deprived of advantages that would normally be given to litigants by South African courts, the 
message it sends to the international community is negative. It suggests that their claims to 
exercise rights given them by a South African statute - not their claims arising in foreign 
proceedings - are somehow less worthy of consideration by our courts than rights vested in 
domestic litigants. That is an unfortunate message and one that our courts should be careful to 
avoid.  
 
 In the case of arrests to obtain security it was early laid down that the applicant needed to 
show a reasonable and genuine need for security.101 The degree of proof required by an applicant 
                                                 
101
 MV Thalassini Avgi, Cargo laden and lately laden on board the v MV Dimitris 1989 (3) SA 820 (A). As to the 
origin of this expression see MV Orient Stride: Asiatic Shipping Services Inc v Elgina Marine Company Ltd 2009 (1) 
SA 246 (SCA) where it was held that what is required by this formulation is that it must be established that there is a 
genuine and reasonable apprehension that the party whose property is arrested will not satisfy a judgment or award 
made in favour of the arresting party. With respect this is unduly narrow. An apprehension that the other party ‘may’ 
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has likewise been held to be on balance of probability.102 Here the reasoning seems correct.  Such 
an application, whilst having its own substantive existence and purpose, is nonetheless an adjunct 
to other proceedings usually in another jurisdiction.103 A decision on the question of the need for 
security does not involve any adjudication on the merits of the claim or on the entitlement to 
security arising from the association. Policy would suggest that it is undesirable to have a full-
scale trial over a question whether any litigant, foreign or domestic, has a genuine need for 
security for an action or arbitration before a court or tribunal situated either within or outside 
South Africa. The approach to the onus of proof is in accordance with general principles of the 
nature of the burden of proof in civil litigation in South Africa - a fact that the court stressed in its 
judgment
104
 - and none of the reasons for doubting that approach to the onus in the case of 
association appear to be applicable here. The fact of the need for security is something the 
applicant will be fully aware of from facts within its own knowledge and if it is unable to show 
that it needs security that will invariably be because the court is satisfied that the claim is already 
adequately secured or (possibly) that such security is obtainable by other more appropriate 
means. In those circumstances the decision by the court in Bocimar that the need for security 
should be demonstrated on a balance of probabilities and that no reasons of policy suggest 
otherwise
105
 is with respect correct.  
 
(b) Control 
 In its original form section 3(7)(a)(ii) referred to ownership or control of the shares of a 
company and not to control of the company itself. This was unfortunate as in the deeming 
provision in section 3(7)(b)(ii) it was said that a person; 
                                                                                                                                                              
not satisfy a judgment or arbitration award should surely suffice to show a genuine need for security.  To require the 
applicant to show that they probably will not satisfy a judgment goes too far. 
102 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd, supra. 
103 In Ecker v Dean 1937 SWA 3, 4 Van den Heever J said of such an application: ‘the claim for security was a 
separate and ancillary issue between the parties, collateral to and not directly affecting the main dispute between the 
litigants’. This was cited with approval in Shepstone & Wylie and another v Geyser NO 1998 (3) SA 1036 (SCA) 
1042. 
104 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd, supra, at 580 H-I. 
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‘shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to control 
the company.’  
 
The result engendered a good deal of confusion and comment. With characteristic understatement 
it was said that the provisions of this deeming provision reflected ‘an unfortunate absence of 
clarity’.
106
 In the first decision to consider the meaning of the section
107
 the court simply equated 
the power to control the company with the power to control its shares, and being satisfied on the 
former count granted an order. The confusion between the two is clear from the statement in the 
judgment that: 
 
‘In order to satisfy the requirements of the section [ie section 3(7)(a)(ii)], however, what 





Perhaps with a degree of prescience in the light of the subsequent amendments this rewrites the 
language of the section and replaces control of the shares of the company with control of the 
company itself. Having moved to more comfortable ground and avoided the conundrum posed by 
the difference in wording between the operative provision and the deeming provision related to it, 
the court held that the control contemplated by the deeming provision: 
 
‘... relates to overall control, such as is exercisable for instance by a majority shareholder 
or his nominee, of the assets and destiny of the company; it does not refer to its day to 
day management and administration.’109  
                                                                                                                                                              
105
 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd, supra, at 581 F-I. 
106 Shaw, op cit, 39-40. The offending provisions do however appear in this form in the draft bill forming part of the 
Law Commission Report  
107
 E E Sharp & Sons Ltd v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C). This has been described as the first case dealing with the 
arrest of an associated ship.  See for example Staniland and McLennan, The Arrest of an Associated Ship, 1985 SALJ 
148 but that is incorrect. It is the first reported judgment dealing with the requirements for association. The case of 
The Berg is undoubtedly prior in time in terms of when it was brought. 
108 At 326 I. Shaw, op cit, 39 draws attention to the erroneous approach in this case. He makes the point that control 
of the assets of the company is no more than evidence which may tend to show that a person controls the shares in 
the company. 
109 At 327 H- 328A. 
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As a preliminary description of the concept of control of a company this seems undoubtedly 
correct. The case was however unhelpful as a guide to the interpretation of a difficult section.  
 
 The problems posed by the section were first mentioned by Friedman JP110 when he 
pointed out that: 
‘It is possible for a person to control a company without necessarily controlling the shares 
in that company. For example, control over a company without a majority shareholding 
where voting rights are not commensurate with shareholding, or where ‘pyramiding’ 
takes place.’  
 
To similar effect was a judgment of Magid J where he held that the fact that two ship-owning 
companies had common directors did not mean that the vessels were associated in terms of the 
Act and said: 
 
‘If they had common directors, those directors, acting together would have controlled the 
management of the companies’ affairs. That is not however to say that they controlled the 
shares in the companies for there is a vast conceptual and factual difference between 
control of the management of a company’s affairs and control of the shares in that 
company; and, as appears clearly from s 3(7)(a)(ii) of the Act, the ownership [and 
control?] of shares is the sole criterion of association contained therein.’111 (My 
insertion.) 
 
 Curiously the problem was resolved at the level of interpretation by a judgment that was 
delivered after the Act had been amended to resolve the issue by amending section 3(7)(a)(ii) to 
replace the reference to the ownership or control of shares in a company with a reference to 
control of the company itself. However it was still necessary for the court to consider the problem 
in a case that arose before the amendments. Its approach was to start with the provisions of 
section 3(7)(a)(ii) and to adopt the passages quoted above to make the point that there is a 
substantial difference between the control of shares in a company and the control of the company 
itself. Following upon that the court said: 
 
                                                 
110 In Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) 489 B-C, which was quoted with approval in 
National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) 485B.  
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‘In its literal meaning para (b)(ii) does not perform any function.  Unless therefore it is to 
be treated as pro non scripto, it should be interpreted as if it read: 
‘(ii) (A) person shall be deemed to control the shares of a company if he has the power, 
directly or indirectly, to control the shares in the company.’ 
Such an interpretation would complete what seems to be an ellipsis in para (b)(ii).  And it 
would maintain the symmetry of para (a) of ss (7) (which deals with two factual situations 
(i) and (ii) and para (b) (which contains two deeming provisions (i) and (ii) for the 
purposes of para(a)).’112 
 
As will be seen in due course the amendments to this section effected in 1992 rendered this area 
of dispute and the judgment academic. 
 
 A possible problem that did not, as it happens, arise in practice in applying these 
provisions, arose from the reference to control of the shares in a company. What if the company 
did not have shares as with a company limited by guarantee? In those circumstances the 
provisions of section 3(7)(a)(ii) could not apply as they depended upon control of the shares of 
the company and if the company had no shares it could not be applied. The suggestion that this 
could be resolved in part at least by reference to the definition of ‘person’ in the Interpretation 
Act
113
 on the basis that a foreign company or one without shares is a person did not it is 
submitted assist. The effect of this would simply be that the ship-owning company would be 
owned by a person in the shape of a company not having shares. Unless one had the improbable 
situation that this company itself owned or controlled the shares in a company that owned the 
other relevant vessel, whether the ship concerned or the associated ship, the provisions could 
never find application. Whilst a theoretical possibility it was not a practical reality.  After all if 
the one-ship-owning company did not have shares what was the likelihood of another ship-




                                                                                                                                                              
111 East Cross Sea Transport Inc v Elgin Brown and Hamer (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 102 (D) 107 E-F . 
112 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v MV Kapetan Leonidas 1995 (3) SA 112 (A) 119 G-I. Booysen, South 
Africa’s new Admiralty Act: A maritime disaster?’ 1984 MBL  75 81. 
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(c) When must the association exist? 
 
 Whether vessels are associated for the purposes of the Act depends upon the relationship 
between their owners. However the Act did not initially spell out with any degree of clarity at 
what times the relevant requirements for association needed to exist. Section 3(7)(a)(i) described 
an associated ship as one: 
 
‘... owned by the person who was the owner of the ship concerned at the time when the 
maritime claim arose’.  (My emphasis.) 
 
Accordingly the section clearly identified the relevant time as regards the ownership of the ship 
concerned. However it was silent in regard to the time when ownership of the putative associated 
ship was relevant. Was it the time of the arrest or the time when the claim arose or possibly both 
of these? The section dealt with sister ship arrests where the two vessels were in common 
ownership. If one examines the Arrest Convention and its background it seems clear that its 
intention was that the sister ship should, at the time of its arrest, be in the same ownership as the 
ship in respect of which the claim had arisen. That would be logical because the underlying 
principle of the Convention was that the shipowner was already liable in personam to pay the 
claim and all that claimants were permitted to do by the sister ship arrest provisions was arrest 
another vessel also owned by the same person. In other words the same person would remain 
liable but property owned by that person, other than the vessel in respect of which the claim had 
arisen, would be susceptible to arrest. That could only be achieved if the sister ship was one 
owned at the time of its arrest by the same person as had owned the ship concerned at the time 
that the claim arose. The same approach seemed appropriate in regard to the time when 
ownership of the associated ship had to be established. 
  
 This understanding of section 3(7)(a)(i) accords with that of the draftsman of the Act. Shaw 
wrote in regard to it that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
113 Shaw, op cit, 39. Section 2 of Act 33 of 1957. 
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‘As has been suggested with regard to the action in rem against the ship concerned, the 
phrase ‘owned by the person’ means ‘owned by the person at the time of the arrest’.  If 
therefore, A, at the relevant time (that is at the time of the arrest) owns a ship, that ship 
will be an associated ship if A, at the time when the maritime claim arose, was the owner 
of the ship concerned. Changes of ownership in the ship concerned after the time when 
the maritime claim arose are irrelevant, as is the question whether the ship which is an 
associated ship was owned by A at the time when the maritime claim arose.’114 
 
No issue ever arose in regard to this provision and in the court a quo in the Berg it seems, albeit 
much in passing, to have been accepted as self-evident.
115
 It accorded with the provisions of 
article 3(1) of the Arrest Convention, which had been worded in this way to ensure that the 
situation could not arise where a person purchased a vessel subject to a maritime lien and thereby 
rendered his entire fleet liable to arrest as sister ships of the newly acquired vessel.
116
 The same 
protection was given to shipowners in relation to the possibility of having their vessels arrested as 
associated ships. 
 
 Section 3(7)(a)(ii) likewise identified the time when the maritime claim arose as being the 
relevant time insofar as the time when ownership or control of the shares in the ship-owning 
company had to exist. However it was not silent in respect of the time when the shares in the 
company owning the putative associated ship had to be owned or controlled. The section read: 
 
‘... owned by a company in which the shares, when the maritime claim arose, were 
controlled or owned by a person who then controlled or owned the shares in the company 
which owned the ship concerned.’ (My emphasis.) 
 
This language seemed to refer back to the time when the maritime claim arose as being the time 
when ownership or control of the shares in the company owning the associated ship had to be 
determined.117 This created an anomaly between the position when ownership of the two ships 
                                                 
114 Shaw, op cit, 37-8. Booysen, op cit, 81 had already made the point that ‘Of cardinal importance is that ship B, the 
associated ship, must be owned by X when the action is instituted.’ 
115 NPD judgment 662 C-D. 
116 Berlingieri, Arrest of Ships,4th Ed, 158, para 52.429. 
117 That was said to be its effect in National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles CC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) 
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was the criterion for association and that where ownership or control of the shares in the two 
ship-owning companies was concerned because the time for association was different. In the 
former case the relevant time for ownership of the associated ship was the time of the vessel’s 
arrest. In the latter the relevant time for ownership or control of the shares in the company 
owning the associated ship was the time when the maritime claim arose. That also seemed 
inconsistent with the explanation of the purpose of the section given to the Appellate Division in 
the Berg
118
 namely that: 
 
‘... the purpose of the Act was to make the loss fall where it belonged by reason of 
ownership, and in the case of a company, ownership or control of shares.’  
 
 The problem, as pointed out by Professor Booysen119, was that the section merely required 
the shares in the company owning the associated ship to have been owned or controlled at the 
time the maritime claim arose by the person who then owned or controlled the shares in the 
company owning the ship concerned. In the result there was no need at that time for the company 
owning the associate ship to own any ship at all nor any need at the time of the arrest for the 
person who owned or controlled the shares at that time to have any remaining interest in the 
company owning the associated ship: 
 
‘What is important is that both companies eg Y and Z, must have been owned by the 
same person (X) when the claim arose. If X owns or controls the two companies Y and Z, 
and Y is involved in shipping and Z not, it does not matter that Z did not even have a ship 
when Y’s ship, eg, caused damage by collision. Even if Z acquires a ship after the claim 
arises, that ship can still be arrested as an associated ship in an action in rem.  The only 
way X can protect his other ships is to sell them to companies established after the 
original cause of action arose. Even if X sells his shares in company Z after the claim 
arises and company Z then goes into shipping and acquires a ship, that ship will also be 
liable to attachment as an associated ship.’120 
                                                 
118 AD judgment 712A. 
119 Booysen, op cit, 81. 
120 Booysen, op cit, 81-2. Staniland and McLennan, 1985 SALJ 148 151 question whether Professor Booysen’s 
example is correct as an instance of association on the basis that the word ‘owned’ in section 3(7)(a)(ii) can be 
interpreted in both the present and the past tenses. That does not appear to be correct linguistically or grammatically.  
The section deals with the arrest of an associated ship. The preamble to section 3(7) is in the present tense - ‘an 
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The possibility of a person owning a company that does not own a ship and then using that 
company to acquire a ship is fortunately relatively remote. It is an even more remote possibility 
that X should dispose of the company that does not own a ship to a person who would then 
acquire a ship using that company. However the possibility of the shares in a ship-owning 
company being disposed of after a maritime claim arises to a person having no connection with 
the company owning the vessel in respect of which the claim arose is at least real, if somewhat 
unusual, particularly if there is a significant time lapse between the date on which the claim arises 
and the date of the arrest. The result would be that association would not result in the liability for 




 Potentially an even more eccentric result was possible. If a claim arose in respect of ship A 
owned by X and X was unwise enough thereafter to acquire ship B, then on such acquisition ship 
B would become an associated ship in relation to ship A. That was exactly what the draftsman 
had in mind as it would cause the loss to fall on X. However if X chose to acquire ship B through 
a newly formed company Y, in which X held all the shares, then there would be no association 
because the company Y would not have been in existence when the claim arose in relation to A.  
 
 Fortunately the problem does not appear to have been significant in practice in that there is 
only one reported case in which such a situation arose.
122
 One commentator noted that it was a 
situation that could lead to hardship and suggested that consideration should be given to 
                                                                                                                                                              
associated ship means a ship … owned.’  It is difficult in those circumstances to treat the word ‘owned’ as being 
couched in the past tense or relating to any time other than the time that the arrest is sought. 
121 This is the effect of the example set out in the AD judgment in the Berg 712G - 713A. Indeed unless one 
understands that this was the original effect of section 3(7)(a)(ii) it is difficult to see why the court should have 
thought that this was a case of an associated ship at all. 
122 Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1984 (4) SA 444 (C).  In this case the original arrest of the vessel had 
been set aside on the basis that the vessels were not associated at the date of the arbitration award on which the arrest 
was originally founded. Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) 489 F - 490A. Whilst the 
argument in that case was underway the vessel was again arrested but in this instance on the basis of the underlying 
claims giving rise to the arbitration and not on the award. The arrest was upheld because it was common cause that at 
the time the underlying claims arose the vessels were associated ships. In other words reliance was placed on the 
provisions of section 3(7)(a)(ii) that made the time for association when the maritime claim arose and not when the 
arrest was effected. Had consideration been given to the question of retrospectivity both arrests should have been 
refused. See footnote 123, post. 
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providing some form of protection for bona fide purchasers of vessels liable to be arrested as 
associated ships.
123
 Clearly the situation was not one that could be permitted to continue and it 
was remedied in 1992 by way of the amendments to the Act that altered the relevant time under 
section 3(7)(a)(ii) to the date of arrest thereby harmonising the two sections. 
 
(d) Proof of association 
 
 From the outset proof of association has never been easy particularly as this has ordinarily 
fallen for consideration on affidavit in opposed motion proceedings and not in trials. In such 
proceedings the applicant is usually confronted by the difficulty that it does not have access to the 
internal workings of the relevant companies or group of companies. Obviously there are many 
shipping groups that operate their fleets through a series of one-ship companies that are relatively 
public in advertising this fact. The vessels operate as part of a single fleet, with the same 
manager, and whilst the ship-owning companies are registered in flag of convenience states there 
is often no secret about the ultimate ownership and control of those companies and the shares in 
those companies. However it is not usually such groups that become involved in litigation 
requiring the invocation of the associated ship jurisdiction. The more frequent situation relates to 
fleets in financial difficulty or those that are operating on a shoestring budget and concerned to 
avoid paying their debts if they can do so. In those situations it is usually the case that their 
operations are deliberately shrouded in secrecy so that few details of the ownership and control of 
such fleets are available in the public domain. The companies owning the ships are invariably 
incorporated in countries where information concerning their shareholders is not readily available 
either because of the use of bearer shares or because the shares are registered in the name of 
nominees.124 In the result at the inception of the jurisdiction, when what had to be shown was 
                                                 
123 Friedman J in 1986 SALJ 678 686. 
124 Hurt J commented in a case involving the MV Sandokan, Case No A166/2001, DCLD, SCOSA B171, that; ‘The 
whole enterprise of ship ownership and control has become pervaded by efforts to set up a de jure picture that de 
facto shields a person in control from numerous liabilities… The contest between creditors and owners … often 
devolves into one of searching through the records of a series of companies that are interposed between the ship itself 
and the actual source of control. Once the veil has been slashed one often finds nominee shareholders who are more 
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common ownership or control of shares rather than control of a company, it was fairly easy to 
overcome reasonably compelling circumstantial evidence of a link between two companies by a 
bald assertion that the shares in the two companies were owned by different - although often 




 The position of the applicant for an arrest is ameliorated to some extent by the provisions of 
section 6(3) of the Act that permit hearsay evidence to be admitted ‘subject to such directions and 
conditions as the court thinks fit’ and on the basis that the weight to be attached to such evidence 
is in the discretion of the court. An initial attempt to restrict the scope of this provision to urgent 
cases where the original source of the information embodied in the hearsay evidence is identified 
was rejected by the appeal court. It held that the proper approach to the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence is to be lenient, so that in general the court inclines to admitting it and a decision to 
exclude it should only be taken when there is some cogent reason for doing so.126 The court 
assesses the weight to be given to such evidence when considering the case in its totality. Since 
that decision there does not appear to be any case where the court has excluded hearsay evidence 
although there are decisions where it has given it very little weight because it has been shown to 
be unreliable.
127
 The result has been that information culled from publications such as Lloyds’ 
List or Fairplay and reports on shipping groups by organisations that specialise in providing 
information, usually of a financial nature, are frequently relied on by the courts in cases where 
the question of association is under consideration. However this does not necessarily overcome 
the problems of peering behind anonymous share registers reflecting that a company’s shares are 
                                                                                                                                                              
often than not legal practitioners. Therefore a person trying to recover a debt based on the common control must 
often end up having to make an educated and calculated guess as to the person in control.’  
125 As occurred in Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C). The case had a curious sequel in 
that before the arrest had been set aside in terms of that judgment the vessel had been arrested again and that 
subsequent arrest was upheld. Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1984 (4) SA 444 (C). In fact neither arrest 
should have been granted in the light of the decision in the Berg that these provisions were not retrospective but that 
point was not apparently raised. The NPD judgment in the Berg was only reported after both judgments in the Zygos 
cases had been delivered. See Friedman J in 1986 SALJ 678 685.   
126 Cargo laden and lately laden on board the MV Thalassini Avgi v MV Dimitris 1989 (3) SA 820 (A) 842 F-H. 
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all bearer shares or discovering who is the puppet-master behind a company all of whose 




 In view of this difficulty it was suggested fairly shortly after the Act came into operation 
that the problem needed to be addressed by way of the introduction of a statutory presumption. 
The suggestion came from Friedman J who said: 
 
‘Of more importance, I think, is the incorporation of some presumption. Whilst in general 
I am opposed to presumptions that alter the normal incidence of proof, it may be 
unavoidable if the ‘associated ship’ provisions are to be given proper efficacy. In the final 
analysis, whether or not control resides in a particular person is a question of fact, and 
very often the real facts will only be known to those who are the respondents in such 
proceedings. Such was the position in the Zygos Corporation case, where the result, 
whilst probably correct, may nevertheless have been unfortunate.’129   
 
However nothing has ever come of this suggestion and the immediate difficulty with it lies in 
determining what presumption would be appropriate. The situations in which an association is 
alleged are so disparate that it is difficult to conceive of a presumption that would be both 
generally applicable and fair to all potential respondents. Presumably what Friedman J had in 
mind was some sort of presumption that ships are associated or shares in ship-owning companies 
are owned or controlled by the same person or persons once certain primary facts have been 
proved by the party seeking arrest. Whilst there is a certain attraction to having a presumption 
that assists an applicant for arrest in circumstances where the inner workings of a group of 
                                                                                                                                                              
127 See for example MV Achilleus v Thai United Insurance Company Limited 1992 (1) SA 324 (N) where some 
hearsay evidence was accepted and other hearsay evidence rejected on questions of the genuineness of certain bills of 
lading. 
128 This very difficulty appears to have underpinned the approach of the majority of the court in MV Heavy Metal: 
Belfry Maritime Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA), a decision that will be considered in 
much greater detail at a later stage 
129 Friedman J, op cit, 685. In an unreported judgment in Ssang Yong Shipping Co Ltd and another v MV Theokeetor, 
A51/1987 (DCLD), SCOSA C81, Wilson J remarked that: ‘It may well be … with the ship registered in a 
jurisdiction where outsiders are unable to obtain information as to the ownership of the company that it would be 
desirable that the legislature take steps to ensure that vessels that venture into the jurisdiction of these courts are 
obliged to provide information in proper circumstances as to the shareholding of the company which is the owner of 
the vessel.’ That was a case where the shareholder in the company that owned the ship in respect of which the claim 
arose deposed to no affidavit although a representative of the ship’s agent did so. 
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companies is kept deliberately opaque and it is not possible to obtain information about such 
workings, the drafting of an appropriate presumption is fraught with difficulty if not impossible.  
Perhaps for that reason the suggestion has never been taken further. It would be preferable in my 
view for the court to adopt a more generous approach to referring these matters for evidence or 
requiring discovery the effect of which is almost certainly going to be that dishonest denials of an 
association will be exposed.  
 
 It is debatable whether the original deeming provisions in sections 3(7)(b) and (c) of the 
Act were particularly useful to an applicant in proving an association. They read as follows: 
 
‘(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a) -   
(i) ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if all the shares in the ship are 
owned by the same persons;  
(ii) a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, 
to control the company. 
(c) If a charterer or sub-charterer of a ship by demise, and not the owner thereof, is 
alleged to be liable in respect of a maritime claim, the charterer or sub-charterer, as the 
case may be, shall for the purposes of subsection (6) and this subsection be deemed to be 
the owner.’ 
 
The first of these was relevant to the association in the case of sister ships and is taken from 
article 3.2 of the Arrest Convention. As has already been noted that has not proved to be a 
problematic area and there is no reported case in which it has been necessary to have resort to this 
presumption.  
 
 The second deeming provision has been extensively discussed above
130
 and it is 
unnecessary to canvass it further in any great detail. In view of the confusion that it engendered it 
was of hardly any assistance in proving an association.  When authoritatively interpreted it was 
said that words had to be read into the section so that it read as if it referred to control of the 
shares of the company rather than control of the company itself. As the presumption was left 
unchanged by the subsequent amendments to this section that approach is no longer valid and it 
provides a curious example of a section in a statute changing its meaning without changing its 
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wording. It is only as a result of this change in meaning that the issues that arise from the 
references to ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ control
131
 of a company have arisen subsequently.  
 
 The third deeming provision is clearly unrelated to any issue of proving an association. Its 
function is to extend the scope of the action in rem commenced by the arrest of an associated 
ship. That it does in relation to the demise charterer but it has no application in any other 
situation and does not bear upon the problems of proof facing an applicant for arrest. 
 
 Notwithstanding these difficulties it would be an overstatement to say that the dice are so 
loaded against those claimants who seek to enforce their claims by way of an action in rem 
against an associated ship that the remedy is virtually an empty one. There is always some 
evidence available to a claimant and as long as it can produce enough to constitute at least a 
prima facie case of association that will suffice to force the owners of the two vessels to produce 
in response some direct evidence that they are not in truth associated. Sometimes the applicant’s 
task is relatively straightforward as when an investigation of the ship-owning companies reveals 
that they have the same shareholders (albeit nominees) and the same directors or where there are 
proven financial links between the two companies in the form of common borrowing or cross-
mortgages or cross-guarantees. In the absence of countervailing evidence from the owners of the 
shares in the ship-owning companies that will usually suffice to discharge the onus of proof on 
the claimant even in the face of a bare denial of the fact of association. This flows from the well-
established principle that less evidence will be required to establish a prima facie case where the 
matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.
132
 A passive approach of simply 
not responding to allegations of fact pointing towards common control of the shares of two ship-
owning companies was adopted unsuccessfully in an early case where the deponent to the 
opposing affidavit declined to deal with the question of control over the shares of the company 
                                                                                                                                                              
130 Para (b), sv ‘Control’, supra. 
131 MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Maritime Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA). 
132 Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Sykes 1913 AD 156, 173-4; Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Van 
der Schyff 1972 (1) SA 26 (A) 39G-H.  
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that owned the ship concerned. The approach adopted was to say that the opposing affidavit had 
been delivered  ‘in the nature of an exception’. However the court held that the failure to advance 
a positive denial that a named individual was the person who owned or controlled the shares in 
the company that owned the putative associated ship was sufficient to tip the balance in favour of 
the claimant.133  
 
 That was a special case in the light of the complete failure of the ship-owner to deny any of 
the allegations made against it or to make any positive case concerning the ownership or control 
of its shares or even to deny that they were owned by the person identified by the claimant. 
Experience suggests that such a stance is rare and in that case it was borne of an inability 
truthfully to deny the existence of an association. There are however a number of cases where the 
court has, notwithstanding opposition, held that an applicant has discharged the onus of proving 
an association on a balance of probabilities. Unfortunately all these cases are unreported134 but a 
common thread running through several of the judgments is that the court rejected as 
unconvincing and not raising any significant dispute of fact the case made on behalf of the 
respondent ship-owner. In other words the court has adopted the ordinary approach in opposed 
applications where it is not satisfied that bare denials or general explanations are sufficient to 
raise a genuine dispute of fact.135 
 
 In other cases where there has been a failure to prove the existence of the association the 
applicant has invariable been confronted with positive evidence dealing with the crucial questions 
of control of the shares in the company (prior to the 1992 amendments) or control of the 
                                                 
133
 Hasselbacher Papier Import and Export (Body Corporate) and another v MV Stavroula 1987 (1) SA 75 (C)  
134 Examples are MV Bacanao: Transportes del Mar SA v Jay Bay Shipping Co Ltd, A119/95 (DCLD), SCOSA C42; 
MV Ain Temouchent: Keytrade USA Inc v MV Djouf, A 135/2001 (DCLD), SCOSA B160; The Able Monarch: 
Prestige Splendour SDN BHD v Globe Engineering Namibia (Pty) Ltd, AR 249/2001 (DCLD) B135 and Chester 
Shipping Company v Rifino Shipping Company Limited AR 24/2005 (DCLD). 
135
 Peterson v Cuthbert & Co Ltd 1945 AD 420, 428; Da Mata v Otto NO 1972 (3) SA 858 (A) 865I-866A. 
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company itself  (after the 1992 amendments).136 The problem with such evidence has often lain in 
the reluctance of the respondents in those proceedings to produce documents that would 
decisively demonstrate the truth of their allegations or refute them. This has lead in several cases 
to applications either for discovery or for the issue of association to be referred for the hearing of 
oral evidence. It appears from the reported cases that applications for discovery have invariably 
failed.137 The courts have also exhibited a clear reluctance to refer questions of association for the 
hearing of oral evidence.
138
 Whatever the merits of the decisions in those cases it is submitted 
that the particular ground upon which that has usually been done, namely that this is a 
preliminary question of jurisdiction, is erroneous for the reasons given when dealing with the 
question of onus and that this is not a factor that should influence a court asked to grant such an 
order.   
 
                                                 
136 Thus in Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) there was a substantial body of evidence 
dealing with the circumstances of certain financial transactions that lead to the vessels no longer being associated 
albeit relatively unsupported by documents. In Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 
(4) SA 210 (D) the question of ownership and control was fully dealt with albeit again without the production of 
documentary evidence.   
137 See Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 (4) SA 210 (D); East Cross Sea 
Transport Inc v Elgin Brown and Hamer (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 102 (D); MV Urgup: Owners of the MV Urgup v 
Western Bulk Carriers (Australia) 1999 (3) SA 500 (C) 513E-I and MV Rizcun Trader (2): Manley Appledore 
Shipping Ltd v Owner of the MV Rizcun Trader and another 1999 (3) SA 956 (C). In the latter two cases where 
discovery was sought before the delivery of all the affidavits the court held that exceptional circumstances needed to 
be present before making such an order. There is one unreported case in which the court ordered production of a 
document, namely The Voyager V: Mesogea SA v MV Voyager V (ex ‘Hanjin Jedda’), A 186/2000 (DCLD),SCOSA 
E90 but in that case the document in question had been specifically mentioned in the answering affidavit and its 
production was sought in terms of rule 35 (12) of the High Court Rules.  Litigants who are alive to the provisions of 
this rule are careful not to mention specific documents in their affidavits. 
138
 Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C). There is only one case of which I am aware in 
which the question of association was determined after a full trial and that is the unreported judgment in Kherson 
Shipyard v MV Als Express and others A55/2001 (DCLD), SCOSA C97. There however the defendant put up a letter 
of undertaking to secure the release of the vessel and the matter then proceeded to trial. The case illustrates that even 
a trial will not necessarily reveal the true position as the court granted absolution from the instance and made no 
order as to the costs of the action on the grounds that it was left with a ‘lingering suspicion that I have not heard the 
full truth’.  In MV Kadirga 5: J A Chapman & Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Kadirga Denizcilik ve Ticaret SA AR115/98 
(NPD), SCOSA C12, the court referred the issue of association for the hearing of oral evidence because it was unable 
on the papers to reject the denials of an association on the part of the Respondent. It is clear from the judgment 
however that it regarded the probabilities on the papers as strongly favouring the applicant. A similar course was 
adopted in The Leros Strength; Roza v MV Progress; MV Progress v Stone Engineering Ltd SCOSA C20. An 
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 It is submitted that the court should consider such applications in the same way in which it 
would deal with similar applications in any other field of the law.  In other words the court has a 
discretion whether to order oral evidence. Two factors are of importance in this regard. The first 
is the nature of the proceedings in which this arises as an issue. If it arises in an application to 
obtain security for foreign proceedings then the proceedings are interim proceedings in the sense 
that they do not resolve any issue between the parties other than the question whether the 
applicant will have security for its claim in the foreign proceedings. In such a case there is 
authority that the court will be slow to order that oral evidence be heard because it may involve 
the vessel being detained or at least the costs of security being furnished whilst the parties litigate 
over an issue that cannot directly resolve the dispute between them.139 That should be seen 
subject to the qualification that if the issue on which evidence could be taken is a narrow one and 
the evidence readily available the factors of inconvenience, delay and expense will diminish and 
other factors such as the likelihood of that evidence resolving matters in favour of the applicant 
will assume greater significance. The court should bear in mind the possibility of giving 
directions for the expeditious hearing of the case that will obviate delays. 
 
 Where the question of association arises in an application to set aside an arrest that 
commences an action in rem to be pursued in the local court then these factors of inconvenience 
and delay are of far less importance. In those situations it is submitted that if the probabilities on 
the papers support the applicant’s contention that an association exists or are evenly balanced 
then the court should generally exercise its discretion in favour of a reference to oral evidence or 
trial or should order the production of any document which by its nature is likely to be decisive of 
the issue. If the probabilities are evenly balanced or even against the applicant then the exercise 
of the court’s discretion will depend upon the prospects of the hearing of oral evidence disturbing 
                                                                                                                                                              
examination of a number of unreported judgments suggests that applications to refer them for the hearing of oral 
evidence on questions of association are infrequent. 
139 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Ltd 1994 (2) SA 563 (A) 586; MV Alam Tenggiri: Alam Tenggiri SDN 
BHD and another v Golden Seabird Maritime Inc and another, A 243/98 (DCLD), SCOSA B25; MV Alam Tenggiri: 
Golden Seabird Maritime Inc and another v Alam Tenggiri SDN BHD and another 2001 (4) SA 1329 (SCA), para 
21.  
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that balance in favour of the applicant.140 It is legitimate for the court to have regard to the 
prejudice that the respondent ship-owner may suffer if the arrest is permitted to continue pending 
the hearing of evidence. On the other hand the failure of a ship-owner to put relevant and 
potentially decisive documents before the court; the absence of direct evidence concerning the 
ownership and control of a ship-owning company and the fact that the material facts may well not 
be in the public domain should weigh heavily in favour of an applicant seeking a reference to oral 
evidence. 
 
5 CONCLUSION    
 
 The decisions by the courts in the first ten years after the Act came into operation 
established certain principles in relation to associated ships. Of these the most important is that 
the action instituted by the arrest of an associated ship is an action in rem against the associated 
ship itself and not merely an action in rem against the ship concerned instituted by way of the 
procedure of arresting the associated ship. The implications of that still need to be examined and 
have not been further explored in the cases.  It does however have implications for the adoption 
of either the English procedural theory of the action in rem or the American personification 
theory, at least in their purest form. The reason for the former is that it is based upon an 
acceptance that the availability of the right of arrest creates new rights and imposes new 
obligations of a substantive nature. This involves a rejection of the proposition that this is 
achieved merely as a matter of procedure. The reason for the latter is that the personification 
theory at the least flows from the notion that the vessel itself is in some way the instrumentality 
through which the liability is created a matter that is tied to the American concept that the 
foundation of the action in rem is the existence of a maritime lien over the property that is the 
subject of the action. It is for this reason that the United States does not recognise the sister ship 
arrest of the Arrest Convention. The associated ship is an even more remote concept. To apply a 
                                                 
140 Kalil v Decotex (Pty) Ltd and others 1988 (1) SA 943 (A) 979A-C; Wiese v Joubert 1983 (4) SA 182 (O) 202 B-
C; Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 (2) SA 486 (C) 497I. The case of Ssang Yong Shipping Co Ltd 
and another v MV Theokeetor, A51/1987 (DCLD) referred to in footnote 127 is a prime example of a case where a 
reference to oral evidence would have been justified if it had been asked for.   
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personification theory to the action in rem against the associated ship is to deprive the theory of 
any conceptual foundation and reduce it to the obvious statement that the action is in form said to 
lie against the ship. 
 
 The other important principles established initially and still of application relate to 
evidential matters. They are that the onus of proving association must be discharged on a balance 
of probability and that hearsay evidence is generally admissible and not confined to cases of 
urgency. Cases on these topics are therefore still applicable notwithstanding the amendments 
effected in 1992. In approaching cases where there is a dispute of fact on the papers the court’s 
approach is no different from that applied in all other applications, save that the cases reflect a 
reluctance to order the production of documents or a reference of disputed issues to oral 
evidence.  
 
 Apart from these matters the principal difficulties with the new regime related to the time at 
which the association between the ship concerned and the putative associated ship had to exist 
and the fact that in the case of companies it was ownership or control of the shares in the 
company rather than control of the company itself that was relevant to the existence of an 
association. These were matters that were addressed when the Act was amended in 1992. So were 
other possible problems that had not arisen in practice such as the fact that in its original form the 
Act did not appear to allow for a situation where the association was sought to be demonstrated 
in a situation where the ship concerned was owned by a natural person, A, who was the owner of 
the shares in the company that owned the putative associated ship. Whilst this apparently gaping 
lacuna could possibly have been filled by a process of interpretation141 it was more readily dealt 
with by way of an amendment. By the time the amending statute was passed the implementation 
of the associated ship jurisdiction over a reasonably substantial period had highlighted potential 
and actual anomalies; areas where it was appropriate to extend the scope of the jurisdiction as 
well as areas of the Act unrelated to the question of an associated ship where practical experience 
                                                 
141 See Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the Fund comprising the proceeds of the sale of the MV 
Jade Transporter 1987 (2) SA 583 (A) 590. 
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suggested that amendment was necessary. As with the initial formulation of the Act a wide-
ranging debate took place within the ranks of the members of the Maritime Law Association. The 
end result was the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992 (‘the 
Amending Act’), which came into effect from the 1st July 1992.  The amendments brought about 
by the Amending Act brought the associated ship provisions of the Act into their present form. 




 THE AMENDMENTS AND THE PRESENT ASSOCIATED SHIP JURISDICTION 
 
1 BACKGROUND TO THE AMENDMENTS 
 
 The two major innovations of the Act, namely the provisions for the arrest of associated 
ships and the security arrest under section 5(3), proved to be extremely attractive to foreign 
claimants and brought an immediate upsurge in maritime litigation in South Africa. It must be 
emphasised that in most instances the invocation of these provisions posed no problems of 
interpretation or application and - at least from the perspective of claimants, if not from that of 
aggrieved shipowners whose vessels were the targets of such proceedings - provoked no 
particular controversy. However, as noted in the previous chapter certain areas posing potential 
difficulties were identified at an early stage in relation to the associated ship arrest provisions. 
This alone would probably not have prompted any great pressure for the Act to be amended. 
What did was the litigation arising out of the collapse of a single shipping group that occurred at 
a very early stage of the life of the Act.  No less than four vessels were arrested and sold in terms 
of orders granted under section 9 of the Act. The resultant funds in court fell to be distributed in 
accordance with the order of priorities prescribed in section 11 of the Act. The application of 
these provisions in regard to the distribution of funds was highly controversial and hotly 
disputed.
1
  Much of this litigation was around the appropriate treatment of the novel institution of 
associated ships and, as will be seen, it played an important role in bringing about the 
                                                 
1 The three principal reported judgments are Banque Paribas v The Fund Comprising Proceeds of Sale of the m.v. 
‘Emerald Transporter’ 1985 (2) SA 452 (D); Gulf Oil Trading Company and others v the Fund Comprising the 
Proceeds of the Sale of the m.v. ‘Emerald Transporter’: Irving Trust Co. v Gulf Oil Trading Co. and others :The 
Gulf Oil Trading Co and others v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the m.v. ‘Jade Transporter’ 1985 
(4) SA 130 (N) and Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants Against the Fund Comprising of the Proceeds of the 
Sale of the m.v. ‘Jade Transporter’ 1987 (2) SA 583 (A). Related separate issues were canvassed in Petjalis  
Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport Services 1985 (1) SA 787 (C). 
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amendments to the Act that occurred in 1992.2 It is accordingly necessary to make some 
reference to it.   
 
 The order of priorities in the distribution of a fund in court in terms of the Act is prescribed 
under section 11 of the Act. One result of introducing the concept of associated ships was that 
claims against the fund would include not only claims arising from the operation and activities of 
the vessel that had been sold but also claims arising from the operation and activities of other 
vessels in relation to which it was an associated ship. It was accordingly necessary in setting out 
the statutory scheme for the distribution of a fund to deal with situations where the claims against 
the fund were both direct, that is arising from the operations and activities of the vessel itself, and 
indirect, that is claims that had nothing to do with the operations and activities of that vessel but 
were being pursued against the fund because it was an associated ship in relation to the vessels in 
respect of which those claims had arisen. In the result section 11(8) of the Act provided that:- 
 
 ‘Where the fund arises by reason of an action in rem against an associated ship, the 
ranking of claims set out in this section shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 
3(6), apply with regard to claims in respect of the associated ship, and claims in respect of 
the ship concerned shall be paid thereafter in the order set out in this section.’ 
 
 It seems probable that the initial understanding of this section was as clear and simple as 
it appeared to Milne JP in the case of The Berg.
3
 Having set out the section Milne JP went on to 
say:- 
 
‘In my view the meaning of this section is quite clear.  It is that, notwithstanding that s3(6) 
gives the right to a marine claimant to bring an action in rem by the arrest of an associated 
ship instead of the ship in respect of which the marine claim arose, claims of the nature 
described in ss(1) of s11, which lie against the associated ship, are to be paid in preference 
to claims which lie against the associated ship by reason of the provisions of s3(6).  In 
other words, claims which lie directly against the associated ship have preference over 
claims for which it is, as it were, vicariously liable.’
4 
                                                 
2 In terms of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act, 87 of 1992. 
3 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ and others 1984 (4) SA 642 (N). 
4 At 656F-H. 
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Having dealt with another submission Milne JP summarised his conclusion as follows:- 
 
‘... in my view, the ordinary meaning of the words ... [is that] where a ship is sued as an 
associated ship in terms of s3(6), the ranking of claims set out in ss(1) apply (sic) firstly 
with regard to those claims which arise primarily against the associated ship itself and 
only thereafter will claims in respect of its vicarious liability be met.’5 
 
 However, when the proper interpretation of section 11(8) arose in practical circumstances 
where the effect of the interpretation would determine whether and to what extent particular 
claims against funds would be paid the language of the section was placed under the microscope 
and the wording proved not to be entirely felicitous. Notwithstanding that its proper interpretation 
had initially seemed clear it was subsequently noted, somewhat ruefully, that the provisions ‘have 




 In view of the subsequent amendments to the section it is not necessary to expand in detail 
upon the litigation surrounding section 11(8) save to say that the rival contentions revolved 
around three questions. The primary question, although never posed as such, was whether 
section 11(8) provided a comprehensive answer to the issue of the proper ranking of direct and 
indirect claims in all possible situations?
7
 The second question was whether a distinction fell to 
be drawn between associated ship claims brought against sister ships under section 3(7)(a)(i) of 
the Act and those brought against true associated ships under section 3(7)(a)(ii) of the Act, on the 
basis that sister ship claims could be pursued by way of a direct action in personam commenced 
                                                 
5 At 657C-D. 
6 Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 99. 
7 That was clearly the view of Milne JP in ‘The Berg’, supra and it was the view of the Full Bench in Gulf Oil 
Trading Company and others v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the m.v. ‘Emerald Transporter’ 
1985 (4) SA 133 (N) that this was the intention. Howard J said (at 139H): ‘To achieve the apparent object for which 
it was enacted, the subsection should have been made applicable whenever the claims against a fund include an 
enforceable associated ship claim.’ Although that was the apparent intention of the section Howard J concluded (at 
140E-F) that: ‘My construction of s11(8) does not cater for that contingency: it does not render the subsection 
applicable in all cases where the claims against a fund include one or more associated ship claims, and accordingly 
falls short of realising what I conceive to be the object for which the subsection was enacted. As already indicated, 
however, that is a shortcoming that only the Legislature can rectify.’ 
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by the attachment of the vessel ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem, without having 
resort to the associated ship jurisdiction.
8
 The third question was the meaning to be attached to 
the rather cryptic opening words of the section namely: ‘Where the fund arises by reason of an 
action in rem against an associated ship.’ Indeed, it was the cryptic nature of these words that 
largely occasioned the primary problem of whether the section applied in all possible 
circumstances. 
 
 In order to arrive at any reasonably satisfactory solution to the problems occasioned by the 
language of the section resort was had to the principle of interpretation that the court is entitled to 
depart from the literal meaning of words in a section in order to give effect to the legislature’s 
clearly expressed intention.9 However, when the interpretation of section 11(8) came before the 
Appellate Division
10
 it held that a departure from what it described as ‘the literal meaning’ was 
impermissible.11 The result of this decision was to throw the entire question of the distribution of 
                                                 
8 Wilson J had recognised a distinction between the two types of claim for the purpose of  retrospectivity in Banque 
Paribas v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of Sale of the m.v. ‘Emerald Transporter’ 1985 (2) SA 442 (D) 460.   
However, in the appeal from that judgment in Gulf Oil Trading Co. and others v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds 
of the Sale of the m.v. ‘Emerald Transporter’, supra, 141F-J the Full Court rejected the contention that in the ranking 
of claims a distinction fell to be drawn between the two different types of associated ship claims. That was upheld by 
the Appellate Division in Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the Fund Comprising the Proceeds of 
the Sale of the m.v. ‘Jade Transporter’ 1987 (2) SA 583 (A). 
9
 R v Venter 1907 TS 910 at 914-5; Van den Berg v Direkteur van Ekonomiese Sake 1983 (1) SA 106 (A) 117A-B. 
10
 Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants Against the Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the m.v. 
‘Jade Transporter’, supra. 
11 In a passage in the judgment remarkable for its non-literal approach to the ‘literal’ meaning of the preamble 
Corbett CJ said: ‘It was argued by counsel for Summit... that a fund could not properly be described as arising ‘by 
reason of an action in rem’. In my view, there is no substance in this argument. The phrase ‘by reason of’ … 
indicates a causal relationship between the arising of the fund and the action in rem taken against an associated ship 
… It is true that the institution of an action in rem does not, per se, give rise to a fund in the Court. For a fund in the 
Court to be created the Court must make an appropriate order in terms of s 9 for the sale of the ship and the holding 
of the proceeds of the sale as such a fund; and in pursuance thereof the sale must take place and the proceeds duly 
held as a fund in the Court. Plainly the Legislature was aware of this and consequently the words of the preamble to 
s11(8) must be interpreted as contemplating a chain of causation consisting basically of (i) the institution of an action 
in rem by the arrest of an associated ship, (ii) an application to Court in terms of s 9 for the sale of the arrested ship 
and the holding of the proceeds of the sale as a fund in the Court, (iii) an order of court granting the application, (iv) 
the sale of the ship and (v) the holding of the proceeds of the sale as a fund in the Court. Admittedly the precise 
nature of the causal connection between links (i) and (ii) is a matter upon which the subsection is not clear.’ (At 595-
6). On the basis of this very considerable extension of the language of the preamble he went on to say (at 597B-D): ‘I 
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funds into a state of confusion and raise again the spectre that had haunted the dual jurisdiction 
prior to the commencement of the Act of the priority of claims being determined by random 
factors such as the identity of the party seeking an order for the sale of a vessel under section 9 
and the nature of the claim upon which that party founded its application for the sale of a vessel. 
Manifestly this was an intolerable situation and it precipitated the need for the Act to be 
amended. In the process the opportunity was taken to consider all the potential problems that had 
been identified in its operation as well as to build upon its advantages. The result was that in 
1992 substantial amendments were effected to the Act.12 
 
 In the course of making the amendments that were needed to section 11 it was sensible to 
review the entire Act now that it had come into operation and address issues that had arisen in the 
initial years. At the same time possible difficulties that had not yet manifested themselves in 
practice, but had been identified in academic writing and by the principal draftsman of the Act, 
Douglas Shaw QC, in his own book on the subject, could be dealt with and the problems avoided. 
What followed was an overall process of scrutinising the Act and identifying the teething 
problems that had arisen in which once again the Maritime Law Association took the lead. The 
result was a significant revision that not only eliminated some gaps but also broadened and 
extended the entire scope of the associated ship provisions. Each of the problems noted in 
chapter 5 was addressed in the amendments. In addition other amendments were made, either 
specifically to section 3(7) where the associated ship is defined, or elsewhere in the Act in 
                                                                                                                                                              
do not think that a departure from the literal meaning of the preamble to s11(8) is justified. Giving the words their 
literal meaning does not lead to any absurdity. It brings about a ‘queuing’ in the very circumstances obviously 
intended by the Legislature, i.e. where a fund in the Court arises ‘by reason of’ (i.e. in the manner indicated above) 
an action in rem against an associated ship.  Counsel for Summit sought to argue that the literal interpretation gave 
s11(8) ‘no practical field of operation’. I have difficulty in accepting this … Analysis shows that the so-called 
absurdity lies not in the application of s11(8) within its stated field of operation, but in the fact that the statute does 
not provide for the same system of queuing where a fund arises in other circumstances, such as where the ship is sold 
in pursuance of an action in rem to enforce a direct claim or an action in personam; or indeed whenever there are 
associated claims against a fund.  It may well be that in this regard s11(8) is deficient but, as I have shown, it is not 
the function of the Court to remedy a casus omissus. If remedial action be needed, then that must be taken by the 
Legislature.’ 
12 By way of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992 which came into effect on the 1st 
July 1992. A minor remedial amendment was effected later that year by section 21 of the General Law Amendment 
Act, 139 of 1992 and there have been subsequent amendments not bearing upon the topic under discussion in 1997, 
1998. An amendment in 2003 is referred to below. 
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provisions having a direct impact on the scope of the associated ship jurisdiction. Each of these 
amendments is dealt with below and placed in its context in relation to the associated ship 
provisions generally. The first is one that does not bear directly on the associated ship 
jurisdiction, but illustrates how far South Africa had travelled beyond the Arrest Convention on 
the road to reform.  
 
2. EXPANSION OF THE LIST OF MARITIME CLAIMS 
 
 Jurisdiction can never be divorced from the claims that are capable of being pursued under 
that jurisdiction.  Any expansion of the list of claims cognizable in admiralty has the result that 
the range of operation of the associated ship jurisdiction is extended. The revision of the Act 
brought with it a substantial expansion of the claims defined as maritime claims in section 1(1) of 
the Act. The original list of maritime claims13 had overlapped substantially with the list of claims 
in article 1(1) of the Arrest Convention, although usually more broadly phrased.14 The source of 
some of the departures from the Arrest Convention is often to be found in the claims giving rise 
to admiralty jurisdiction in various parts of the United Kingdom.15 Some omissions were 
                                                 
13 Then in s 1(ii) of the Act. 
14 This was deliberate.  See para. 7.1 of the Law Commission Report.  See m.v. Heavy Metal : Belfry Marine Limited 
v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA), para. 43, 1096H-1097B. 
15 In terms of s 20(2) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 and in the case of Scotland in terms of s 47 of the 




 and other areas were clarified.
17
 It is unclear whether in any respect the jurisdiction 
under the Act is narrower than that provided for in terms of the Arrest Convention.18   
  
 A comparison of the list of maritime claims in the Act with the list of claims in article 1 of 
the Arrest Convention shows that from the outset it was intended that the jurisdiction conferred 
under the Act would be more extensive than that under the Arrest Convention. Perhaps the most 
significant extension was the inclusion of marine insurance, including claims by or against P & I 
Clubs.19 With the 1992 amendments and the addition of six further claims the jurisdiction was 
further expanded. Thus it now includes claims arising out of or relating to agreements for the sale 
of a ship or a share in a ship or any other agreement with regard to the ownership, possession, 
delivery, employment or earnings of a ship;
20
 disputes concerning containers and any agreement 
relating to any container;21 salvage relating to any aircraft;22 claims by ship’s agents, clearing and 
                                                 
16 For example disputes about the possession of a vessel were included in section 1(1)(ii)(a) of the Act although they 
are not included in article 1(1)(o) of the Arrest Convention.  See Berlingieri, Arrest of Ships (4th ed.) para. 52.261, 
83. They were however historically part of the admiralty jurisdiction and part of the admiralty jurisdiction in England 
and Wales. Shaw, op cit, 10. Marine insurance was included on the basis that it is a maritime claim in the USA and 
Scotland. Shaw, op cit, 20.  
17 For example a claim relating to pollution was expressly included under section 1(1)(ii)(w) whereas it may be 
debatable whether this is included under article 1(1)(a) of the Arrest Convention. Berlingieri, op cit, para. 52.199, 57.  
Shaw , op cit, 23. 
18 The only possibility is that in terms of article 1(1)(f) of the Arrest Convention the claim is one for ‘loss of or 
damage to goods including baggage carried in any ship’.  Section 1(1)(ii)(g) of the Act in its original form refers to 
‘any claim for loss of or damage to goods (including the baggage and personal belongings of the Master or crew of a 
ship) carried or which ought to have been carried in a ship.’ It is unclear whether that includes a claim by a passenger 
in respect of baggage. The amended section 1(1)(iv)(g) refers to a claim for ‘loss of or damage to goods (including 
the baggage and the personal belongings of the Master, officers or seamen of a ship) carried or which ought to have 
been carried in a ship, whether such claim arises out of any agreement or otherwise.’ The initial language of the 
section appeared to exclude passengers’ baggage and the amended section was directed at including it.  Whether it 
achieves that aim is debatable. The explanation that the inclusion of ‘the’ in the original section is a typographical 
error (Shaw, op cit, 13) is probably correct although it is not clear that its omission would have resolved the 
difficulty. 
19 In terms of section 1(1)(ii)(r) of claims relating to marine insurance or any policy of marine insurance and claims 
by or against P&I Clubs. 
20 Para (c) of the definition of ‘maritime claim’ in s 1(1). 
21 Para (i). The effect of this provision is to dispose of the difficulties that arose in The ‘River Rima’ [1988] 2 All ER 
641 (HL); [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep. 193 (HL). 
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forwarding agents, brokers, attorneys and other advisers relating to ships.23 The scope of claims 
in respect of the remuneration of the Master and crew of a vessel was extended to include 
expressly all types of employment benefit funds and the contributions to those funds.24  astly the 
amendments added claims arising out of piracy, sabotage or terrorism relating to property capable 
of being arrested in proceedings in rem or to persons on any ship
25
 and added the general 
provision that a maritime claim included:- 
 
‘Any other matter which by virtue of its nature or subject matter is a marine or maritime 
matter, the meaning of the expression marine or maritime matter not being limited by 
reason of the matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs.’26. 
 
 This considerable extension of the list of maritime claims that may give rise to an arrest or 
an attachment ad fundandam confirmandam jurisdictionem of a vessel means that the Act departs 
even more significantly from the terms of the Arrest Convention than had originally been the 
case. The initial process of departure from the Convention evidenced by the Act in its original 
form has been substantially extended by the amendments to the list of maritime claims in the Act. 
In doing so the amendments anticipated in some respects the extension of the list of maritime 
claims embodied in the 1999 Arrest Convention.
27
 In other respects particularly by making the 
list of claims open-ended, a matter on which agreement could not be reached at the Conference,28 
it adopted a clear stance on which there is no international consensus. 
                                                                                                                                                              
22 Para (k) 
23 Para (p) 
24 Para (s) This overcame the difficulties illustrated by the decision in Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust 
Co. of Chicago v Greek Seamen’s Pension Fund 1989 (2) SA 515 (D). 
25 Para (bb). 
26 Para (ee). 
27 The International Convention on Arrest of Ships adopted at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva on the 12th 
March 1999.  The text of the 1999 Convention is set out in Berlingieri, op cit, 428-433. 
28 Berlingieri op cit, para. 99.10, 10 and 99.16-22, 55-6. 
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 What are we to make of these substantial departures from the provisions of the Arrest 
Convention in the drafting of the Act and the significant extensions of those departures in the 
1992 amendments? In particular, what is their significance insofar as the associated ship arrest 
provisions are concerned? The questions are not academic as is demonstrated by the reliance 
placed on the Arrest Convention in the judgments in the three most controversial cases dealing 
with associated ships namely the Heavy Metal
29
 the Fortune 22
30
 and the Cape Courage
31
. Those 
decisions will be considered in greater detail in due course. It is sufficient at this stage to submit 
that the significant extension of the list of maritime claims in the Act, embodying substantial 
departures in many areas from the Arrest Convention, demonstrates that reliance on the Arrest 
Convention in construing the Act is something that should be done only with caution and then 
only where there can be no realistic doubt that the provision in question is both linguistically and 
textually based on the Arrest Convention and where the context makes it clear that the legislature 
intended the Act to have effect in accordance with the common understanding of the Convention. 
It is one thing to have resort to the jurisprudence in other countries arising out of the application 
of the Arrest Convention where one of the maritime claims described in the Act in the same or 
similar terms to the description of one of the claims in the Arrest Convention is being interpreted. 
That is hardly controversial. What is controversial is when the Convention is taken as a starting 
point for the consideration and understanding of provisions that are either wholly novel or at the 
least involve a substantial departure from the terms of the Convention and the underlying 
principles that it embodies, merely because of perceived similarities of language but absent a 
similarity of context. 
 
 In the light of the obvious intention to make the ambit of the admiralty jurisdiction 
conferred upon courts in South Africa substantially wider than that conferred under the Arrest 
Convention or legislation directed at implementing that Convention, it is submitted that it is a 
                                                 
29 m.v. Heavy Metal : Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Limited and others 1998 (4) SA 479 (C) 
and m.v. Heavy Metal : Belfrey Marine Limited v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA). 
30 m.v. Fortune 22: Owners of the m.v. Fortune 22 v Keppel Corporation Limited 1999 (1) SA 162 (C). 
31 mv Cape Courage: Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd and another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA). 
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dangerous exercise for courts to see parallels between the provisions of the Act governing the 
novel institution of the associated ship and provisions of the Arrest Convention. As has already 
been pointed out32 the notion that the associated ship is merely an extension of the sister ship 
provisions of the Arrest Convention does not bear close scrutiny. There is accordingly no 
foundation for the suggestion that in construing the nature and ambit of the associated ship 
provisions of the Act guidance can safely be sought from jurisprudence arising from the 
implementation of the Arrest Convention. A more subtle danger arises where a provision in the 
Act has its linguistic origin in the Convention33 but the overall statutory context under the Act 
differs from that in the Convention. An endeavour to give the South African provision not only 
the same meaning but the same effect as the Convention avoids the necessary task of construing 
the Act in order to ascertain its meaning in South Africa. Had it been the intention simply to 
implement the Arrest Convention in South Africa there were simpler ways of doing so and the 
associated ship jurisdiction would not have come into existence. A construction of the provisions 
dealing with associated ships that seeks to maintain harmony between the provisions of the 
Convention governing arrests generally and sister ship arrests in particular and those of the Act 
governing associated ship arrests starts from a failure to recognise the profound differences 
between the two and serves to confine the latter jurisdiction in a straitjacket not of the 
legislature’s making.  
 
 Whilst the range of claims that are recognised as maritime claims in terms of the Act and 
hence are potentially enforceable by way of an action in rem against an associated ship does not 
directly impact upon the associated ship provisions themselves, it is submitted that it nonetheless 
provides an indication of the approach that should be taken to the relevance of the Arrest 
Convention in relation to those provisions. What is unquestionable is that from its inception the 
Act went well beyond the Arrest Convention in establishing and defining the scope of the 
                                                 
32 In Chapter 4, ante. 
33 Such as section 3(8) which provides that property may not be arrested and security therefor given more than once 
in respect of the same maritime claim by the same claimant.  This corresponds with the opening words of Article 
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associated ship jurisdiction. It also went further than the provisions of the English Administration 
of Justice Act 195634 and the Supreme Court Act 198135. This is a clear indication that the Act is 
not to be seen as an attempt to introduce by statute the provisions of an international convention, 
without acceding thereto.
36
 The compromise of the Arrest Convention, represented by its sister 
ship arrest provisions, which permitted the arrest of either the particular ship or a sister ship, is 
wholly circumvented in South Africa in all cases (save those where reliance is placed upon a 
maritime lien not arising from the personal liability of the owner of the particular ship), because 
of the ability to attach any sister ship ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem in an action 
in personam against the owner.
37
 It is beyond question that the true associated ship is an 
innovation that departs fundamentally from conventional principles of company law and has no 
direct points of contact with anything in the Arrest Convention. In those circumstances it is 
submitted that an attempt to analyse the true associated ship provisions conformably with the 
Arrest Convention is a process for which there is no warrant.   
 
3. AMENDMENTS TO THE ASSOCIATED SHIP PROVISIONS 
 
 There were significant amendments to both provisions of the Act dealing with associated 
ships. The first was the amendment of section 3(6) of the Act which provides for the institution of 
an action in rem brought by the arrest of an associated ship. In its original form the section had 
excluded three types of maritime claim from those that could be pursued by way of an action in 
                                                                                                                                                              
3(3) of the Arrest Convention. This will be dealt with in the examination of the decision in MV Fortune 22, Owners 
of the MV Fortune 22 v Keppel Corporation Ltd 1999 (1) SA 162 (C) in Chapter 8. 
34 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c46 
35 1981 c54 
36 As had been the case with the Hague Rules, which were given statutory effect in terms of sections 307 to 310 of 
the Merchant Shipping Act, 57 of 1951 and occurred with the Hague-Visby rules in terms of the schedule to the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986. 
37 Shaw, op cit, 37. This is so irrespective of whether there is some restriction in regard to proceeding in rem against 
both the particular ship and a sister ship. 
 198
rem against an associated ship. Those were the claims in section 1(1)(ii)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act 
which were:- 
 
‘(a) any claim relating to the ownership or possession of a ship; 
(b) any claim relating to the ownership of a share in a ship or to any dispute between co-
owners of a ship as to the ownership, possession, employment or earnings of that ship;  
(c) any claim in respect of a mortgage, hypothecation, right of retention or pledge of or 
charge on, a ship.’ 
 
Some of these restrictions were now removed so as to extend the possible range of maritime 
claims in respect of which such an action could be brought. Others were preserved and in one, 
probably academic, respect extended. The restriction was preserved only in respect of the claim 
set out in paragraph (d) of the definition relating to:- 
 
‘Any mortgage, hypothecation, right of retention, pledge or other charge on or of a ship 
and any bottomry or respondentia bond.’ 
 
Bottomry and respondentia bonds are virtually unknown in modern shipping practice but they 
had not previously been excluded from the ambit of the associated ship arrest. This was probably 
an oversight and the amendment resolved that oversight. To that extent this extension of the 
restriction is probably only of academic relevance. The excluded claims are those that afford the 
claimant not only a claim sounding in money but also a right of security over the vessel in respect 
of which the claim arose. To that extent it can be said that it is logical to require that these claims 
should not be capable of being pursued save against the vessel in respect of which the claims lie 
and which constitutes the security for the claim. The notion of transferring the security that a 
claimant enjoys over vessel A to an associated ship, vessel B, is one so fraught with obvious 
practical problems, such as how such security would rank in relation to existing security over 
vessel B, that the legislature rightly drew back from allowing associated ship proceedings in 
these cases. 
 
 What is of greater importance is the extension of the possible scope of the associated ship 
arrest to include certain claims originally excluded, although it is unclear how some claims 
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falling under these heads can be pursued in a satisfactory fashion by way of an associated ship 
arrest and consequent action in rem. For example it is now possible to pursue a claim relating to 
ownership or possession of a ship by way of an associated ship arrest. However it is difficult to 
see how a South African court can determine a claim for possession of a vessel that is not within 
its jurisdiction and under its control by way of a claim against an entirely different vessel. More 
sensibly therefore this extension must be taken to have effect in relation only to monetary claims 
arising from questions of ownership or possession of a ship, such as a claim for damages arising 
from late delivery of a vessel under an agreement of sale. In principle there is no reason why such 
claims should not be pursued in this way. With claims between co-owners it is doubtful whether 
the change is of any moment. If the claim relates to the terms of the registration of the vessel in 
the South African register there will be no need for an arrest as the register is located in South 
Africa. If one is looking at the position in relation to a foreign register a South African court 
could not exercise jurisdiction effectively. It will therefore only be claims of a monetary character 
against the owner of the majority interest in the vessel that can be pursued meaningfully by way 
of an action commenced by the arrest of an associated ship. However in order to make use of this 
remedy it will be necessary to show that the claim is one that lies against the owner of the ship 
and in a situation of co-ownership that seems to be impossible. The change may therefore be one 
more of form than substance.   
 
 The second and more significant amendment related to the language of section 3(7), which 
was so substantially amended that it is in effect a new section. It reads as follows:- 
 
‘(7)(a) For the purposes of subsection (6) an associated ship means a ship, other than the 
ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose:- 
 (i) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by the person who was the owner 
of the ship concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose; or 
(ii) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the 
company which owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose; or 
(iii) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company which is controlled 
by a person who owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the 
ship concerned, when the maritime claim arose. 
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a):- 
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(i) ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if the majority in number of, 
or voting rights in respect of, or the greater part, in value of, the shares in the ships are 
owned by the same person; 
(ii) a person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, 
to control the company; 
(iii) a company includes any other juristic person and any body of persons, irrespective of 
whether or not any interest therein consists of shares; 
(c) If at any time a ship was the subject of a charterparty the charterer or sub-charterer, as 
the case may be, shall for the purposes of subsection (6) and this subsection be deemed to 
be the owner of the ship concerned in respect of any relevant maritime claim for which 
the charterer or the sub-charterer, and not the owner is alleged to be liable.’ 
 
 A comparison between this provision and its predecessor demonstrates that they are 
significantly different. Whilst the original notion may simply have been to fill some potential 
gaps and clarify one or two problematic areas, the amendments not only address these issues but 
clearly and deliberately extend the area of operation of the associated ship arrest provisions.  At 
the same time there was a substantial extension of the scope of the security arrest provisions in 
section 5(3) of the Act. All this is indicative of the fact that both the associated ship and the 
security arrest were provisions that had been welcomed within the international maritime 
community, at least by claimants and their underwriters. Whilst no doubt those affected by their 
application viewed them with a jaundiced eye there was nothing to indicate that the 
implementation of this broad and generous jurisdiction had an adverse affect on the willingness 
of vessels to call at South African ports. Nor had the application of the jurisdiction given rise to 
any problems that would call for its reconsideration. In those circumstances the opportunity was 
taken to extend the scope of the associated ship provisions. The different ways in which greater 




(a) Control of the ship-owning company 
 As noted earlier39 the control which was originally relevant to establishing whether a ship 
was an associated ship was ownership or control of the shares in the company owning the 
                                                 
38 There is a helpful article on the amendments by H Staniland, Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novi:Associated Ship 
Arrest in South Africa, 1995 LCMLQ 561. 
39 Chapter 5, ante. 
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putative associated ship. Several judgments had pointed out that control of the shares of a 
company is a different matter from control of the company itself.  In addition what was required 
was control of all the shares in the company. Whilst this protected minority shareholders it also 
provided a simple means for avoiding the provision entirely by vesting a single share in someone 
other than the person in control of the company. 
 
 The amendment directly addressed all of these problems. In cases where the ship concerned 
or the associated ship are owned by a company or both of them are owned by companies - which 
is the normal situation - it makes control of the relevant company the touchstone for liability. In 
other words ownership or control of the shares in the company becomes merely an indication of 
where actual control of the company lies. However, it is no longer decisive. That is a helpful 
amendment as far as applicants are concerned because in many cases it is not feasible to discover 
the identity of the person who owns or controls the shares in a ship-owning company. The 
principal reasons for this are that in many jurisdictions there is no access to the share register of 
the company or the shares are bearer instruments or are held by nominees. However, actual 
control can often be discerned from outward matters ascertainable from an examination of the 
trading operations of the company in question. However, this must not be taken too far. The 
amendment rendered applicable the statement made in one of the earlier cases40 that the control 
contemplated in section 3(7):- 
 
‘...relates to overall control, such as is exercisable for instance by a majority shareholder 
or his nominee, of the assets and destiny of the company; it does not refer to its day to 
day management and administration.’ 
 
                                                 
40
 EE Sharp & Sons Limited v m.v. Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) 327H-328A. Hofmeyr, op cit, 70 is critical of this 
decision on the grounds that the factual basis upon which it was held that there was an association was inconsistent 
with this passage. The facts showed that the same individual was the president and director of the two companies and 
could by his signature bind the companies. There was no suggestion that the person concerned held these offices as a 
nominee or other than by virtue of his interest in the companies. On the face of things it was a far clearer case of 
association than the ground accepted in both the court below and by the majority in the SCA in the Heavy Metal, 
which was that a person who expressly stated that he was a nominee and nothing more than a post box in relation to 
the two companies controlled both of them. Hofmeyr (at 71-72) seems to be critical of the latter reasoning as well.   
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 In one other respect the amendment brought about a significant change in the legal position. 
The previous section had referred to ‘the shares in the company’ and this was construed as 
meaning ‘all the shares in the company’.41 The court had gone on to say that:- 
 
‘That interpretation accords with the policy of the Act regarding associated ships. An 
associated ship may be arrested instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim 
arose and it then becomes liable to be sold in terms of s9 of the Act. The Legislature 
could never have intended that a person owning shares in the company which owns the 
alleged associated ship, but who is a stranger to the company which owns the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose, should be deprived of his interest by its arrest 
as an associated ship.’(Emphasis added) 
 
 The amendments not only render this view academic but contradict the court’s perception 
of the intention of the legislature insofar as the policy underlying the section is concerned. As the 
section is now concerned solely with control of the company it disregards the position of persons 
holding minority interests in the company, whether one is dealing with the ship concerned or an 
associated ship. Accordingly if A controls two ship-owning companies at the times relevant for a 
consideration of the question of association it will not matter that a minority shareholder in the 
company owning the associated ship has no interest in the company owning the ship concerned. 
Such a person can now clearly be deprived of his or her interest in the associated ship under the 
new provision notwithstanding that they have no connection with or responsibility for the default 
by the ship concerned.   
 
 The effect of this change is to simplify the task of the arresting creditor and to extend the 
scope of the jurisdiction. Hitherto the arresting creditor had to show that the companies owning 
the two vessels had the same shareholders although they could hold their shares in different 
proportions. Thus in the case of two companies A and B, if one postulated that the shareholding 
in A was held by X as to 60% and Y as to 40% and the reverse prevailed in relation to B, the one 
company would be controlled by X and the other by Y, although the vessels would be held to be 
associated. The amended section avoids this possibility, which is probably fairly unusual in 
                                                 
41




, by concentrating on the person in whom the power of control vests and providing that 
if the same person controls both companies the association is established notwithstanding the 
presence of minority shareholders in either company. The effect of rendering the presence of 
minority shareholders irrelevant is probably to extend the scope for associated ship arrests 
especially as in the example given above it would frequently be possible to contend that X and Y 
jointly controlled both companies. However it does raise the possibility of a constitutional 
challenge to the associated ship jurisdiction on the basis that it involves an arbitrary deprivation 
of the property of the minority shareholder. That is a topic that will need to be addressed when 
dealing with the relationship between the associated ship arrest provisions and the rights that now 





 Apart from the possible impact that the amendment could have upon parties holding a 
minority interest in ship-owing companies the amendment had the potential to create an 
association that would not have existed prior to its coming into force. That provided a substantial 
reason for it to be held that the amendments were not retrospective in effect. In The Pericles GC
44
 
Corbett CJ said that:- 
 
‘... it seems to me that if the amending Act of 1992 were to be applied to the maritime 
claims which appellant seeks to enforce it would operate in a manner which prejudiced 
shipowners by creating burdens or obligations that did not exist before.’ 
 
He went on to illustrate how this could occur as a result of the test for association being changed 
to a consideration of the control of the company instead of the ownership or control of the shares 
in the company, by way of the following example. 
                                                 
42 I have come across one situation where a European shipping line and a line operating in South East Asia undertook 
a number of joint services the vessels for which were owned by companies in which they each owned shares but 
always depending on the location of the joint operation, so that in the European operations the European line owned 
the majority stake in the ship-owning companies and in the case of the Asian operations the position was reversed.  
43 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act. 
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‘X (the person concerned) owns all the shares in company A which in turn owns ship No. 
1. Ship No. 2 is owned by company B, in which X has a minor (as to number of shares), 
but controlling, shareholding. Prior to the coming into effect of the amending Act in 1992 
(but after the coming into effect of the Act on 1 November 1983) an event occurs giving 
rise to a maritime claim in respect of ship No. 1, thus causing it to become the guilty ship. 
After the amending Act has come into effect the claimant applies to arrest ship No. 2 as 
an associated ship. If the Act and the original definition apply, ship No. 2 cannot be 
arrested because at the time when the claim arose X did not own or control the shares in 
B company. If, on the other hand, the amending Act and the new definition were to apply, 
ship No. 2 could be arrested because at the time the action commenced X controlled B 
company.’45  
 
The example was given to illustrate how a new burden could be placed upon a shipowner and 
how vested rights could be adversely affected if the amendments were to be given retrospective 
effect. The conclusion that the amendments did not operate retrospectively was accordingly 
inevitable.46 
 
(b) Majority ownership of the shares in a ship 
 
 The original section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act followed the wording of article 3.2 of the Arrest 
Convention in deeming ships to be owned by the same persons if all the shares in the ship were 
owned by the same persons. This referred to the practice of dividing the ownership of a vessel 
into shares47 and had the effect that the two would be regarded as associated ships, provided the 
                                                                                                                                                              
44
 National Iranian Tanker Co v The Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A), 484G-H. 
45 At 484I-485B. 
46 It appears from the facts set out in the judgment in the Pericles GC that the application was squarely based upon 
the amended provisions of the Act.  A reading of the facts suggests that it was possible that the Pericles GC was an 
associated ship under the original provisions in respect of the two ships concerned, but that the applicant had 
insufficient information available to it to demonstrate that fact. 
47 The origin of the practice may lie in Italian maritime states as a way of sharing the costs of building and equipping 
ships. According to Transport Canada’s website www.tc.gc.ca/Marine Safety/Ships-and-operations-
standards/FAQ.htm#20  its origin is obscure. The use of 64 shares may be explained by a convenient adoption of the 
binary system or by the fact that most vessels had 64 ribs or as a result of an Elizabethan tax.  Whatever the origins 
of the practice it is usual to register ships in many jurisdictions having an English heritage in 64 shares. See for 
example section 15(1)(a) of the Ship Registration Act 58 of 1998. In Italy it is 24 shares and in some countries 100 
shares.  Coles R, Ship Registration: Law and Practice, 4th Ed. (2002), para 1.26, p 7. 
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same individuals or entities were owners of the shares in both ships. As in the case of control of 
the two ship-owning companies it did not matter if X held the majority of the shares in ship A 
and Y the majority in ship B, provided that all the shares in the two ships were owned by X and 
Y.  
 
 The amendment to section 3(7)(b)(i) changed this by altering the basis for determining 
whether vessels are associated. Ships are now deemed to be owned by the same persons (the use 
of the plural appears to be deliberate) if those persons own the majority in number of the shares 
in the ships. That resolves the question that could arise under the original section where 
ownership of all the shares in the vessel had to lie, albeit not necessarily in the same proportions, 
with the same persons. In the example given above if a third shareholder Z is interposed in either 
company, provided X and Y continue to own the majority of the shares in both vessels they will 
be deemed to be the owners of both for the purpose of association. Once again that is an 
amendment that favours claimants and makes an associated ship arrest easier, although the 
instances where the section may have to be invoked are likely to be few and far between.48 If the 
section is to be invoked it is submitted that what is required is that a person or persons own the 
majority of the shares in the ship, in other words if the shares in the ship are divided into 64 
shares as is customary they must own 33 or more. The section does not speak of the majority 
owner of shares but of owning the majority in number of the shares. One does not do that if one 
owns 32 or fewer shares in the ship.49  
                                                 
48 The writer has not encountered a situation where this section came into play and there is no reported case where it 
was applied.  
49 The issue arises because of the rather odd example given by Marais JA in MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Maritime Ltd v 
Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA) 1110, para 6 where he said: ‘For example, if x was the sole 
owner of ship A (the guilty ship) and there is another ship, B, in which there are 64 shares of which x owns 30, y 20, 
and z 10, ship B in its entirety is deemed to be owned by x even although it is not in fact so owned.  It seems clear 
that dominance of ownership in a situation of divided ownership, or dominance of control in such a situation, or 
dominance in the relative values of respective shareholdings, is considered to be the justification for equating the 
situations.’ It appears that there is a typographical error and that he intended to refer to x owning 34 shares not 30 
shares. If he meant that ownership of 30 shares suffices to bring the section into play in a situation where there are 64 
shares or even only 60 shares, he was, with respect, incorrect.  
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 However the section now goes on to speak of the majority voting rights in respect of the 
shares in the ships or the greater part in value of the shares in the ships. This seems to be 
anomalous as it is the ownership interest in the ship that is expressed as being divided into shares 
and this interest that is being dealt with in the section. It is difficult to conceive of a situation 
where those interests are expressed in terms of voting rights or with different values and it is hard 
to avoid the impression that elements of rights attaching to shares in a company have been 
permitted to creep into a section dealing with an entirely different type of share. If, by way of 
example, the provisions of section 15 of the South African Ship Registration Act, 58 of 1988 or 
section 23 of the Canada Shipping Act, 198550 are examined they cannot be reconciled with the 
idea that the shares in a ship applicable in relation to registration could be shares giving different 
voting rights or shares having different values. That latter notion appears more compatible with a 
corporate structure in which shares of different classes enjoy different voting rights. 
 
(c) When must the association exist? 
 
 The potential difficulties relating to the relevant times when ownership or control of the 
ship concerned and the associated ship had to exist were resolved by the amendments. In relation 
to the ship concerned the amendments now stated expressly what had in any event been the 
accepted construction, namely that the relevant date is the date upon which the claim arose.51 In 
regard to the associated ship the relevant date at which to determine either ownership of the ship 
or control of the company owning the ship is clearly stated to be the date of the commencement 
of the action. It is submitted, for reasons that will be discussed later in analysing the present 
requirements of the action in rem against the associated ship, that this will be the date of the 
                                                 
50 R.S., 1985, c, S-9. Section 53 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 [2001, c. 26] is to the same effect. 
51 As to when a claim arises see MV Forum Victory: Den Norske Bank ASA v Hans K Madsen CV and others (Fund 
constituting the proceeds of the sale of the mv Forum Victory) 2001 (3) SA 529 (SCA) and mv Cape Courage: 
Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd and another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA) and the further discussion below. 
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vessel’s actual or deemed arrest
52
. This latter amendment gives effect to the purpose of the 
section, which is to make available to creditors property owned or under the control of the party 
that owned or controlled the owner of the ship concerned. 
 
 The manner in which the section is structured with its emphatic statements that it is 
ownership or control of the company owning the ship concerned at the time the claim arose and 
ownership or control of the company owning associated ship at the time of the commencement of 
the action that gives rise to an association serves to identify the key dates and finally laid to rest 
another issue that arose from the terms of section 3(6). That section provides that an action in rem 
may be instituted by the arrest of an associated ship ‘instead of’ the ship concerned. The use of 
this expression, when read in the light of the provisions of section 3(4), founded an argument that 
at the time that it is sought to arrest the associated ship there must be at least a notional 
possibility that the ship concerned could, if it came into a South African port, itself be subject to 
arrest in respect of the claim. This argument had been upheld in the court below in the Fayrouz 
IV but was rejected on appeal53. In the High Court in the Heavy Metal that decision was 
followed
54
 and it was endorsed on appeal
55
. Farlam AJA laid stress on the fact that each sub-
section is couched in the present tense when it speaks of ownership or control of the owner of the 
associated ship but in the past tense when it deals with the same matters in relation to the ship 
concerned. That was rightly held to be a decisive indication by the legislature that it is 
                                                 
52 Section 1(2)(iii) of the Act provides that an action shall for any relevant purpose commence by the service of any 
process by which that action is instituted; by the issue of any process for the institution of an action in rem and by the 
giving of security or an undertaking as contemplated in s3(10)(a). It is submitted that there cannot be different dates 
of commencement for the same purpose and therefore that a choice must be made as to the correct date for any 
particular purpose. As in terms of s 3(5) an action in rem is instituted by the arrest within the area of jurisdiction of 
the court concerned of property against or in respect of which the claim lies it is submitted that the date of service of 
the process instituting the action, which in an action in rem coincides with the date of arrest, either because the court 
has authorised the arrest or because the warrant of arrest cannot be issued unless a summons has also been issued 
(Admiralty Rule 4(3)), will be the relevant date for the purpose of association.  
53  See October International Navigation Inc v mv Fayrouz IV 1988 (4) SA 675 (N) 678E. 
54 MV Heavy Metal: Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Ltd and others 1998 (4) SA 479 (C) 484G-
487I. 
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unnecessary for it still to be possible to pursue an action in rem against the ship concerned in 




 In the result it matters not that the ship concerned no longer exists or that it has changed 
hands since the claim arose. This is a construction that is most favourable to claimants as it 
means that they can still pursue their claims even if the ship is lost or has been scrapped or sold. 
In those circumstances they are no longer left with a meaningless claim against a company that 
no longer has any asset or may even no longer exist. Previously even if their claim gave rise to a 
maritime lien that was of little use if the vessel had been sunk or scrapped. The advantages 
conferred on claimants by the associated ship jurisdiction are starkly manifested in such 
situations. 
 
(d) What is a company? 
 
 In considering the potential difficulties presented by the associated ship provisions as 
originally enacted one of the issues identified was the possibility that ships could be owned by 
companies that did not have a share capital. Also there was the possibility that it could be owned 
by some other form of corporate entity such as the close corporation or a corporation established 
by charter. Whilst in South Africa a trust is not a corporate body57 it is possible that under 
different legal regimes it would be regarded as such
58
. In order to make the associated ship 
provisions applicable to all forms of corporate ownership of ships section 3(7)(b)(iii) introduced 
                                                                                                                                                              
55
 MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Maritime Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA), paras 48-51.  
56 See MV Ivory Tirupati:MV Ivory Tirupati and another v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka BULOG) 2003 (3) SA 104 
(SCA), para 40 and the discussion in Hofmeyr, op cit, 68-69. 
57
 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO 1993 (1) SA 353 (A) 370. 
58 One must also bear in mind other similar but by no means identical legal institutions such as the German stifftung 
or the foundation that is a prominent feature of certain Scandinavian legal systems. 
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a provision that a company includes ‘any other juristic person and any body of persons’ 
irrespective of whether any interest therein consists of shares. 
 
 This provision gives a more extensive meaning to the word company than it would 
otherwise bear59 if viewed exclusively through the prism of South African company law. It does 
however ensure that whatever form of corporate ownership may be adopted in relation to a ship it 
will still be possible to apply the associated ship provisions in relation thereto. In the result the 
associated ship jurisdiction will not be limited by parochial considerations of what constitutes a 
company but is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any form of corporate ownership. This is 
wholly consistent with its intended purpose. 
 
(e) Deemed ownership of the chartered vessel 
 
 In its original form section 3(7)(c) had provided that the charterer or sub-charterer by 
demise was deemed to be the owner of the ship concerned in respect of claims that lay against the 
charterer rather than the owner of the vessel. This enabled parties having such claims to find 
other vessels owned by the charterer or owned by companies controlled by the charterer and 
arrest those vessels as associated ships in respect of their claims. It did not entitle them to arrest 
the ship concerned. The section was undoubtedly modelled on the Arrest Convention
60
 although, 
unlike the Convention, it did not permit the arrest of the ship subject to the demise charter but 
only the associated ship. Shaw suggested
61
 that there was an argument that the reference to the 
owner in section 3(4) of the Act, which permits the vessel in respect of which the maritime claim 
arose to be arrested if ‘the owner’ of the ship would be liable in an action in personam to the 
                                                 
59 Contrary to the view expressed by Hofmeyr, Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa, 69 this does 
not make it a deeming provision unlike the provisions of sections 3(7)(b)(i) and (iii). Not every definition is a 
deeming provision. However that may be immaterial as it is clearly conclusive of what constitutes a company for the 
purposes of these provisions  
60 Article 3.4. Shaw, op cit, 40-41. 
61 Shaw, op cit, 32-33. 
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claimant in respect of that claim, is capable of including the demise charterer. The basis for the 
argument is that in common parlance the demise charterer is frequently referred to as being pro 
hac vice the owner of the vessel. However, as he recognised, the language of section 3(7) that 
clearly drew a distinction between the owner and the demise charterer of the vessel militated 
against that construction and it is doubtful whether such an argument would have succeeded. The 
question was resolved when section 1(3) was introduced into the Act62 with effect from the 20th 
June 2003. This provided that for the purposes of an action in rem a charterer by demise is 
deemed to be, or to have been, the owner of the ship for the period of the charter. It follows that it 
is unnecessary to consider the arguments for and against the proposition that a demise charterer is 
encompassed in the concept of an owner for the purposes of section 3(4) of the Act. It is safe to 
proceed on the basis that in its original form when the Act referred to the owner of the vessel it 
did not include the demise charterer. The amendment to introduce section 1(3) with its deeming 
provision appears to recognise that this was the case and deliberately sets out to remedy it.63 
 
 Section 3(7)(c) itself was amended in 1992 to remove the original limitation to demise 
charterers and extend the scope of the deeming provision to include all charterers. This is a 
considerable extension as time and voyage charters are far more numerous than charters by 
demise. The extension should be of assistance in two circumstances. The first is where the 
charterer is the carrier of the cargo on board the vessel and the cargo is lost or damaged. The 
second is in relation to supplies to the vessel such as bunkers and stores for which the charterer 
may bear financial responsibility under the charterparty. The unpaid creditor in each instance is 
now able to seek out a vessel owned or controlled by the charterer or the person who controlled 
the charterer in order to arrest it and enforce the claim. The underlying principle remains the 
same namely that the party that stands behind the debtor should be the party behind the company 
that owns the associated ship. The fact that the extension applies to all charterers is an indication 
                                                 
62 By way of section 10 of the Sea Documents Act, 65 of 2000. 
63 Patel v Minister of the Interior and Another 1955 (2) SA 485 (A) 493A-D cited with approval in National 
Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and others 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC), para 66. 
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of how useful the associated ship jurisdiction has become to claimants seeking to enforce 
maritime claims.  
 
 The problem of retrospectivity that had arisen in relation to other aspects of the associated 
ship jurisdiction also arose in consequence of the amendment to section 3(7)(c). The case arose 
from the arrest of the MV Yu Long Shan
64
. An arbitration award had been obtained by the 
claimant against the charterer of a vessel sub-chartered to the claimant. The dispute that gave rise 
to the award had arisen prior to the amendment of section 3(7)(c) as had the reference to 
arbitration. However the arbitrator only handed down his award after the amendment came into 
effect. Arguing that the claim under the arbitration award was a separate and distinct maritime 
claim the claimant arrested the MV Yu Long Shan as an associated ship in reliance on the 
amended section on the basis that the ship in respect of which the dispute had originally arisen 
was time chartered to a party controlled by the same entity as controlled the owner of the MV Yu 
Long Shan at the time of the arrest. As with the decisions in the Berg and the Pericles GC the 
Court concluded that it had not been the intention of the legislature to make the extension of 
liability operate so as to make an associated ship arrest available to a claimant even though it had 
not been available to that claimant in respect of that claim before the amendments came into 
effect. This decision reinforces the fundamental position that our courts have taken that the arrest 
of an associated ship involves a substantively different claim and gives rise to an entirely distinct 
action in rem from the claim against the ship concerned. 
 
 One matter relating to this section and not dealt with directly in the amendments in 1992 
justifies comment. In its original form section 3(7)(c) drew a clear distinction between the demise 
charterer and the owner of the vessel in specifying that it is where the charterer or sub-charterer 
by demise ‘and not the owner’ is liable in respect of a maritime claim that the deeming provision 
came into operation. That has the effect
65
 that in circumstances where there might be joint 
                                                 
64 MV Yu Long Shan: Drybulk SA v MV Yu Long Shan 1998 (1) SA 646 (SCA). The judgment in the court below is 
reported as MV Yu Long Shan: Drybulk SA v MV Yu Long Shan 1997 (3) SA 629 (D). 
65 As Shaw, op cit, 41, pointed out. 
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liability, which could possibly be the case both in relation to cargo claims and in relation to 
delictual claims, the deeming provision would not come into play. This did not prove 
controversial, as it is a situation very unlikely to arise. The distinction is preserved in the present 
section. However there is a far greater likelihood of the owner and the charterer being jointly 
liable in respect of a maritime claim where the charter is a time or voyage charter than where the 
charter is one by demise. The effect is that a claimant having a claim against both the owner and 
the charterer is free to arrest the ship concerned or an associated ship but may not arrest in rem a 
vessel owned by the charterer or owned by a company controlled by the charterer or the same 
person as controls the charterer. It is unclear why this should be so when such an arrest would be 
permissible if the claim lay against the charterer alone. There is after all no prospect of two 
vessels in the same ownership or under the control of the same person being arrested. It is true 
that two vessels may be arrested but the one will be arrested in respect of the owner’s liability 
and the other in respect of the charterer’s liability. That seems fair and in accordance with the 
general purpose of the associated ship provisions as well as the purpose underlying this deeming 
provision. 
 
 There are clearly provisions such as section 3(8) where the drafting of the Act was 
influenced by the express provision of the Arrest Convention that precludes the arrest of more 
than one vessel. If section 3(7)(c) was influenced by that - and this would be no more than 
speculation - it is submitted that such a restriction defeats the very purpose for which the 
associated ship jurisdiction was established. The aim of these provisions is to enable claimants to 
pursue claims by arresting associated ships instead of the ship in respect of which the claim 
arose. It is suggested that there is no need for the South African legislation to adhere to a 
restriction in the Arrest Convention - namely the restriction that only one vessel can be arrested 
and not all the property of the debtor as in many Continental systems - that reflects the historic 
compromise that is inherent in the terms of that Convention but has nothing to do with the novel 
jurisdiction introduced in this country by way of the associated ship jurisdiction.  South Africa 
has moved beyond the compromises of the Arrest Convention. It accordingly seems to be 
unnecessary and anachronistic to maintain a limitation on what is sought to be achieved by the 
associated ship jurisdiction that prevents potential claimants from using these provisions merely 
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because there are two parties liable in respect of a particular claim. I suggest that the limitation in 
the section should be reconsidered and removed. This could be achieved quite simply by deleting 
the words ‘and not the owner’ in section 3(7)(c).  
 
4 THE PRESENT REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ASSOCIATED SHIP ARREST 
 
 Against the background of the amendments we can now turn to examine the different 
elements of an associated ship arrest and look at each of the elements that must be established by 
a claimant wishing to pursue an action in rem by the arrest of an associated ship or to obtain the 
arrest of an associated ship for the purpose of obtaining security in terms of s 5(3) of the Act. 
Each step that must be followed by the arresting creditor will be considered in turn. It is 
suggested that for a successful arrest five questions will need to asked and answered66.  They are 
the following.  
 
(a) Has the claimant a maritime claim arising in respect of a particular ship? 
 
 The requirements for an associated ship arrest fall into two categories and must be viewed 
at two different times. The first category encompasses the claim and the ship in respect of which 
the claim arises and the second the associated ship itself. The initial requirement for an associated 
ship arrest is that the claimant has a maritime claim that arose in respect of a particular ship (‘the 
ship concerned’). All maritime claims can potentially give rise to an associated ship arrest, with 
the exception of claims falling under section 1(1)(iv)(d) of the Act. These are the claims already 
mentioned namely claims for, arising out of or relating to any mortgage, hypothecation, right of 
retention, pledge or other charge on or of a ship and any bottomry or respondentia bond.  
 
 Although the Act does not expressly contain such a limitation there is an inherent limitation 
on the claims that are capable of giving rise to an associated ship arrest. This flows from the 
requirement in section 3(6) of the Act that the associated ship is arrested instead of the ship ‘in 
                                                 
66 The questions set out in (e) and (f) infra are alternative questions, depending on whether on is looking at 
ownership of the two vessels or control of the companies owning the two vessels. 
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respect of which the maritime claim arose’. It follows from this that an associated ship arrest is 
only available in respect of maritime claims that initially arose in respect of a particular ship.  
Thus a maritime claim of a purely general nature that has no connection to a particular ship 
cannot give rise to an associated ship arrest67. An example of such a general claim would be a 
claim for outstanding hire in respect of containers made available generally to a shipping line for 
use on its fleet of vessels in terms of a container leasing agreement or a supply of fuel to a 
shipping line’s tanks for general use in all its vessels. Whilst such a claim is a maritime claim in 
terms of section 1(1)(iv)(i) of the Act it is not a claim that arises in relation to a specific vessel. 
As such it cannot give rise to an associated ship arrest.  
 
 There are a number of claims defined as maritime claims that can potentially give rise to 
issues of this type. For example any claim for services rendered to a fleet as opposed to a 
particular vessel, such as vessel tracking services or weather reporting services, will not 
ordinarily be claims in respect of a particular ship. Agency services will need to be scrutinised 
carefully to see whether they were truly rendered in respect of a particular vessel or whether the 
appointment of the agent is perfectly general on behalf of a line or fleet of vessels. The services 
of attorneys or advisers, whilst often in respect of particular vessels, are frequently rendered at 
the instance of insurers and P & I Clubs rather than the owners of the vessels themselves. A 
salvage claim in respect of an aircraft (section 1(1)(iv)(k) of the Act) cannot be a claim in respect 
of a particular ship and some claims in respect of P&I contributions and marine insurance 
policies will not be in respect of particular vessels. Such claims cannot found a conventional 
action in rem because such an action must be commenced in terms of section 3(5) by the arrest of 
property of one or more specified categories ‘against or in respect of which the claim lies’. A 
general claim of the type under discussion cannot satisfy this requirement. Likewise they cannot 
found an action in rem against an associated ship. 
 
                                                 
67  The reasoning is similar to that of the House of Lords in The River Rima [1988] 2 All ER 641 (HL) at 645 a-e  
also reported as Tiphook Container Rental Co v The River Rima [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 193 (HL) as applied in The 
Lloyd Pacifico [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54 (QB (ComCt). See also I.C.S. Petroleum (Montreal) Ltd. v. Polina 3 (The) 
(F.C.), 2005 FC 251, [2005] 3 FCR 595 and Specialty Shipping Units Pte Ltd v The Owners of the Ship or Vessel 
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 It follows from this initial requirement that, save in the case where the claim is one for 
which the charterer or sub-charterer and not the owner of the ship concerned is liable, the claim 
must at the time that it arises be one that would, at least notionally in the sense of satisfying the 
requirements for such an arrest under the Act, be capable of being pursued against the ship in 
respect of which the claim arose. That this only needs to be notional is clear because it is 
immaterial whether that notional possibility is capable of practical realisation. Thus in many 
cases the possibility of arresting the ship concerned may never arise although it would be feasible 
if the ship concerned came within South African waters. Notionally the ship concerned might be 
susceptible to an arrest in rem at the time a cargo claim arose, although if the vessel sank that 
may not be a practical possibility. The fact that the claim arises in consequence of the vessel 
being lost does not preclude the owner of cargo that was lost with the ship from proceeding 
against an associated ship. However if the owner of the ship carrying the cargo is not personally 
liable for the claim of the cargo owner because, for instance, it is not the contractual carrier and 
no claim in negligence or bailment lies against it, then it is not possible to pursue an associated 
ship claim unless the person liable to the cargo owner on its claim is the charterer or sub-charterer 
of the vessel. In other words in order to pursue a maritime claim by way of an action in rem 
against an associated ship the claim must be a claim giving rise to a maritime lien against the ship 
concerned or a claim that lay against the owner of the ship concerned because that owner was 




(b) Does the maritime claim give rise to a maritime lien or is it one that lies against the 
owner or charterer of the ship in relation to which the maritime claim arose? 
 The first requirement for the arrest of the ship concerned is that either the claim is one 
giving rise to a maritime lien or is one in respect of which the owner of the ship concerned is 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘Heath Boat HCAJ 000/2005 available at http:/www.hku.hk/law/faculty/_file/Judgment%202%20December%20005.
pdf 
68 S3(4) of the Act. The recognition in cases such as Dias Compania Naviera SA v The Al Kaziemah 1994 (1) SA 570 
(D) 574; Great River Shipping Inc v Sunnyface Marine Ltd 1994 (1) SA 65 (C) at 68-69 and The Tao Men v 
Degueldere 1996 (1) SA 559 (C) 565C-F that there may be other instances in which an action in rem may be 
available does not affect matters. Those were cases dealing with the vindication of ownership in a vessel in which the 
requirements of s3(4) were clearly inapplicable yet it was held that an action in rem was available.     
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personally liable to the claimant.69 Insofar as maritime liens are concerned the proper 
interpretation of this expression in the Act limits such liens to those liens that were recognised in 
English admiralty law in 1983.70 This limits the claims under this head to claims relating to 
salvage, collision damage, seaman's wages, bottomry, master's wages and master's disbursements. 
Apart from claims of that type, which may arise without the personal liability of the owner of the 
ship, an action in rem against a ship in respect of which a maritime claim has arisen can in 




 In the case of a chartered ship where the claim lies against the charterer or sub-charterer, 
the claim would lie against the ship concerned but for the fact that the charterer or sub-charterer 
is not the owner of the vessel in respect of which the claim arises. The effect of the deeming 
provision in section 3(7) is to place claims against charterers and sub-charterers on the same 
footing as claims against the owner of the ship concerned. However, this is subject to the 
qualification that the claim must be one for which the charterer or sub-charterer, and not the 
owner of the vessel, is alleged to be liable. The oddity of this restriction has already been 
mentioned. It does however also pose certain problems of interpretation.  In the first instance 
must the claimant specifically allege that only the charterer or sub-charterer is liable in respect of 
the claim? Would it be a proper defence to such a claim for the charterer to admit its own liability 
but to plead that the owner of the vessel was also liable in respect of the claim? On whom would 
the onus of proof then lie? The section itself gives no indication of how to answer these questions 
and fortunately they do not appear to have arisen in practice. It is tentatively suggested that it 
should be for the defendant to show that its own liability is concurrent with the liability of the 
owner. The reason is the pragmatic one that a party whose liability is otherwise established 
                                                 
69 S3(4) of the Act. 
70 Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and others; Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others 1989 (4) 
SA 325 (A). 
71 S3(4) of the Act. The exceptions appear to be limited to claims arising in relation to the ownership or possession of 
the vessel.   
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should not lightly be permitted to escape that result for technical reasons unconnected with that 
liability.  
 
 The description of the liability of the charterer as ‘concurrent’ with that of the owner points 
to a more difficult issue that may arise from this restriction in section 3(7) on the ability to arrest 
an associated ship in respect of the claim against the charterer. It is to determine when a claim is 
one against the charterer or sub-charterer ‘and not the owner’. Must the claims be concurrent in 
the sense that the same cause of action is relied on and the liability of owner and charterer is joint 
and several or is it only necessary that the claim is directed at securing the same or substantially 
the same relief? Take the obvious example of a cargo claim where the cargo is either lost or 
damaged. The owner or party interested in the cargo may be entitled to proceed on a bill of lading 
against the charterer where the bills are charterer’s bills. However where the charter was a time or 
voyage charter it may be entirely permissible for the cargo owner to claim against the owner of 
the vessel in delict (tort) on the basis that the loss was caused by the negligence of the crew in 
failing properly to care for the cargo. Conceivably both claims may be good but the legal basis 
for each is entirely different as the one is a claim in contract and the other a claim in delict. The 
one depends upon the carrier’s failure to carry the goods in accordance with its obligations under 
the contract of carriage evidenced in the bill of lading, whilst the other is dependent upon 
negligence. However both arise out of substantially the same occurrence and are directed at 
recovering the same loss. For the purposes of section 3(7) therefore the question arises whether 
this is a single claim for which the owner and the charterer are both liable or whether there are 
two separate claims? The answer may significantly affect the claimant’s ability to recover in 
respect of its loss.  
 
 There are sound practical reasons why in that situation the cargo owner will wish to be able 
to pursue its claims against both the charterer and the owner of the vessel. For example it may be 
uncertain of the financial stability of one of the two or both of them. If both owner and charterer 
are parties to the litigation, that may also assist in bringing about a settlement of the claim. If the 
ship concerned is available to be arrested it may be arrested in respect of the claim against the 
owner. However if the claim against the owner is taken to be the same claim as the claim against 
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the charterer, in the sense of the claim being one for which the owner is liable, then it will not be 
possible to arrest a vessel owned by a company that is controlled by the charterer
72
. Nonetheless 
such a ship will be capable of being arrested as an associated ship if the owner of the ship 
concerned is not liable for the claim against the charterer. It is important in that situation to 
determine whether the claim against the charterer is the same claim as the claim against the 
owner.  
 
 Again this is not an issue that has thus far arisen in practice so that any answer to the 
problem is necessarily tentative. Two factors seem to be relevant. Firstly the purpose of the 
deeming provision in section 3(7) is to make it easier for persons having claims against charterers 
to find vessels that can be arrested for the purpose of commencing an action in rem or in order to 
obtain security under section 5(3) of the Act for their claims. The section is thus remedial in 
purpose and should not be given an interpretation that has the potential to stultify this legitimate 
purpose. Secondly there does not appear to be any clear reason for limiting the claimant’s right to 
invoke the deeming provision in these circumstances, whatever the reason may be for doing so 
when the claim is one for which the owner and the charterer are jointly and severally liable. It is 
accordingly submitted that where the claims against the owner and charterer are legally distinct 
and do not give rise to joint and several liability they should not be treated for the purposes of 
section 3(7) as being a single claim for which both owner and charterer are liable. Applying the 
same reasoning it is submitted that if the claimant wishes to claim against the owner and the 
charterer in the alternative, as would be the case where it was uncertain which of them was the 
contractual carrier under the bill of lading - a question that may pose substantial difficulties - it is 
entitled to invoke section 3(7) in order to arrest a ship owned by the charterer or one owned by a 
company that is controlled by the charterer or controlled by a company that controlled the 
charterer at the time the claim arose. 
 
 
                                                 
72 A ship owned by the charterer could not be arrested in rem because it would not be the ship against or in respect of 
which the claim lies.  It would however be susceptible to attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem.    
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(c) Who was the owner or charterer of the ship concerned when the maritime claim 
arose?  
 
 The underlying concept of the associated ship jurisdiction is that liability for a maritime 
claim should be visited on the person or persons for whose benefit the operations of the vessel in 
respect of which the claim arises tenures. The ‘ purpose of the Act was to make the loss fall 
where it belonged by reason of ownership, and in the case of a company, ownership or control of 
shares’.73 Where the claim is one that lies against the charterer of the vessel the same principle 
applies in consequence of the deeming provision in section 3(7). It follows that it is essential to 
the arrest of an associated ship that the claimant identify either the owner of the ship in respect of 
which the claim arose at the time that claim arose or, where reliance is placed on section 3(7), the 
charterer at the time that the claim arose. There is a separate and special question in regard to 
identifying when the maritime claim arose which will be dealt with in sub- paragraph (g) below 
after the fundamental questions in regard to association, but for present purposes it will be 
assumed that the date upon which the claim arose is readily identifiable and our focus will be on 
identifying the owner or charterer at that time. 
 
 Where the claim gives rise to a maritime lien or is a claim for which the owner of the vessel 
is personally liable as required by section 3(4) the focus falls upon the ownership of the ship 
concerned at the time that the maritime claim arose. The same theme is carried through into 
section 3(7)(a) of the Act.  There is no definition of owner in the Act but clearly it bears the same 
meaning in both sections.  It is submitted that in the provisions of section 3(7)(a) of the Act 
ownership means legal ownership, that is possession of the legal rights that ownership confers 
upon a person. As Shaw has pointed out
74
 the distinction that may be drawn in English law 
between beneficial or equitable ownership on the one hand and legal ownership on the other is 
not one that is recognised in South African law. It is therefore improbable to think that the South 
                                                 
73
 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1986 (2) SA 700 (A)  712A. 
74 Shaw, op cit, 32. 
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African legislature used the expression ‘owner’ in any sense other than that in which it is 
understood by South African lawyers. It is submitted therefore that the reference to the owner of 
the ship concerned is a reference to the legal owner75. 
 
 Under the laws of most maritime states the ownership of vessels flying the flag of that state 
is reflected in a register and procedures are prescribed for securing the entry in the register of 
ships of that country. Likewise ownership is ordinarily transferred by registration of the transfer 
in accordance with the bill of sale.76 Ordinarily therefore the person reflected in the relevant 
ship’s register as the owner of the vessel will be the owner of the ship. However there may be 
exceptions to this rule as where a registration has been effected unlawfully and is to be regarded 
as void or where the registration was fraudulently procured or does not reflect the true situation77. 
In those cases it may be permissible to go behind the registration to identify the true legal owner 
of the vessel. In other words the fact of registration is not necessarily decisive of the question of 
ownership. 
 
 In principle the same should be true of a situation where the registration in the registry is in 
the name of a nominee for the true owner. This situation is one that is well recognised in various 
circumstances in South Africa. Thus it is commonplace for the owner of shares to register those 
shares in the name of a nominee.78 It is capable of being applied in any situation where the fact of 
                                                 
75 It is submitted that the considerations that troubled Donaldson MR in The Evpo Agnic [1988] 3 All ER 810 (CA); 
[1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 411 (CA) and that lead him to hold that in the English statute the reference to ‘owner’ was a 
reference to the registered owner are not applicable in South Africa where there is no distinction between legal and 
equitable ownership. The better approach is that of the Federal Court in Australia in Tisand (Pty) Ltd and others v 
The Owners of the Ship MV ‘Cape Moreton’ (ex ‘Freya’) [2005] FCAFC 68; (2005) 143 FCR 43 where it was held 
that ‘owner’ in s17 of the Admiralty Act was the legal owner after an exhaustive analysis of all possible contrary 
contentions but essentially following a line of reasoning similar to that in the text.  
76 See for example Chapter 4 of the Ship Registration Act 58 of 1998 and section 3 of Schedule 1 to that Act.. 
77 In The Able Monarch: Prestige Splendour SDN BHD v Globe Engineering Namibia (Pty) Ltd, SCOSA B135, it 
was held on an examination of the facts that an alleged sale and transfer of the vessel had been procured solely for 
the purpose of avoiding an arrest and was a simulated transaction that should be ignored.    
78
 Bell's Trust v C.I.R., 1948 (3) SA 480 (AD) 489; Sammel and others v President Brand Gold Mining Company Ltd 
and others 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 666C-E; Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 
1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 453A-B.  
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registration is not decisive of the question of ownership. This is clearly recognised in the 
registration provisions of the Ship Registration Act79, which expressly deal with a situation where 
ownership passes other than by way of registration under the Act. In the case of the registration 
of a South African ship further recognition is given to the notion that registration is not 
necessarily decisive of ownership under section 32 of that Act which provides that a person 
having a beneficial interest in a ship will be held liable for any pecuniary penalty payable in 
terms of the Shipping Acts
80
. Lastly it is permissible in South Africa to register a vessel in the 
ownership of the bareboat charterer.81 In each of these instances the true legal owner is not in fact 
the registered owner of the ship. 
 
 Accepting that there are these instances where registered ownership and actual legal 
ownership may differ it is submitted that a claimant must identify the true owner of the ship 
concerned at the time the maritime claim arose before any question of association can be 
considered. This will ordinarily be the registered owner but may be the beneficial owner if the 
registered owner is a nominee or may be some other person if there are legitimate grounds for 
challenging the validity of the registration. 
  
 The language of the various sub-sections of section 3(7)(a) of the Act is such that in order 
to invoke its provisions it is essential that a single owner of the ship concerned be identified. The 
phrase used in each sub-section is ‘the owner of the ship concerned’ or ‘which owned the ship 
concerned’. This is not language that is capable of being construed as referring to more than one 
person unless they are acting jointly and can for the purposes of the section be treated as one. The 
point is that the section does not contemplate that there can be two separate parties both of whom 
                                                 
79 Section 4 of Schedule 1 of Act 58 of 1998. 
80 In terms of s1(1) ‘Shipping Acts’ means the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951, the Marine Traffic Act, 1981 (Act No. 
2 of 1981), the Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act, 1981 (Act No. 6 of 1981), the Marine Pollution 
(Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act, 1986 (Act No. 2 of 1986), the Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act, 1987 
(Act No. 64 of 1987), and this Act 
81 S16(c) of the Ship Registration Act 58 of 1998. 
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are the owner of the vessel simultaneously, such as the registered owner and the beneficial owner. 
The language of the section dictates that in that situation – which is by no means rare - one of the 
two must be identified as owner for the purposes of the section. The section provides no 
mechanism under which both can be treated as owner at the same time. It is submitted that what 
the section requires is that the actual or legal owner of the ship concerned be identified as at the 
time when the maritime claim arises. It is open to a claimant to allege and prove - the burden of 
proof being upon it - that legal ownership of a vessel vests in either the registered owner or some 
other person on the basis that the registration does not truly reflect the ownership position. It is 
equally open to a person identified as owner on the basis of registration to demonstrate that they 
are not in fact the owner, because they are merely a nominee or because ownership has passed to 
another but is not yet reflected in the ship’s registry.  
 
 Identification of the owner of a vessel may be relatively straightforward in the light of the 
international system of registration and resources such as international publications that contain 
lists of shipowners. Identification of the charterer of the vessel may be more difficult as that is a 
matter of contract and the claimant may not have access to the charterparty that discloses the 
identity of the charterer at the time the claim arose. However if the claimant wishes to invoke the 
deeming provision in section 3(7) of the Act it is necessary that they provide evidence of the 
identity of the charterer at the time the claim arose. It does not appear to matter for the purposes 
of applying the presumption whether the charterer is a time, voyage or demise charterer or 
whether they are a head or a sub-charterer. The question is whether they are the charterer of the 
ship concerned at the time the claim arises and whether they are personally liable on that claim. 
 
(d) Who is the owner of the associated ship at the time when the action is commenced? 
 
 The next step in the process is to identify the owner of the vessel that is to be arrested as an 
associated ship as at the date of commencement of the action. In this regard there is little to be 
added to the discussion of ownership in the previous paragraph. Each of the sub-sections of 
section 3(7)(a) starts with the word ‘owned’ in relation to the putative associated ship. Each is 
concerned with ownership at the date of the arrest of the vessel as an associated ship. For the 
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reasons already given it is submitted that this refers to the legal owner. This will ordinarily be the 
registered owner of the vessel but there are occasions on which registration will not be definitive 
of this issue. The enquiry is in all respects the same as the enquiry into the ownership of the ship 
concerned. 
 
 There is however a question in regard to the identification of the date of commencement of 
the action, which is highly relevant for the purpose of determining whether a ship is an associated 
ship and therefore susceptible to arrest. In section 1(1) of the Act it is now provided that an 
admiralty action commences ‘for any relevant purpose’ in one of four ways, namely by the 
service of any process by which that action is instituted; by the making of an application for the 
attachment of property to found jurisdiction; by the issue of process for the institution of the 
action in rem and by the giving of security or an undertaking as contemplated in section 3(10)(a) 
of the Act. For present purposes the second of these can be disregarded. In any action in rem 
however the other three may all occur and the order in which they do so may vary. Thus the 
summons may be issued and then served together with the warrant of arrest and thereafter 
security may be given in terms of section 3(10)(a). Alternatively a summons may be issued and 
then security furnished without the need for the issue of a warrant of arrest. Another possibility is 
that security may be given in order to prevent an arrest and the summons is then only served or 
even issued and served at some later stage. In that situation the only arrest is the deemed arrest 
arising from the giving of security. 
 
 One approach to these provisions is to say that the sequence is irrelevant and therefore that 
whichever event one occurs first marks the commencement of the action in rem. That will be 
either the issue of summons or the giving of security if that occurs before summons is issued. In 
any case where the vessel is actually arrested the summons will have been issued prior to the 
arrest. In most cases the question will not matter but where the issue of the summons is the first 
thing to occur and there is a change in ownership of the associated ship (or even the ship 
concerned when that is the target of the action) between the date when the summons is issued and 
the date when it is served or security is given the effect could be significant at two levels. The 
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first relates to the applicability in South Africa of the judgment in The Monica S82 in which it was 
held that the security interest afforded to a claimant by the statutory right to arrest the vessel in an 
action in rem accrues on the issue of the writ (summons in South African procedure) and 
continues to exist notwithstanding the passing of ownership of the vessel to a new owner in the 
period before the vessel is arrested. That issue will be discussed later
83
. The second issue, more 
pertinent for present purposes, is whether for the purposes of an associated ship arrest the 
proceedings are commenced by the issue of a summons even though it is not served until some 
later stage when the vessel enters a South African port. If that is so then the relevant date for the 
purpose of determining whether the two vessels are associated will be the date of issue of the 
summons and a change in ownership between that date and the date upon which the summons is 
served and the vessel is arrested will be immaterial. This has fundamentally important 
consequences because it has the result that the underlying link that serves as the factual 
justification for the associated ship jurisdiction, namely the fact of common ownership of the two 
vessels or common control of the companies owning the vessels, is broken at the critical stage 
when effect is given to the jurisdiction by arresting the associated ship. That is not only 
undesirable but it has constitutional implications once it is recognised that an arrest involves a 




 It is submitted that this brings into play the principle of constitutional interpretation that, 
where a statute is capable of two interpretations, the one being constitutionally compliant and the 
other not, the one that is constitutionally compliant is to be preferred. That is feasible in applying 
the provisions of section 1(2) of the Act to the question when the action is commenced in the case 
of an associated ship arrest. The starting point is to say that the section itself recognises that there 
may be different purposes under the Act itself for which the commencement of the action may be 
relevant. The section does not say that the four cases it gives are applicable for all purposes but 
only ‘for any relevant purpose’. In saying that it is submitted that the section recognises that for 
                                                 
82  The Monica S [1967] 3 All ER 740 (QBD). 
83  In chapter 12. 
84 See the discussion of the constitutional implications of the decision in The Heavy Metal in chapter 9 where it is 
concluded that the arrest of a vessel as an associated ship when there is no link between the owner of that vessel and 
the owner of the ship concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose is constitutionally impermissible.  
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different purposes a different commencement date may be relevant.  Under the Act the time of 
commencement of proceedings is relevant for the purposes of prescription, the operation of 
statutory and contractual time bars, expedition in pursuing a claim85 and the ranking of certain 
claims against a fund. These different contexts may demand a difference in approach to the 
question of when the action is commenced. 
 
 It cannot be said that the issue of summons is now the sole relevant date as held in The Jute 
Express
86because the holding in that case has been altered by the amendments introduced in 
1992. The argument in The Jute Express revolved around the question whether the action in rem 
had commenced by the giving of security to prevent the arrest of the vessel, in which event suit 
had been brought for the purposes of the time bar in the Hague Rules or whether it could only be 
commenced by the issue of summons, security having been given but no summons having been 
issued within the period of the one year time bar in the Hague Rules. It was there held that the 
action commenced by the issue of summons and not by the obtaining of security so that the claim 
was time barred, but that has been altered by the inclusion in section 1(2) of the Act of the 
furnishing of security as one of the dates upon which an admiralty action can commence. That 
amendment would alter the result of that case.   
 
 One must therefore strive to make sense of the reference in the preamble to the section of 
the words ‘for any relevant purpose’. These words replaced the words ‘for the purposes of any 
law, whether of the Republic or not, relating to the prescription of or limitation of time for the 
commencement of any action, suit claim or proceedings, an admiralty action shall be deemed to 
have commenced’, that clearly limited the scope of the deeming and confined its area of 
operation. The amendment makes the provision generally relevant and provides alternatives that 
are inconsistent and as already remarked can occur in the same case and in varying order. There 
                                                 
85  MT Cape Spirit: Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the mt Cape Spirit and others 1999 (4) SA 321 
(SCA). 
86 MV Jute Express v Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the MV Jute Express 1992 (3) SA 9 (A). Hofmeyr, 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa, 62, fn 93 says that the decision in The Jute Express applies 
equally to the amended section, but it is difficult to see how that can be bearing in mind that the very instance that 
the court rejected as constituting a commencement of the action in rem is now included as such a commencement in 
the amended s1(2). 
 226
appear to be two possible approaches to this. The first is to say that any particular action 
commences when the first event identified in the section occurs so that there is a ‘once and for 
all’ aspect to the commencement of an action and once it has commenced that date is immutably 
fixed. The other approach is to say that the opening words of the section permit of different dates 
of commencement being fixed for different purposes so that one must identify the date that is 
most pertinent to the issue under consideration.   
 
   It is submitted that in order to avoid the constitutional difficulty the latter and more flexible 
approach is to be preferred. That has the consequence that the proper interpretation of section 
1(2) in the context of the commencement of an action in rem against an associated ship is that the 
action commences either on the date upon which the process instituting that action is served, 
which date will coincide with the arrest of the vessel, or on the date of its deemed arrest being the 
date upon which security is given. On that basis in the case of an associated ship arrest the 
necessary link between the ship concerned and the associated ship will always be present at the 
time of arrest and the problem that would be occasioned by saying that the action commenced 
when the summons was issued will be avoided. It must be recognised that this approach probably 
renders fruitless the practice of issuing a ‘protective’ summons the purpose of which is to try and 
obtain a security interest against the vessel that will continue in force notwithstanding a change in 
ownership.  
 
 The suggested approach does however mean that the identification of a vessel as an 
associated ship will be the same in the case of an arrest for the purposes of an action in rem as for 
a security arrest under section 5(3) of the Act. The same definition of an associated ship applies 
to both cases but the security arrest is an independent ‘stand alone’ procedure that starts and 
finishes with the arrest itself. Section 1(2) does not appear to apply in that case inasmuch as it 
applies in the case of an ‘admiralty action’ and that is defined as ‘proceedings in terms of this Act 
for the enforcement of a maritime claim … and includes any ancillary or procedural measure, 
whether by way of application or otherwise, in connection with any such proceedings.” A claim 
for security under section 5(3) is not a maritime claim as defined. Whilst it is ‘ancillary’ in the 
sense that it is related to proceedings for the enforcement of a maritime claim those proceedings 
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are by their very nature not proceedings ‘in terms of this Act’ for the enforcement of a claim. 
Accordingly section 1(2) does not appear to be of assistance in determining when the ‘action is 
commenced’ for the purpose of a security arrest. The question is then when the action 
commences in the case of a security arrest.  It is submitted that it is either when the order for the 
arrest of the vessel is served or when security is furnished to prevent her arrest. That at least leads 
to consistency. It ensures that the position of the claimant is not different if it arrests the vessel 
than it would be if it demanded and obtained security. It is unsatisfactory to postulate that the 
action is commenced by the issue of papers in the application for arrest as opposed to the arrest 
itself. Such an application can be brought some time before the vessel is due to enter a South 
African harbour and circumstances may alter as time passes. That is avoided if the approach is 
that the vessel must have been arrested or that its arrest has been forestalled by the furnishing of 
security. In other words both the issue of papers and service of the order are necessary to say that 
the action to obtain security has commenced.   
 
 This approach is consistent with the underlying factual justification of the associated ship 
arrest and it avoids any constitutional difficulty in the application of the provision. It is suggested 
that it is the proper approach to this issue although it must be noted immediately that it has 
implications for the nature of the action in rem that will distinguish the South African model from 
its English origins. 
  
(e) Are the two ships owned by the same person? 
 
 The first basis for an association to exist is that the ship concerned and the associated ship 
were owned at the relevant times by the same person.
87
 In view of the definition of a company in 
section 3(7)(b)(iii) it is submitted that the reference to ‘a person’ is a reference to a natural person 
as the definition appears to be comprehensive insofar as any corporate body is concerned or any 
                                                 
87 Section 3(7)(a)(i) of the Act. 
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body of persons, corporate or incorporate88. That approach avoids what would otherwise be an 
anomaly. If a company is treated as a person for the purposes of s3(7)(i) then in the (admittedly 
unlikely89) situation of two different ships being owned by the same company at the relevant 
times, but the shareholding of the company having changed entirely in the interim, the ships 
would be associated even though they would not be if one looked at them as being owned by 
separate companies and examined who controlled them at the different stages that are relevant for 
the purposes of association 
90
. An association in that situation would be entirely contrary to the 
purpose of the associated ship jurisdiction. However if the same natural person owned the two 
ships at the relevant times then no such anomaly arises91. They are associated for the purposes of 
the Act and the associated ship can be arrested in an action in rem.  
 
 That conclusion means that the associated ship will also be capable of being arrested in 
order to provide security for the maritime claim in proceedings against the ship concerned or its 
owner, whether in or out of South Africa and whether before a court or an arbitral tribunal92. This 
has the curious result that if the arrest is for the purpose of commencing an action in rem in South 
                                                 
88 Shaw, op cit, 39 suggested that ‘person’ would, by virtue of the provisions of s 2 of the Interpretation Act, 33 of 
1957, include a foreign company not having a share capital. However the amendments have done away with that 
issue and there is now a definition of ‘company’ that is comprehensive.  The point is probably academic.   
89 The situation could arise in the following circumstance involving an adaptation of the facts in Gericke v Sack 1978 
(1) SA 821 (A). A speedboat S, owned by company A, is used for recreational purposes by someone unconnected 
with the company for whose actions it cannot be said to be vicariously liable. The user is responsible for an accident 
in which someone is badly injured although there is no physical contact between the speedboat and the injured 
person, as might happen if another boat towing a person water-skiing was forced to take evasive action because of 
the way the speedboat was being driven. The speedboat is then sold and a new one T purchased. Thereafter X the 
sole shareholder in company A emigrates and rather than sell the boat sells the company to Y, who knows nothing of 
the earlier incident. The injured party then wishes to institute a claim for damages. That person has a maritime lien 
over S but no claim against its owner A personally. However as the claimant could have arrested S in an action in 
rem on the basis of the maritime lien it can arrest T as an associated ship because it is a vessel owned by A at the 
time of the arrest. This is harsh on Y and not what the associated ship provisions are aimed at. 
90 In that event the company owning S was controlled by X at the time the claim arose. The company owning T will 
be controlled by Y when the arrest is sought.  On that basis the requirements for association would not be satisfied. 
91 This would be the position if X continued to own company A at the time of the arrest of the new speedboat T. 
92 Section 5(3)(a) of the Act. 
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Africa that action proceeds as a separate action in rem against the associated ship
93
, but if the 
arrest is for the purpose of obtaining security for a claim then the security will be for proceedings 
against the ship concerned or its owners or charterer and not against the associated ship or its 
owners. However that is the consequence of permitting the arrest of an associated ship to obtain 
security for the purpose of pursuing a claim in some other jurisdiction or before some other 
forum. It is for that reason that care must be taken that security furnished in response to or to 
avert an associated ship arrest is security for the specific claim that gave rise to the arrest and no 
other claim.   
 
 It is relatively unusual to encounter a situation where the same person owns two ships. That 
is the classic sister ship situation of the Arrest Convention and as has been pointed out all too 
frequently the phenomenon of the ‘one-ship’ company has rendered that type of arrest largely 
obsolete94. There is no reported case where the provisions of section 3(7)(a)(i) have had to be 
considered by the courts. It is more likely to be invoked in minor cases where a natural person 
owns say a yacht and a motor boat, rather than in any case involving conventional sea-going 
vessels. Whilst it may occasionally happen that a company owns more than one vessel even that 
situation has become relatively unusual. The ordinary situation encountered in practice at present 
is one where the vessels are owned by separate companies. That is the situation that will now be 
addressed. 
 
(f) Were the ship-owning companies controlled by the same persons at the relevant 
times?    
 The alternative basis for association (and that most frequently encountered in practice) is 
that the same person or persons controls both the company owning the ship concerned and the 
                                                 
93 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N). 
94 There are still examples of sister ships in national fleets such as that of the Republic of India (Indian Endurance, 
The (No. 2), Republic of India and another v India Steamship Company Limited [1997] 4 All ER 380 (HL); [1998] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL)) and the former Polish fleet (The Tatry (C-406/92) [1994] ECR I-5439). Another well-known 
case involving a sister ship arrest was that of The Nordglimt [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 470 (QB (Adm Ct)) but these 
instances are few and far between. 
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company owning the associated ship. Thus the key issue in most cases of associated ship arrests 
is to identify the person who controls, or the persons who control, the companies that own the 
two ships in question. This is the case of the true associated ship in that the right to arrest, and 
hence liability for the claim, depends not upon an arrest of the assets of the original debtor but 
upon the arrest of an asset owned by a different legal persona. Three situations are contemplated 
by sections 3(7)(ii) and (iii). They are where the ship concerned is owned by a company and the 
associated ship by a person (s 3(7)(ii)); where the ship concerned is owned by a person and the 
associated ship by a company and where both ships are owned by companies (s 3(7)(iii)). The 
last of these is the most common.  
 
 It will be apparent that in each case where one of the ships is owned by a company it is 
necessary to determine who controls that company at the relevant date. This will be the date when 
the maritime claim arose in the case of the ship concerned and the date of commencement of the 
action in the case of the associated ship. In any case where the claimant relies on the presumption 
in section 3(7)(c) it is necessary to determine who controlled the charterer when the maritime 
claim arose. This is the same enquiry as arises in a case where the maritime claim gives rise to a 
maritime lien or is a claim that can be enforced personally against the owner of the ship 
concerned. It is also the same enquiry that arises in every instance in relation to the associated 
ship. The enquiry is a matter of fact in each case.  It can raise a number of different issues. Some 
of these have already been mentioned briefly above but most remain controversial and the whole 
topic will be dealt with in the next chapter. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that if the 
companies owning the ship concerned and the associated ship are controlled by the same person 
at the relevant times there will be an association. The circumstances in which that will be the case 
are dealt with in chapter 7. Before we turn to that however there is an important ancillary issue 
that arises in some cases that impacts upon the issue of common control of the ship concerned 
and the associated ship and that is the issue of when the claim arises. 
  
(g) When does a claim arise? 
 Ordinarily the precise date upon which a claim arose will be of little significance when 
considering issues of association. It serves at most as marking the point at which the enquiry as to 
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ownership of the ship concerned must be undertaken, but the actual date is unlikely in itself to 
create any difficulty. Its primary relevance is likely to be in relation to prescription and the 
ranking of claims. However the requirement that the ship concerned be owned at the time the 
maritime claim arose does create difficulties when the cause of action of the claimant arises from 
a sale of the ship concerned to the claimant.95 The problem is created in part by the law of 
purchase and sale and in part is an issue of the proper interpretation of the Act. The difficulty is 
not simply that the purchaser usually only becomes aware of the fact that it has a claim once it 
has taken transfer of the ship, but that its claim will ordinarily only come into existence at that 
point in time. There are several cases considered below in which this difficulty has arisen.  
 
 In the Fayrouz IV
96
 a ship called the Jade II was sold subject to a condition warranting that 
at the time of delivery it would be free from encumbrances, maritime liens and any other debts. 
The purchaser was indemnified against any such claims. After the sale and transfer of the vessel a 
claim giving rise to a maritime lien was asserted against the vessel. The purchaser sought the 
arrest of the Fayrouz IV as an associated ship in order to pursue its claim for an indemnity. 
Unfortunately there is no discussion in the judgment of the particular problem identified above. 
The judgment records that it was common cause between counsel that the claim giving rise to the 
maritime lien arose prior to the sale or the transfer of the Jade II. Patently that concession was 
correct but irrelevant as it was not the claim against the Jade II that mattered for the purpose of 
determining whether the two ships were associated. The relevant claim was the one against the 
seller, its previous owner, in terms of the indemnity. No consideration appears to have been given 
as to when that claim arose, but on the face of it no claim to an indemnity could have arisen 
before the vessel was transferred to the purchaser. It was only then that the seller was in breach of 
any obligation owed to the purchaser and it was only then, at the earliest, that any claim to an 
                                                 
95 The problem could also arise if the claimant was the seller and not the purchaser but that is a far less likely 
scenario.  The reason for that is that any claims by the seller are only likely to arise at the moment of transfer of the 
vessel sold to its new owner.  At that stage the ship concerned will be owned by the person against whom it is sought 
to bring the action.  Accordingly not only the vessel that has been sold but also an associated ship will be able to be 
arrested in rem in respect of the claim.  A problem will only arise if the claim by the seller arises before ownership of 
the vessel sold is transferred to the purchaser, which is unlikely to be the case.    
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indemnity could have been brought97. However without any reference to argument or any reasons 
it is simply said that the ship concerned - the Jade II - was owned by the seller at the time the 
claim arose. The inference seems to have been that the date when the maritime lien arose was 
taken to be the crucial date and not the date when the right to an indemnity arose. That being so 
then the case proceeded on an incorrect approach and cannot be regarded as correctly decided. 
 
 In the Heavy Metal
98
 a similar issue arose and was considered by the Court. Again the 
context was a dispute arising from the sale of a vessel. The ship that was sold was called the Sea 
Sonnet. The memorandum of agreement provided that the vessel was at the seller’s risk until 
delivery to the buyer. She was to be delivered ‘with present class free of recommendations’ but 
subject to an obligation to notify the Classification Society of any matter coming to the 
knowledge of the purchaser before delivery that would result in class being withdrawn or the 
imposition of a recommendation relating to her class. It was alleged that when delivered there 
was a breach of this condition because the vessel had numerous problems known to the seller that 
should have been reported to its classification society and would have resulted in 
recommendations being imposed. Again the problem was the time when the maritime claim 
arose. On behalf of the owners of the Heavy Metal it was contended that the claim only arose 
when the Sea Sonnet was delivered in a defective condition. The claimant  contended that the 
claim arose when the vessel was tendered for delivery after the seller had failed to report the 
defects to the classification society. During the period between the tender of delivery and the 
acceptance of that tender the purchaser contended that its ‘claim must already have arisen against 
                                                                                                                                                              
96
 October International Navigation Inc v mv Fayrouz IV 1988 (4) SA 675 (N). 
97 A right to an indemnity may only arise once the person claiming the indemnity has paid the claim. See Jonnes v 
Anglo-African Shipping Co 1972 (2) SA 827 (A). Even if the right in this case was not postponed in that fashion it is 
difficult to see on what basis it can be said to have arisen before the vessel was transferred to the purchaser. 
98
 MV Heavy Metal; Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Ltd and others 1998 (4) SA 479 (C). 
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the first respondent inasmuch as the applicant could have sued immediately for damages for the 
breach whilst ownership of the vessel was still vested in the first respondent (the seller).’99   
 
 This argument found favour with the court. It cited with approval the following passage 
from another judgment: 
 
‘I am of the view that the claim for damages for breach of contract arises when the debtor 
fails to perform his contractual obligations during the performance of the contract.  As the 
debtor might remedy his prior breach at any stage during the execution of the contract, 
the right of action will only accrue when the contract has been completed and the debtor 
offers his completed, but defective work as ostensible performance of his obligation.’ 100 
 
On that basis and particularly because of the use of the word ‘offers’ the court held that the claim 
‘probably’ arose before ownership of the vessel passed101. With respect this is a remarkable 
conclusion based on a misunderstanding of the issues in the case relied on and the question to 
which this remark in the earlier judgment was addressed. The case in question dealt with the 
construction of a tennis court and the court was concerned with the commencement of 
prescription. No distinction between the tender of defective performance and the acceptance of 
that tender was relevant to this issue. The problem was that the tennis court had been completed 
in September 1974 but the defects only manifested themselves the following Easter. Nonetheless 
the court held that the claim for damages arose in September 1974 when the work was completed. 
What is also strange is that in the Heavy Metal the court did not go on to cite the portion of the 
judgment immediately following which read: 
 
‘Wessels in his Law of Contract in SA at para 2780 states inter alia :’It is therefore 
essential to the defence of prescription that the creditor should have been entitled to bring 
                                                 
99 This was the applicant’s contention as set out at page 488 E-F. There is nothing in the judgment to indicate the 
legal basis for this contention. The real difficulty is that the damages for which the claimant was in fact suing had not 
at that stage been suffered. 
100
 Hawken v Olympic Pools (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 224 (T) 227A-B. 
101 It is unclear how an issue of law, viz when a claim arises, can be determined as a matter of probability. 
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his action at the moment from which the debtor claims that prescription runs in his 
favour.’ 
 
In other words the judge in the tennis court case was concerned simply to apply the well-
established rule that prescription commences to run when the cause of action is complete and in 
that case it was when the tennis court had been laid, albeit that the defects were only discovered 
later. There was no question there of a gap in time between a tender of performance and the 
acceptance of that tender. 
 
 It is hardly surprising that when the Heavy Metal went on appeal
102
 the appeal court found 
it unnecessary to pronounce on the correctness of this passage in the judgment of the court 
below
103
. It upheld the decision of the court below on the simple ground that, whilst the seller 
could have remedied its breach at any time before delivery it had to be accepted that any breach 
that occurred was a breach committed before delivery.104  It is apparent from the judgment that it 
was accepted that this conclusion would be decisive of the appeal but it is unclear why that 
should have been so. The judgment does not deal with the point that what the claimant was 
seeking to recover was damages arising from the Sea Sonnet having been delivered in a defective 
condition. What it wanted to recover was the cost of remedying the defects. Whilst these defects 
should have been disclosed to the classification society before delivery and the failure to disclose 
them was a breach of the sale agreement the crucial question was whether these damages arose 
from this breach and whether it was necessary that they should have been suffered in order for the 
claim to have arisen. This issue is not dealt with in the judgment nor was it raised or dealt with in 
argument.  
 
                                                 
102 MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Maritime Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA). 
103 Para 53, 1099D. 
104 Para 53, 1099B-D.  In other words it did not draw a distinction between the tender of delivery and delivery itself. 
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 The applicant for the arrest had accepted delivery and elected not to resile from the sale
105
. 
The claim for damages that it intended pursuing in arbitration proceedings was dependent on 
such acceptance, as until it accepted the vessel it had not suffered the damages that it was trying 
to recover. This should have created an obstacle in the path of the court’s conclusion. The 
difficulty was that until delivery had been accepted by the purchaser it had not suffered any 
damages at all, even though the breach on which it purported to rely had occurred prior to 
delivery. Applying basic principles of causation the failure to report defects to the vessel’s 
classification society prior to delivery would not have given rise to the damages it now sought to 
recover.
106
 The claimant may have had a cause of action before delivery had it discovered the 
breach prior to that taking place, but that cause of action would have been for specific 
performance or for cancellation and damages, but not for the damages that it was actually seeking 
to recover, namely the cost of remedying the defects in the vessel. The claim that was to be 
pursued against the seller and in respect of which security was being sought was a claim arising 
from the fact that the vessel was defective when delivered, not one flowing from the failure to 
report defects to the Classification Society.   
 
 The issue arising from this is to determine when a claim arises for the purpose of the 
section. Care must be taken not to confuse this question with the question when a claim arises for 
the purposes of prescription although reference will need to be made to cases dealing with that 
topic. The need for caution arises from the fact that we are dealing with an expression in a South 
African statute and the primary issue is the meaning to be given to it in that statute. That meaning 
will apply irrespective of the legal regime governing prescription of the claim, which may vary 
depending on the legal system that governs the claim.107 It would be inappropriate for the 
                                                 
105 See judgment in the court a quo, 483F-G. 
106
 International Shipping Co Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 700E - I.  Whilst that case dealt with a delictual 
claim the approach to causation has been held to be applicable in other fields including contract.  Napier v Collett 
and another 1995 (3) SA 140 (A) 143E-144B; Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd and another v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 
(2) SA 719 (SCA)  
107
 Society of Lloyd's v Price; Society of Lloyd's v Lee 2006 (5) SA 393 (SCA) 
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meaning of a provision in a South African statute to vary depending on the vagaries of foreign 
laws governing prescription. The only legal system governing prescription that may be relevant 
will then be that of South Africa and then only for the light that it can cast upon the meaning of 
the expression ‘when the maritime claim arose’. 
 
 Ordinarily a claim cannot be said to have arisen unless there is a cause upon which the 
claimant can sue.  In this regard there is ample authority that a claim for damages is not complete 
in South African law until damages have actually been suffered. It suffices in this regard to quote 





‘The plaintiff's claim in this case is founded upon an allegation of negligent conduct 
during the months of February, March and April, 1934; that is, upon wrongful acts 
complete and finished when the spraying was completed. It is an action for damages for 
negligence under an extension of the Lex Aquilia, and the right of action in such a case is 
complete as soon as damage is caused to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's 
negligent act (see Union Government v Warneke (1911, A.D. at p. 665); Coetzee v S.A. 
Railways and Harbours 1933 CPD 565).  By the word damage is not meant the injury to 
the property injured, but the damnum, that is the loss suffered by the plaintiff by reason of 
the negligent act (see Grueber, Lex Aquilia (p. 233)). 
  
Whilst that was a case of a claim for damages for delictual wrongdoing the same principle applies 
in the case of contractual damages in South African law
109
. Until there has been loss there is no 
complete cause of action. Central to the existence of a claim is that the elements making up that 
claim are all in existence. Where one or more of those elements is missing the claim has not 
arisen although its future existence may be predictable. However, there may be circumstances in 
which, even though the claim has arisen because a breach of contract or wrongful act has been 
perpetrated and loss has been suffered, the ability to pursue the claim is inhibited. This will be so 
in a contractual situation where the debtor has been given time to pay or in claims against certain 
                                                 
108 1938 AD 584, 588.  The position is no different in English law. Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2006] 
4 All ER 1161 (CA), para 19; Law Society v Sephton & Co [2006] 3 All ER 401 (HL). 
109
 Swart v Van derVyver 1970 (1) SA 633 (A) 643C-D and 650F-G; Escom v Stewarts and Lloyds SA (Pty) Ltd 1979 
(4) SA 905 (W) 908G-909H.  
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statutory bodies where notice must be given before action can be commenced.
110
 In that event 
while the claim may have arisen it is not due and prescription does not commence to run under 
the Prescription Act111. The SCA has held that the question of when a claim arises under the 
provisions of section 11 of the Act is determined by asking when the claim comes into existence 
relying on the meaning of that term as explained in these authorities on prescription.112 Applying 
those principles to the question of when the maritime claim arose in the Heavy Metal the answer 
appears to be that there was a breach of contract prior to delivery that could have given rise to 
remedies such as the right to resile from the contract and claim consequential damages or a 
refusal to accept the tender of delivery until the defects had been remedied, but that the claim for 
damages that was in fact being pursued did not arise until after delivery had been taken. In those 
circumstances ownership had passed when that claim arose and an essential requisite for 
establishing the association was not present. 
 
  A perusal of the judgment suggests that the court’s attention was not drawn to this 
difficulty.  In the court a quo the argument had been addressed on the basis of when the breach 
occurred and not when the loss was suffered. The heads of argument filed with the Supreme 
Court of Appeal on behalf of the appellant did not raise the point but deal only with the question 
of when the breach of contract occurred and not with whether the claim for damages that was in 
                                                 
110 The distinction between a claim being due and a claim having arisen was said to be elementary in Cohen v 
Haywood 1948 (3) SA 365 (A) 371. It was explained by Miller J in Apalamah v Santam Insurance Co Ltd and 
Another 1975 (2) SA 229 (D) 232E - G as follows: 'Although it is true that in many cases the date upon which a debt 
''becomes due'' might also be the date upon which it ''arose'', that is obviously not true of all cases. There is a vital 
difference in concept between the coming into existence of a debt and the recoverability thereof. There can be little 
doubt, if any, that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting s12(1) of the new Prescription Act was to crystallise that 
difference; thenceforth prescription in terms of that Act began to run not necessarily when the debt arose but only 
when it became due.'  
111 Act 68 of 1969. 
112
 MV Forum Victory: Den Norske Bank ASA v Hans K Madsen CV and others (Fund constituting the proceeds of 
the sale of the mv Forum Victory) 2001 (3) SA 529 (SCA) para 14.  Whilst the Court reserved the position under 
s3(7) there is no apparent reason for distinguishing this section from the identical wording in s11.  
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issue had arisen at that stage113. The only submission made by the appellant was that on a proper 
interpretation of clause 11 of the MOA there could be no breach until delivery and that it was 
only on delivery of the Sea Sonnet that the maritime claim could have arisen. It is clear therefore 
that the point was not raised114 and this has subsequently been confirmed115. That explains why 
the court did not address it in its judgment and why it cannot provide authority for the general 
proposition that in a case involving the sale of a vessel a claim by the disgruntled purchaser that 
the vessel was delivered in a defective condition arises before delivery.   
 
 The same issue arose in the case of the Alam Tenggiri116. The dispute was one that arose 
out of the purchase of a vessel, in that case two new buildings, where there was a complaint 
concerning the suitability of their paint coating for the carriage of particular chemicals. Again the 
problem was that the two ships concerned passed into the ownership of the purchasers before the 
                                                 
113 I am grateful to Michael Posemann, who was the attorney for the successful respondent, for making copies of the 
heads of argument available to me.  His recollection of the argument and that of counsel who appeared in the appeal 
is that the point was never raised. 
114 Counsel for the respondent appear to have been alive to the point because in their heads of argument they 
advanced the submission on the basis of List v Jungers 1979 (3) SA 106 (A) 121 C-E that it made no difference that 
the damages only became recoverable after delivery had taken place, because a claim may arise before damages 
become recoverable. However that case is not authority for this proposition.  It dealt with an undertaking to pay a 
debt and the argument was whether the undertaking was conditional on non-payment by a particular date or whether 
it was an unconditional undertaking.  In the latter event the obligation arose for prescription purposes when the 
undertaking was given and in the former it only arose once the condition was fulfilled.  The case was not concerned 
with when a claim for damages arose but with when a contractual obligation to pay an amount of money arose.  The 
question of when a claim for damages for breach of contract arose was the issue in the Heavy Metal but it was not 
dealt with by the court.  In the light of the approach of the respondent’s counsel it seems unlikely that reliance was 
being placed on the English rule that a breach of contract will always give rise to a right to recover nominal damages 
even if no damage is suffered. Chitty on Contracts (29th Ed, 2004) Vol 1, para 26-004, 1427.  It does not appear that 
evidence of foreign law was lead and in any event such a contention would raise other difficulties, not least of which 
being whether it is permissible to have regard to foreign law on the point or whether the question of when a claim 
arises under the Act is a matter to be determined by the principles of South African law.  In South Africa it is 
essential for a person claiming damages to allege and prove those damages and in the absence of such proof there is 
no entitlement to nominal damages. Steenkamp v Juriaanse 1907 TS 980. 
115 In mv Cape Courage: Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd and another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA), para 
[18]. 
116 MV Alam Tenggiri Golden Seabird Maritime Inc and another v Alam Tenggiri SDN BHD and another 2001 (4) 
SA 1329 (SCA) 
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causes of complaint were discovered. The contention by the sellers was that the claims only arose 
once delivery of the vessel had taken place and as this was simultaneous with the transfer of 
ownership to the purchasers there was never a moment when the claim existed but the vessel 
remained in the ownership of the seller. In terms of the contract it was expressly contemplated 
that payment, delivery and the passing of ownership would take place simultaneously.  However 
human affairs can rarely be ordered so exactly particularly when events take place in three 
different centres across a number of time zones. In the result the crews went on board the vessels 
a few moments before payment for the vessels was made so it was contended that there was a 
brief interval during which the seller owned the vessels but the purchaser had a claim. However 
there was dispute among the experts as to whether ownership passed when physical delivery took 
place even though payment had not yet been effected. In the result the court held that the 
claimant purchasers had failed to prove that when their claims arose the vessels were still owned 
by the sellers and accordingly had failed to prove that the Alam Tenggiri was an associated ship 
in relation to the vessels they had purchased. 
 
 Issues such as these will inevitably arise when there is a change in ownership of the ship 
concerned at much the same time as the maritime claim arises
117
. Usually this will be in a 
situation where the claim arises from the sale of the vessel and the question will be whether the 
ship concerned was owned by the debtor at the time that the claim arose. It must be stressed 
however that this is not indicative of a flaw in the Act. In the majority of instances the precise 
time when a claim arises will not be of significance to the question of association and the identity 
of the owner of the ship concerned at that time will be apparent. The issues in these cases arose 
from the nature of the claims being advanced and the circumstances in which they arose. In the 
two cases where an arrest was granted and upheld there was no analysis of the different type of 
claims. In the three where it was seriously debated the arrest was set aside at first instance. The 
                                                 
117 They arose in MV ‘Silver Constellation’: Ipanema Navigation Corporation v MV ‘Silver Constellation’, A 
68/2007 (DCLD); SCOSA  C141 where the arrest was set aside on the basis that the claim only arose simultaneously 
with the passing of ownership. A similar conclusion was reached by the same judge in the mv ‘Cape Courage’: 
Qannas Shipping and another v Bulkship Union SA and another, Case No A74/2006 (DCLD); SCOSA C124. The 
latter judgment was reversed on appeal. Both judgments have been followed in MT ‘Active’/ ‘A Dragon’: Trienergy 
Transportation Corporation v mt  ‘Aristidis’, A70/2007 (DCLD), SCOSA C 149 (D). 
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matter has now been the subject of a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal and that decision 
must now be examined. 
 




 This was another case of the sale of a ship. After delivery the purchaser complained that the 
vessel was defective in various respects. It accordingly advanced claims for damages (not for 
cancellation of the sale) based upon breaches of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) under 
which the ship had been purchased. These claims were related to clause 11 of the memorandum 
(which provided that the vessel should be delivered and taken over in substantially the same 
condition as when inspected, fair wear and tear excepted), clause 18 (which provided that the 
vessel should be delivered 'with her present BV class maintained, free of outstanding 
recommendations and average damage affecting her present class at the time of delivery') and a 
term implied by s 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) (that the vessel was of 
satisfactory quality or fit for the purpose for which it was sold)
119
. It sought the arrest of the Cape 
Courage as an associated ship in relation to the vessel that was sold. All of these claims were 
held to be established at the requisite prima facie level and the only question was whether at the 
time the claims arose in terms of section 3(7)(a) the seller was the owner of the ship concerned. If 
the purchaser’s claims arose only upon delivery of the vessel to the purchaser then the associated 
ship arrest of the Cape Courage was not permissible because it was not owned by a company 
controlled by the same person or persons as the ship concerned at the time the maritime claim 
arose. 
 
 The competing contentions of the parties were straightforward. The seller contended in 
accordance with what is set out above that the meaning of the expression ‘when the maritime 
claim arose’ fell to be determined by South African law and in accordance with the authorities 
                                                 
118 mv Cape Courage: Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd and another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA). 
119A further claim based upon misrepresentation was not pursued in the light of the approach of the court although 
the judgment reaches a conclusion in regard to delictual claims as well as contractual claims.  
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discussed earlier that only occurred once the purchaser suffered some damage, which could only 
occur after delivery and the passing of ownership. The purchaser contended that the claim arose 
when the wrong giving rise to the claim occurred and did not involve the purchaser in having a 
complete cause of action. Accordingly in respect of a claim based on a breach of contract it is the 
date of the breach and in the case of a claim based in delict it is the date of the wrong that 
constitutes the claim having arisen. 
 
 The court held that the issue had not been considered in the Heavy Metal and should be 
considered as res nova. It distinguished and thereafter ignored its own judgment in the Forum 
Victory
120 where the similar expression in section 11(4)(c) of the Act was construed in 
accordance with the authorities already mentioned as meaning when a complete claim had come 
into existence. It did so on the basis of a statement in the earlier decision that: 
 
‘The expression ‘when the maritime claim arose in s 3(7) is perhaps no less ambiguous 
than the expression ‘claim which arose’ in s 11(4)(c). In these circumstances there would 
seem little to be gained by interpreting the one, in its different contextual setting, in order 
to serve as an aid to the interpretation of the other.’ 
 
However, that is hardly a sufficient basis for distinguishing the decision. The court in the Forum 
Victory did not say that the two expressions bore a different meaning and it could hardly have 
done so bearing in mind the general rule of interpretation that where a statute uses the same 
expression in different sections it will usually intend them to have the same meaning121. All that 
it said was that it was not helpful in resolving the question of the meaning of the expression in the 
context of the provisions concerning priorities to have regard to the complex provisions 
concerning associated ships. This does not necessarily mean that when the problem has to be 
addressed in relation to associated ships there is no need to consider whether any reasons arising 
from the difference in context dictate that a different meaning should be given to it. It certainly 
                                                 
120  MV Forum Victory: Den Norske Bank ASA v Hans K Madsen CV and others (Fund constituting the proceeds of 
the sale of the mv Forum Victory) 2001 (3) SA 529 (SCA) 
121
 Minister of Interior v Machadadorp Investments (Pty )Ltd and another 1957 (2) SA 395 (A) at 404C-E. 
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does not mean that the court can simply disregard its own previous decision or the reasons that 
led it to the conclusion that the meaning of the expression is ‘when a claim comes into existence’ 
by which it meant that all the elements of the claim had to exist albeit that the claim was not 
presently enforceable122. It must at the least identify the reasons for holding that in the present 
case the legislature intended a different meaning to attach and this it made no attempt to do.  It is 
also appropriate to bear in mind that the reservation expressed in that case was expressed in the 
context of an argument that if reference is made to the expression in section 3(7)(c) anomalies 
would arise if that were construed as meaning that the claim was payable as opposed to merely 
having arisen. The problem here presented was a contention that a claim could arise when all the 
elements of a claim had not yet come into existence. That was a novel proposition departing from 
all previous consideration of similar topics in South African law which one would have thought 
reinforced the presumption that in using it the legislature did not have in mind a special meaning 
but one that would be familiar to lawyers practising in this jurisdiction123 as meaning that the 
claim had come into existence albeit that it was not yet due. 
 
 The court’s reasoning commences with the approval of a view expressed in another 
unreported matter that the idea of origin is fundamental to dictionary definitions of the word 
‘arose’. It went on to say that the expression had been taken over from article 3(1) of the Arrest 
Convention dealing with the arrest of sister ships and quoted a passage it had cited in the Heavy 
Metal from the decision in The Banco
124
 in which Lord Denning said that the compromise 
embodied in the Arrest Convention was between the English rule that only one-ship could be 
arrested and the European approach that more than one-ship could be arrested. It accepted that 
the associated ship is different from a sister ship but said that the requirement that the owner or 
controller of the ship sought to be arrested must be the same as the owner or controller of the ship 
concerned ‘when the maritime claim arose’ is the same as the provision in article 3(1). However 
                                                 
122 Para [16] of the judgment in the Forum Victory. 
123 See the Forum Victory para [14] where the court made a similar point. 
124 The Banco  [1971] 1 All ER 524 (PDA and CA) 531; [1971] 1 Ll. L. Rep. 49 
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the court had not been referred to any international jurisprudence on the meaning of the term and 
the judge (Farlam JA) had been unable to find any.125 Then follows the crucial passage which 
reads as follows: 
 
‘[23] In my view it is significant that in cases other than those involving maritime liens, 
where other considerations apply, for a maritime claim to be enforced by an action in rem 
the owner of the property to be arrested must be liable to the claimant in an action in 
personam in respect of the cause of action concerned. When one realises that the owner 
or controller of the 'offending ship' has to be personally liable on the claim, it becomes 
clear that it is really inappropriate to speak of the 'offending ship': it is really the 
'offending owner' (or controller) who should be looked at because property owned or 
controlled by it, in the form of another ship, becomes liable to be arrested when the 
associated ship provision is utilised. It accordingly makes sense, when a claim has 
'originated' and enough factors are present to indicate that the owner or controller of the 
ship concerned at that time (or those for whose actions or omissions it is liable) has 
'offended', that another ship owned or controlled by that person when the claim is 
enforced may be arrested in respect of the claim. Damage resulting from the offending 
actions or omissions by the owner or controller (or for which it is liable) may not yet have 
been suffered but if it is clear that it will in due course be suffered, I think that it is not 
stretching language to say that the claim has 'arisen'. Although the point did not form the 
subject of the decision in the case it is interesting to note that Gaudron, Gummow and 
Kirby JJ, in their judgment in Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping 
Limited (1997) 190 CLR 181 (H C of A) used the expression 'when the cause of action. 
arose' in speaking of a date when a breach occurred but before the damages in question 
were suffered. The case concerned a voyage charterparty for the carriage of a cargo of 
bagged rice from Bangkok to Nouakchott in Mauritania. The agreement was breached on 
8 July 1995 at Bangkok when the charterers failed to ensure proper fumigation of the 
cargo, leading to the infestation of the cargo by a species of beetle. As a result of this the 
vessel was arrested in Mauritania and the owners subsequently claimed $1 833 285 as 
damages from the charterers in consequence of the arrest, which included interest and the 
cost of obtaining the release of the vessel and also certain demurrage and dead freight 
charges alleged to be due under the charterparty. These damages would all appear to have 
been suffered after the failure to fumigate. Yet Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ said (at 
200): '(o)n 8 July 1995, when the cause of action of the respondent against the appellant 
arose on the respondent's general maritime claim concerning the Nyanza …'  
[24] In the circumstances I am satisfied that the appellant's submissions regarding the 
meaning of the phrase 'when the maritime claim arose' in s3(7)(a) are correct and that it 
was also correctly submitted that the claims under clauses 11 and 18 of the memorandum 
of agreement and s 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 as well as the claims in tort 
based on alleged misrepresentations all arose when the first respondent was still the 
owner of the MV 'Pearl of Fujairah'.’ 
 
                                                 
125 My research has similarly not uncovered any international case dealing with the meaning of the expression. 
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The outcome of the case was accordingly that the arrest of the associated ship was sustained. It is 
suggested with respect however that it is entirely unclear from the judgment on what principled 
basis the court reached the conclusion that it did or indeed exactly what that conclusion is. To 
adopt the remarks of Friedman J concerning another decision by that court126 the conclusion that 
the court reached does not appear to be deduced from any process of legal reasoning but is rather 
the result of a policy decision that it would not be appropriate merely because of the fact that the 
claimant became the owner of the ship concerned under the very transaction giving rise to the 
claim not to afford it the advantages offered by the associated ship jurisdiction.127 
 
 One can have little difficulty with the general notion that the origin of the claim is pertinent 
to the question when the claim arose. However it is not apparent that this insight assists in 
resolving the interpretational problem. In the first instance its relevance depends upon what one 
means when one speaks of the origins of the claim. In one sense one may merely be asking the 
same question in different words, which is generally a pointless and unhelpful exercise, 
particularly when one is replacing the established legal concept of a claim arising with a notion of 
origin hitherto unknown to the law. In another sense one is replacing the question of when the 
claim arose with an abstract question of causation, which is an entirely different matter, not raised 
by the section. A plant may have its origins in a seed but if the statute requires one to identify at 
what point it becomes a plant it is simply wrong to ask where the plant has its origins as opposed 
to when it became a plant. Similarly to ask when the claim had its origins instead of when it arose 
alters the enquiry and removes it to an unnecessary level of abstraction as appears when one 
presses the enquiry in rather more detail than did the court. 
 
                                                 
126 In Thathiah v Khan NO 1982 (3) SA 370 (D) 375B-C concerning the decision of the then Appellate Division in 
Magwaza v Heenan 1979 (2) SA 1019 (A). 
127 Similar remarks are to be found in the judgment of Nugent JA in Makambi v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 
2008 (5) SA 449 (SCA) paras [21] and [37] to [39] who cites the Chief Justice’s statement in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 
2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) para [174] that courts must be careful not to substitute their own policy choices into a statute 
for those of the legislature. Equally they should not insert policy choices into legislation without the clearest possible 
indication that those choices coincide with those of the legislature. 
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 The claims in the present case had their origin in the conclusion of the MOA in respect of a 
vessel that was not fit for the purposes for which it was sold. Whichever way the claim was 
formulated the same damage was complained of and, as no intervening cause was relied on128, 
this implies that the vessel must have been both out of class and unseaworthy at the time the 
MOA was entered into. Accordingly the factual foundation for the claims based on the vessel 
being out of class and unseaworthiness rested upon facts that existed when the MOA was 
concluded. Why then is that not the origin of the claims? After all that is what formed the 
substance of the complaint. The likelihood of those claims being brought to fruition and 
acquiring a monetary component by the delivery and acceptance of the vessel was as great at that 
stage as when delivery was tendered. Logically that seems to be the appropriate time to speak of 
if the enquiry is when the claim had its origins. The origins of the claim lay in the deficiencies in 
the steel plating which had the result according to the claimant that the vessel was sold in an 
unseaworthy condition and suffering from defects that affected her class. The origin of the claim 
lay in that fact and the conclusion of the MOA, but it is clearly absurd to speak of a claim based 
on breach of contract arising when the contract is concluded. Instead the court selected the date of 
delivery. The point when delivery is tendered is merely a continuation of the events that had their 
source in the conclusion of the agreement itself. The tender of delivery adds nothing to the 
identification of the origin of the claim. It is merely an arbitrary point along the continuum of 
events that started with the conclusion of the MOA.  True the act of tendering delivery constitutes 
the breach of the contract and is therefore a component of the legal claim that will come into 
existence once damages are suffered. However it is not the origin in any significant practical 
sense of that claim and nor is the origin of the claim in a legal sense as the conclusion of the 
MOA and the existence of the defects are all part of the claim in a legal sense. To say that the 
claim has arisen when the breach occurs is the same as saying that the plant exists when the seed 
is planted but before it germinates or that the cake exists when the ingredients are placed in the 
mixing bowl but before it is put in the oven. Whether viewed as a statement of fact in regard to 
                                                 
128 As the complaint related to the thickness of the vessel’s steel plating it could hardly have been a problem arising 
after the conclusion of the MOA.It was clearly a pre-existing condition 
 246
the claim arising or as a statement of law it is simply wrong because the claim does not at that 
time exist and whether it will ever exist is dependent upon other later events occurring.  
 
 It cannot be stressed too often that a claim is not an abstract set of events but a legal 
concept and its parameters, and hence whether it has arisen, is a legal question to be answered by 
an application of the legal principles relevant to the identification and existence of that claim. It is 
legitimate to ask why one should take the moment of tendering delivery as the key when the 
problems must on any basis have been extant prior to that? Why is that breach of contract or legal 
duty critical especially when one has regard to the fact that the seller may breach the contract 
even though it is not aware of the defects in the vessel giving rise to that breach? After all breach 
of contract is not a matter of intentional wrongdoing but a case of absolute liability irrespective of 
the knowledge or intention of the party in breach. The condition of the vessel that forms the basis 
for the claim must in this case have subsisted at the time of conclusion of the MOA, so that 
objectively speaking and with the benefit of hindsight a breach was always likely and indeed 
inherent in the contract itself. To select an arbitrary date at some point in the process of giving 
effect to the MOA as the date upon which the claim arose as opposed to the date when the claim 
came into existence is simply arbitrary and not the result of an exercise in statutory construction. 
On any date that one selects prior to the giving and acceptance of delivery there was no claim in 
the legal sense of a claim on which the claimant could either then, or at some later stage if the 
claim was not yet due, recover. The section speaks of the date when a maritime claim arose, but 
there is no claim at the prior stage identified by the court, merely the potential for a claim to arise 
at some stage in the future depending on what happens. It cannot be material to answering the 
issue of statutory interpretation that the claim is very likely to arise. In any event that creates its 
own difficulties in regard to the date when the claim arose. The section speaks of the claim 
arising not the likelihood of a claim arising. The excursus into questions of its origins does not 
assist in the construction of the section. When a claim originates depends upon what one means 
by a claim and when one is speaking of a claim for damages that claim includes the damages 
because in the absence of damage, and therefore damages, there can be no claim at all.  Any other 
enquiry is not addressed to the correct question. 
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 The references by the court to the Arrest Convention and the judgment in The Banco do not 
advance the consideration of the issue before it. Accepting for the present that in the borrowing 
from the Arrest Convention that was admittedly a feature of the drafting of some portions of the 
Act the draftsman adopted the language of the Convention in speaking of ‘when the claim arose’, 
that would only be relevant or helpful if there was some settled international meaning attaching to 
the expression that could guide our courts in construing it. However as the judgment goes on to 
accept there is no such settled meaning or indeed any authority of which the court was aware that 
could be of assistance. Nor is there any standard understanding of this expression that could be 
adopted. All that we know therefore is that if the problem arises in any other jurisdiction they will 
be in the same position as our courts in interpreting something that has no a priori meaning. The 
court is accordingly on a featureless ocean where the only guides available to it are those 
provided by its own jurisprudence, which are usually the safest guides when construing a 
domestic statute. After all it was accepted that this was the task facing the court and that it was a 
task that fell to be dealt with in accordance with the principles of South African law
129
. One can 
accordingly discard the Arrest Convention in considering the problem. It is interesting to note 
that neither side referred to it in either the written or the oral argument before the SCA.  
 
 One moves on then to the key passage in the judgment quoted above.  It starts with the 
proposition that in cases other than those involving maritime liens the owner of the ship 
concerned must be personally liable for the claim. Leaving aside that this statement is incorrect 
when dealing with an associated ship because it fails to take account of the deemed ownership of 
the ship concerned that attaches to a charterer of the vessel and accepting that the point sought to 
be made is that the aim of the associated ship jurisdiction is to make available for arrest a vessel 
owned or controlled by a person who is personally liable for the claim or who controls the 
company that is liable for the claim, it is difficult to see on what basis one can ignore the case of 
a maritime lien. After all an associated ship can be arrested in respect of a claim giving rise to a 
maritime lien and the same question will arise in that situation, namely when did the maritime 
lien arise and who owned the ship concerned or controlled the company that owned it at that 
                                                 
129 Para [16] of the judgment. 
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time. The notion following from this that one is concerned not with the ‘offending ship’ but with 
the ‘offending owner’ creates similar problems to those that have arisen in England as a result of 
the judgment in the Indian Grace 130 where the approach of ignoring the maritime lien was 
adopted. In addition it introduces a novel concept of the ‘offending ship’ not previously 
encountered in the jurisprudence on this topic, save in the dramatic language of Lord Denning in 
The Banco, which was not directed at indicating that in actions in rem it was the owner rather 
than the ship that is liable. Historically the vessel in respect of which the claim arises is referred 
to as ‘the ship concerned’, which is appropriate as there may be no wrongdoing by the ship 
concerned in relation to the claim. The use of the pejorative expression becomes a rhetorical 
device to transit from the notion of the ‘offending ship’ to the notion of an ‘offending owner’ and 
thence to the notion of ‘offence’ which is equated to breach. This is a play on words rather than a 
process of legal reasoning. There seems to be no appreciation that it is a view that has profound 
implications for the understanding of the nature of the action in rem itself as will emerge from the 
discussion in the final chapter of this work. 
 
 But even if one does accept that this concept has some validity and that in the vast majority 
of cases one is dealing with a claim for which the owner of the ship concerned is liable that does 
not resolve the question of when the claim against that owner arose. If one speaks of an offending 
owner one can only do so in the context of a claim against that owner. The law is not concerned 
with making moral judgments about the conduct of shipowners. It is concerned with the more 
prosaic question of their legal liability for claims. It is only when their offending conduct, such as 
a breach of contract or delict, has caused damage, and hence that the party injured thereby has 
suffered damages, that the law intervenes to remedy the offence. And that is what the particular 
provision under consideration does. It is not concerned with the offending owner but with the 
claim and when that claim arises. If it arose at a time when A was the owner of the ship 
concerned and that renders vessels owned or controlled by A liable to be arrested as associated 
ships that fact is of no assistance in answering the question of when the claim arose. An owner 
                                                 
130 Republic of India v India Steamship Company Limited (Indian Grace)(No. 2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL). Also 
reported as The Indian Endurance (No. 2), Republic of India and another v India Steamship Company Limited 
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may ‘offend’ in the sense that the judge used that expression but no claim may ever arise. For 
example the other party may undertake an inspection of the vessel, note the defect and demand 
that it be remedied. A surveyor from the classification society may come on board to certify some 
routine matter and in the course of their duties become aware of something that leads the 
classification society to impose a condition on class, that the ‘offending’ seller then has to 
remedy. The purchaser’s master and crew may come on board for an orientation and detect that 
something is amiss with the vessel. All of this may well occur after delivery is tendered. In those 
events there is no claim and it is difficult to see on what basis one can speak of a claim having 
arisen. 
 
 This last point highlights the central problem with the approach adopted by the court in the 
Cape Courage namely that intervening events may ensure that there is never an exigible claim at 
all. In all of the examples mentioned above the problem will be resolved before loss is suffered.  
It is of little help to say that the claim has arisen and then gone away. The section does not 
contemplate the magician’s mantra: ‘Now you see it. Now you don’t.’ There is no comparable 
situation where a claim may exist one minute and cease to exist the next. Let me take one more 
example arising from experience in a case where an oil drill rig slipped its moorings in Cape 
Town harbour and caused severe damage to a number of vessels as it caroomed around the 
harbour in high winds. What happens if the vessel that is the subject of the sale is sunk in a storm 
or as a result of a collision after the tender of delivery? Clearly the prior failures that might have 
matured into claims had delivery been effected and the purchaser realised that there had been 
breaches of the MOA would never in fact become claims. The consequence of the vessel being 
lost would depend upon the incidence of the risk and the terms of the MOA. Yet in terms of this 
judgment maritime claims for damages for the breach of the MOA have arisen prior to the loss 
and are quantifiable only on the basis of delivery occurring. The question must then be asked 
what happens to these claims. Clearly they cannot be pursued yet in terms of the judgment they 
would form the proper foundation for the arrest of an associated ship. That cannot be correct, yet 
it is the clear consequence of the judgment.  
                                                                                                                                                              
(1997) 4 All ER 380 (HL). 
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 The only purpose of identifying that a claim against the ship concerned has arisen is to 
enable the claimant to arrest an associated ship, yet in the situation under consideration by the 
court no such arrest would have been possible until after the transfer of ownership of the ship 
concerned to the purchaser which is the time when a claim would have come into existence. That 
is not a result contemplated by the section. The inability to arrest would arise because the 
claimant would not yet have suffered any damage or any loss. An argument that such damage 
was overwhelmingly probable or indeed certain was considered and rejected by Beldam LJ in 
relation to an attempt to obtain a Mareva injunction in The Vera Cruz 1 and similar arguments 
have consistently failed in the United Kingdom
131
. The contention in those cases that once 
delivery was effected the existence of a claim was certain did not affect matters. Regrettably the 
SCA did not grapple with these authorities or any of the others to which it was referred in the 
course of argument. 
 
 The end result is the conclusion expressed in the following passage, which bears repeating 
because it highlights the vagueness and uncertainty occasioned by the decision and the absence of 
an underlying principle in it. It is the statement that: 
 
‘It accordingly makes sense, when a claim has 'originated' and enough factors are 
present to indicate that the owner or controller of the ship concerned at that time (or 
those for whose actions or omissions it is liable) has 'offended', that another ship owned 
or controlled by that person when the claim is enforced may be arrested in respect of the 
claim. Damage resulting from the offending actions or omissions by the owner or 
controller (or for which it is liable) may not yet have been suffered but if it is clear that it 
will in due course be suffered, I think that it is not stretching language to say that the 
claim has 'arisen'. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Clearly damage had not yet been suffered and there was no prospect that it would be suffered 
until delivery was accepted and ownership passed so one is left with the concept of a claim 
arising before damage is suffered on the basis that a claim that does not exist has ‘originated’ and 
                                                 
131
 The Veracruz I [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 353 (CA) 357-359. See also Ninemia Corporation v Trave 
Shiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H und Co K G (The Niedersachsen) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 (CA) and The P [1992] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 470 [QB (Com Ct)]. 
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that there are ‘enough factors’ to show that its owner or controller has ‘offended’. This is taken 
together with the court’s view, arrived at with the benefit of hindsight, that damage will be 
suffered. Respect and restraint require that one confine oneself to saying that this is a remarkably 
amorphous concept of a claim arising. It raises more questions than it answers. Three points are 
sufficient to identify the major problems it occasions. Firstly, as already discussed, it is not 
possible to determine when or on what basis a claim can be said to have originated. Secondly it is 
impossible to tell what factors are relevant to knowing when the owner (and here for the first time 
and without prior discussion the court introduces the notion of other persons for whom the owner 
is liable without saying if that includes cases of maritime liens) has ‘offended’. Thirdly it is 
impossible for anyone standing at the point of breach to say with confidence that damage will be 
suffered as opposed to predicting that it will probably be suffered. The court then refers ‘as a 
matter of interest’ to an Australian case that has no bearing on the issue132 but coincidentally uses 
a similar expression because it happens to be the words of the section of the Australian legislation 
under which the issue in that case arose. It is plainly irrelevant and unhelpful. 
 
 With respect the judgment lacks any persuasive basis in established legal principle. It can 
only be explained on the basis that the court took a policy decision that it was wrong or unfair for 
the purchaser in that situation to fall outside the category of persons entitled to invoke the 
associated ship jurisdiction
133
. Although the judgment covers all cases where some of the events 
                                                 
132 Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping Limited (1997) 190 CLR 181 (H C of A). The case dealt 
with the question of the meaning of the word ‘charterer’ in s19 of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth). It had nothing to do 
with the meaning of the expression ‘when the cause of action arose’ in the same section and in using it in the cited 
judgment their Honours were merely repeating the words of the section. The argument before the court was that a 
voyage charterer did not fall within the meaning of ‘charterer’ and this argument was rejected.  The significance 
attached to the fact that their Honours referred to a claim arising when a breach occurred and before damage was 
suffered needs to be seen in the light of the fact that under the common law a breach of contract gives rise to an 
entitlement to claim nominal damages so that the claim is said to arise when the breach occurs. It is by no means 
clear that either an English or Australian court confronted with statutory wording in the context of a provision similar 
to section 3(7) would hold that the claim arose before damage was suffered. The cases concerning Mareva 
injunctions suggest otherwise. All that this does is highlight the importance of context before engaging in borrowing 
from other jurisdictions. 
133 If that is correct it did so without articulating that policy thereby ignoring Lord Steyn’s caution that ‘judges ought 
to strive to give the real reasons for their decision’. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 4All ER 961 (HL) 
977j  
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giving rise to a claim have occurred before the claim comes into existence and the ownership of 
the ship concerned changes before the claim has fully come into existence the situation is a 
special one. It is most likely to arise in the situation where a maritime claim arises out of an 
agreement for the sale of a vessel where the purchaser is disappointed in the quality of goods 
delivered and seeks a remedy. As the purchaser is now the owner of the ship concerned its 
prospects of obtaining redress are likely to be small if the vessel was previously owned by a one-
ship company. Hence the wish to invoke the associated ship jurisdiction. However the judgment 
also covers other situations in which there may be a change in ownership of a vessel while a 
claim is in the process of coming to full fruition. Repossession of a vessel sold on terms because 
of failure to comply with those terms; the collapse of a shipping group or a need to realise cash 
rapidly resulting in a ‘fire sale’ of a vessel in the course of a voyage, or the abandonment of a 
vessel to its underwriters after a maritime incident all provide possible instances where the 
judgment could be relevant. Against this background of the potential scope of application of the 
decision the difficulty is to identify the reasons of policy that moved the court to its conclusion. 
All that one can perceive is an undercurrent of sympathy for the situation of the purchaser in the 
key highlighted passage from the judgment134. However sympathy is hardly a proper basis for the 
interpretation of legislation and no reasons are given for affording such sympathy to purchasers 
of ships who are presumably capable of protecting their own interests by customary commercial 
means if they think it necessary to do so. Every consideration of principle pointed to the opposite 
conclusion and there are dangers in a court departing from principle in order to facilitate a result 
that it thinks will be fair to a particular litigant. Ours is not the only jurisdiction that has noted 
that hard cases make bad law and it is in any event not clear why the claim of the purchaser of a 
ship is a hard case worthy of special consideration.  
 
 Accepting that a policy perspective underpinned the judgment there are other policy 
considerations that should have been borne in mind. An unconvincing judgment based on 
unarticulated reasons of policy or sympathy for one type of litigant may attract the charge that 
                                                 
134 The court also faced the predicament that if it dismissed the appeal that would have demonstrated that the result of 
the Heavy Metal was wrong. 
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South African courts are minded to exercise a broad jurisdiction in these matters to the advantage 
of South African lawyers135. In particular when taken together with the decision in the Heavy 
Metal and the continued articulation of the purpose of the jurisdiction as being directed at parties 
who have sought to avoid the sister ship jurisdiction of the Arrest Convention it gives the 
impression that our courts are hostile to the legitimate interests of shipowners. Unconvincing 
judgments on maritime issues from our highest court
136
 will make parties less willing to have 
resort to South African courts for the resolution of their disputes to the detriment of our legal 
system as a whole. Then when judgments are couched in the type of vague words of this decision 
137
 it produces uncertainty and confusion all of which is undesirable particularly in a commercial 
context. Lastly all of these considerations may redound to this country’s detriment if as a result 
other jurisdictions become reluctant to accept and enforce the judgments of our courts
138
. In 
international matters of which shipping cases form part that would be a very serious situation. 
Overall there can be little doubt that the judgment is wrong in principle and most unfortunate for 
our admiralty jurisdiction.  
    
(i) Practical implications of the need to identify when the claim arose 
 It is submitted that there is a practical lesson from the general discussion of this topic even 
though it has to some extent been thrown into disarray and confusion by the judgment in the 
                                                 
135 This is not mere speculation on my part. It has been reported to me that precisely that suggestion was made at a 
recent meeting of London maritime lawyers about the likely stance of the South African government to complaints 
about the associated ship jurisdiction, the suggestion being that the response to a complaint would be that it is a nice 
little fee-earner for South African lawyers and a positive enhancement of South Africa’s balance of payments.   
136 It is the highest court in matters other than constitutional matters. 
137 The judgment uses ‘originated’ and ‘offended’ placing both expressions in inverted commas and says that in order 
to determine whether an owner has ‘offended’ one looks to see if ‘enough factors’ of an unspecified kind are present.   
138 Both South African courts (Jones v Krok 1996 (1) SA 504 (T)) and English courts (Adams v Cape Industries plc 
[1991] 1 All ER 929 (Ch D and CA)) have jibbed at the notion that they should enforce penal damages awards issued 
by United States courts. When the Act was drafted one of the concerns that underlay the retention of the action in 
rem was the view that jurisdiction obtained by attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem might not 
be recognised by foreign courts. An excessive claim to jurisdiction on the basis of the associated ship arrest raises the 
possibility of foreign courts not accepting judgments flowing from such jurisdiction or setting aside security obtained 
by means of such arrests. That would imperil the entire jurisdiction.  
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Cape Courage. Accepting that some claims may as a result of that decision arise earlier it is still 
necessary to identify the nature and basis for the claim being advanced before one can determine 
when that claim arose. It is now clear that a claim will certainly have arisen by no later than the 
time when it came into existence and not when it becomes due and payable. However a claim 
does not come into existence (arise) in South African law merely because there has been a breach 
of contract or an act of negligence. If the claim is one to recover damages then such claim only 
comes into existence when damage is suffered. There may be an immediate right to enforce or 
cancel the contract but that is not the same claim.139 The claim that is being advanced by the 
claimant must be identified in order to determine when that particular claim arose. In other words 
the question that must be posed in each instance is when the particular maritime claim relied on 
by the claimant arose. The importance of this becomes apparent where the arrest is a security 
arrest in terms of section 5(3) of the Act. In terms of that section such an arrest is permitted  ‘for 
the purpose of providing security for a claim’. The right to security is therefore expressly linked 
to a particular claim. However the position may well be that there are claims in respect of which 
there is an entitlement to security and other claims in respect of which there is no such 
entitlement. This may not emerge until a late stage as it is not a requirement for a security arrest 
that the arbitration or other proceedings should have commenced and the position may well be 
that no statement of claim or points of claim has been delivered in those proceedings at the stage 
that a security arrest is sought. Indeed the proceedings might not even have commenced as the 
claimant may take the practical point of view that unless it can obtain security it will not pursue 
such proceedings.  
 
                                                 
139 As to when claims arising from the same facts are the same or separate it will be helpful to have regard to cases 
arising from attempts to amend pleadings where the amendment is opposed on the basis that it seeks to introduce a 
new claim that has prescribed. There is a considerable body of authority on this question. See for example Evins v 
Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A); Sentrachem Ltd v Prinsloo 1997 (2) SA 1 (A); Associated Paint & 
Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd t/a Albestra Paint and Lacquers v Smit 2000 (2) SA 789 (SCA); CGU Insurance Ltd v 
Rumdel Construction (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 622 (SCA); Firstrand Bank Ltd v Nedbank (Swaziland) Ltd 2004 (6) SA 
317 (SCA). 
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 The practical difficulty is that once security has been furnished the South African court will 
ordinarily have little further interest in those proceedings140. In those circumstances the claims 
formulated by the claimant may diverge substantially from the claims formulated in the 
application for security.  Not all of such claims will be claims in respect of which it was entitled 
to security. Thus a claim for damages for breach of contractual obligations will ordinarily only 
arise when delivery takes place and if ownership passes simultaneously with delivery no 
associated ship arrest will be possible in respect of that claim. However a claim based on a prior 
misrepresentation at the time of concluding the contract may arise prior to delivery and the 
change of ownership. In those circumstances the claimant will be entitled to arrest the associated 
ship on the one claim but not the other. If the arrest is a security arrest the claimant will be 
entitled to security for the one claim but not the other. Courts and litigants must be alive to this 
and ensure that orders to provide security and the security itself are restricted to those claims in 
respect of which the claimant is entitled to such security. Otherwise the situation may arise that  
                                                 
140 Notwithstanding the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in MV Alam Tenggiri Golden Seabird Maritime 
Inc and another v Alam Tenggiri SDN BHD and another 2001 (4) SA 1329 (SCA) para 15 that once security has 
been furnished there is still a deemed arrest in terms of section 3(10)(a)(i) of the Act. 
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the claimant obtains security on one basis but pursues its claim in the relevant proceedings - 
usually in a foreign arbitration - on an entirely different basis.
141
 That is an abuse that the courts 
must be alert to prevent142 
                                                 
141 Comrie J noted that this is precisely what happened in the London arbitration involving the Heavy Metal. See MV 
Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 2000 (1) SA 286 (C) 293B. There the claim for 
security was based on a breach of clause 11 of the MOA but when the points of claim were served they included 
claims based on misrepresentation and implied terms. These were not the claims in respect of which security had 
been obtained and it is unclear whether they were claims in respect of which the claimant was entitled to security.  In 
a case in which the writer was involved the claims advanced in the points of claim in the arbitration were all claims 
that it is accepted did not arise until ownership passed with delivery of the vessel. However in the affidavit in support 
of the application entirely different claims were advanced to overcome the problem in obtaining security.  No 
attempt was made to amend the points of claim. 
142 It is what happened in fact in The Cape Courage where the claimant sought to introduce an entirely different 
claim for the purposes of sustaining the arrest which it never sought to introduce as a claim in the arbitration. 
 
 CHAPTER 7 
 




 Most ships, or at least those that give rise to maritime litigation, are owned by companies in 
the conventional sense of organisations incorporated by law, having an existence separate from 
the natural persons who stand behind them and enjoying the benefits of limited liability. Within 
that broad description there are myriad forms that a company can take depending upon the terms 
of the domestic legislation under which it is incorporated. In general, however, those local 
variations are unlikely to be relevant to the question of whether a ship is an associated ship for 
the purposes of the Act. Other forms of corporate body are recognised by different legal systems 
and the Act in turn recognises this fact by including any form of juristic person within the 
concept of a company.1  
 
 The principal focus of the associated ship arrest was always intended to be the operation of 
shipping fleets under the same beneficial ownership but with the vessels forming part of the fleet 
in the ownership of separate ‘one-ship’ companies. That conceptual model underpinned the 
notion of association. As the concern lay with identifying the person or persons who ultimately 
benefited from the ownership of the vessels and their operations
2
, whatever structures may have 
been interposed between them and the vessels themselves, it was insufficient to base the concept 
of association on ownership alone. Whilst ownership was recognised as a basis for association 
the broader concept of control provides the principal focus of the associated ship jurisdiction in 
                                                 
1 Section 3(7)(b)(iii). The section also includes any body of persons, which would presumably include a partnership 
or joint venture and perhaps some bodies such as trusts.  
2 This person if an individual is usually referred to as the beneficial owner of the vessel. That expression neatly 
encapsulates the notion of the person who enjoys the benefits of ownership.  It is in this sense that the expression is 
used in this chapter.   
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practice. As the Act does not define what is meant by control, that expression is given meaning 
by the courts in the varying factual circumstances that come before them.  
 
 It is convenient at the outset to approach the requirements of the Act in regard to the control 
of companies by considering the conventional situation of a company having the features 
described above. As these are what are generally understood to be the characteristics of a 
company and this is the type of organisation most frequently encountered in practice confining 
the discussion to that case is not unduly limiting. This concept of a company permeates the 
statements by judges in regard to the nature of the requirement of control because in general they 
have been confronted with this type of entity. However, in view of the extended meaning given to 
the notion of a company by way of the definition in s3(7)(b)(iii) of the Act as including ‘any 
other juristic person and any body of persons, irrespective of whether or not any interest therein 
consists of shares’, it may well be that the concept of control cannot be confined to control as 
exercised in relation to conventional companies. Be that as it may until such a situation arises in 
practice this may be a rather academic consideration. For the present therefore the discussion can 
be confined to companies in the conventional sense. In order to avoid repetition the focus will fall 
on the situation where both vessels - the ship concerned and the putative associated ship - are 
owned by companies in the conventional sense, that is, not in the extended sense given by section 
3(7)(b)(iii). What is said in that regard is equally applicable to the situation where one of the 
vessels is owned by a natural person and the other by a company. 
 
2 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
 As the reference to control appears in a statute the meaning to be attributed to it falls to be 
identified by a conventional process of statutory interpretation. The best starting point is therefore 
the statutory language. That enables one to identify the conclusions that flow from it and to 
consider those in the light of any relevant extraneous material.
3
  
                                                 
3 As Harms JA said in Abrahamse v East London Municipality and Another; East London Municipality v Abrahamse 
1997 (4) SA 613 (SCA) 632G - H:  
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(a) A single controlling interest 
 
 Sections 3(7)(a)(ii) and (iii) contain three references to the control of a company in similar 
but not identical terms. Thus both subsections refer to ‘a person who controlled the company 
which owned the ship concerned’ and sub-section (iii) refers, in relation to the associated ship, to 
‘a company which is controlled by a person ‘. It is not suggested that these slight shifts of 
language, dictated as they are by the grammatical structure of the provisions in question and their 
differences in tense, convey any difference of meaning. They do convey, and on the face of it 
quite unequivocally, that in applying these provisions the search is for a single locus of control. 
This follows from the clear language of the sections. They are couched in the singular and refer 
to ‘control’ of the company. They do not as a matter of language contemplate that an 
investigation into the question of control could identify more than one controller.  
 
 Nor does the language suggest that the position can be any different as a result of control 
having more than one meaning for the purposes of the section. In other words these sections do 
not contemplate the possibility that because control may take more than one form, either direct or 
indirect, there may be more than one person controlling a company depending upon the sense 
used. Had this been contemplated so that there might be more than one locus of control of the 
company, one would have expected to find a mechanism for distinguishing between the different 
sources or giving priority to one over another but there is none. All that the sections require is 
that in relation to both the ship concerned and the associated ship a ‘person’ must be identified 
                                                                                                                                                              
'Interpretation concerns the meaning of words used by the Legislature and it is therefore useful to approach the task 
by referring to the words used, and to leave extraneous considerations for later'  
In the recent case of KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) the 
same learned judge said: ‘… to the extent that evidence may be admissible to contextualise the document (since 
‘context is everything’) to establish its factual matrix or purpose or for purposes of identification, ‘one must use it as 
conservatively as possible’ (Delmas Milling Co Ltd v du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 455B-C). The time has 
arrived for us to accept that there is no merit in trying to distinguish between ‘background circumstances’ and 
‘surrounding circumstances’. The distinction is artificial and, in addition, both terms are vague and confusing. 
Consequently, everything tends to be admitted. The terms ‘context’ or ‘factual matrix’ ought to suffice. (See Van der 
Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) paras 22 and 23 and Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Murray & Roberts (Pty) Ltd 
2008 (6) SA 654 (SCA) para 7.)’ 
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who ‘controls’ or ‘controlled’ the companies in question. The process of comparison that follows 
upon this identification is intended to be a simple one. The maritime claimant identifies the party 
who controls the company that owned the ship concerned and identifies the party who controls 
the company that owns the associated ship that it seeks to arrest. The result of those exercises is 
then compared. If they correspond, in the sense that the same person or persons control both 
companies, then the requisite association is established4. If they are not the same then the 
association is not established. The proper conclusion from the language of section 3(7)(a) is that 
the legislature was of the view that for each company it would be possible to identify a single 
person or persons who controlled that company at the statutorily relevant time.   
 
(b) Actual or ultimate control 
 
 This understanding of the manner in which the sections are intended to operate does not 
clarify what is meant by control. All it does is establish that the enquiry is one directed at 
identifying the ‘person’ who controls the company in the sense that the statute regards as 
relevant. What kind of control that is the Act leaves for determination by way of a process of 
interpretation. In what sense then does the Act use the expression ‘control’? There seem to be 
several possibilities. The narrowest is the legal and formalistic control under the applicable law of 
the country where the company is incorporated which identifies the person who in accordance 
with the appropriate legal system is to be regarded as controlling the affairs of the company for 
the purposes of the law of that country. In other words one looks at immediate legal control of the 
company. Alternatively control may refer to the power to manage the operation of the vessel as a 
commercial venture. As we are concerned with companies that have only a single trading asset of 
any relevance, namely a ship, the management of the commercial activities of the vessel 
constitutes management of the day to day affairs of the company. Apart from these activities the 
company has no business so that control of the management of the vessel may be regarded as 
                                                 
4 This should not be understood as saying that it is essential to the proof of association that a specific natural person 
or persons must be identified as controlling the two companies. It will suffice if the chain of control in both instances 
leads back to a common source of control, even if the applicant is unable to identify that source. The source may 
itself be corporate. What is important is that it is common to both ship-owning companies. 
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control of the company itself. This may be referred to as managerial control although we will see 
that this expression is wide enough to encompass a variety of very different situations. Lastly and 
at its most general control may refer to actual or ultimate control of the company’s activities, 
however exercised, and irrespective of the controller’s economic stake in the company. This 
control is distinct from managerial control in that it has within itself the power to control the 
manager and direct what they do. It consists in a general oversight of the activities of the 
company and hence the vessel and the power to continue or alter or discontinue its activities, to 
lay up the vessel or to sell it. It is the ability to control and direct that is significant here not the 
actual day to day activities of the person in whom that power vests.  
 
 In examining these different possibilities it is convenient to start with the narrowest sense 
in which control can be used namely immediate legal control over the company in question by 
whatever mechanism is recognised as giving that control under the law of the company’s 
incorporation. Thus in South Africa and many other countries whose company law has been 
derived from England the relevant legislation only affords specific recognition to the registered 
shareholder irrespective of the capacity in which that shareholder holds the shares and 
irrespective of any restraints operating on that shareholder in the exercise of his or her or its 
rights as a shareholder. Technically it is only the registered shareholder who can exercise the 
votes attaching to a share and by those means directs the affairs of the company.  Hence the 
registered shareholder whose shares carry the majority vote will for legal purposes control the 
company. If they have acted in a particular way then that is the action of the company 
irrespective of whether in doing so they acted in accordance with instructions from another or 
whether they acted contrary to such instructions. In jurisdictions where bearer shares are 
recognised it will be the person who for the time being is in possession of the shares that have the 
greatest voting power. There are no doubt variations on this theme but it is unnecessary to 
explore them. The question is whether this is the meaning that the legislature had in mind in 
referring to control. 
 
 The problem with such an approach is that it invites circumvention and ignores commercial 
reality. Let us take two ships A and B owned by separate companies X and Y both of which have 
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Z as their sole shareholder. On this approach the vessels would be associated ships because X and 
Y would have the same shareholder and would be controlled by the same person. However that 
result could be avoided by the simple expedient of interposing between the shareholder Z and the 
companies X and Y, two further companies X1 and Y1. Commercially the position would be 
identical but on the narrow approach to the concept of control that would be the result. It seems 
improbable that the legislature had this in mind. In the Law Commission report that led to the 
enactment of the Act it had been suggested
5
 that sister ship arrests under the Arrest Convention 
had been stultified by the move to ‘one-ship’ companies. There would have been little purpose 
served by moving beyond the sister ship arrest and creating a situation that could have been 
circumvented so easily. The improbability is reinforced by the provisions of section 3(7)(b)(ii) of 
the Act where reference is made to the power ‘directly or indirectly’ to control the company. 
Such language is pointless if the enquiry is confined to legal control irrespective of actual control. 
This possibility can be safely rejected as giving the sense in which control is used in the Act. 
That is not to say that regard will not be had to these matters. It is merely that they cannot of 
themselves give a complete answer to the question of who controls the company and the enquiry 
in regard to control cannot stop at this point.    
 
 The second possible form of control relates to the control that the managers of the business 
have over its affairs. The nature of this may vary widely.  At one level those who manage may be 
merely employees and agents whose tasks are administrative and not ministerial. They are put in 
place by the shareholders in order to carry out the latter’s directions and are readily replaced. 
They may have input into key decisions but ultimately no power to take such decisions. This may 
be so even if the agent has considerable latitude in regard to the operation of the vessel as is 
usually the case with a managing agent. As was pointed out by King AJ in an early case6 there 
must be managing agents in different parts of the world who manage a number of vessels on 
                                                 
5 Correctly so, but the move to ‘one-ship’ companies was not directed at achieving this result for the reasons given in 
Chapter 4. 
6 E E Sharp & Sons Ltd v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) 327A. Whether there are as he said ‘many’ such agents is 
perhaps debatable. 
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behalf of different and unconnected owners. It could not have been intended that the employment 
of common managing agents on its own would give rise to an association rendering all the 
vessels under the same management liable to arrest as associated ships. This seems clearly to be 
correct but it cannot dispose of all instances of common management. 
 
 There are cases where the manager may effectively run a number of one-ship owning 
companies with little or no input from shareholders. (The managers may themselves be 
shareholders but only in respect of a minority interest.) Thus there are companies that act as 
professional ship managers for those who wish to invest in shipping but lack both the knowledge 
and the resources to do so on their own. In those cases the manager may identify vessels as 
suitable to be part of a fleet that it will manage and seek out investors to invest in each vessel, 
taking stakes of say between one and ten percent in the ship-owning companies, with no single 
investor or group of investors having any capacity to control any one-ship-owning company. 
Each company will have its own body of investors although there may be investors who invest in 
more than one of the ship-owning companies. However in the greater picture the only common 
feature holding the entire structure together is the manager. The terms of the investment 
effectively bind the investors to permit the management company to operate the vessel as part of 
its larger fleet and the only real remedy that a disgruntled shareholder has is to dispose of their 
investment, which the manager facilitates on their behalf. All decisions about the acquisition and 
operation of a vessel, whether its acquisition is financed and if so the terms and extent of that 
financing; the trades in which the different vessels in the fleet will operate and even when each 
vessel is disposed of are made by the managers. Meetings of shareholders are purely a formality. 
The only difference between this situation and one in which a variety of investors invest in a 
company, which in turn owns a number of one-ship-owning companies, is that the individual 
investor has a stake in a particular vessel and not the general interest that a shareholder would 
have in the latter type of company in all the vessels in the fleet. Managerial control encompasses 
this situation. There seems to be much to be said for the proposition that in a circumstance such 
as this it is a power to control the assets and destinies of each of the ship-owning companies, 
particularly when it is recognised that this is a power that can be exercised indirectly. Otherwise 
one is left with the peculiar proposition that no-one controls the ship-owning companies, a 
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proposition that appears to fly in the face of reality.7 The Act proceeds on the basis that ship- 
owning and operating companies are controlled by some person or persons because otherwise 
they would not own and operate the ship that is the principal asset of the company, and it is this 
control that is important for the purposes of the associated ship provisions. However this is an 
extreme and somewhat unusual situation. It should not be taken as indicating that in the ordinary 
course common management of ship-owning companies suffices to establish an association 
between them. If there is an association here it flows from the nature of the control exercised by 
the managers over the ship-owning company.8  
  
 Neither legal control nor limited managerial control seems to be sufficient to support the 
arrest of a ship as an associated ship. That points towards the conclusion that it is overall or 
ultimate control of the affairs of the ship-owning company that is intended. This conclusion 
derives support from the accepted purpose of permitting an action in rem to commence by way of 
the arrest of an associated ship as it emerges from the language of the statutory provisions9. That 
purpose is to make the loss fall where it belongs by reason of common ownership of the two 
vessels or by reason of common control of the companies that own the two vessels.10 In other 
                                                 
7 In a case in which the writer was engaged where the corporate structure was largely as set out in this example it was 
contended by the ship-owning company that no-one controlled the company, which seems self-evidently absurd as 
the company was a profitable trading entity. However see the judgment in MV La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs 
SNC v Tor Shipping 2006 (3) SA 441 (D), para 53-55.  
8 On the other hand to treat the vessels as associated ships in this situation does seem to undermine the principle that 
one is trying to lay the responsibility for the debt on those who by virtue of their ownership interest in the associated 
ship should properly bear that burden. In the case described above an association would render shareholders in a one- 
ship company, A, liable for the debts of another one-ship company, B even though their shareholdings may overlap 
only to a minor extent. That is inconsistent with the grounds of justification of the associated ship jurisdiction.   
9 This follows the basic rule of interpretation that one ascertains the intention of the legislature by having regard to 
the language used in the provision in the light of its scope and purpose. Nkisimane and others v Santam Insurance 
Company Ltd 1978 (2) SA 430 (A) 434A. How this is labelled hardly matters. As Harms JA said: ‘If one has to label 
this method of interpretation, it can either be an application of the 'soewereine' rule of interpretation of Dr L C Steyn, 
namely, a determination of the intention of the Legislature, or the 'purposive construction' of Lord Diplock, or even 
Lord Steyn's 'context is everything'.’ A Moolla Group Ltd and others v The Gap Inc and others 2005 (6) SA 568 
(SCA), para 17. 
10 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1086 (2) SA 700 (A) 712A-B. That case was decided 
before the amendments and I have accordingly adapted what was there said to the present situation. It is convenient 
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words where the beneficial ownership of the two vessels is the same so that they operate as part 
of a broader enterprise it is appropriate for the vessels to be regarded as associated and each to be 
subject to arrest for the debts of the other. In that way the ultimate loss falls on the same person 
or persons. This can only be achieved if the section is concerned with real or actual control over 
the company. Any other approach is destructive of the fundamental rationale for the institution of 
the associated ship. As explained in Chapter 4, whilst the use of one-ship companies is a 
legitimate form of corporate organisation for which there may be many different justifications, to 
the extent that it shields the assets of the beneficial shareholder from legitimate creditors of one 
or other ship-owning company, it is proper for the legislature on grounds of policy to regard such 
use as exorbitant and provide the means for circumventing it. The provisions in respect of 
associated ship arrests are directed at achieving this. In order to achieve that purpose it is 
therefore necessary that there be a proper identity between those who control the company that 
owns the ship concerned and those who control the company that owns the associated ship. If that 
identity does not exist there is no justification at all for permitting an associated ship arrest. In 
that case the legislation would be imposing the debts of one company on another company 
without any adequate link between them. Such an approach is arbitrary and penal.  
 
 In many instances actual control, however indirect, of the ship-owning companies will also 
reflect the underlying economic interest in the vessels. In other words the fact of control will go 
hand in hand with at least a majority economic interest in the ship-owning companies. However 
this will not always be the case. We are familiar with the fact that in the commercial world it is 
feasible to establish business structures that secure to one party control of the enterprise whilst 
dispersing the economic interest in the enterprise among a number of parties. The obvious 
example is a simple pyramid structure in terms of which company A, in which X owns a 51 
percent stake, owns 51 percent of company B, which in turn owns 51 percent in company C. X 
will control all three companies by virtue of his or her 51 percent interest in A, but X will only 
have an economic interest in B of about 25 percent and in C of about 12,5 percent. Similar 
                                                                                                                                                              
to describe such common ownership or common control by the expression ‘beneficial ownership’ provided it is 
remembered that this does not mean that all the economic benefits of ownership accrue to the party exercising 
control. 
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structures may be established in the shipping industry to accommodate family members or 
business associates without imperilling the control exercised by the founder or controller of the 
business. The example mentioned above of the ship manager assembling and operating a fleet of 
vessels with a range of investors taking a share in different ship-owning companies is equally one 
where the manager’s control of all companies in the group is not reflected directly in the manager 
having a majority economic interest in any of the ship-owning companies. There may therefore 
be instances where control of a company may not reflect a majority economic interest in that 
company.   
 
 It is submitted that this does not detract from the principle that the legislation is concerned 
with identifying the person or persons who exercise actual control over the two vessels at the 
critical times. If anything the reference to indirect control reinforces the possibility that this type 
of situation is also intended to fall within the concept of control. The circumstances where it will 
arise are likely to be infrequent and the alternatives create even greater anomalies where there 
may be no real connection between the trading activities of the two vessels and the owner of the 
associated ship is truly a stranger to the activities of the owner of the ship concerned. At least 
where one is concerned with actual control there is a common benefit accruing from the operation 
of the fleet in lowering operational costs and securing preferential rates for necessary items such 
as insurance, P & I cover, stores and agency services irrespective of whether any person or group 
of persons has a controlling economic interest in the two companies. A mechanism is also likely 
to be present to secure an internal adjustment among investors that attaches liability for the debt 
to those who should in fact bear the loss. Whilst therefore this situation involves some departure 
from the principle that association imposes the ultimate loss on the party for whose benefit the 
debt was incurred or in whose interests the ship concerned was being operated when it 
occasioned the loss, it is submitted that it is not sufficient of an anomaly to warrant a departure 
from the plain language of the provisions of the statute. 
 
(c)  Conclusion on the requirements of control   
 It is submitted that a proper interpretation of the provisions of section 3(7)(a) in the context 
of the Act as a whole and in the light of the purpose of the associated ship arrest is that they are 
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concerned with a single repository of control located in the person who exercises actual control, 
initially of the shares in the ship owning companies and, after the 1992 amendments, of the 
companies themselves. On that footing the issue of control would be determined from case to 
case as a largely factual matter. In most instances this will involve an analysis of the corporate 
structure of the groups of companies standing behind the ship owning companies.   
 
 This conclusion was undoubtedly the received wisdom amongst maritime lawyers for the 





‘The level of control required is that the person must control the overall destiny of the 
company and not merely control the running of the company’s day to day affairs (E E 
Sharp and Sons Limited v MV Nefeli 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) at 326I-327C). 
Such a person has to be in effective control directly or indirectly or the affairs of the 
company (c/f Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa Limited 1975 (2) SA 
652 (A) at 669F; Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rile Investments (Pty) Limited 1978 (3) 
SA 732 (A) at 737D) and really be the directing mind and will of the company. (c/f 
Lennards Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Limited [1915] AC 705 at 713; Tesco 
Supermarkets Limited v Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127 (HL) at 131h-j; Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Malcomess Properties 1991 (2) SA 27 (A) at 37A-H).’ 
 
This common understanding was, however, disturbed by the judgments, initially of the Cape 
High Court and then of the Supreme Court of Appeal, in the Heavy Metal.
12
 Leaving aside for the 
present the question of when the maritime claim in that case arose13 and assuming the correctness 
of the judgment on that point, there is much to be said for the proposition that on the facts of the 
case the claimant had proved an association by establishing that the real control behind the two 
                                                 
11 In giving the judgment of the Full Bench in The Kadirga Five (No. 1) J A Chapman & Co Ltd v Kadirga 
Denizcilik ve Ticaret AS, SCOSA C12, C14E-G. 
12 MV Heavy Metal : Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Limited and others 1998 (4) SA 479 (C) and 
MV Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine Limited v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA). For 
convenience these are hereafter referred to as the Heavy Metal (Cape) and Heavy Metal (SCA). 
13 This is discussed in Chapter 6 ante, where the view is expressed that on a proper analysis of the nature of the claim 
in respect of which security was sought it did not arise until ownership of the ship concerned passed to the purchaser 
so that an essential element of an associated ship arrest was absent. 
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companies vested in the same person.14 However, the majority, in a judgment by Smalberger JA, 
went far beyond the facts of the particular case. Based on the deeming provision in section 
3(7)(b)(ii) they arrived at a conclusion that an association can exist between two ships even 
though the only connection between the two is that the separate individuals who exercise actual 
control over the two ship-owning companies and are the beneficial owners of the vessels chanced 
to use the same lawyer to incorporate the ship owning companies and act as their nominee on the 
share register of those companies. In so doing they departed from both the basic principles 
arrived at above on an analysis of the language of section 3(7)(a) of the Act. They concluded that 
the legislature accepted that there could be more than one person controlling the company at the 
same time and they also concluded that two different types of control could co-exist, namely 
legal control and actual control, vesting in different people simultaneously. That result is of such 
fundamental importance for the entire institution of the associated ship arrest and its implications 
so far reaching that the judgment of the majority demands critical scrutiny. If it is correct then we 
need to re-examine the analysis set out above to see where and why it is flawed. If it is incorrect 
then consideration must be given to ways in which to overcome the judgment and restore the 
status quo ante. 
 
3 The Heavy Metal 
  
(a) The facts. 
 
 On 23 October 1996, Dahlia Maritime sold the m.v. Sea Sonnet to Palm Base Maritime. In 
terms of the memorandum of agreement (MOA) the seller was obliged to deliver the vessel with 
present class free of recommendations and to notify the Classification Society of any matters 
coming to their knowledge prior to delivery which, upon being reported to the Classification 
Society, would lead to the withdrawal of the vessel’s class or to the imposition of a 
recommendation relating to her class. Palm Base alleged that in a number of respects Dahlia had, 
                                                 
14 This was the basis upon which Marais JA dismissed the appeal and would in any event have been the basis upon 
which the majority would also have dismissed the appeal. See the Heavy Metal (SCA) per Smalberger JA, paras. 16-
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between the date of conclusion of the MOA and the date of delivery, become aware of matters 
that would have led either to the withdrawal of the Sea Sonnet’s class or to the imposition of a 
recommendation relating to her class, but had failed to notify the Classification Society 
accordingly. Arising from this Palm Base alleged that it had a maritime claim against Dahlia in 
respect of the m.v. Sea Sonnet. 
 
 Palm Base had accepted delivery of the Sea Sonnet and elected not to cancel the sale 
agreement. It alleged that it had suffered damages under various heads arising from Dahlia’s 
breach of contract. It intended to institute arbitration proceedings in London in order to pursue 
that claim for damages. In order to obtain security for the proposed arbitration proceedings in 
London it sought the arrest of the m.v. Heavy Metal on the basis that the latter was an associated 
ship in relation to the Sea Sonnet. The owner of the Heavy Metal, Belfry Marine, challenged the 
arrest and sought to have it set aside on the basis that the Heavy Metal was not an associated ship 
in relation to the Sea Sonnet. 
 
 In seeking the arrest of the Heavy Metal Palm Base produced a body of evidence that 
showed that there were apparently close links between Dahlia Maritime and Belfry Marine. The 
two companies had the same registered office and the majority of shares in each company were 
registered in the name of Mr. Lemonaris, an advocate of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, practising 
in Nicosia. Mr. Lemonaris was the sole director of both Dahlia Maritime and Belfry Marine. In 
addition the two companies had the same secretary and the same company managed the two 
vessels as part of a fleet of vessels regarded as a group many of which had musically related 
names. According to the Greek Shipping Directory the operating address for the two vessels was 
the same as that of their managers. The managing director of the management company held a 
10% shareholding in Belfry Marine. On a previous occasion when a vessel in the fleet had been 
arrested as an associated ship in relation to another vessel in the fleet, the managers had furnished 
security for its release. Publications circulating in the maritime industry identified the vessels as 
part of a fleet falling under common control.     
                                                                                                                                                              
20 and Marais JA paras. 16-21. 
 270
 The response to this evidential material was extremely limited. Mr. Lemonaris deposed to 
an initial affidavit in which he said nothing about the identity of the controlling interest in either 
Dahlia Maritime of Belfry Marine. He confined himself to the following:- 
 
‘18.The shares I hold in the First and Third Respondents are held by me as the nominee 
for non-residents of Cyprus.  It is normal practice in Cyprus for advocates to be appointed 
as nominee shareholders and directors. We act on the instructions of beneficial owners, 
which instructions are often given through intermediaries. We are required by the laws of 
Cyprus to abide strictly by, and carry out, these instructions and we are more often than 
not, as in the case of my relationship with the First and Third Respondents, simply ‘post 
boxes’. 
19 I am therefore merely a nominee director and shareholder of the First and Third 
Respondents in which I have no interest or ownership. I exercise no control over these 
companies and, indeed, I have no discretion to represent these companies without having 
received instructions as I have, for example, for the purpose of dealing with this 
application.  
20 Cypriot advocates are not, in terms of the ethical rules applicable, permitted to 
disclose information given to them in confidence by their clients. The information 
contained in the instructions given to me when I attended to the registration of the First 
and Third Respondents was given to me in confidence and I am accordingly not at large 
to disclose this information.’ 
 
 
These statements as to the role of Mr Lemonaris were hardly controversial bearing in mind that in 
the founding affidavit it had been said that: 
 
‘To the best of the knowledge and belief of those instructing me, he is not directly 
involved in the business of owning or operating ships but serves as a ‘post box’ and 
registered office for the Brave Maritime group of companies, and possibly in other roles, 
such as the authorised signatory of the companies.’ 
 
On the evidence therefore it was common cause that Mr. Lemonaris had no beneficial interest in 
either company and was not in a position to take any decisions in regard to either of them without 
instructions from those on whose behalf he acted as nominee. His statement of his legal 
obligations as an advocate was also not challenged.  
 
 A significant feature of the response was that, save for denying that a minority shareholder 
in Belfry Marine controlled Dahlia Maritime, there was no attempt initially by Mr. Lemonaris to 
identify who did control the companies. In the face of a very considerable body of evidence that 
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indicated that the same person controlled two companies this provoked adverse comment from 
Palm Base. That criticism lead to him delivering a further affidavit in which he dealt with the 
shareholding in Dahlia Maritime from the date of signature of the MOA to the date of delivery of 
the Sea Sonnet in terms of that agreement and revealed that the ultimate beneficial owner of the 
Sea Sonnet was a Mr. Tsavliras. However, in regard to the m.v. Heavy Metal itself, he simply 
said that he was not authorised by the beneficial owner of that vessel to disclose their identity.  
 
 This produced a very curious state of affairs. The vessel under arrest was the Heavy Metal. 
That vessel was on its final journey to a breaking yard. Nonetheless the true beneficial owner of 
that vessel was not identified nor was any reason advanced why the beneficial owner should not 
be identified.
15
 The court was therefore faced with the situation that the real party before the 
court, namely Belfry Marine as the owner of the m.v. Heavy Metal, was not prepared to instruct 
its nominee to disclose to the court, even on terms that such disclosure would be confidential, the 
identity of the person holding the beneficial interest in Belfry Marine. However, the former 
owner of the Sea Sonnet, who had both disposed of that vessel and, according to the evidence, 
disposed of the various companies through which he held his beneficial interest in the Sea 
Sonnet, was willing to be identified but not to put up an affidavit. 
 
 In those circumstances there is considerable merit in the straightforward approach adopted 
by Marais JA in the SCA of holding that on the facts Palm Base had discharged the onus of 
proving the association. He said that the response was permeated by evasiveness, constituted by 
selective and limited denials where such was possible and by diversionary strategies or 
arguments where it was not. It is difficult to fault his conclusion that:- 
 
                                                 
15 It emerges from the judgment in m.v. Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine Limited v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 2000 
(1) SA 286 (C) 306, that Mr. Tsavliras offered a personal guarantee to secure the release of the Heavy Metal from 
arrest. This does not appear to have been before the court in the application to set the arrest aside. If he had no 
interest in the Heavy Metal and there was no connection with the Sea Sonnet, there was no good reason for him to 
provide such security. With the benefit of this knowledge it appears probable that he did indeed control both 
companies. 
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‘I do not think that a litigant in motion proceedings who resorts to this kind of response in 
the face of a powerful circumstantial showing that, on the probabilities, whoever 
ultimately had the power to control the company which owned the guilty ship also has the 
power to control the company which owns the ship sought to be arrested as an associated 
ship can shelter behind the principles laid down in the case of Plascon-Evans Paints 
Limited.
16  In a few words, such an approach should not be regarded as giving rise to a 
genuine dispute of fact.’17  
  
 That was the approach that had been adopted in an earlier case, relied on by Palm Base in 
argument, where the beneficial owner of the associated ship had adopted a similarly coy approach 
to identifying themselves.
18
 As the views of Marais JA were shared by the majority judges
19
 it is 
also difficult to see why the appeal was not simply disposed of on that basis. However the 
majority decided to go further. The approach that they adopted to the law and the interpretation of 
certain provisions of the Act is what renders this decision controversial.    
 
(b) The role of the presumption in section 3(7)(b)(ii) 
 
 It emerged clearly from the evidence in the Heavy Metal that in practical terms Mr. 
Lemonaris, a Cypriot advocate, had absolutely no control whatsoever over the affairs of either 
Dahlia Maritime or Belfry Marine. His own description of himself as a ‘post box’, which was 
shared by the Applicant, is only consistent with his having no freedom to exercise any powers at 
all in relation to the affairs of the companies or the operation of the ships, which constituted the 
only business of the companies. The conclusion by both the Cape court and the SCA that he 
controlled both companies is accordingly highly artificial. The foundation for it must be 
examined closely. 
 
                                                 
16
 Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited 1984 (3) SA 623 (A). 
17 Heavy Metal (SCA), Marais JA, para. 21,  1115F-H.  
18
 Hasselbacher Papier Import and Export (Body Corporate) and Another v m.v. Stavroula 1987 (1) SA 75 (C).  
19
 Heavy Metal (SCA), Smalberger JA paras. 16-20, 1107I-1108G. 
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 Both the Cape court and the majority in the SCA relied for this conclusion on the 
provisions of section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act. That section provides that for the purposes of the 
provisions that define when a vessel is an associated ship:- 
 
‘A person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly to 
control the company.’ 
 
Both the Cape court and the majority in the SCA held that as Mr. Lemonaris was the registered 
owner of the majority of the shares in both Dahlia Maritime and Belfry Marine he had power 
directly to control those companies. Accordingly they held that the effect of the deeming 
provision was that he was deemed to control both companies and further that this deeming was 
irrebuttable. The result, so it was held, was that the Heavy Metal was an associated ship in 
relation to the Sea Sonnet. 
 
 In the SCA there were two judgments that strongly dissented from the view of the 
majority
20
.  It is fair to say that the conclusion was also one that took the maritime community by 
surprise. The implication of the decision was that a vessel might be held to be an associated ship 
even though there was no connection between the beneficial ownership of the ship concerned and 
the beneficial ownership of the associated ship21. What then was the reasoning by which each 
court reached this conclusion? 
 
(c)    The Heavy Metal (Cape) 
 
 It is not easy to discern from the judgment precisely what arguments were advanced on 
behalf of Belfry Marine before Thring J at first instance. Thus the judgment deals with the facts 
concerning the identity of the shareholders in the two companies, Dahlia Maritime and Belfry 
                                                 
20 Those of Farlam JA and Marais JA. 
21 J Hare in Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2nd Ed (2009) says (at 111) that the decision 
‘struck fear in the hearts of many operators of one-ship companies’.  This is noted with interest in the foreword by 
Farlam JA who dissented from the majority view. 
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Marine and draws attention to the fact that they had the same registered office address, the same 
majority shareholder and director in Mr. Lemonaris and the same secretary. The judge then 
said22:- 
 
‘Prima facie a strong case is made out on these facts that both companies are controlled 
or were, at the relevant times, controlled by the same person, Lemonaris.  Alternatively, if 
they are or were not in fact controlled by him, he has or had power to control them at the 
relevant times and is accordingly deemed to have controlled them.: 
 
With respect neither sentence stands up to careful scrutiny. Cyprus is well known as a country 
that promotes the off-shore registration of vessels and has many companies that register vessels 
there for various commercial reasons, including a friendly tax regime.
23
 The shareholder and 
director in question was an advocate of the Supreme Court of Cyprus practising as such in 
Nicosia.  It was overwhelmingly probable in those circumstances that Mr. Lemonaris was merely 
a nominee on behalf of the true owners of the shares in the ship owning companies and not 
himself the owner of the shares. It was accordingly highly improbable that he controlled the two 
companies in any practical sense.  Practising lawyers do not often combine their profession with 
a sideline in the ownership and operation of trading vessels.24 The fact that the two companies 
had the same registered office did not justify any inference at all. No doubt it was the address 
used by Mr. Lemonaris in the conduct of his practice. Countless companies around the world 
have their registered offices at the offices of their auditors, but this hardly indicates a link 
                                                 
22 At 489G-H 
23 Shipping companies registered in Cyprus do not pay any income tax at all. Coles, Ship Registration Law and 
Practice, para 10.22, 117. A shipping company will ordinarily be registered as a non-resident (commonly referred to 
as an off-shore company) with the Central Bank of Cyprus, which will require proof that its entire share capital is 
beneficially owned by non-resident shareholders. Coles, id, para 10.7, 111. The advantage of this is that the company 
is then free of exchange control in its business dealings. The use of nominee shareholders and directors provides 
anonymity.  
24 In my experience practising lawyers with a maritime bent are more interested in pleasure boats such as yachts, 
motor-boats and recreational fishing vessels. 
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between all the companies audited by the same firm.
25
 In the absence of any suggestion that the 
secretary was anything other than an employee of Mr. Lemonaris no weight could be attached to 
the fact that she was the secretary of both companies. All of this was apparent without even 
having regard to the affidavits that confirmed that this was the position and without having any 
special knowledge of international maritime trade. 
 
  The factors relied on by Thring J did not, whether separately or cumulatively, indicate that 
there was any connection between the two companies other than Mr. Lemonaris, who was 
admittedly a nominee for others. Viewed from a broader perspective the existence of such 
nominee relationships is so prevalent in international shipping26, where the vast majority of 
vessels are in the registered ownership of one-ship companies, that it is unsafe to draw any 
inference from the fact that two companies have the same nominee as their nominee shareholder 
and director. In countries where such forms of registration are prevalent, such as Panama, Cyprus 
and Malta, there are a number of firms of lawyers who specialise in registering companies for 
ship owners and acting as the nominee shareholder and, very often, director of the company, 
where the true owners wish to retain their anonymity.
27
 On their own, proof of facts such as these 
does not indicate the existence of a commercial link between the two companies much less that 
they are controlled by the same person or that such person is the lawyer acting as nominee for the 
beneficial owners. 
 
                                                 
25 All Liberian one-ship companies are required to be registered at 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia the address of 
the LISCR Trust Company. Ready, ante, para 15.7, 174. That is not an indication that the entire Liberian fleet 
consists of vessels that have some commercial link to one another. 
26 And so well-known. 
27 Even a fairly cursory examination of the websites of Cypriot advocates offering such services reveals that one of 
the major benefits held out to ship owners is that their anonymity will be preserved as the lawyer will be their 
nominee as shareholder and director of the company in question and there is no public disclosure of the identity of 
the beneficial shareholders. As one site puts it ‘Confidentiality and anonymity of the beneficial owners is assured by 
disclosing their details only to the Central Bank of Cyprus.’ In jurisdictions such as the Bahamas where there is no 
public disclosure of the identity of the registered shareholder and director the need to use nominees falls away. 
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 Evidential material of this type is only of assistance where there is other evidence before 
the court to suggest common control of the ship owning companies. Usually that is provided by 
evidence that the vessels form part of a single fleet and are managed by the same managing 
agents and have other features that point to common control. These may be varied. It may be 
relevant that both vessels are part of a single fleet entry with their P&I club. It may be possible to 
show that there are cross-mortgages between the vessels or common guarantors.  The fact that the 
manager has guaranteed the debts of both vessels is important as indicating a connection between 
the two. Sometimes there is evidence of the identity of the person standing behind the fleet in the 
form of interviews with trade papers. It is when that evidence is available that the use of the same 
lawyer in the same off-shore registry to register the ship owning companies and that this lawyer 
acts as the nominee of the true owners of the shares in those companies becomes relevant as 
evidence supporting the inference of common control. 
 
 In the Heavy Metal there was indeed evidence of that type as has been demonstrated earlier 
in this chapter. It was not inappropriate therefore for the Cape court to say that there was a strong 
prima facie case that the two ship owning companies were at the relevant time controlled by the 
same person. However, the court’s approach did not deal with this other evidence and elevated 
the facts concerning the registration, shareholding and directorship in the ship owning companies 
to a strong case standing on their own that Mr. Lemonaris was the person who controlled the two 
companies. In that it erred.  
 
 The conclusion that these facts made out a strong prima facie case that Mr. Lemonaris 
controlled both companies at the relevant times was unjustified. The details of the companies did 
not support this proposition and the further evidence clearly pointed away from that being the 
case. That evidence showed that the vessel was operated from Piraeus and was listed in the Greek 
Shipping Directory. Its managers were based in Piraeus and it was part of a fleet managed by the 
same ship managers. When the beneficial owner of the shares in Dahlia Maritime was identified 
he was a Greek based in Piraeus. If, as appears to be the case, Thring J was expressing a view on 
the real or actual situation in regard to control of the two companies at the relevant times there 
was simply no justification for that view. Nothing in the evidence suggested that Mr Lemonaris 
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actually controlled either ship-owning company in the sense of being the person who controlled 
their direction and fate. If the judge had some other concept of control in mind he did not identify 
it.  
 
 The second sentence in the quoted passage is even more difficult to understand unless it is 
written in anticipation of the later finding in regard to the effect of section 3(7)(b)(ii). If the judge 
was wrong in thinking that there was a strong case that Mr. Lemonaris actually controlled the two 
companies, the absence of such a case could not justify a conclusion that he had power to control 
them. Put simply if the evidence on which the judge was relying did not justify the conclusion 
that Mr. Lemonaris in fact controlled the two companies at the relevant times it equally had no 
bearing on the question of whether he in fact had the power to control the two companies. The 
statement is only explicable in the light of the subsequent conclusion in regard to the 
requirements for control. 
 
 These conclusions by the court were followed by a consideration of the evidence of Mr. 
Lemonaris. However, that reduced the enquiry to a series of fragmented stages, rather than a 
consideration of the evidence as a whole. The court took certain pieces of evidence and 
concluded that they pointed towards a particular conclusion. Only then did it consider the 
evidence on behalf of Belfry Marine, which was directed at establishing the opposite proposition. 
It is with respect unhelpful to weigh evidence in this piecemeal fashion. It also creates the risk of 
fragmenting the onus of proof. The onus of proving an association on a balance of probabilities 
rests on the claimant.  It is unhelpful to take some of the evidence and hold that this creates a 
strong prime facie case and then consider the evidence that controverts it. Had the evidence on 
which the court relied been considered in the light of the affidavit of Mr. Lemonaris, which 
demonstrated his nominee status and was undisputed, the court could hardly have come to the 
conclusion that there was any case, much less a strong prima facie case, that Mr. Lemonaris in 
fact controlled the two companies.   
 
 This is relevant because it appears from the judge’s description of the contentions on behalf 
of Belfry Marine that those contentions were construed and understood by him in the light of the 
 278
correctness of his earlier findings, whether or not actually advanced on that basis. Thus he said 
that the contention was that the allegations by Mr. Lemonaris justified the conclusion that Dahlia 
Maritime and Belfry Marine ‘are controlled, not by Lemonaris, but by the beneficial owners of 
the shares held by him, whoever they may be.’ The argument is reflected as being that:- 
 
‘...the deeming provision of s3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act is not conclusive and that the Court is 
entitled and, indeed, bound to look behind the picture which is presented by the facts 
registered in the share registers and other public documents of the companies and to 




It is unclear from this whether counsel accepted that the deeming provision applied or, in the light 
of the judge’s belief that it applied, argued that it was rebuttable. Whichever is the case the 
fundamental flaw lies in the premise that it had been shown that the deeming provision applied. 
That provision could have no application unless and until it had been shown that Mr. Lemonaris 
had the power, either directly or indirectly, to control the two companies concerned at the 
relevant times. It was common cause on the evidence that in practical terms he did not have any 
such power. To apply the presumption it was necessary for the judge to adopt some conception of 
the power to control a company other than actual practical control and to take the view that this 
different concept was applicable in terms of the presumption. This brings into focus the concept 
of the power to control a company in the deeming provision. 
 
 The reasoning of Thring J that lead to his final conclusion appears in the following 
passages from his judgment:- 
 
‘The purpose of the Act, as was said in the Berg case, supra, at 712A-B is to make the 
loss fall where it belongs by reason of ownership and, in the case of a company, 
ownership or control of shares. It is common practice these days for vessels to be owned 
by so-called ‘one-ship’ companies. One vessel is owned by one company, whilst other 
vessels are owned by other one-ship companies in the same group of companies, all of 
which companies are controlled by the same person or persons. It was with the object of 
extending liability for maritime claims beyond the ‘one-ship’ company which owns the 
                                                 
28
 Heavy Metal (Cape), 590G-H. 
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vessel concerned in the claim that ss3(6) and 3(7) of the Act were enacted. It is against 
this background, it seems to me, that the deeming provision of s(7)(b)(ii) of the Act must 
be construed.  In my view it was intended to assist a claimant who seeks to rely on the 
‘associated ships’ provisions of the Act in order to recover money due to him from the 
owner of an associated ship. It is frequently difficult for a claimant in this position to 
establish and prove who the beneficial owners of the shares in a particular ship-owing 
company are, because they are concealed from him. Indeed, this is amply demonstrated in 
this very case. Accordingly, it seems to me, the Legislature came to the aid of such 
claimants by providing, in effect, in s3(7)(b)(ii) that the claimant need establish no more 
than that the person concerned has the power to control the company concerned, directly 
or indirectly. Whether or not he in fact exercises that power himself or whether it is 
exercised through him by others is immaterial. He is deemed to control the company, that 
is to say he is regarded as controlling the company, whether he does so in fact or not.  In 
other words, this is a situation in which the Legislature sought to achieve finality as 
regards the identity of the person or persons who control such companies, even at the 
expense perhaps of artificiality. Had it not sought this result, it seems to me that the 
Legislature would not have used the very strong word ‘deemed’ in the subsection 
(Afrikaans text ‘geag’): it would have used some less far-reaching expression such as 
‘presumed until the contrary is proved.’’ 
 
Having referred to two cases on the use of the word ‘deemed’ and accepting the dictum that:- 
 
‘Generally speaking when you talk of a thing being deemed something you do not mean 
to say that it is that which it is deemed to be. It is rather an admission that it is not what it 
is deemed to be and that, notwithstanding it is not that particular thing, nevertheless … it 
is deemed to be that thing.’29 
 
Thring J proceeded as follows:- 
 
‘If I am correct in holding this view the only question which needs to be considered is 
whether Lemonaris has or had at the relevant times power to control both the First and 
Third Respondents. He says nothing in any of his affidavits to indicate that in the law of 
Cyprus companies are controlled differently in any material respect from the manner in 
which they are controlled in our law. His statement in para. 19 of his first affidavit that ‘I 
exercise no control over these companies’ when read in its context means no more, to my 
mind, than that the manner in which he acts in relation to the First and Third Respondents 
is subject to direction by others. He does not say that under Cypriot law he has no power 
to control the companies.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary it is presumed that 
foreign law is the same as ours, being the lex fori ...   
In s440A of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 ‘control’ is defined as:- 
“...a holding or aggregate holdings of shares or other securities in a company entitling the holder 
thereof to exercise, or cause to be exercised, the specified percentage or more of the voting rights 
                                                 
29
 R v Norfolk County Council 65 LT 222 
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at meetings of that company, irrespective of whether such holding or holdings confer de facto 
control.” 
The ultimate control over a company’s affairs is exercised by its members in general 
meeting, although immediate and direct control may vest in its directors, but they are 
answerable to the company’s members in general meeting who may, of course, determine 
who the directors are to be. … It is the policy of the law that a company should concern 
itself only with the registered owners of its shares. … It follows that even if he holds the 
shares of the First and Third Respondents as a nominee for others, Lemonaris, as the 
registered shareholder has the power directly to control these companies by voting the 
majority of their shares in their shareholders’ meetings. This means that as the majority 
shareholder of both companies Lemonaris has overall control over them; he can exercise 
control over their assets and their destinies… Moreover, as their sole director, he is 
probably the only person with managerial powers in them.  In my view it does not matter 
that other persons or entities, as beneficial owners of the shares held by Lemonaris, may 
be entitled by reason of arrangements made inter se to direct Lemonaris as to how he 
exercises his powers: the companies are obliged to give effect to his legitimate wishes as 
the registered holder of the majority of their shares and are therefore subject to his direct 
control.’ 
 
There appear to be four elements to this line of reasoning. Firstly the court looked at the deeming 
provision contained in section 3(7)(b)(ii) and held that it was intended to constitute an 
irrebuttable deeming. In other words, whatever the true factual situation might be, the deeming 
provision would override it. Secondly, it asked whether Mr. Lemonaris had power to control the 
two companies, either directly or indirectly. In doing so it construed the power to control the 
company directly as referring to the question of where under the law the legal power to control 
the company lay. In other words it asked who the appropriate legal system would identify as 
being the person legally entitled to exercise power over the company’s affairs. Thirdly, and 
following from this approach the court had regard to the South African Companies Act, 61 of 
1973, and asked itself who would be the party legally entitled to control a company under that 
statute. The answer it gave to this question was that the registered majority shareholder had that 
power. Lastly, the court applied the presumption that in the absence of evidence to the contrary 
the law of a foreign state is presumed to be the same as South African law. Each of these 
propositions will be subject to analysis and scrutiny in due course. Before undertaking that task, 
however, it is necessary to examine the reasoning of the majority in the SCA, which upheld the 




(d) The Heavy Metal (SCA) 
 
 The judgment of the majority in the SCA was delivered by Smalberger JA.30 The approach 
adopted differed in some respects from that of Thring J in the court below although it arrived at 
the same conclusion. The starting point was the proposition that a person can control a company 
without controlling all the shares in the company and that control over a company can be 
exercised without a majority shareholding. This apparently uncontentious statement does, 
however, conceal certain relevant issues. Firstly, in what sense was Smalberger JA referring to 
‘control’ of a company or of the share in a company? Presumably the reference to controlling the 
company without controlling the shares in the company is a reference to real or actual control of 
its affairs irrespective of shareholding. It is indeed perfectly possible to control a company 
without any shareholding in that company at all. The reference to controlling the shares in the 
company is more problematic. It seems to refer to something different from ownership of the 
shares, but whether the expression is intended to include a situation where the registered 
shareholder is purely a nominee for the true owner of the shares is not clear. In any event the 
statement was only relevant to the question whether someone other than Mr Lemonaris controlled 
the two companies in that case. It was after all common cause that Mr Lemonaris was the 
registered shareholder in respect of the majority of the shares in both companies. 
 
 Leaving this aside Smalberger JA went on to consider the concept of control used in the 
Act. His approach was that the deeming provision in section 3(7)(b)(iii) cast light upon the 
concept of control. He expressed himself as follows:- 
 
‘The subsection elaborates upon and refines the concept of control by that person.  
Control is expressed in terms of power. If the person concerned has power, directly or 
indirectly to control the company, he/she shall be deemed (‘geag ... word’) to control the 
company. ‘Power’ is not circumscribed in the Act. It can be the power to manage the 
operations of the company or it can be the power to determine its direction and fate. 
                                                 
30 It was concurred in by Nienaber JA and Melunsky AJA. 
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Where these two functions happen to vest in different hands, it is the latter which, in my 
view, the Legislature had in mind when referring to ‘power’ and hence to ‘control’.31 
 
This approach does not appear to differ significantly from that taken in a number of earlier 
judgments. Indeed in the first case to consider the question the conclusion had been that the 
reference to the power to control the company in the deeming provision:- 
 
‘Relates to overall control, such as is exercisable for instance, by a majority shareholder 
or his nominee, of the assets and destiny of the company; it does not refer to its day to 
day management and administration.’32 
 
 
 From this point on Smalberger JA moved into more disputable terrain. The judgment 
continues as follows from the passage cited above:- 
 
‘In South African legal terminology that means (essentially for the reasons given by the 
court a quo … at 492C-F; see also s195(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) the person 
who controls the shareholding in the company. Foreign law is a question of fact.  If the 
appellant wished to make out a case that the law of the Republic of Cyprus differed 
significantly from the law of South Africa it should have adduced evidence to that effect. 
It did not do so. Consequently there is no reason to surmise that the applicable law in 
Cyprus differs materially from that of South Africa …’ 
 
 
In this passage Smalberger JA endorsed three aspects of the approach of Thring J in the Cape 
court. Firstly, he endorsed his reliance on the provisions of the South African Companies Act. 
Secondly, he endorsed the proposition that in dealing with control of a company the court was 
only concerned with the registered shareholding of the company. Thirdly, he endorsed the 
invocation of the presumption that foreign law is the same as South African law. These aspects 
will require further attention.   
                                                 
31 The Heavy Metal (SCA), para. 8, p1105I-1106A. 
32
 E E Sharp & Sons Limited v m.v. ‘Nefeli’ 1984 (3) SA 325 (C) 326I-327A.  The correctness of the statement is not 
affected by King AJ having overlooked the fact that section 3(7)(a) throughout referred to control of the shares of the 
company, whilst the deeming provision referred to the power to control the company. That conundrum subsequently 
led the then Appellate Division in Dole Fresh Fruit International Limited v m.v. ‘Kapetan Leonidas’ and another 
1995 (3) SA 112 (A) at 119H to hold that the section should be construed as referring to control of the shares of the 
company and not control of the company itself. 
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 Smalberger JA’s reason for adopting this approach lay in the fact that the deeming 
provision referred to the power to control a company both directly and indirectly. As he 
expressed it in the following portion of his judgment:- 
 
‘[9] The subsection clearly distinguishes between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ power. That 
distinction must be given a meaning.  Indirect power can only refer to the person who de 
facto wields power through, and hence over, someone else. The latter can only be 
someone who wields direct power vis-à-vis the company and the outside world and who 
therefore, in the eyes of the law (i.e. de jure), controls the shareholding and thus 
determines the direction and fate of the company. On the facts of the present case 
Lemonaris is the person in that situation. Of course, the same person may in given 
circumstances exercise both de facto and de jure control.   
[10] In my view, therefore, direct power refers to de jure authority over the company by 
the person who, according to the register of the company is entitled to control its destiny; 
and indirect power to the de facto position of the person who commands or exerts 
authority over the person who is recognised to possess de jure power (i.e. the beneficial 
‘owner’ as opposed to the legal ‘owner’). This extension of de jure power to de facto 
power is in line with the objective of the section; to prevent the true ‘owner’, by 
presenting a false picture to the outside world, from concealing his assets from 
attachment and execution by his creditors.  
[11] From the above analysis it follows, in my view, that, if the person who has de jure 
power happens to control, at the relevant times for such control, both companies 
concerned (i.e. the company which owns the guilty ship and the company which owns the 
targeted ship), the statutory requirement of a nexus between the two companies will have 
been satisfied. This is the position in which Lemonaris found himself.    
[12] On the other hand, if de jure control of the respective companies vests in different 
hands it would still be open to the applicant for arrest to establish that the same person 
was in de facto (i.e. indirectly) in control of both, thereby also supplying the required 
statutory nexus to satisfy the provisions of s3(7)(a) of the Act. 
[13] The principal purpose of the Act is to assist the party applying for arrest rather than 
the party opposing it. While the section is designed, in the interests of an applicant, to 
cater for the situations referred to in paras. [11} and [12} above it is not, in my view, 
designed to cater for the converse situation where de jure control over both vessels 
(companies) vests in one person, but the owner of the targeted ship is able to show that 
such person is a mere puppet dancing at the string of two different masters. If the latter 
approach were to be the correct one, the distinction drawn by the Legislature between 
‘direct and indirect control’ would fulfil no purpose. The only issue on that approach 
would be de facto control.  If that had been the Legislature’s intention it need only to 
have spoken of the ‘power to control’ in the section. Any approach which effectively 
negates a clear provision in an Act cannot be sound unless there are compelling reasons to 
the contrary. No such compelling reasons have been advanced in the judgment of my 
Colleague. 
[14] It needs to be emphasised that the subsection does not speak merely of the ‘power to 
control’. If it did, the decision in Barclays Bank Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1961] AC 509 (HL) referred to by my Colleague may have been of greater relevance to 
its interpretation. There is much to be said for the view that where one speaks simply of a 
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‘power to control’ one is concerned with a single repository of power - the person who is 
in actual, overall control. But the power to control directly or indirectly envisages two 
possible repositories of power, one de jure and one de facto.  Either form of control can 
be satisfied to bring the subsection into operation. If there can only be one repository of 
power in terms of the subsection it would follow that the person who has de jure control 
could be ignored once it has been established that someone else has de facto power. This 
would appear to be contrary to the clear wording of the subsection. By using the words 
‘directly or indirectly’ the Legislature clearly intended to extend and not restrict the 
expression ‘power to control’ (c/f Olley v Maasdorp and Another 1948 (4) SA 657 (A) at 
665FF and Lipschitz N.O. v UDC Bank Limited 1979 (1) SA 789 (A) at 797D-E. 
[15] In my view, and on the undisputed facts, the respondent therefore succeeded in 
establishing the requisite nexus for the conclusion that the Heavy Metal was an associated 
ship of the Sea Sonnet. If that conclusion results in the bizarre position referred to in para 
[57] of my Colleague’s judgment, that is the direct and foreseeable consequence of a ship 
owner choosing to operate behind a cloak of secrecy. It is precisely for that reason, 
because the creditor is at such a disadvantage in tracing the assets of his debtor, of which 
this case is a prime example, that the subsection was worded as it is. The result is not as 
unfair as it may at first blush seem, for it lies within the power of the ship owner to 
arrange his affairs and his relationship with the company in question so as to avoid any 
prejudicial consequences to himself...’ 
 
 It is clear from these portions of the judgment that the distinction drawn between direct and 
indirect control of the company was critical to the majority’s judgment. The categorisation of 
direct control as being de jure control, that is, formal legal control in accordance with South 
Africa’s company legislation, with all other forms of control being categorised as indirect or de 
facto control is also critical. Of course, once that distinction was drawn in that way the result was 
inevitable. However, the distinction is also central to other reasoning in the judgment as emerges 
from paragraph [13], where it is suggested that an approach that required the court to look at 
actual control, whether exercised through ownership of shares or indirectly through other means, 
would nullify the distinction between direct and indirect control and render it nugatory. That 
proposition will also be examined in much greater detail. 
 
 The last point to be made about this reasoning is that Smalberger JA and his colleagues 
who concurred in his judgment appeared unconcerned about the consequences of this decision
33
. 
                                                 
33 Bradfield, [2005] LCMLQ 234, 246 refers to the majority’s ‘rather dismissive attitude to the consequences of their 
decision’. I agree with him that the decision of the majority is incorrect but his suggestion that the reason is that the 
majority erred in treating the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ as adjectives qualifying ‘power’ rather than as 
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That they were aware of those consequences is apparent from a reference in Smalberger JA’s 
judgment to an aspect of the dissenting judgment of Farlam AJA34. The argument summarised in 
that paragraph was that the interpretation of the majority led to the bizarre conclusion that merely 
because two companies had the same nominee shareholder and nominee director, but no real 
commercial connection whatsoever, the vessels owned by those companies would be held to be 
associated. This was a key issue as emerges from the heads of argument filed on behalf of Belfry 
Marine.
35
 Whilst Smalberger JA does not appear to have thought that this was a substantial 
likelihood it appears not to have concerned him and his colleagues as he put the blame for that 
situation squarely on the beneficial owner of the associated ship by saying that it was the direct 
and foreseeable consequence of a ship owner choosing to operate behind a cloak of secrecy. It is 
hard not to read this as an unspoken condemnation of any situation where the true beneficial 
owner of the shares in a company is not identified. 
 
(e) The Heavy Metal - a critique 
 
 There are a number of aspects of the judgments in the Heavy Metal that call for analysis. It 
may be helpful to deal with each aspect under a separate heading. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
adverbs modifying the verb ‘control’ is perhaps slightly pedantic and a rather narrow approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
34 In paragraph [15] of the former referring to paragraph [57] of the latter. 
35  In paragraph 1 of those heads of argument it was said:-’The second question is whether the court a quo was 
correct in elevating the deeming provisions in section 3(7)(b)(ii) to an irrebuttable presumption, incapable (in the 
present case) of being refuted by explicit evidence to the contrary.  On this approach, because specialist maritime 
lawyers around the world act professionally for registration purposes on behalf of many clients, by virtue of that fact 
ships with no true links of ownership or control must be regarded as associated ships by South African courts and 
hence subject to arrest in South African waters in such circumstances.’ 
Later in paragraph 48 of the heads of argument counsel returned to the same theme in saying:- ‘The effect of the 
decision of Thring J is that an entirely co-incidental nominee shareholding by a legal practitioner to meet the legal 
requirements of the country of registration could lead to totally unrelated ships being deemed to be associated.  Given 
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(i) The decision is inconsistent with the underlying basis for an associated ship arrest 
 
 At the outset the most important criticism of these judgments is that they undercut the 
fundamental premise on which the whole concept of the associated ship rests. That premise was 
explained and accepted in the case of the ‘Berg’ as being that liability for a claim should fall 
where it belonged by reason of common ownership of the vessels or common control of the ship-
owning companies
36
. This involves an incursion upon the principle that companies are separate 
entities independent of the natural person or persons who benefit from their operations and can be 
regarded as the beneficial owners of the vessels. However, if it is accepted, as suggested in 
Chapter 4 that the associated ship jurisdiction is a policy response to the existence of one-ship 
companies in the operation of a commercially connected group of vessels and the invocation of 
the separate corporate personality of those companies to enable the beneficial owner to avoid the 
payment of legitimate debts of one of those companies, there is justification for this incursion. 
That response is based on the view that this is an exorbitant use of separate corporate personality 
and that it is appropriate for there to be legislative intervention in that regard. However, it is 
fundamental to this justification for the associated ship arrest (and indeed any other justification) 
that the two ship-owing companies are indeed subject to common control. 
 
 The point can be illustrated by way of a simple example. If a ship X owned by a company 
controlled by A incurs a debt and does not pay it, the purpose of the associated ship jurisdiction is 
to permit the arrest of another ship in pursuance of that debt in circumstances where liability for 
the debt will ultimately rest on A. To arrest a ship Y owned by a company controlled by B, who 
is not in any way connected with A, involves a random re-allocation to B of liability for a debt 
for which A should ultimately be responsible. However, the effect of the judgment in the Heavy 
Metal is precisely this. It holds that because A and B wish to preserve their anonymity as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
the limited number of admiralty practitioners in any legal community, a vast number of ships might be regarded as 
associated by the South African courts, whereas in truth they are not.’ 
36 Oddly enough Thring J had referred to this principle early in his judgment at 490I, although he appears to have 
overlooked the amendment to the Act and referred to ‘ownership or control of shares’. However he did not thereafter 
deal with the point that his decision was contrary to this principle.  
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beneficial owners of the ship-owing companies and have chosen to use the same legal 
practitioner to act as a nominee shareholder in those companies subject to their direction and 
control, they have created a situation where the two vessels are associated. Even if they thereafter 
reveal who they are to a South African court and are believed when they deny any business link 
between themselves and their companies that will be fruitless in the view of the majority. The 
ships will be associated because they have used the same nominee and that is an end to the 
matter.  
 
 It is hardly surprising that this reasoning ‘struck fear into the hearts of many operators of 
one-ship companies, particularly those structured and situated in Greece and Cyprus where local 
attorney nominee shareholders are common’.
37
 It is one thing for a ship-owner to know that in 
South Africa all the vessels that are operated for his benefit will be vulnerable to arrest as 
associated ships in respect of the debts incurred in relation to any of them. It is an entirely 
different matter for a ship-owner to learn that his or her vessels are vulnerable to arrest in South 
Africa because they happen to make use of the perfectly legitimate device of a nominee 
shareholder in order to preserve their anonymity and have the misfortune to use as their nominee 
a person who is the nominee of another ship-owner with outstanding debts.   
 
 The dismissal of these concerns as being the fault of ship-owners who choose to operate 
behind a cloak of secrecy is entirely misconceived and unjustifiable. It would not have made the 
slightest difference to the reasoning in the majority judgment had there been a full and complete 
disclosure of the identity of the beneficial shareholders in both Belfry Marine and Dahlia 
Maritime and this had shown beyond any question that they were not the same person. Mr. 
Lemonaris would nonetheless have been the registered owner of the majority of the shares in both 
companies. He would therefore have had what the majority called de jure or direct control of both 
companies. In other words if it had been shown that Mr. Lemonaris was ‘a mere puppet dancing 
                                                 
37 Hare, footnote 21 ante. 
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at the string of two different masters’38 the result would have been the same. In those 
circumstances the Heavy Metal would still have been held to be an associated ship in relation to 
the Sea Sonnet. 
 
 The unspoken premise underlying the view of the majority was that a desire for anonymity 
and the use of nominee shareholders to achieve that purpose is in some way reprehensible and if 
it results in adverse consequences being visited on people who choose to do business in that 
fashion, so be it. With respect that approach is commercially naive and legally unsound. It is 
commercially naive because there are many very good commercial reasons why a businessperson 
will desire such anonymity. Take for example the case of a shipowner that is based in Israel or 
has strong Israeli links. There is every reason why that owner would want to remain anonymous 
if a portion of its business operations relates to trading with Arab nations. The converse is also 
true. The principle is the same as that which caused various ships to be transferred to the British 
and United States flags during the Iran/Iraq conflict in order to take advantage of naval protection 
afforded by those two states in the Persian Gulf.
39
 Avoidance of political restrictions on trade or 
the imposition of unwanted commercial burdens in the form of punitive taxes or simply steps to 
take advantage of government subsidies available in one country but not in another, in 
circumstances where disclosure of the identity of the ultimate beneficiary of such subsidies could 
raise public protest, are all sound commercial reasons for desiring anonymity. Leaving aside 
practical issues such as these, in the case of private companies there does not appear to be 
anything wrong in principle with the beneficial owners of those companies wishing to preserve 




                                                 
38 See Smalberger JA para 13.   
39 Coles ante 15. 
40 In a world where kidnapping remains a problem in some jurisdictions anonymity may be a helpful protection for 
wealthy business people and their families. 
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 This was emphasised in the dissenting judgment of Marais JA
41
 where he said:- 
 
‘I cannot subscribe to the proposition that, if the interpretation of the provision favoured 
by Smalberger JA should result in a third party who has no connection whatsoever with 
the guilty ship other than that he happened unwittingly to use as his nominee to hold 
shares in his ship-owing company a person who also holds as a nominee all the shares in 
the company which owns the guilty ship, losing his company’s ship, that is his fault for 
‘choosing to operate behind a cloak of secrecy’. There is nothing inherently immoral, 
unethical or reprehensible in nominee shareholdings. The reasons why they may be 
resorted to in good faith are legion and the interpretation to be given to the provision 
cannot be grounded upon an assumption that there must always be some or other 
disreputable purpose lurking behind their use.’ (My emphasis.) 
 
Whilst this sentiment must be endorsed it should be taken one step further. The only justification 
for the associated ship arrest is that the same person or persons stands behind both ship-owning 
companies so that the person who ultimately benefited from the incurring of the debt is also the 
person who is ultimately required to discharge that debt. If an associated ship arrest is to be 
permitted in circumstances where the person standing behind the ship concerned is not the same 
person as the individual standing behind the associated ship, it is wholly irrelevant what the 
motives of the latter were in creating a one-ship company and preserving his or her anonymity by 
securing that the shares in the company are registered in the name of a nominee.42 Even if one 
                                                 
41 Para [13]. The impression one has from reading the judgments is that they were written sequentially so that the 
judgment of Smalberger JA reads like an answer to that of Farlam AJA and the judgment of Marais JA is in turn a 
reply of that of Smalberger JA.  With respect this is not entirely satisfactory although there are a number of other 
judgments of the SCA where the same pattern can be detected. See for example Betha and others v BTR Sarmcol, a 
division of BTR Dunlop Ltd 1998 (3) SA 349 (SCA), where the sequence is  Smalberger JA followed by Olivier JA, 
Streicher JA and Scott JA and Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and 
Others 1996 (4) SA 499 (A), where the sequence is Schutz JA, Plewman JA, Botha JA, Van Heerden JA and Nestadt 
JA. A judgment that reads as a rebuttal of that of another judge tends to concentrate excessively on what are seen to 
be the flaws in the reasoning of the former and insufficiently on a coherent and convincing analysis of the issue in 
the case. In part this is due to the approach adopted now for some years by the SCA that judgments should be 
delivered by the end of the term in which the cases are argued. This arises from the pressures under which that court 
operates but it can lead to unsatisfactory results. It definitely means that decisions are produced under greater time 
pressure than is conducive to decisions by the highest court in non-constitutional matters.  
42 It must be borne in mind that a nominee shareholder is not the owner of the shares. They are the registered owner, 
but their ownership is purely nominal so that at any time the true owner is entitled to demand that the registration in 
the share register be altered to reflect his or her ownership. They are not in law the owners of the shares.  The fact 
that under the appropriate legislation governing companies they may for some purposes be given recognition ahead 
of the true owner does not alter that situation. Sammel and others v President Brand Gold Mining Company Limited 
1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 642 and 633G-H. In Bell’s Trust v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1948 (3) SA 480 (A 489I 
Centlivres JA referred to a clear case where ‘A is the registered shareholder, but is a mere nominee for B who is the 
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assumes that the purpose was in some way improper, such as tax evasion, or the exploitation of 
the crew on board the vessel by avoiding social security payments or unionisation, or a lax 
approach to maintenance of the vessel, that is no justification for visiting that beneficial owner 
with liability to pay debts for the creation and non-payment of which they have no responsibility. 
Such liability is not a proper response to whatever improper or immoral purpose may lie behind 
their choice of this type of corporate organisation. On any basis it defeats the underlying purpose 
of the associated ship jurisdiction and is palpably unfair. 
 
 The complaint of unfairness was dismissed in the majority judgment. It was suggested that 
the result is not as unfair as it might at first blush seem because it lay within the power of the 
ship-owner to arrange his affairs and his relationship with the company so as to avoid any 
prejudicial consequences to itself.
43
 However, that is not correct. The only way in which a ship-
owner wishing to avoid the consequences of the majority judgment could rearrange their affairs 
would be by securing that the nominee shareholder did not act as such for any other beneficial 
owner of a one-ship company. That is impractical. A person wishing to acquire a ship through the 
medium of a one-ship company registered in a jurisdiction such as Cyprus does not wish to have 
to find the only lawyer or accountant or trust company in that jurisdiction that does not offer its 
services to any other ship-owner. No doubt such an individual could be identified in the ranks of 
practitioners specialising in family work or criminal law, but would any sensible person about to 
invest large sums of money in a ship be willing to risk making use of their services? There are 
obvious reasons why ship-owners will use the services of lawyers and accountants who are 
experienced in this field. If they do so then on the majority judgment they run the risk of having 
their vessel identified as an associated ship merely on the basis that they have used the same 
nominee shareholder as another ship-owner. It clearly does not lie within the powers of the ship-
owner on any sensible basis to arrange their affairs so as to avoid such a result. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
real owner’. In other words the nominee shareholder is not the legal owner of the shares. Nor was Mr Lemonaris the 
legal owner of the shares in Belfry Marine and Dahlia Maritime, even if the law in Cyprus was that he would be 
recognised for company law purposes as the shareholder to the exclusion of his principals. 
43 Smalberger JA, para. 15, 1107G-H. 
 291
 It is a fundamental weakness of the majority judgment that it does not engage seriously 
with the problems created by its analysis. That problem had been identified in the argument 
before it and in the judgments of the other two judges.44 With respect the approach of the 
majority to this very real problem is quite unsatisfactory and unconvincing. There was in truth no 
answer to the proposition that their interpretation of the deeming provision led directly to a result 
that was inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the associated ship arrest. On that ground 
alone the majority conclusion cannot be accepted as correct. As a conclusion of law it leads 
directly to the next proposition namely that the result, as a matter of the interpretation of the Act, 
is clear and unsustainable breach of the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
(ii) The favoured interpretation is inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution 
 
 The decision of the majority creates a further problem that will need to be dealt with again 
in considering the impact of the Constitution on the associated ship jurisdiction. It is, however, 
appropriate to draw attention at this stage to the fact that the interpretation favoured by the 
majority must inevitably involve a breach of the rights of the owner of the associated ship under 
section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in circumstances where 
the limitation of rights involved cannot be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. Section 
25(1) provides that no-one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. This has been held to be a 
right that vests in corporate entities. As the section speaks of ‘no one’ there does not seem to be 
any basis for not extending its protection to foreign companies.  
 
 There is little doubt that the arrest of a vessel involves a deprivation of property in that 
either the vessel is lost or the owner is compelled to put up security to secure its release. Is the 
                                                 
44 Farlam AJA dealt with it at paragraph 76 of his judgment (at 1104) where he said:-‘When one has regard to the 
mischief at which the section is directed, viz the device of hiding the fact that two vessels are associated in that a 
single person ‘owned’ them at the relevant times, it becomes obvious that an association based on apparent but not 
real control was not what Parliament had in mind when it enacted the section. Furthermore, if apparent control were 
to be held to be sufficient this would lead to the bizarre result to which Mr. Gauntlett referred.’ 
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resultant deprivation arbitrary? On the face of it the answer must be in the affirmative as it 
involves taking the property of A in order to obtain payment of the debt of B. Whatever 
justification there may be for that where the same individual stands behind both shipowning 
companies it is hard to see that there can be any justification for it where the beneficial owners of 
the two companies are different. In the context of the provisions of s114 of the Customs and 
Excise Act 91 of 1964, which in certain circumstances permitted property not belonging to the 
customs debtor to be seized and sold in execution of a debt for customs duty, the Constitutional 
Court has already held that this constitutes an unjustifiable interference with the property rights 
of the owner of the goods.45 The same reasoning must lead to the conclusion that the 
interpretation given by Smalberger JA to the provisions of section 3(7)(b)(iii) is constitutionally 
untenable. 
 
 All courts in South Africa are bound in interpreting any legislation to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.46 This means that where there are potentially conflicting 
interpretations of a statutory provision that interpretation should be favoured that is consistent 
with the provisions of the Bill of Rights and wherever possible an interpretation inconsistent 
therewith should be avoided.
47
 An application of this principle in the Heavy Metal clearly 
                                                 
45 See First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services and another 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para. 37. The court held (in para. 111) that as there was no connection between the owner of 
the vehicles in question and the customs debt the seizure of the vehicles and their sale in execution constituted an 
unjustifiable infringement of the owner’s rights under section 25(1). 
46 S 39 of the Constitution. 
47 ‘There is, it is true, a principle of constitutional interpretation that where it is reasonably possible to construe a 
statute in such a way that it does not give rise to constitutional inconsistency, such a construction should be preferred 
to another construction which, although reasonable, would give rise to such an inconsistency.  Such a construction is 
not a reasonable one, however, when it can be reached only by distorting the meaning of the expression being 
considered.’  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), para [23]. See the discussion in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and 
others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: in re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO 
and others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) paras 21-26. The constraint that: ‘The provision concerned must be reasonably 
capable of the preferred construction without undue strain to the language of the provision.’ (per Yacoob J in 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of Good Hope v Robinson 2005 (4) SA 1 (CC) para [54]) does not present a 
problem as it is clear that the deeming provision is capable of a meaning different from that ascribed to it by the 
majority. 
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favoured the approach of the minority and not that of the majority. The majority approach led to 
an arbitrary deprivation of property whilst the minority approach did not. Accordingly the 
minority approach to the interpretative question should have been favoured. On constitutional 
grounds therefore the majority judgment cannot be accepted. 
 
(iii) The distinction between de jure and de facto control of the company and their 
identification with direct and indirect power to control the company is unjustified. 
 
 Section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that:- 
 
‘A person shall be deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to 
control the company.’ 
 
This provision was in the Act in 1983 when it was originally passed at a time when the associated 
ship provisions referred not to control of a company but to control of the shares of the company. 
In order to make sense of it in that context it was held that it should be read as if the words ‘the 
shares in’ were inserted before each reference to ‘company’.
48
 However when the associated ship 
provisions were amended to refer to control of a company instead of control of the shares of the 
company this deeming provision was not amended. Presumably therefore it is appropriate to 
approach its construction anew in the light of its new context.   
 
 Seen in that light it is a somewhat curious provision. It says that a person who has power to 
control a company is to be deemed to control the company. However, it is difficult to conceive of 
a situation where a person who has power to control a company does not in fact control the 
company, which renders the deeming redundant. If there is a delegation of the power of control 
this remains an exercise of control, because the delegate is always responsible to account for their 
actions and the delegation can always be withdrawn. It is only an abdication of the power of 
control that would seem to fit with the words but the problem with that is that control is given up 
and passes to the person who takes it up. That person then controls the company not the person 
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who has abdicated such control. One is therefore driven back to the proposition that having the 
power of control and controlling the company seem to be the same thing. Once it is accepted, as 
has generally been accepted since the introduction of the Act and correctly so, that the concept of 
control of the company is not a matter of managing its day to day operations but consists in the 
capacity to control its direction and fate, there seems to be little need for a provision that the 
person who controls the company is to be deemed to control the company. After all if that is the 
factual situation it is unnecessary to deem it to be so. 
 
 If the clause is to have a useful meaning therefore it must flow from the parenthetic words 
‘directly or directly’. Unlike the court below, which did not explore this phrase, it is central to the 
reasoning of the majority in the SCA. Its approach was to say that the subsection distinguished 
between direct power to control the company and indirect power to control the company. It 
explained the distinction between the two on the basis that indirect power refers to someone who 
de facto wields power through and hence over someone else, whilst direct power was said to be 
de jure power, being the power of someone who in the eyes of the law controls the 
shareholding.49 The clear result flowing from this construction was said to be that:- 
 
‘...the power to control directly or indirectly envisages two possible repositories of power, 
one de jure and one de facto’.50 
 
 
 It is submitted that this distinction is not justified and that it entails a false dichotomy. The 
power to control a company in the sense of determining its direction and fate cannot reside in two 
places at once. That is a recipe for a tug of war between the two persons competing to exercise 
the power of control and the ultimate result must be that one will be dominant and the other 
subordinate. In Biblical terms the company cannot be the servant of two masters. Whichever one 
                                                                                                                                                              
48 Dole Fresh Fruit International Limited v m.v. Kapetan Leonidas and another 1995 (3) SA 112 (A) 119H. 
49 Smalberger JA, para. 9, 1106C-D. 
50 Smalberger JA, para. 14, 1107D-E. 
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is dominant will have the power to control the company. The other will not have the power to 
control the company in the sense of being able to determine its direction and fate. If the power to 
control the company bears that sense there can be only one repository of that power. It follows 
that the necessary consequence of suggesting that there may be two separate repositories of 
power existing simultaneously is that the meaning of control of the company must be different in 
each case. This can be illustrated by taking the simple case of a company all the shares in which 
are owned by X, but registered in the name of Y, her nominee. There can be no doubt that X 
determines the direction and fate of the company. Y will sign whatever shareholder’s or 
director’s resolutions X puts in front of him. He has no power but to do the bidding of his 
mistress and any attempt to revolt will be quelled by the court. In what sense then can it be said 
that Y has the power to determine the direction and fate of the company? The only sensible 
answer is that he has not. Accordingly to speak of Y controlling the company, as well as X, one 
must be giving a different meaning to the concept of control in the case of Y to that which one 
gives in the case of X. 
 
 There are obvious difficulties with that result. Not only does it contemplate that there may 
be more than one person who controls the company which owned the ship concerned or which 
owns the putative associated ship but it contemplates that the nature of their control may be 
different. The one will be real and actual control having a practical effect on the operations of the 
company and the other a tenuous and formal control, which has no separate effect because it is 
always exercised under the direction of the person who has the real power of control. There is 
nothing in the language of sections 3(7)(a)(ii) and (iii) that even remotely contemplates such a 
possibility. These sections speak of ‘a person who controlled the company which owned the ship 
concerned’ and of ‘a company which is controlled by a person’. This language contemplates only 
a single repository of control and only one type of control namely real or actual control of the 
company. That control lies in the ability to determine the direction and fate of the company. The 
provisions of section 3(7)(a) are not capable of being read as encompassing at the same time and 
vested in different people both the real or actual power to control the company and distinct from 
it and vested in a different person a power of control which is purely vestigial and consists of 
performing corporate formalities at the instance of the person who exercises that real or actual 
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power of control. Unfortunately the majority judgment focuses its attention entirely on the 
deeming provision and does not consider it in the light of the substantive associated ship 
provisions to which it relates. 
 
 The deeming provision does not refer to and distinguish between de facto and de jure 
control of a company. That was an interpretative gloss put on the actual words used in the 
deeming provision which are ‘the power, directly or indirectly, to control the company’. Leaving 
the Latin tags aside it is appropriate to examine in the context of a company what constitutes the 
power to control directly and what the power to control indirectly. The best way to do this is to 
consider the simple example of a company with a single shareholder X, where the shares are 
registered in the name of X’s nominee, Y and ask the question whether X exercises direct or 
indirect control over the company. It is submitted that it is only at an extremely formalistic level 
that one can suggest that X does not exercise direct control over the company.51 It is also wholly 
artificial to say that X exercises indirect control over the company and that direct control vests in 
Y.  
 
 This illustrates the further difficulty namely that of drawing a clear defining line between 
the power to control a company directly and the power to control it indirectly. It is accepted that 
the registered owner of shares, who holds those shares in his or her own right and in that capacity 
is entitled to vote these shares, exercises direct control over the company. The essence of the 
judgment of the majority in the Heavy Metal is that all other situations are to be regarded as 
examples of a power to control a company indirectly. But that is unrealistic. To say that the mere 
interposition of a nominee as the registered shareholder, obliged at every point to give effect to 
the wishes of the true owner and to forego such registration if the true owner so wishes, is not a 
case of direct control of the company ignores reality. It is an artificial description of the process 
                                                 
51 That precise situation had been considered by a strong Court of Appeal in Bibby (J) & Sons Limited v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1944] 1 All ER 548 (CA) 550 where Lord Greene MR expressed the opinion that the 
controlling interest in such a case would be held to be in the true owner, not the nominee. That view was left open in 
the subsequent appeal but in Barclays Bank Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] 2 All ER 817 (HL), the 
majority of their Lordships (Lord Reid, Lord Cohen and Lord Denning) shared the view of Lord Greene MR. 
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of control of the company. It becomes even more artificial when it is then said that this power of 
control is indirect and that the nominee exercises directly the power to control the company. 
 
 The difficulty of distinguishing between direct and indirect control of the company is 
illustrated by complicating the simple example set out above. The first step is to insert a holding 
company, Z, on behalf of whom the nominee Y holds the shares in the ship-owning company. If 
X is the sole shareholder in Z her control of the ship-owning company is as complete as it would 
be if Z did not exist. If one asks in that situation who has the power to control the ship-owning 
company directly, the answer would surely be X, not Y or Z. The position would be the same 
even if X is only a majority shareholder in Z having distributed some of the shares in that 
company to her husband and children. An approach that confines the power to control the 
company directly to the person who, for whatever reason and on whatever basis, is the registered 
shareholder is not one that would be adopted by any practical person in the business world. The 
example can be complicated further by introducing other intermediaries and shareholders until 
the stage is reached when one says that the power to control is now so remote from the exercise 
of real or actual control that it becomes a power to control the company indirectly.   
 
 If the problem is approached from a different direction it is possible to suggest cases of 
indirect control of a company. Thus there is the example of a ship-owning company where the 
vessel has been purchased with the assistance of a financier who takes a bond over the vessel and 
a pledge of the ship-owning company’s shares on terms that entitle the financier in certain 
circumstances of default to take over the operations of the company and the vessel, appoint its 
own managers and give directions to the registered nominee shareholder in regard to the 
company’s affairs.
52
 In those circumstances it is suggested that the control exercised by the 
financier upon an event of default would be indirect rather than direct. 
 
                                                 
52 Such an arrangement would be similar to a notarial bond over a business such as that in Barclays National Bank 
Ltd and another v Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd and others 1982 (4) SA 650 (D). 
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 Little point is served in trying to conjure up further examples lying on the continuum from 
the power to control the company directly to the power to control the company indirectly. At 
either end of that continuum it may be possible to identify cases that clearly involve a direct 
power to control or an indirect power to control the company. At some indistinct point on the line 
one will pass from one to the other. The identification of that precise point will not be possible.
53
    
 
 The point of this analysis is to suggest that where the majority judgment saw a clear 
distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ power to control a company no such clear distinction 
exists. Once that is recognised it is unnecessary to seek to give a non-existent distinction a 
meaning. The analysis in the majority judgment is not assisted by seeking to characterise the 
distinction as one between the de facto power to control the company and the de jure power to 
control the company.
54
 A problem arises immediately with the exposition of what is intended by 
the concept of the de facto power to control the company.  It is said that: 
 
‘Indirect power can only refer to the person who de facto wields power through, and 
hence over, someone else.’55 
 
However, that is an unusual and distorted meaning of the expression de facto. The ordinary 
meaning of de facto is:- 
 
‘In fact, in reality; in actual existence, force, or possession whether by right or not.’56 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
                                                 
53
 Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) 77B-F. 
54 It does not assist in the exposition of a statute in the English language for it to be re-cast in what Edward Gibbon 
referred to as ‘the obscurity of a learned language’. 
55 Smalberger JA, para.9, 1106D. 
56 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Ed, sv de facto, Vol. 1, 623. In Black’s Legal Dictionary, 7th Ed, 427 it 
is defined as ‘Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally recognised’. 
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In other words, when one speaks of the de facto power to control the company one is speaking of 
real or actual power of control, whether or not that flows from any legal right and whether it 
arises directly or indirectly. It is not an indirect power to control as it may exist and be exercised 
directly.  It is actual or real power to control however arising. It includes both the shareholder 
who owns the shares in the company in his or her own right and the shareholder who causes the 
shares to be registered in the name of a nominee. However in the judgment it is used in an 
unusual and restrictive sense as relating to the situation where power is wielded ‘through, and 
hence over, someone else’, thereby excluding the first and most obvious case of de facto control 
namely where the shares are owned by a person in their own right and for their own benefit. With 
respect that is a distorted meaning and it creates a false antithesis with the concept of the de jure 
power of control. The latter ordinarily conveys the notion of power exercised by legal right.
57
 
Again it is irrelevant whether the right is said to exist directly or indirectly. What is important in 
both expressions when applied to the power to control a company is that whichever expression is 
used one is still speaking of power to control the company and that requires that there actually be 





 The problem with this antithesis is illustrated by the fact that in later portions of the 
judgment the expression ‘de facto power’ is used in its ordinary sense. Thus having said that 
what is envisaged are two possible repositories of power, one de jure and one de facto, it goes on 
as follows:- 
 
                                                 
57 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ante, sv ‘de jure’, 630 gives ‘rightfully, according to law’ and Black’s 
Legal Dictionary, ante, 437 gives ‘existing by right or according to law’.   
58 The distinction is more pertinent in an entirely different context. It is illustrated by the cases arising from the 
declaration of UDI in what was then Rhodesia and is now Zimbabwe. There the courts had to grapple with the 
problem arising from the fact that the government of Mr Smith wielded de facto power in the country and whether 
the courts should give this de jure recognition. Madzimabuto v Lardner-Burke NO and another NO 1968 (2) SA 284 
(RA). On appeal to the Privy Council the Board held these arguments to be inapplicable on the grounds that the 
British government was continuing with efforts to displace the usurping government and therefore that the relevant 
principles of international law did not apply. Madzimabuto v Lardner-Burke and another [1968] 3 All ER 561 (PC) 
573H-575B. 
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‘If there can only be one repository of power in terms of the subsection it would follow 
that the person who has de jure control could be ignored once it has been established that 
someone else has de facto power.’ 
 
Not only is this using the expression de facto power in its ordinary sense but it does not deal with 
the fact that de facto power may also be de jure power and, in the corporate situation, usually is. 
There is no suggestion that in the examples set out above X is not exercising actual or real power 
of control over the company and is doing so because she has a legal right to do so enforceable in 
the appropriate courts. 
 
 It is submitted that the basic flaw in the reasoning in the majority judgment lies in the 
notion that there is a clear distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ power to control a company 
and that the legislature intended such a distinction. The distinction is by no means clear or easy to 
draw and the intention to draw such a distinction is not apparent from the statute. Normally when 
the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ is used in a statute or a contract it is used as a composite 
adverbial phrase to indicate that the statutory or contractual provision will apply irrespective of 
the means by which the particular result that is its subject is achieved. In other words, it will not 
matter whether the thing is done directly or indirectly. Its use ensures that all possible cases of the 
particular action in question are covered irrespective of whether they would be described as being 
performed directly or indirectly. That avoids any argument that the statute or contract in question 
only applies to the particular act where it is done directly and not where it is achieved through 
indirect means. These are hair-splitting arguments involving nice distinctions of little practical 
relevance. They are directed at showing that what was done, was only an indirect way of 
performing the act in question, and accordingly falls outside the scope of the prohibition or 
provision. The use of the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ is designed to forestall such arguments.  
 
 There are countless examples in contracts of the use of the composite expression ‘directly 
or indirectly’ in this fashion. In the contractual arena one common example is in a contract in 
restraint of trade that prohibits the restrained person from competing directly or indirectly with 
the party in whose favour the restraint operates. The whole purpose of couching a restraint in 
such terms is to ensure that the restrained person is not able to advance arguments that they 
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themselves are not competing but that a company in which they have an interest is competing 
with the party in favour of whom the restraint was given.59 The inclusion in the restraint of the 
words ‘directly or indirectly’ precludes an argument that the person restrained is not competing 
with the party in whose favour the restraint operates because the competition is by a company 
that has separate corporate personality, although its shares are entirely owned by the restrained 
person. 
 
 Similarly there are numerous examples of the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ being used 
in statutes and always for the purpose of ensuring that all acts of a particular class, however 
performed, whether directly or indirectly, are brought within the compass of the particular 
section.
60
 Perhaps the most important instance of their use is to be found in the equality clause of 
the Bill of Rights. Section 9(3) of the Constitution61 provides that the State ‘may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone’ on various stated grounds. Section 9(4) 
extends the prohibition in the same terms to any person. Manifestly the purpose of using the 
expression ‘directly or indirectly’ is to ensure that all cases of unfair discrimination are covered 
by these prohibitions not to distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. 
 
 The range of statutes in which the expression is to be found is diverse. It includes the 
Competition Act
62
, the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act
63
, the Copyright Act
64
, 
                                                 
59 See the decision in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA); [1933] All ER Rep 109 approved and 
followed in Le’Bergo Fashions CC v Lee and another 1998 (2) SA 608 (C) 612D-E. 
60 An electronic search of the statutes reveals 1140 examples of the use of this phrase. 
61 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
62 Act 89 of 1998 where the expression is used in the definitions of ‘acquiring firm’ and ‘target firm’ in section 1(1); 
in the definition of a merger in section 12(1)(a) and in describing a restrictive horizontal practice in s4(1)(b)(i). 
63 Act 71 of 1988 in the definition of ‘unfair business practice’ in s1. 
64 Act 98 of 1978 in the definition of ‘computer program’ in s1(1) of the Act and in ss8(g), 9(a) and (b), 10(a) and 
11(b)(h) in dealing with the nature of copyright. 
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the Films and Publications Act65 and various statutes imposing prohibitions on electoral 
officials
66
. It appears in a number of statutes dealing with criminal law
67
 as well as in various 
provisions of the Income Tax Act68. It is even used in a similar context in the definition of a 
controlling interest in section 2(1) of the Liquor Act.69. The range of instances where the 
expression is to be found is extraordinarily wide. Most significantly for present purposes is that it 
is invariably used as a comprehensive expression to indicate that the particular action that it 
qualifies is covered by the statutory provision however it may be performed. Whilst the reference 
to something being done indirectly clearly broadens the range of operation of the provision70 it 
cannot have the effect of including conduct that is not of the type referred to in the statute. Thus 
section 226(1) of the Companies Act
71
 provides that no company shall ‘directly or indirectly’ 
make a loan to various specified parties. It has been correctly held that the use of the expression 
‘directly or indirectly’ cannot extend the prohibition to cases that do not in any form or guise 
involve the making of a loan to one of the specified parties.72 There may be instances where it is 
necessary for the court to consider and possibly limit the notional scope of the concept of doing 
                                                 
65 Act 65 of 1996 in s7(1)(c) dealing with the qualification of members of the Board and Review Board established 
under that Act. 
66 In ss82(6) and 83(7) of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998; s9(2)(b) of the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996; in 
s37(6) and 38(7) of the Local Government : Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 and in ss4(2)(a), 6(2)(b) and 8(1) of 
the Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993. 
67 For example the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, the National Gambling Act 7 of 2004, the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
68 Act 58 of 1962. 
69 Act 27 of 1989 referring in turn to the definition of ‘controlling interest’ in s1 of the Maintenance and Promotion 
of Competition Act 96 of 1979.  Klokow v Sullivan 2006 (1) SA 259 (SCA), para. 4. 
70 Olley v Maasdorp and another 1948 (4) SA 657 (A) 665-7 
71 Act 61 of 1973 
72
 S v Pouroulis and Others 1993 (4) SA 575 (W) 589-601. 
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something ‘directly or indirectly’
73
 but this does not affect the principle. Such a limitation is 
merely an endeavour to comprehend the precise scope of what is encompassed by the notion of 
doing the act in question directly or indirectly. 
 
 In the plethora of instances in which the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ is used there is 
no case that I have been able to find in which it has been suggested, as was suggested in the 
majority judgment, that the expression is intended to distinguish between those things that are 
done directly and those that are done indirectly and thereby to create two different classes of 
actions. In all cases it is accepted that the effect is to extend the scope of the provision so that all 
acts of the particular type are comprehended, however they are to be performed. In other words 
the expression is read as intending to convey comprehensively that all actions of a particular type 
are encompassed by the provision no matter how they are performed.  
 
 It is submitted that the expression is used in this manner in the deeming provision in section 
3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act. The purpose of the deeming provision is to make it clear that when the Act 
speaks of control of a company it is concerned with real or actual control of that company not 
with an artificial concept of control created by the appearance of the share register of a company. 
There can be no doubt that in the formulation of these provisions all concerned were aware of 
precisely the type of factual situation that arose in the Heavy Metal. It is submitted that the 
intention in enacting the deeming provision was to make it clear that when the Act spoke of the 
control of the company it was concerned not with matters of outward appearance but with actual 
or real control as it is only actual or real control of both companies concerned that provides a 
justification for the entitlement to arrest an associated ship instead of the ship concerned. 
Properly construed the deeming provision does not create an artificial distinction between the 
power to control a company directly and the power to control it indirectly, but reinforces and 
emphasises what emerges from section 3(7)(a) namely that the Act is concerned with actual or 
real control of companies.  
                                                 
73 As in the case of the prohibition in s38(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 on a company giving ‘whether directly 
or indirectly’ financial assistance for the purchase of shares in that company. Gardner and Another v Margo 2006 (6) 
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 This does not render the deeming provision redundant. So construed it serves the useful 
purpose of putting beyond doubt a particular construction of the concept of control that might 
otherwise have been uncertain.74 In the absence of such a provision it would have been open to 
the beneficial owner of the shares in a company to contend that when control of a company was 
referred to in section 3(7)(a) that was to be construed as a reference to the legal form of control 
arising from the terms of the share register and accordingly that it was impermissible to go 
behind the share register to identify the party who in reality controlled the company. This was 
precisely the approach that had been adopted by the majority in a very formalistic decision of the 
House of Lords in the income tax case referred to in the judgment of Farlam AJA.75 On the 
suggested construction of the deeming provision the answer to such a contention would be that 
the concept of control under the Act was one of actual or real control and that it mattered not that 
control was only exercised indirectly. It is ironic that a provision intended to prevent artificial 
arguments by the beneficial owners of vessels has been construed as endorsing equally artificial 
arguments by claimants.  
 
 Viewed from the correct perspective the deeming provision serves almost precisely the 
opposite function to that conceived by the majority judgment. It makes it clear that questions of 
association are to be determined by having regard to the actual or real power to control the 
                                                                                                                                                              
SA 33 (SCA), paras. [46] and [47]. 
74 Lord Radcliffe in his speech in St. Aubyn (LM) and others v Attorney General (No. 2) [1951] 2 All ER 473 (HL) 
498F-H identified three possible functions of a deeming provision. He said: ‘The word ‘deemed’ is used a great deal 
in modern legislation.  Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a 
word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail.  Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction 
that might otherwise be uncertain.  Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is 
obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible.’ 
The deeming provision in s 3(7)(b)(ii) is of the second type. An example of its use in this fashion is to be found in 
MV Forum Victory: Den Norske Bank ASA v Hans K Madsen CV and others (Fund constituting the proceeds of the 
sale of the mv Forum Victory) 2001 (3) SA 529 (SCA), para [16]. 
75
 Barclays Bank Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1961] AC 509 (HL); [1960] 2 All ER 817 (HL). In a 
sardonic comment on the state of English tax law at this time Robert Stevens says: ‘Tax law had become an elaborate 
form of chess or crossword puzzle with the courts giving the appearance of joining in the game.’ R Stevens, The 
English Judges; Their role in the changing constitution (2002), 27. That high formalism has now been abandoned. 
Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2005]1 All ER 97 (HL), paras 26-33. 
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companies in question. Accordingly the mere fact that two companies have the same shareholder 
may not suffice to show that the same person has power to control both where it can be shown 
that the registered shareholder is a nominee of two separate and distinct parties. It was intended to 
forestall the argument that was accepted in the Heavy Metal that the reality of the power to 
control the two companies could be ignored in favour of registered ownership. The section is not 
directed at facilitating arrests in circumstances in which the underlying rationale for the 
associated ship arrest is not present. It does enable the persons whose shares are registered in the 
name of the same nominee as the shares of the owner of the ship concerned to come forward and 
by demonstrating that the registered shareowner is their nominee to rebut the case that the vessels 
are associated.76 It is intended to avoid the very argument that arose in the Heavy Metal by 




 Once the deeming provision is properly construed the question whether it was rebuttable or 
irrebuttable falls away. Properly construed the provision means that for the purposes of 
determining whether a ship is an associated ship in terms of section 3(7)(a) of the Act, where that 
is dependent upon control of a company owning the ship concerned and control of a company 
owning the alleged associated ship, a person who has the power to control either company, 
whether directly or indirectly, is deemed to control the company. Clearly that deeming is not 






                                                 
76 In other words it does cater for the situation referred to in paragraph 13 of the majority judgment where the owner 
of the targeted ship is able to show that the registered owner of the shares in the two companies is a mere puppet 
dancing at the string of two different masters. This paragraph demonstrates the fallacy of replacing direct control 
with de jure control and indirect control with de facto control.   It overlooks the fact that de facto control may arise 
both directly and indirectly. 
77 In other words it was aimed at avoiding the argument that arose in the case of Barclays Bank Limited v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, supra, where the majority in the House of Lords adopted the extreme literalist approach to 
the interpretation of taxing statutes that has now long since been abandoned by that court. 
78
 S v Rosenthal 1980 (1) SA 65 (A) 90. 
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(iv) The presumption that foreign law is the same as South African law should not have 
been applied. 
 
 In both the lower court and on appeal there was general acceptance of the proposition that, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign law should be assumed to be the same as South 
African law. This was used both by Thring J in the court below and in the majority judgment to 
justify reliance upon the provisions of section 440A of the Companies Act, as it then existed, in 
looking at what constituted control of a company. On a proper construction of the deeming 
provision this question does not arise. However, that the judgment relied on for this proposition is 
in fact one that raises a serious question mark as to its correctness.
79
   
 
 It is submitted that this is an extremely dangerous presumption to rely upon in the context 
of the company laws of a foreign country. As it happens Cypriot company law is based upon the 
English Companies Act of 1948. However, companies incorporated in that country fall into 
separate categories. In the case of an off-shore company engaged in shipping operations the 
company is required to obtain clearance from the Central Bank of Cyprus, which requires 
disclosure to the bank of the identity of the beneficial owner of the shares in that company. In 
those circumstances it is by no means clear that a Cypriot court would take the same view of the 
power to control a Cypriot off-shore shipping company as was taken by the South African court. 
Had the Court approached the question of interpretation without any presuppositions about the 
content and effect of the law of a foreign country it is suggested it would have been hesitant to 
reach the conclusion it did as to the meaning of the deeming provision. 
 
 Indeed it is submitted that a further reason for construing the deeming provision in the 
manner set out above is that it avoids the need to engage with the complexities of foreign legal 
systems in regard to the operation of companies. The question then becomes the more practical 
question of where the actual or real power to control the company lies irrespective of the means 
                                                 
79 Caterham Car Sales and Coachworks Limited v Birkin Cars (Pty) Limited and Another 1998 (3) SA 938 (SCA), 
para. [34]. 
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that are adopted for that purpose. Again this highlights the fallacy of the distinction between de 
jure and de facto control. However indirect the power to control may be it will almost inevitably 
be a power exercisable through legal structures in relation to the company concerned in 
accordance with the legal system of the country where it is incorporated. In other words whatever 
commercial structures and nominees may be interposed between the true beneficial owner of the 
company and the company itself, the true beneficial owner will ensure that those structures are of 
such a nature that he or she can always enforce their power of control by having resort to 
appropriate courts. Accordingly the power to control, however indirect, will be a de jure power as 
well as a de facto power.    
 
(f) The Heavy Metal - a conclusion. 
 
 It is submitted with respect that the decision of the majority in the Heavy Metal is wrong in 
relation to the interpretation given to the concept of control of a company for the purpose of the 
associated ship arrest provisions of the Act and wrong in relation to the primary issue of the 
construction of the deeming provision in section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act. As already indicated the 
decision on the facts by Marais JA is one that appears sound on the basis that the concept of 
control in the section means actual or real control. However it is the legal consequences of the 
decision that are important. Fortunately it has not so far generated problems in practice partly at 
least because of the commonsense of legal practitioners and claimants who would not wish to 
discredit a system that is favourable to them. However that is in principle an undesirable 
situation. Only the SCA itself or the Constitutional Court on appeal from it can alter the decision 
and there may be substantial difficulties in having the matter ventilated again before either of 
those courts. In the circumstances it is submitted that it is desirable that the problem be clarified 
by legislation. This could be achieved most simply by repealing section 3(7)(b)(ii) in its present 
form
80
 and replacing it with the following: 
 
                                                 
80 Its loss would hardly be lamented. On both occasions where it has been considered by the SCA it has caused 
substantial problems of interpretation. 
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‘Control of a company shall be constituted by the power to direct its affairs whether that 
power is exercised directly or indirectly.’  
 
Such a provision would give effect to the intention underlying the associated ship arrest 
provisions and to the proper rationale for such provisions81. Until such an amendment is effected 
however lower courts are bound by the decision of the SCA although it could be challenged if a 
suitable opportunity arose before the SCA. 
 
4  THE PROPER MEANING OF CONTROL. 
 
 It is submitted that the following are the features of the concept of control that emerge from 
a correct analysis of the statutory provisions governing associated ship arrests.  Firstly what must 
be sought is a single repository of control. Secondly, and flowing from the first, it is actual 
control that must be identified. Thirdly the subject matter of control must be the direction and 
policy of the ship-owning company, not necessarily its day to day management. In other words 
what is sought is the directing mind and will behind the company. Fourthly it matters not whether 
control is exercised directly or indirectly. What is important is that the actual repository of the 
power to control the company must be identified. Fifthly the court is not in general concerned 
with the niceties of the corporate law of the jurisdiction where the company is incorporated. The 
fact that for the purposes of the domestic law of the company recognition is only given in regard 
to its affairs to a person’s status as registered shareholder will not matter if in fact the person 
concerned acts on the directions of a third party who is by some legal means entitled to give those 
directions. 
 
                                                 
81 There has been some discussion of this within the ranks of the MLA but no conclusion has been reached. In a 
memorandum submitted to the AGM in 2007 it is said that the majority in the Cape Chapter are opposed to an 
amendment on the basis that: ‘The view was that the shipping world was bedevilled by owners who hid their identity 
and operated under a cloak of secrecy, and that the majority judgment was a welcome step towards greater 
transparency.’ Regrettably this confuses the conduct of some shipowners with a proper and justifiable approach to 
the interpretation of a useful statutory intervention. The majority judgment does not promote transparency because 
transparency will not assist to overcome an association based on the use by separate owners of the same nominee.  
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 However for so long as the Heavy Metal judgment stands these propositions are subject to 
some qualification. In terms of that judgment it is possible to have at the same time two 
repositories of the power to control a company, namely legal control and actual control. The 
search is not restricted to one for actual control and if legal control is established, in the sense of 
the same registered shareholder or shareholders in each company irrespective of whether they are 
merely nominees for the true shareholders, actual control will only be relevant as an aid to the 
arresting creditor. Beyond that situation however it is submitted that the propositions set out 
above are correct. The problem lies in any given situation in the application of the principles. 
 
5 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO CONTROL 
  
 Within the corporate context the application of these principles is relatively straightforward. 
The primary difficulty lies in obtaining the evidence necessary to establish the chain of control. 
Problems tend to creep into the picture when one is not dealing with a single corporate structure. 
Where two or more shipowners form an association for the purpose of working a particular trade, 
which may be a loose arrangement, a joint venture or something as formal as a conference line
82
, 
the outward appearance of matters may well be that the different vessels used for the venture are 
part of a single fleet but that may be misleading. Similarly there may be situations where different 
investors in ships make their vessels available to a single fleet manager to operate jointly but for 
the separate benefit of all the participants. This gives economies of scale in the operation of the 
fleet but it is nonetheless feasible for the managers to account separately to each owner for the 
operation of its vessel. Situations such as these may give rise to an appearance of association but 
the reality may be different.  
 
 The position may be different where a ship manager essentially constitutes and controls a 
fleet with financing from outside but passive investors. There are two ways in which this can be 
done. In the one case a company can be created as the vehicle for the investors who will acquire 
                                                 
82 The early case of Transgroup Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd v Owners of MV Kyoju Maru 1984 (4) SA 210 (D) involved a 
joint chartering arrangement between four shipping lines carrying cargo to and from Japan. 
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shares in that company. The manager will then select vessels, acquire them, arrange finance and 
operate the shipping line. Each ship will be owned by a separate one-ship company and all these 
ship-owning companies will be owned by the investment company.  In that situation all the ships 
will be associated ships. A different approach is for the shares in each ship-owning company to 
be held in different shares by different investors and a different body of investors funds each new 
acquisition. The result is that the shareholding of each ship-owning company is different and 
carefully managed the situation will never arise where two or more vessels have the same group 
of majority shareholders. In fact that situation is never allowed to arise as it would have the 
potential for the investors to displace the manager. In that situation the commercial result is 
virtually identical to the first example but the differences in shareholding of the ship-owning 
companies paves the way for an argument that the vessels are not associated ships because the 
ship-owning companies are not controlled by the same people. However, if the fleet is effectively 
the fleet of the manager and the role of the investors is entirely passive then it can be argued with 
considerable force that it is the manager who controls the companies owning the vessels in the 
fleet and therefore that all the vessels in the fleet are associated ships. This would be a case of 
indirect control.83   
 
 The same or at least a similar problem will also manifest itself in a situation where the fleet 
is owned and operated for the benefit of a family with a number of members. It may be that 
within the family different members will hold different shareholdings in the different vessels 
comprising the fleet. However the operation of the fleet as a single commercial entity managed 
by a single manager (often itself a family company) indicates that there is a sufficient measure of 
common control for the vessels in the fleet to be associated ships. This may be especially the case 
where certain key members of the family are in effect responsible for all decisions in regard to 
the conduct of the business of the fleet. Evidence of cross-mortgages or cross-guarantees or of a 
family-owned management company guaranteeing the debts of different companies in the group 
will all support the inference of common control. It matters not in that situation whether one says 
                                                 
83 C/f The Amer Whitney: Shippers D’Singapore Pte Ltd v Amer Whitney SCOSA C86 (D). The point has arisen in 
one recent case that has yet to be argued and may well never be argued. 
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that the key members of the family indirectly control the ship-owning companies or that the 
family as a collective entity controls the entire group of companies.  
 
 A more complex situation has arisen in the case of shipping fleets operating in the context 
of Communist or former Communist states. As the economies of those companies have become 
more open and sought to adapt in the context of globalisation this has given rise to particular 
difficulties in the context of the associated ship arrest. The matter has come to the fore in cases 
involving Cuba, which continues to claim that it is a socialist state operating in accordance with 
the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, and in relation to China, which since the economic reforms 
initiated by Deng Xioaping after the death of Mao Zedung. moved rapidly to a market economy 
whilst the political hegemony of the Communist Party remained in place. Both situations have 
given rise to cases in which the associated ship jurisdiction has been invoked. 
 
 In the case of Cuba the country’s fleet was transferred to a range of one-ship companies 
established in Malta and Cyprus but ultimately controlled by the nominees of the Cuban 
government.
84
 A vessel was arrested in Durban as an associated ship in relation to a debt arising 
from the charter of another vessel. The allegation was that the Cuban government ultimately 
controlled both the chartering company and the ship-owning company. Reliance was placed on 
the constitution of Cuba, which proclaimed the State’s ownership of property.  Clear links were 
established between the different ship-owning companies and their operations as part of a single 
fleet, centrally controlled. The persons nominally controlling the companies were State 
employees seconded for that purpose. The argument on behalf of the respondent was not assisted 
by it being demonstrated that the defence originally raised was false as was the replacement 
defence. The level of state intervention in the affairs of the ship-owning companies was such that 
it was impossible for it to be said that the Cuban state had divested itself of the ownership and 
                                                 
84
 MV Bacanao: Transportes del Mar SA v Jade Bay Shipping Co Ltd, A119/95 (DCLD), Shipping Cases of South 
Africa, C42. An appeal to the SCA was abandoned shortly before the hearing when an application to lead further 
evidence on appeal was lodged with a view to placing before the court affidavits filed in another matter by the Cuban 
deponents in which they admitted the falsity of the statements of fact in their previous affidavits. This so undermined 
their credibility that the appeal became hopeless. 
 312
control of the vessels that had admittedly existed from the establishment of the Cuban state as a 
communist state after Fidel Castro’s accession to power. At the end of the day the case 
establishes no new principle as it turned on its own facts. 
 
 A more difficult situation has arisen in cases relating to Chinese vessels from the Peoples’ 
Republic of China, where it is sought to claim an association in relation to two vessels operating 
at different levels of the State but both being ‘state-owned enterprises’. The problem has arisen in 
several cases and has received the attention of the Supreme Court of Appeal.85 The case involved 
the security arrest of the mv ‘Le Cong’, which was owned by Guangzhou Ocean Shipping 
Company, a state-owned enterprise, itself owned by another state-owned enterprise, which was 
established and funded by the central government. The debt had been incurred by another entity 
Shantou Sez Chemical Industry and Petroleum Gaz General Company, which was a state-owned 
enterprise established and funded at the municipal level. The claimant contended that because 
both were state-owned enterprises they were associated ships as being subject to common 
control. Guangzhou challenged this claiming that in accordance with Chinese constitutional law 
the two were not subject to common control at all. The differing contentions were summarised as 
follows: 
 
‘[9]The evidence of Guangzhou’’s experts, which formed the basis upon which it was 
sought to set aside the arrest order, was shortly the following. While Guangzhou and 
Shantou Sez were described as ‘‘state-owned enterprises’’ and said to be owned ‘‘by the 
whole people’’, the concept of ownership in this context in Chinese law is a complex one, 
is largely abstract and does not correspond to the concept of civil ownership in western 
legal systems.  Of greater significance, however, was the distinction between the levels of 
government at which the two enterprises were established and funded. Guangzhou was 
established and funded at the level of the central government; Shantou Sez was 
established and funded at municipal level.  In this regard, (and this was common cause, or 
not in dispute) Guangzhou is one of several ship-owning state-owned enterprises 
established by China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company, itself a state-owned enterprise, 
which in turn was established and funded by the central government. Shantou Sez, on the 
other hand, was established by an enterprise called City Petroleum Chemical Industry 
Company (later renamed Shantou Wuzhou (Group) Company) which in turn was 
established and funded by the Shantou City Municipal Government. Each level of 
government is elected by popularly elected bodies. These are, in the case of the central 
                                                 
85 In International Marine Transport SA v MV ‘Le Cong’ and another [2005] ZASCA 106; SCOSA C107. 
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government, the National People’s Congress and in the case of the lower tiers of 
government, local people’s congresses. In accordance with its Budget law China 
implements a system of central and local taxation with each level of government having 
its own independent financial status and being vested with exclusive rights in relation to 
the capital funds within its own particular budget. A state-owned enterprise established at 
a particular level of government, eg at municipal level, would be established with funds 
emanating from the budget at that level and such an enterprise would be subject to the 
control of the government at that level. Accordingly, in the present case, so the evidence 
went, the power to control Shantou Sez vests in the Shantou City Municipal Government 
and is exercised through Shantou Wuzhou (Group) Company. The central government is 
in law precluded from exercising control in respect of Shantou Sez or any of its assets. 
The powers of the central government are limited to those which one would expect to be 
vested in the central government of a largely unitary state and would relate typically to 
the promulgation of administrative rules of a general nature. 
[10] The response of the appellant’s experts was to the effect that the funding of the 
organs of state at different levels did not establish independence between them; that there 
was no warrant for giving the words ‘‘state-owned enterprise’’ anything other than their 
simple express meaning and that the reality of the People’s Republic of China was that 
the central government controlled the provincial and municipal arms of the government 
which enjoyed no independence under the constitution.’ 
 
The Court seemed hesitant to step into the legal minefield created by these opposing contentions. 
It pointed out that: 
 
‘[13]... The closer the system is to ours the more readily a court will rely upon its own 
judgment when faced with a problem of interpretation.  In the present case, however, the 
People’s Republic of China not only has a legal system different from ours but its 
constitutional and social structures are vastly different, as is its political philosophy and 
culture, and it is in this context that its laws must be interpreted. Some examples will 
illustrate the point. Article 1 of the constitution describes the People’s Republic of China 
as a socialist state ‘‘under the people’s democratic dictatorship’’. Article 2 proclaims that 
‘‘all power…belongs to the people’’ while article 6 speaks of ‘‘ownership by the whole 
people and collective ownership of the working people’’. These are all concepts which 
are wholly foreign to our constitution and legal system’ 
    
It then weighed up the conflicting contentions of the parties on the relevant constitutional 
provisions and concluded that the claimant had failed to discharge the onus of showing that the 
mv ‘Le Cong’ was an associated ship in relation to the ship concerned. 
 
 This was an unfortunate conclusion as it meant that the court did not express a view on the 
legal issues posed by such a situation. It is submitted that it is questionable whether the concept 
of control in the Act extends to the type of political control that formed the basis for the 
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appellant’s arguments in that case. None of the cases dealing with associated ship arrests deals 
with the situation where the climb up the corporate ladder in each instance arrives at wholly 
different governmental entities that are not even companies for the purposes of the Act. Can the 
concept of control in the context of the operations of a commercial entity such as a company be 
readily translated to the different arena of the political structure of a state? There are obviously 
marked differences between the control which can be exercised through the mechanism of 
company law and the manner in which governmental organisations operate, which are not in 
general matters of company law but raise questions of constitutional law and the functioning of 
the body politic within a particular state. 
 
 Thus, for example, in this case the thesis advanced was that because of the central political 
role which the National People’s Congress plays in the governance of the People’s Republic of 
China, the it must be seen as controlling, for the purposes of the Act, the two companies that 
were relevant to the case. In earlier litigation, which unfortunately did not proceed to judgment, 
the contention went even further and it was said that because of the pivotal role of the Chinese 
Communist Party in all affairs of state in China any two state-owned enterprises would be subject 




 It is submitted that it is highly debatable whether this is the type of control that the Act 
contemplates in order to establish an association. Were that so then in any democratic state where 
one party is electorally dominant at every level of society, as was the case in Mexico from 1927 
until 1999, and has a mildly socialist agenda proclaiming for example that the State should 
dominate the commanding heights of the economy, it could be argued that the State or that 
political party controlled all economic activity in that country. Such a broad concept of control is 
not, it is submitted, what the Act contemplated. 
 
                                                 
86 The case was that of mv ‘Heng Yu’: G Hinrichs and Company Shipping GmbH v mv ‘Heng Yu’ and another 
A199/99 (DCLD). After argument and shortly before judgment was due to be delivered the case was settled.  
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 In corporate situations such as those mentioned above where one is concerned with the 
control exercised via a holding company or nominee shareholders, or the control arising from 
financing arrangements and the like, the essential element is that on a day to day basis the person 
exercising the control has the immediate legal power to instruct the registered shareholder in 
regard to his or her actions concerning the company and thereby to determine the direction and 
fate of that company. The power to intervene in that company’s affairs for the purpose is 
immediate and legally effective. It is accepted that there may well be cases where such a power 
will vest in a government, for the purposes of section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Admiralty Act. The case 
of the mv ‘Bacanao’ referred to above may provide an example of a situation where a 
government’s presence and control is so pervasive throughout every aspect of society that it can 
genuinely be taken to control even its commercial operations.  In that case the Cuban government 
had always owned and operated directly the vessels that had been transferred to separate 
companies. It was established that the purpose of the transfers was to disguise the interest of the 
Cuban government in the vessels and to avoid the payment of debts incurred in the operation of 
the Cuban fleet. Whilst the Cuban government was not the registered shareholder in the one-ship 
companies those shareholders all worked for a single Cuban state organisation operating directly 
under the government. In those circumstances the involvement of the Cuban government in the 
companies was closely analogous to that which arises in the conventional corporate situation 
where a holding company or an individual exercises control indirectly over a company, but that 
control is immediate and enforceable on a day to day basis. It is submitted that it is this type of 
control that needs to be demonstrated for the purposes of section 3(7)(b)(ii).     
 
 The section refers only to ‘power to control’ the company. It is then said that this power 
may be either direct or indirect. That does not, however, alter the nature of the power but merely 
the manner in which it is exercised. In the case of direct power to control a company the 
shareholders can intervene at any stage in its affairs to determine its direction and fate. It is 
submitted that where reliance is placed upon indirect control then it must be shown that the 
power to control the company vested indirectly in a person other than its shareholders must 
similarly be a power to intervene directly in its affairs on a day to day basis in order to determine 
its direction and fate. This control is entirely absent in the case where a government is politically 
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dominant in a country and adopts communist or socialist terminology to describe its political and 
economic programme. If reliance is to be placed upon political control then it is submitted that 
the control that must be demonstrated must be akin to that which exists in a corporate 
environment where control is exercised in a manner that is capable of having an immediate effect 
on the day to day operations of the entity that owns the ship in question. Anything more remote 
than this is not it is suggested control within the meaning of that expression in the associated ship 
provisions of the Act.    
 
 CHAPTER 8 
 






 The associated ship jurisdiction was plainly instituted for the purpose of assisting maritime 
claimants to enforce their claims and obtain payment. As such it embodies a clear legislative 
choice in favour of shippers and the creditors of ships over the interests of shipowners
2
. In 
conception it was primarily directed at the recalcitrant or elusive debtor and, where the debtor in 
question was a ‘one-ship’ company, those standing behind that company as beneficial owners or 
controllers thereof. However, its usefulness to claimants goes beyond this because, when used in 
conjunction with the power to grant a security arrest in terms of section 5(3) of the Act, it enables 
claimants to obtain the benefit of security in respect of claims that would otherwise have to be 
pursued without security. The advantage of this must not be under-estimated.3  It is not simply 
that the claim is secured.  The provision of security has cost implications for the defendant and its 
availability removes the risk of the litigation proving fruitless, which might otherwise be an 
incentive to the claimant to abandon the claim or accept an offer of settlement. The need to 
provide security places commercial pressure on the debtor to settle the claim. The original debtor 
may well be a company that is a shell because its only significant asset, the ship in respect of 
which the claim arose, has been lost or disposed of. In those circumstances the arrest of an 
associated ship and the obligation to provide security in order to secure its release may well 
                                                 
1 The contents of this chapter owe much to my article ‘The Associated Ship Jurisdiction in South Africa: Choice 
Assorted or Only One Bite at the Cherry’ 2000 LCMLQ 132. In some respects however my views have altered since 
then. 
2 Robert Fisher QC, ‘The Purpose of Admiralty Law’ (2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 14, 17-18. 
3 Writing in 1860 Coote, The New Practice of the High Court of Admiralty, 131-2 pointed out that no-one would 
proceed in personam if they could proceed in rem. The reason was simply that the latter procedure provided security 
by way of the arrest of the vessel or bail or security provided to prevent the arrest or secure its release. 
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prompt the settlement of the claim, particularly if the grounds for resisting it on its merits are 
limited.  
 
 Where the focus of an associated ship arrest is to obtain security for a claim the arrest itself 
usually results in the furnishing of the required security and sometimes the settlement of the 
claim itself. Provided that the target of the arrest is a profitable trading vessel security will 
usually be established and that will be an end to the matter. No question of a further arrest will 
arise. Similarly where the purpose of the arrest is not simply to obtain security but to commence 
an action in rem in South Africa, provided security is forthcoming in response to the arrest the 
action then proceeds without any need to contemplate a further arrest.    
 
 As security is usually forthcoming in response to an arrest, whether it is a security arrest 
under section 5(3) of the Act or an arrest to commence an action in rem, the problem of a 
possible multiplicity of arrests is not likely to arise very often and has not done so in practice.4 
However, in cases of the type for which these provisions were originally devised, where the 
debtor is recalcitrant or evasive and particularly where the debtor is in straitened financial 
circumstances, the issue is a real one. Where a shipping line or group is in financial difficulties 
with a number of creditors pursuing a limited range of assets not every attempt to enforce a claim 
will succeed nor will every arrest of a vessel give rise to payment or the provision of security for 
the claim. In those circumstances the unpaid creditor will always seek further assets to attack in 
pursuit of payment of its claim. South Africa is regarded as a favourable jurisdiction for the 
purpose of obtaining arrests and the associated ship jurisdiction exposes a broader range of assets 
to claims. This gives rise to two questions in the context of the associated ship. Firstly, can a 
claimant arrest both the ship concerned and an associated ship in order to obtain full security for 
its claim or even for the purpose of instituting actions in rem against both the ship concerned and 
the associated ship in respect of the same claim? Secondly can the claimant, for either purpose, 
arrest more than one associated ship? These questions in turn raise issues where more than one 
                                                 
4 There is no reported case involving an arrest in terms of section 5(2)(d), which provides for property to be re-
arrested or further property to be arrested to obtain additional security. 
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vessel in a fleet of associated ships has been arrested and sold in terms of section 9 of the Act. Is 
it permissible in those circumstances for claimants to seek payment from more than one fund 
established pursuant to those sales or is the claimant confined to selecting a particular fund? 
These broad questions and the issues arising from them have been the subject of very little 
attention and of one controversial judgment.5 As that judgment touches on most of the issues 
relevant to these questions and as such provides a background to those issues it is helpful to 
outline the facts and the findings before addressing them in greater detail.  
 
2 THE FORTUNE 22 
 
(a) The facts 
 
 The facts giving rise to the litigation were commonplace. A shipyard performed repairs on 
the mv Mount Ymitos. Payment was not forthcoming and negotiations to recover it ensued but 
only a portion of the amount due was paid. The shipyard commenced proceedings in rem against 
the vessel in Hong Kong and ultimately obtained judgment by default. The vessel had been 
arrested and sold at a judicial sale but this did not result in any payment to the shipyard. A 
mortgagee having a prior claim scooped the pool, leaving the shipyard empty-handed. It looked 
elsewhere to recover payment and not surprisingly thought that the South African associated ship 
jurisdiction might afford it a remedy as the Mount Ymitos was one of a number of vessels owned 
by ‘one-ship’ companies but under common control. On that basis the Fortune 22 was arrested as 
an associated ship in an action in rem to recover the balance of the amount outstanding in respect 
of the repairs. After security had been furnished an application was brought to set aside the 
deemed arrest of the Fortune 22. The application succeeded but this was subject to an appeal. 
                                                 
5
 mv Fortune 22: Owners of the m.v. Fortune 22 v Keppel Corp. Limited 1999 (1) SA 162 (C). This judgment will 
hereafter be referred to as the Fortune 22. Its correctness was challenged in MV Ivory Tirupati: MV Ivory Tirupati 
and another v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka BULOG) 2003 (3) SA 104 (SCA) but the point was not reached. 
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Unfortunately the matter was settled at the doors of the appeal court so that the original judgment 




 The central finding in the judgment was that section 3(6) of the Act precluded the arrest of 
the vessel because it only permitted the arrest of an associated ship ‘instead of’ the ship 
concerned and as the ship concerned had already been arrested and sold in Hong Kong there 
could not be an arrest of an associated ship in South Africa. In reaching this conclusion the court 
took the view that the wording of section 3(6) in providing that an associated ship could be 
arrested ‘instead of’ the ship concerned meant that one or the other could be arrested but not both. 
In other words a claimant was confronted with a choice between a claim against the ship 
concerned and a claim against one associated ship. It fortified itself in this view by reference to 
three matters. Firstly it held that this construction was consistent with the provisions of the Arrest 
Convention. Secondly it held that this was also consistent with English law, which was 
applicable, according to the judgment, by virtue of the provisions of section 6(1)(a) of the Act. 
Thirdly it held that this was consistent with the provisions of section 3(8) of the Act which 
provides that property may not be arrested and security therefor given more than once in respect 
of the same maritime claim by the same claimant.  
 
 Each of these propositions needs to be examined in greater detail. However it is best to start 
with matters of principle before applying them to the specific situation that arose in that case. In 
doing so it must be borne in mind that the Act itself contains provisions dealing with multiple 
arrests. As this was an area of the Act that was clearly influenced by the provisions of the Arrest 
Convention a consideration of those provisions is helpful before turning to the relevant 




                                                 
6 The judgment was followed by Hugo J in The Multidiamond 2000 SCOSA B 50 (D) but without any discussion of 
the reasons why it was said to be incorrect or indeed any statement of principle beyond saying that the judge agreed 
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(b) The Arrest Convention 
 
(i) The Arrest Convention and multiple arrests 
 
 The Arrest Convention was the product of a compromise between civil law jurisdictions 
that permitted the arrest of any property of a maritime debtor and the English institution of the 
action in rem, where only the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen was susceptible to 
arrest. The sister ship arrest permitted by the Convention was the compromise that was struck 
between the high contracting parties. Article 3(1) of the Convention provided that:- 
 
‘Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article 4 and of Article 10, a claimant 
may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, or any 
other ship which is owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim 
arose, the owner of the particular ship, even though the ship arrested be ready to sail but 
no ship, other than the particular ship in respect of which the claim arose, may be arrested 
in respect of any of the maritime claims enumerated in Article 1(1)(o), (p) or (q).’ 
 
The effect of this was that in the United Kingdom and countries sharing its admiralty jurisdiction 
that adopted the Convention a claimant was no longer confined to arresting the ship in respect of 
which the claim had arisen. In civil law jurisdictions they would be confined to arresting one-ship 
only
7
 and the list of maritime claims was defined. This led Lord Denning MR to summarise the 
position as follows:- 
 
‘In 1952 there was an international convention held at Brussels. It was held because of 
the different rules of law of different countries about the arrest of sea-going ships. Some 
countries, like England, did not permit the arrest of any ship except the offending ship 
herself; whereas many continental countries permitted the arrest, not only of the 
offending ship, but also of any other ship belonging to the same owner.  In the result a 
middle way was found. It was agreed that one-ship might be arrested, but only one.  It 
                                                                                                                                                              
with the earlier decision. 
7 Whilst civil law jurisdictions had permitted the arrest of property owned by the debtor other than the ship in respect 
of which the claim had arisen it is not clear to what extent it was permissible to have multiple arrests of the same 
property. Prof Berlingieri does not identify this as a problem in his work Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships (4th Ed, 2006) 
and there is no indication that the provisions of the Convention involved any great sacrifice by civil law jurisdictions 
as opposed to an extension of the English jurisdiction in rem. The more important point from the perspective of civil 
law jurisdictions was probably the fact that agreement was reached on the list of claims giving rise to an arrest.   
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might either be the offending ship herself or any other ship belonging to the same owner; 
but not more. This was an advantage to plaintiffs in England because it often happened 
previously that, after a collision, the offending ship sank or did not come to these shores.  
So there was nothing to arrest. Under the Convention the plaintiff could arrest any other 
ship belonging to the same owner whenever it happened to come to England.’8 
 
 This statement was undoubtedly correct in the situation confronting the court in that case, 
where the plaintiff had not only issued summons against an entire fleet of seven vessels in 
common ownership, but had caused five of them to be arrested simultaneously. It is, however, 
subject to certain qualifications that emerge from a consideration of Article 3(1) together with 
Article 3(3), which reads as follows:- 
 
‘A ship shall not be arrested, nor shall bail or other security be given more than once in 
any one or more of the jurisdictions of any of the Contracting States in respect of the 
same maritime claim by the same claimant and, if a ship has been arrested in any one of 
such jurisdictions, or bail or other security has been given in such jurisdiction either to 
release the ship or to avoid a threatened arrest, any subsequent arrest of the ship or of any 
ship in the same ownership by the same claimant for the same maritime claim shall be set 
aside, and the ship released by the court or other appropriate judicial authority of that 
State, unless the claimant can satisfy the court or other appropriate judicial authority that 
the bail or other security had been finally released before the subsequent arrest or that 
there is good cause for maintaining that arrest.’ 
 
Whilst this Article undoubtedly supports the conclusion in The Banco it is by no means correct to 
say that under the Convention only one arrest is permissible, even if the arrest has been lifted and 
no security has been furnished for the claim. As Professor Berlingieri points out
9
 the English text 
is unfortunate in that it suggests that two alternatives are considered namely the arrest of a ship or 
the provision of bail or security. However, the French text uses the conjunction ‘et’ (‘and’) which 
makes it clear that it is only where the ship has been arrested and either remains under arrest or 
has been released against the provision of security, that a second arrest is prohibited. An 
examination of the Travaux Préparatoires makes it clear that the French text accurately conveys 
                                                 
8
 The Banco: Owners of the motor vessel Monte Ulia v Owners of the ships Banco and others [1971] 1 All ER 524 
(PDA and CA) 532a-c. 
9
 Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships (4th Ed, 2006), paras. 52.516 and 52.517, 195. 
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the intentions of the delegates and that Professor Berlingieri is correct in saying that from this 
material:- 
 
‘…it clearly appears that the provision of the bail or other security was the reason for 
which it was considered that a second arrest should not normally be permitted.’10 
 
Although in the first instance therefore the Arrest Convention requires the claimant to choose 
one-ship in common ownership as the target of arrest, if that arrest is released without security 
being given the Convention does not bar a further arrest in respect of the same claim. 
 
 Article 3(3) provides a further exception to the principle that there should be only one 
arrest.  It qualifies the obligation on the domestic court to order the release of a second vessel 
from arrest in that the claimant is entitled to satisfy the court or other appropriate judicial 
authority that there is good cause for maintaining the arrest. The delegates to the Naples 
Conference where the text of this Article was approved refrained from attempting to define what 
constituted good cause for maintaining the arrest and left this to domestic courts to decide. There 
may well have been significant differences of opinion as to what would constitute good cause. 
Thus in proposing the amendment the French Maritime Law Association postulated the 
possibility of existing security being insufficient or the currency in which it had been furnished 
suffering a sudden depreciation, whilst the British delegation took the view that depreciation of 





 It appears therefore that the restrictions on re-arrest in the Arrest Convention were imposed 
on the basis that once an arrest had been effected and either the vessel remained under arrest or 
security had been furnished it would be inappropriate and possibly oppressive to permit a further 
arrest, save in special circumstances. It is unclear why the delegates were not concerned with the 
                                                 
10 Berlingieri op cit, para. 52.519, 195. 
11 Berlingieri, op cit. 194, footnotes 2 to 4.  The French delegates may ultimately have accepted that the mere 
insufficiency of the security originally provided would not itself constitute good cause. 
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problem of the security furnished to a claimant being insufficient to meet the claim if successful. 
It is possible that the answer lies in the practical circumstance that the effect of the arrest and the 
furnishing of security would be to establish the court’s jurisdiction and that a judgment would 
follow that would ordinarily be enforceable against the owner of the arrested vessel. In civil law 
jurisdictions the proceedings would be against the owner so that if the judgment could not be 
satisfied from the security furnished it would be open to the creditor to enforce that judgment in 
any other jurisdiction where the owner possessed assets. Ordinarily that would also be the case in 
England, which then as now was a major centre of maritime litigation. Whilst proceedings would 
be taken in rem, if the proceedings were opposed by the owner of the vessel entering appearance 
and defending the action it was well established that the action would then proceed as an action in 
personam against the owner of the vessel.12 In any opposed proceedings therefore the judgment 
obtained by the creditor would be for the full amount of the indebtedness and, if the security 
proved inadequate, any other assets of the owner could be pursued in satisfaction of that 
judgment. Accordingly it would only be in the limited situation where the owner did not defend 
the action and perhaps also in the case of some claims under maritime liens where the action in 
rem was pursued after a change in ownership of the vessel, that a party obtaining inadequate 
security would be left remediless, with a judgment that could not be enforced by other means. Of 
course insolvency of the debtor or other reasons rendering the judgment unenforceable could still 
exist but it does not appear that this was an issue in the forefront of the minds of the delegates. 
 
 A last point of significance about this provision of the Convention is that whilst its 
provisions apply to the re-arrest of a ship (or the arrest of a sister ship after an initial arrest and 
the provision of security) in the country where the original arrest took place it is of substantially 
greater importance in preventing a further arrest in another state that has acceded to the 
Convention. This is a significant advantage for shipowners in that in contracting states it means 
that, subject to a narrow and ill-defined exception, they are not at risk of having their vessels 
subjected to multiple arrests by the same creditor in respect of the same maritime claim.  Re-
                                                 
12 The Dictator [1892] P304, 7 Asp MLC 251; The Gemma [1899] P285 (CA) 291, 8 Asp MLC 585; The Dupleix 
[1912] P8, 12 Asp MLC 122. This may be subject to the qualification that the owner is personally liable for the 
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arrest was impermissible in England and it is unclear to what extent it would have been permitted 
in civil law jurisdictions. It seems improbable that in any of them it would have been permissible 
or possible to obtain a second arrest when full security had already been furnished for the claim. 
Procedural remedies by which courts regulate their own process, such as the plea of lis pendens 
or the exercise of a jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process, would have been available to 
prevent that from happening. 
 
 A consideration of these provisions of the Arrest Convention reveals that the concerns of 
the delegates to the various conferences leading up to the adoption of the Convention were 
markedly different from those that were present at the time the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation 
Act was under consideration and the associated ship arrest provisions were introduced. The 
history of the Arrest Convention indicates that like other conventions having their origins in the 
work of the Comité Maritime International the concern was to secure uniformity in regard to the 
customs and practices of the major maritime nations. Prior to the Convention different systems 
had prevailed in different countries regarding the entitlement to arrest vessels. The whole purpose 
of the protracted history leading up to the adoption of the Convention in 1952 was to bring about 
uniformity in this regard. In turn that had the desirable goal of providing certainty to those 
involved in maritime trade as to the scope of the remedies available to courts in major maritime 
nations and the risks attendant upon participation in that trade. That is a far cry from the 
particular and considerably narrower concern underpinning the association ship jurisdiction, 
which was the ability to make use of corporate personality in the form of  ‘one-ship’ companies 
in order to avoid liability for legitimate debts. At the time the Convention was negotiated and 
agreed it is unclear whether this was thought to be a major problem as the bulk of world shipping 
was still undertaken by major shipping lines that had not as yet adopted the one-ship company as 
their preferred corporate form. That had changed dramatically by the time the Act was being 
drafted and in the result the target of the associated ship jurisdiction is the evasive or recalcitrant 
debtor, not international uniformity in arrest regimes in different maritime nations. In considering 
                                                                                                                                                              
claim. 
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the impact of the Arrest Convention on the provisions of the South African statute this distinction 
should be borne in mind. 
 
(ii) The position in South Africa prior to the Act 
 
 Prior to the inception of the Act it was impermissible, whether proceedings were taken 
before the court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction or in the exercise of its parochial 
jurisdiction, to arrest a vessel a second time after an initial arrest or attachment and the release of 
the vessel against the provision of security. As the reasons for this were different depending upon 
which jurisdiction had been invoked each must be considered separately. 
 
 When the court was exercising its admiralty jurisdiction the position was the same as in 
England. Once a vessel had been arrested in an action in rem it could be released against the 
provision of bail or some other form of security.13 The effect of a vessel being released from 
arrest against the provision of bail was that no further arrest of the vessel was permissible. Dr. 
Lushington set out the position as follows:- 
                                                 
13 There was a distinction between the giving of bail, where the security was furnished to the court, and the giving of 
security in some other form, which is purely a contractual matter. The Christiansborg (1885) 10 PD 141 (CA) 152, 
154 and 155-6.  The usual form in which security was given in South African practice prior to the Act was by way of 
a letter of undertaking from or on behalf of a P&I Club. The language of s 3(10)(a)(i) in using the expression 
‘security or an undertaking’ appeared to refer to the historic distinction between bail and a private contractual 
undertaking whereby security was furnished. This is reinforced by reference to the draft bills accompanying the 1979 
and 1980 memoranda, the first of which referred simply to ‘bail’ and the second to ‘bail or security’. The word ‘bail’ 
was then deleted apparently, according to Mr. Shaw, because certain members of the Law Commission were of the 
view that it could only be used in a criminal law context. Thereafter the word ‘undertaking’ was added. However in: 
The Merak S: Sea Melody Enterprises SA v Bulktrans (Europe) Corporation 2002 (4) SA 273 (SCA), paras.7 and 8 
the court rejected this distinction and held that the reference to ‘undertakings’ must be restricted to undertakings 
which do not constitute personal security, such as an undertaking to give a bail or undertakings in relation to the 
vessel, such as that it not be removed from the jurisdiction or that it return to the jurisdiction at specified intervals or 
that the vessel will be kept maintained and insured. It is doubtful whether this is what was intended when the 
legislation was drafted or that it was ever intended that Courts could adjudicate on the terms of security and direct 
that vessels be released against security, which remains contractual in nature, to which the arresting party has not 
agreed. 
 327
‘... now the bail given for a ship in an action is a substitute for the ship; and whenever bail 
is given, the ship is wholly released from the cause of action, and cannot be arrested again 
for that cause of action.’14    
 
Even if the security was furnished by means of a personal undertaking, rather than by providing 
bail the effect was the same. The vessel could not be arrested again in respect of the same claim. 
 
 Where a ship was attached ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem the attachment 
served a dual purpose. It served both to establish the jurisdiction of the court and to provide the 
claimant with property or security in South Africa against which any judgment could in due 
course be executed.
15
 Whilst an attachment is effective for the first purpose even though the value 
of the asset attached is significantly less than the amount of the claim16 if the defendant wishes to 
secure the release of their property attached it does not suffice for it to tender security to the 
extent of the value of that property. The authorities are clear in saying that what is required is 
security to satisfy the judgment and not merely security to stand and abide by the judgment.
17
 
Accordingly in the case of an attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdiction the 
position would always be either that the attachment was still in place or that security for the claim 
had been furnished. In view of the dual function of the attachment as establishing the court’s 
jurisdiction no further attachment would be permissible. Jurisdiction was already established and 
                                                 
14
 The Wild Ranger (1863) B&L 84. The point has been emphasised many times. See The Joannis Vatis (No 2) 
[1922] P213; 16 Asp Mar Cas 13; The Point Breeze [1928] P135; 30 Ll L Rep 229 and The ‘Daien Maru’ No. 18 
[1986] 1 Lloyds Rep. 387.   
15
 MT Argun: Sheriff of Cape Town v MT Argun her owners and all persons interested in her and others; Sheriff of 
Cape Town and Another v MT Argun, her owners and all persons interested in her and another 2001 (3) SA 1230 
(SCA) 1244E-F; Naylor and another v Jansen; Jansen v Naylor and others 2006 (3) SA 546 (SCA) para. [26], 559. 
16
 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Limited v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Limited 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) 309-310. 
17
 Yorigami Maritime Construction Company Limited v Nissho-Iwai Co Limited 1977 (4) SA 682 (C) 697H-698I. 
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 In the result the position prior to 1983 and the enactment of the Act was that where a vessel 
had been arrested in an action in rem or attached ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem 
no situation could arise in which a second arrest or attachment would be permissible. Either the 
original arrest or attachment would still be in place, thereby precluding a further arrest or 
attachment, or bail or security would have been furnished. Once bail or security was furnished 
and whether in admiralty or in the parochial jurisdiction no further entitlement to arrest or 
attachment could arise.   
 
 As was the case with the Arrest Convention this situation was unrelated to the then non-
existent associated ship arrest jurisdiction and the underlying reasons for it were unrelated to the 
factors that led to the introduction of that jurisdiction. That being so it is impermissible and 
frankly misleading to extrapolate from the position as it was prior to the Act coming into 
operation and prior to the introduction of the associated ship arrest, in order to determine the 
intention of the legislature in regard to multiple arrests after that jurisdiction had come into 
existence. One cannot project forward onto a novel institution clearly intended to break with the 
past the restrictions that formerly applied to its predecessor. Nor can one use the past position to 
identify a supposed mischief that the later statutory provisions could be directed at remedying. 
 
(c) The Act and multiple arrests 
 
(i)  Section 3(8) 
  
 The Act contains two provisions that are directed specifically at the possibility of multiple 
arrests. Firstly there is section 3(8) which provides that:- 
                                                 
18 The position is the same as that which prevails where the peregrinus has consented to jurisdiction prior to an 
attachment being made. In that event no attachment is permissible. Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA). 
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‘Property shall not be arrested and security therefor shall not be given more than once in 
respect of the same maritime claim by the same claimant.’ 
 
That provision is in turn subject to an exception embodied in section 5(2)(d) which provides that 
a court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction:- 
 
‘... notwithstanding the provisions of section 3(8), order that, in addition to property 
already arrested or attached, further property be arrested or attached in order to provide 
additional security for any claim, and order that any security given be increased, reduced 
or discharged, subject to such conditions as to the court appears just.’19 
 
 That the wording of section 3(8) was adapted from the provisions of Article 3(3) of the 
Arrest Convention is undoubtedly correct. However, in the course of adaptation to fit the very 
different circumstances of the jurisdiction to be conferred on South African courts by the Act 
material changes were effected that bear directly upon the question of multiple arrests in relation 
to associated ships. In addition the context in which the provision falls to be construed is very 
different from anything that the Arrest Convention was concerned to address. 
 
 Section 3(8) refers generally to the arrest of property because, in terms of section 3(5) of 
the Act it is permissible to arrest not only the ship, but also its equipment, furniture stores or 
bunkers, the whole or any part of the cargo, the freight, a container where the claim arises out of 
or relates to use of that container and a fund in court arising out of the sale of the vessel in terms 
of section 9. As the Arrest Convention is concerned only with the arrest of ships it is not 
                                                 
19 S5(2)(d) originally empowered the court to:- 
‘Order that any security given be increased, reduced or discharged subject to such conditions as to the court appears 
just and, for the purpose of an increase of security, authorise the arrest of property notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 3(8).’ 
In its original form the section clearly permitted an additional arrest for the purpose of obtaining an increase in 
security and the amended language merely makes it clear that the power is available not only in the case of an arrest 
but also in the case of an attachment.  No judicial consideration was given to the section as originally worded and it 
suffices for present purposes to look only at the amended version. 
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concerned with the other types of property that are capable of being arrested in order to 
commence an action in rem in South Africa. However, for present purposes the broader reach of 
the South African statute is immaterial and one can read the reference to property as referring to a 
ship and limit the discussion accordingly. 
 
 More importantly the draftsman has avoided the problem occasioned by the difference 
between the French and English texts by adopting the former and using the conjunction ‘and’. 
This makes it clear that the prohibition in section 3(8) is only applicable where a vessel has both 
been arrested and thereafter security has been given to secure its release. An actual arrest is not 
necessary because in terms of section 3(10)(a)(i) of the Act if security has been given to prevent 
the arrest of the vessel there is deemed to be an arrest. Accordingly, whether there has been an 
actual arrest followed by the furnishing of security or the furnishing of security accompanied by a 
deemed arrest, section 3(8) is applicable. However if an arrest is no longer in place and security 
has not been furnished the section does not pose a bar to a further arrest of the same property. 
Thus in a case where an initial arrest was set aside on the basis that it had been obtained without 
the respondent making out a prima facie case in respect of the causes of action on which it relied 




 A more difficult situation arises where security is furnished to secure the release of the 
vessel, but subject to a reservation of the defendant’s right to apply to court to have the original 
arrest, or deemed arrest, set aside. If that application is successful the claimant will be left with 
neither an arrest nor security. However, until the arrest or deemed arrest is set aside the 
claimant’s situation was that the ship had been arrested and security therefor had been given. 
Does the setting aside of that arrest mean that the elements of the statutory prohibition fall away 
so that the claimant is entitled to seek a further arrest if it is able thereafter to remedy the original 
defect in its case, for example, by obtaining sufficient evidence to show that it has a prima facie 
case in respect of the cause of action? It is submitted that the answer must be in the affirmative. 
The reason for the prohibition on the duplication of arrests and the provision of security is that, 
                                                 
20
 Great River Shipping Inc v Sunnyface Marine Limited 1992 (2) SA 87 (C). 
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save in the circumstances provided in section 5(2)(d), a further arrest where one has already taken 
place and security has been furnished would be oppressive. Where that arrest was set aside as 
lacking a proper legal foundation so that the claimant has neither an arrest nor security, the 
underlying reason for the prohibition in section 3(8) is absent.  
 
 One can arrive at the same conclusion by a slightly different route. It can be said that as a 
matter of construction of the section security is not being ‘given more than once’ where no 
security is in existence. In other words it is a necessary implication of the section that the 
prohibition contained therein only operates when the claimant is in possession of valid security 
given in respect of the maritime claim and to secure the release from arrest (or that no arrest 
would take place) of the vessel. Accordingly it is submitted that in a situation where security has 
been given, but the arrest or deemed arrest underpinning that security is set aside, with the result 
that the security is void, a further arrest of the same vessel is permitted. 
 
 The other elements of section 3(8) appear on the face of matters to be relatively 
straightforward. The section applies only where the second arrest is by the same claimant. The 
latter should not ordinarily occasion difficulty because the existence of a claim is inextricably 
linked to the identity of the claimant.21 Accordingly the claim and the claimant will ordinarily go 
together.  However there are some situations where this is not the case.  Thus if the claimant is a 
company and it has been placed in liquidation or for some other reason the original claimant is 
replaced by someone representing them, such as a trustee or executor, is the claimant for the 
purposes of section 3(8) the same claimant? Then there is the case of a cession of a claim to a 
third party. Patently the claim is the same but the identity of the claimant is different. Can section 
3(8) be invoked in that situation? These are not easy questions to answer. A tentative response to 
the first is that in any situation where there is an identity of interest between the original claimant 
                                                 
21 As Van Heerden J put it in Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (4) SA 63 (D) 68A-B;  ‘Every action 
has to have a plaintiff and it is the plaintiff that has to have title to bring a particular action and not the other way 
about; it is not the action that has to have title to a particular plaintiff. A court does not first decide whether there is a 
cause of action and, if there is, start looking for a plaintiff. The issue a court is called upon to decide is that between 
the parties before it and there can only be such an issue if it has properly been brought by a plaintiff who has to bring 
that particular kind of claim against a defendant who can legally be held liable in respect thereof.’  
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and the subsequent claimant - as in the case of a liquidator or a trustee or executor - they should 
be treated as being the same claimant for the purposes of the section. The case of the cessionary 
is more difficult and it may be more appropriately dealt with on the basis that a further arrest at 
the instance of the cessionary would be an abuse of process. However these are hypothetical 
situations
22
 so it may be preferable to leave the question until it arises in a concrete situation. As 
shown below the scope of application of section 3(8) is relatively limited so this question may 
never arise. 
 
 As with the requirement that it be the same claimant, ordinarily whether the claim is the 
same claim will not give rise to difficulties. However one question that does arise is whether a 
claim based upon a judgment or an arbitration award is the same as the underlying claim so as to 
prevent a second arrest by virtue of section 3(8). The point arose in the context of a claim against 
a vessel called the Amer Prabha. She had been arrested in Singapore and released against the 
provision of security for proceedings in Hong Kong. Those proceedings had resulted in a 
judgment in favour of the claimant but the party furnishing the security had gone into provisional 
liquidation so that the judgment was not satisfied. The claimant then arrested the Ivory Tirupati 
as an associated ship in proceedings to enforce its judgment. An application was brought to set 
the arrest aside inter alia on the grounds that the arrest was prohibited by the provisions of 
section 3(8). 
 
 The basis for the application was the contention that the effect of the judgment obtained in 
Hong Kong was simply to confirm or strengthen the original underlying claim by way of what is 
known in South African law as a novatio necessaria23, which is not a true novation replacing the 
existing contract with another, but a means of strengthening and not supporting existing rights. 
Accordingly, so it was argued, the claim in respect of which the Ivory Tirupati had been arrested 
was the same claim as that brought in the courts of Hong Kong against the Amer Prabha. It 
                                                 
22 Prior to the Act cessions were used in South Africa to try and circumvent the limitations of the attachment ad 
fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem.  
23
 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Dhooma 1970 (3) SA 304 (N)  and Swadif (Pty) Ltd v Dyke NO 1978 (1) SA 928 (A) 
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followed according to the argument that this was a case falling within section 3(8). Of course, in 
order to sustain the argument it was necessary for the court to uphold the contention that a claim 
on a judgment is the same claim as the original underlying claim in respect of which the 
judgment had been given. Absent that foundation the entire argument was doomed to fail. 
 
 In the court below the argument was rejected on the simple basis that in terms of the Act 
the original claim, a simple cargo claim, is a different maritime claim from the claim on the 
judgment. They fell under different sub-paragraphs of the definition of a maritime claim24 and 




 it was correctly held that this 
approach led to anomalies in that there were other claims that could properly fall under two or 
more heads of maritime claim as defined in section 1 of the Act and it would be incorrect to say 
that this meant that there was more than one claim. That is undoubtedly so in the application of 
section 3(8). The court is there concerned with the nature of the claim rather than its precise 
characterisation as a particular maritime claim under the Act. However, it is not clear that the 
court a quo had been guilty of the overly simplistic approach attributed to it on appeal. 
Immediately before referring to the definition of a maritime claim the court had referred to the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in which it had held that an arbitration award was a 
claim in its own right in terms of the Act.27 Be that as it may the appeal court then moved on to 
look at the nature of the claim and held that a judgment or arbitration award not only reinforces 
and strengthens the original claim by proclaiming its validity, but also creates a new obligation as 
well. Whilst it is correct therefore to say that a judgment or arbitration award strengthens the 
original debt it also creates a new and independent debt capable of being sued upon in its own 
                                                 
24 Sub-paragraphs (g) and (aa) respectively. Whilst this case dealt with a judgment it is equally applicable in the case 
of an arbitration award. 
25
 MV Ivory Tirupati: MV Ivory Tirupati v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Bulog) 2002 (2) SA 407 (C) 
26
 MV Ivory Tirupati: MV Ivory Tirupati and another v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka BULOG) 2003 (3) SA 104 
(SCA). 
27
 MV Yu Long Shan: Drybulk SA v MV Yu Long Shan 1998 (1) SA 646 (SCA) 650I-651B 
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right by virtue of a different and separate cause of action. This point the court illustrated by 
reference to the different matters that would have to be proved in order to pursue a claim on a 
judgment as opposed to those that would have to be proved in an action on the original cause of 
indebtedness. It followed that the claim being sued upon was not the same claim as the original 




 It follows from this that in interpreting and applying section 3(8) it is important to examine 
the underlying nature of the maritime claim rather than its pigeonhole within the various classes 
of claims that are designated as maritime claims in section 1 of the Act. In other words it is ‘the 
matter in issue’ rather than the cause of action that is relevant
29
. For these purposes however a 
claim on a judgment or arbitration award is a different claim from the claim on the underlying 
indebtedness itself.     
 
(ii) The territorial scope of section 3(8) 
 
 The most significant difference between section 3(8) of the Act and Article 3(3) of the 
Arrest Convention lies in their respective territorial scope. The prohibition in Article 3(3) 
prohibits multiple arrests and the furnishing of security more than once ‘in any one or more of the 
jurisdictions of any of the Contracting States’. Its operation therefore extends beyond the 
territorial limits of any particular State to all Contracting States. Conversely the prohibition has 
no operation in relation to arrests and the furnishing of security in states that are not Contracting 
States. In other words there is nothing in Article 3(3) to prevent the arrest of a vessel in both 
France, which is a Contracting State, and in South Africa or the United States of America, which 
                                                 
28 It appears from the facts of the Fortune 22 that the action in rem was based on the original claim for payment for 
repairs and not on the judgment obtained by default in Hong Kong. Had it been the latter then section 3(8) would not 
have applied in that case to preclude the South African arrest.  Also as the maritime claim was different it could not 
have been said that the ship concerned had already been arrested on the same claim. However there would then have 
been a problem in establishing the association as the claim on the judgment arose after the vessel had been sold in 
execution. 
29 MV Silvergate; Tradax Ocean Transport SA v MV Silvergate properly described as mv Astyanax and others 1999 
(4) SA 405 (SCA) para [54]. 
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are not Contracting States. There is nothing in the Arrest Convention that suggests that the rule of 
comity that is extended to States that are parties to the Convention extends to States that are not. 
If there is to be a prohibition in any Contracting State on arrests in that State in consequence of 
an arrest in a non-Contracting State, that prohibition must flow from a rule of domestic law, not 
from the provisions of the Arrest Convention.30 
 
 Section 3(8) is likewise subject to territorial limitation but the limitation is even narrower 
than those under the Arrest Convention. In the absence of any indication to the contrary the 
limitation is that it is only concerned with the arrest of property in South Africa in terms of the 
Act and the giving of security for that property. The starting point is the general principle that in 
the interpretation of statutes legislation is presumed not to have extra-territorial application.
31
 An 
examination of the language of section 3(8) does not suggest that it is in any way concerned with 
arrests in any country other than South Africa. An important point is that it is concerned with the 
arrest of ‘property’ and section 3(5), has itself set out what property is subject to arrest in terms of 
the Act. That seems a clear indication that the arrest of property to which section 3(8) is directed 
is an arrest of property under section 3(5) of the Act. That is perhaps reinforced by the fact that 
the property that can be arrested in South Africa under section 3(5) is not limited in the same way 
as the property subject to arrest under the Arrest Convention.  
 
 The context of section 3(8) does not suggest that it is intended to have any application other 
than to arrests and the furnishing of security in South Africa. It is part of section 3 of the Act that 
deals with the form of proceedings. It follows upon section 3(5), which provides that an action in 
rem shall be instituted by the arrest within the area of jurisdiction of the court concerned of 
property in respect of which the claim lies. Then in section 3(6) it is said that an associated ship 
may be arrested instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, and section 3(7) 
                                                 
30 Certain countries that are parties to the Arrest Convention such as Portugal and Sweden do not limit the property 
or the claims that may give rise to an arrest when dealing with non-Convention vessels. See the country entries in 
Maritime Law Handbook (Kluwer in co-operation with the International Bar Association) 
31
 Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1996 (1) SA 
1196 (A) at 1205-1205; American Natural Soda Corporation and Another v Competition Commission and others 
2003 (5) SA 633 (CAC), para. 17, p645.   
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sets out what an associated ship is. When it is provided in the immediately following subsection 
that property shall not be arrested and security therefor shall not be given more than once the 
ordinary connotation is that this is dealing with arrests of the character set out in the immediately 
preceding subsections. There is no indication whatsoever that it is concerned with either prior or 
subsequent arrests in foreign jurisdictions of which no mention is made in any section of the Act.   
 
 Nor is there any reason why section 3(8) should have any application in relation to arrests 
in jurisdictions other than South Africa. The essence of the prohibition in Article 3(3) of the 
Arrest Convention is the international comity that exists between the Contracting States.  The 
purpose of the Convention is to provide a uniform arrest regime in those countries that adhere to 
the Convention. Part and parcel of that Convention is the principle that, in general, only one 
arrest will be permitted where security is furnished to the claimant (and whilst the property is still 
under arrest no further arrest would be possible). However, this rationale clearly has no 
application in relation to the domestic statute of a country that is not, and could not be, a party to 
the Arrest Convention. The reciprocity that underpins this provision of the Arrest Convention is 
then absent. Why should one country prohibit the arrest of a vessel in its jurisdiction in 
accordance with its domestic law, merely because the vessel has already been arrested in another 
country, without the other country being under any obligation to reciprocate?  No apparent reason 
presents itself especially as reciprocity can be achieved if so desired by the mechanism of 
acceding to the Arrest Convention. A French or German court would not refuse an arrest of a 
vessel in accordance with their domestic law merely because it had previously been arrested in 
South Africa.  Why should the converse not hold true? 
 
 It is accordingly submitted that on a proper interpretation of section 3(8) it relates only to 
the arrest of property in South Africa under the provisions of sections 3(5) and (6) of the Act.
32
 
Unlike the provisions of the Arrest Convention therefore section 3(8) does not have any extra-
                                                 
32 There is an argument that the reference to property being arrested in section 3(8) must be construed as including an 
attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem. Some force attaches to that argument by virtue of the 
current language of section 5(2)(d) of the Act. However, as the subject matter of consideration in this work is the 
associated ship it is unnecessary to explore this any further.  
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territorial application. It is neither concerned to prohibit arrests and the furnishing of security in 
jurisdictions outside South African nor is it directed at prohibiting arrests in South Africa where 
an arrest has taken place in another country. There are of course various circumstances in which 
an arrest in South Africa could be challenged in consequence of proceedings elsewhere. For 
example, if the claimant already held adequate security for its claim in another jurisdiction arising 
out of an arrest in that jurisdiction that would on its own be sufficient reason to refuse an arrest in 
terms of section 5(3) of the Act.
33
 Then in terms of section 7(1)(a) of the Act the court may 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction or it could, in terms of section 7(1)(b) of the Act, stay any 
proceedings in South Africa. Alternatively it could exercise its powers in terms of section 5(2)(c) 
of the Act to order that any arrest in South Africa be subject to the condition that the security 
already held by the claimant be released or discharged upon security being furnished for the 
proceedings in South Africa. It is apparent therefore that there are ample remedies in the Act for 
any abusive exercise of the power of arrest. It is accordingly submitted that section 3(8) can 
properly be confined to arrests in South Africa in terms of sections 3(5) and (6) of the Act.
34
   
 
 This view of the position differs from that reached in regard to section 3(8) in the Fortune 
22.  Thring J expressed his conclusion as follows: 
 
‘I am unable to agree with Mr Hazell that the Legislature could have intended s 3(8) of 
the Act to have been of only local application; in the sense that it could have envisaged 
and countenanced a second arrest of property in South Africa which had already been 
arrested, and replaced by security, in a foreign jurisdiction.’35  
 
Leaving aside the fact that in the case before the court the claimant had not obtained security in 
the foreign jurisdiction and the reason for the arrest of an associated ship in South Africa was that 
                                                 
33
 Cargo Laden and Lately Laden on Board the m.v ‘Thalassini Avgi’ v mv ‘Dimitris’ 1989 (3) SA 820 (A); Bocimar 
M.V v. Kotor Overseas Shipping Limited 1994 (2) SA 563 (A). 
34 For this reason alone the judgment in the Fortune 22 is clearly wrong as it prohibited an arrest in South Africa on 
the grounds that there had been a prior arrest in Hong Kong although no security had been given to secure the release 
of the vessel.  
35  166F-G  
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the earlier proceedings in Hong Kong had proved fruitless, the starting point is incorrect. It is not 
a question of determining whether the legislature intended a law to be of local application, but 
whether the legislation should for any reason be construed as being intended to apply to events 
occurring extra-territorially. As already mentioned no foreign court would prohibit an arrest in its 
jurisdiction because of a prior arrest in South Africa. It is unclear in those circumstances why it 
should have been thought that the South African legislature would have wished to take such a 
benevolent approach to arrests in other countries with which we have no reciprocity.  
 
 If one tries to discern the underlying reason for the view that the section should not be 
confined to prior arrests in South Africa it appears to lie in the following passage: 
 
‘Proceedings in rem are often international in their operation and effect in the sense that it 
frequently happens, as indeed has happened here, that peregrini find themselves litigating 
with one another in foreign Courts. Such litigation is, by its very nature, subject to less in 
the way of territorial restrictions than is municipal litigation. Why, then, would our 
Legislature don blinkers, as it were, and confine itself in enacting s 3(6) of the Act 
entirely to arrests within the jurisdiction of a South African Court? Our common law 
recognizes foreign judgments, subject to certain requirements … Why, then, would the 
Legislature wish to close its eyes to foreign arrests? I can think of no good reason. I 
interpose here that it is not suggested by the respondent that the arrest of the Mount 
Ymitos in Hong Kong was in any way irregular or invalid, nor that the default judgment 
taken out there by the respondent is open to attack of any kind. These actions appear, on 
the face of it, to have been regularly and validly executed.’36 
 
 
Whilst the judge was here speaking of section 3(6) he made it clear that the same reasoning 
applied to section 3(8). With respect it is unclear why the fact that South Africa, like most states, 
recognises foreign judgments, which after all are a specific category of claim in terms of the Act, 
should mean that a South African statute dealing with proceedings in this country and the 
entitlement to arrest a ship in South Africa, should be construed as applying to foreign arrests. A 
judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction affirms the validity of a claim thereby rendering 
it unnecessary for another court to investigate it on the merits. The recognition of foreign 
judgments is based on comity and on the need for finality in litigation. Neither of these bears 
                                                 
36 At 165H-166B. 
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upon an arrest in a foreign state that is relevant only to questions of the jurisdiction of that court 
and security for claims.  
 
 Other than where security has already been furnished, where there are other remedies 
available to prevent oppressive behaviour, the fact that there has been an arrest in a foreign 
country is ordinarily irrelevant to the question whether an arrest should be permitted in this 
country. In that situation the issue should revolve around questions of convenience of the conduct 
of litigation rather than an arrest that may have no practical benefit for the arresting party.37 Why 
should a South African court refuse to exercise its undoubted jurisdiction merely because of the 
existence of proceedings between the same parties over the same claim in a different jurisdiction? 
At common law, both here and elsewhere, this is the subject of the plea of lis alibi pendens. In 
South Africa it has never been the position that the mere existence of foreign proceedings should 
result in an automatic stay of local proceedings and there are no reasons of policy why this 
should necessarily and inevitably be the case. A more appropriate response is to leave such 
questions to be dealt with in the court’s discretion having regard to the respective interests of the 
parties and whether the further proceedings in South Africa are vexatious or oppressive
38
. It is 
always open to the court to impose conditions on its order, such as a requirement that the foreign 
proceedings be stayed, to prevent any abuse. Nor does the international character of the 
proceedings alter this. Legal rules such as those that govern the plea of lis alibi pendens are 
specifically applicable to international litigation and probably find greater purchase in that 
situation than in regard to conflicting domestic litigation. 
 
                                                 
37 In the Fortune 22 there had been an arrest in Hong Kong and the vessel had been sold but the entire proceeds of 
the sale had been taken by a mortgagee whose claim ranked prior to that of the shipyard that was the claimant in that 
case. 
38 In Loader v Dursot Bros (Pty) Ltd 1948 (3) SA 136 (T) 138 the following was said: ‘It is clear on the authorities 
that a plea of lis alibi pendens does not have the effect of an absolute bar to the proceedings in which the defence is 
raised. The Court intervenes to stay one or other of the proceedings, because it is prima facie vexatious to bring two 
actions in respect of the same subject-matter. The Court has a discretion which it will exercise in a proper case, but it 
is not bound to exercise it in every case in which a lis alibi pendens is proved to exist …  
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 Additionally no good reason exists why section 3(8) should be given this interpretation. It 
is not, as the judge thought, a case of the legislature donning blinkers and ignoring arrests in 
foreign jurisdictions. There can be no doubt that those who drafted the statute were aware of that 
possibility. A more pertinent questions would be to ask why the legislature would think it 
necessary to override the common law defence of lis alibi pendens by an outright prohibition on 
an arrest in South Africa if there had been a prior arrest elsewhere, irrespective of where the 
arrest had taken place and irrespective of the results of that litigation
39
. The reasons that underpin 
the related provision in the Arrest Convention are not applicable in relation to a country that is 
not a party to that convention. It is an odd conclusion that the legislature introduced as radical a 
procedure as the associated ship arrest whilst silently and by inference abolishing a long-standing 
and uncontroversial means of dealing with duplication of proceedings in different jurisdictions. 
Nowhere in the Law Commission report is it suggested that this was what those responsible for 
drafting the Act had in mind.  
 
 One final point is that section 3(8) only deals with arrests and not attachments. In at least 
some instances therefore it would be possible for the claimant to attach the ship - either the ship 
concerned or a true sister ship - and to commence proceedings in personam against the owner in 
South Africa.40. There is no apparent reason why this should be permitted but not the 
commencement of proceedings in rem. Overall the reasons given by Thring J for holding that 
section 3(8) did not permit an arrest in South Africa if there had already been an arrest in some 
other jurisdiction are unfounded and unpersuasive. On this point it is submitted that the Fortune 
22 was incorrectly decided and the result should have been different. That does not however 
meant that the other point of principle decided in the case, which is of fundamental importance to 
associated ship arrests, can be ignored and it will be dealt with after completing the consideration 
of section 3(8).  
                                                 
39 For example the arrest might have taken place in a jurisdiction where shortly afterwards there was an outbreak of 
hostilities or an internal uprising rendering the courts ineffective or inaccessible. The effect of the judgment is that 
even in a case where South Africa is the most appropriate jurisdiction to conduct the litigation it is impossible to 
commence it.  
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(iii) Section 3(8) and subsequent arrests 
 
 The other major point of difference between Article 3.3 and section 3(8) and the last point 
of difficulty in regard to the interpretation of section 3(8) is whether the section applies to any 
subsequent arrest of any property or whether the section is specific and relates only to the re-
arrest of property that has already been arrested by way of an actual arrest or is subject to a 
deemed arrest and for which security has been provided. In Article 3(3) of the Arrest Convention 
it is expressly spelled out that the prohibition on a subsequent arrest applies not only to the ship 
that was the subject of the original arrest but also to ‘any ship in the same ownership’. In other 
words if the ship in respect of which the claim arose has been arrested in any Contracting State 
neither that ship nor any sister ship may be arrested in any other Contracting State. Similarly if 
the first vessel arrested is a sister ship of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose 
then not only can that ship not be arrested again but no other sister ship, including the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose, is susceptible to arrest in a Contracting State or indeed 
in the country where the initial arrest was effected. 
 
 Not only does section 3(8) not contain any specific provision that would preclude arrest of 
other property, apart from that which has already been the subject of an arrest, but the inclusion 
of the word ‘therefor’ brings about a significant change in the meaning of the language used. 
There is a substantial difference between saying:- 
 
‘Property shall not be arrested and security therefor shall not be given more than once in 




‘Property shall not be arrested and security shall not be given more than once in respect 
of the same maritime claim by the same claimant.’41   
                                                                                                                                                              
40 Shaw, op cit, 47 mentions this possibility although there are arguments that s 3(8) includes attachments. 
41 The Afrikaans text, which is the signed version, has the expression ‘sekerheid daarvoor’. 
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The inclusion of the word ‘therefor’ means that the provision of security relates back to the 
specific property that has been arrested or has been the subject of a threat of arrest. In other words 
the furnishing of security is linked not only to the claim but also to the specific property that is 
the subject of the arrest or deemed arrest. This is not the case if the word ‘therefor’ is omitted.  In 
that event the furnishing of security, whilst of course it arises from the arrest or deemed arrest, is 
linked only to the maritime claim. What would then be prohibited by the clear language of the 
section would be the furnishing of security more than once in respect of the same claim. However 
the insertion of the word ‘therefor’ links the provision of security not only to the claim but also to 
the specific property that is subject to arrest or a deemed arrest..   
 
 No assistance is to be obtained from the drafting history of the section.  From the outset it 
followed the wording of section 3(3) with the only alteration during the drafting process being 
the substitution of  ‘property’ for ‘a ship’. The word ‘therefor’ appears for the first time in the 
draft attached to the Law Commission’s report and the report itself contains no explanation for 
this, the Commission confining itself to saying
42
 that ‘the broad notions upon which the 
Convention is founded have been preserved’. That general statement is of little assistance in the 
interpretation of a specific provision in the Act. 
 
 The language of section 3(8) seems to confine the operation of the section to a re-arrest of 
the same property and is silent on the possibility of an attachment of one vessel and the arrest of 
another.  However, that then raises the question of the reason for including this section in the Act. 
The purpose of the parallel provision in the Arrest Convention is clear. There it largely operates 
to prevent a claimant from harassing a debtor by way of multiple arrests in different jurisdictions. 
However, the need for such a provision in a single country is debatable. Most developed systems 
of jurisprudence have a mechanism for preventing the abuse of process and South Africa is no 
                                                 
42 In para. 7.3 of its report. 
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different in this regard.
43
 Accordingly any inadequacy in the existing statutory remedies could be 
dealt with by developing an appropriate procedure for preventing this type of abuse of process. 
That has led the court in one instance to suggest that section 3(8) cannot be given this 
construction. However, the statement is by way of an obiter dictum and displays a considerable 
measure of confusion so that it is hardly a safe guide.44    
 
 In the case in question the claimant alleged claims against both Louis Dreyfus Armateurs 
SNC (LDA) and an entity known as Takamaka. The claimant had previously threatened to arrest 
the vessel La Sierra and in consequence had obtained a guarantee for its claims against LDA but 
not against Takamaka. The arrest of the m.v La Pampa was sought in order to provide security 
for the latter claim. The court held that the terms of the original security precluded such an arrest. 
That disposed of the matter but the court went on to say that the arrest of the m.v. La Pampa 
could be set aside in terms of section 3(8). The judge noted (in para. [41]) that this point had not 
been seriously argued by the parties but went on to say:-  
 
‘[42] It cannot be disputed that the claimants in this case are the same...claimants, 
and the claims are the same, as those in the arrest of the La Sierra.  It is also the same 
claimants who now sought unlawfully to arrest the La Pampa.  The implication in this 
argument is that for contingencies created by s3(8) to be present, the respondent must 
arrest the same vessel that was previously arrested.  This argument, if it is understood 
properly is, with respect, flawed.  It could not have been the intention of the Legislature 
to prevent the claimants from arresting the same vessel that was arrested but allowed the 
arrest of a different vessel from the same owner.  To allow that, to my mind, would be to 
negate the intention of the Legislature, which was to prevent the potential claimants from 
arresting and re-arresting vessels for the same claim even when, as in this case, security 
has been provided.’ 
 
 With respect there are a number of difficulties with this passage.  Firstly it commences with 
the premise that the arrest of the La Pampa was unlawful. If so it fell to be set aside without 
resort to section 3(8). Secondly, the La Sierra and the La Pampa were not owned by the same 
                                                 
43 To the extent that there are not sufficient express provisions in the Act to prevent its abuse, section 173 of the 
Constitution empowers the High Courts to protect and regulate their own process taking into account the interests of 
justice.   
44 The judgment is that in m.v. La Pampa Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping 2006 (3) SA 441 (D).  
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person. The basis for the threatened arrest of the one and the actual arrest of the other was that 
they were associated ships in relation to the ship in respect of which the claim had arisen. 
Thirdly, it was not correct to say that the claims were the same in that, entirely separate from the 
question of association, they lay against a different defendant namely Takamaka and not LDA.  
Lastly, as already pointed out, if there had been adequate security for the claim - and it was 
conceded that there was no security for the claim against Takamaka - the further arrest would 
have been an abuse of process and could have been set aside on that basis alone.  It is submitted 
that the reasoning is so flawed that it provides no assistance in regard to section 3(8). 
  
 There seems to be only one possible situation in which in South Africa there could be a re-
arrest of the same vessel after security had been provided. That would be where the vessel was 
initially arrested, say in Durban, and after being released against the provision of security was 
then re-arrested when it called at Cape Town. To that extent there is some parallel with the Arrest 
Convention and section 3(8) would clearly apply in those circumstances to preclude the second 
arrest. However, it must be conceded that such conduct on the part of the claimant would be 
extremely unusual and it is by no means clear why a claimant would follow that course.45 Apart 
from that unusual situation, however, it is hard to see that section 3(8) has any particular 
relevance in the South African context.  
 
                                                 
45 It is conceivable that a claimant might do this in order to secure a procedural advantage such as that the case would 
come to trial more quickly in the one jurisdiction rather than the other or that it would be more convenient to its 
lawyers and witnesses for the case to be held in the other jurisdiction or possibly to take advantage of a local 
precedent. However, none of these scenarios is particularly likely.  In practice if there are reasons why it would be 
more convenient to proceed in a provincial jurisdiction rather than the one where the vessel is available to be arrested 
the parties would agree when security was furnished to provide it in the other jurisdiction. An alternative situation 
that I have encountered in practice, which might have resulted in two arrests in the same jurisdiction, was one where 
a claim arising from damage to cargo could have arisen under either the bill of lading or a charterparty. (C/f 
Intercontinental Export Company (Pty) Limited v mv ‘Dien Danielsen’ 1982 (3) SA 534 (N)). The vessel had been 
arrested in rem in respect of the claim under the bill of lading but any claim under the charterparty was subject to 
arbitration in New York and it was suggested that notwithstanding the subsisting arrest she should be arrested under 
section 5(3) for security for the arbitration proceedings. That would have brought section 3(8) squarely into play. The 
problem was resolved by having the court attach conditions to the existing arrest in terms of section 5(2)(c) of the 
Act ensuring that any security given would cover the claim in both sets of proceedings. That obviated the need for a 
second arrest.     
 345
 The limited usefulness of section 3(8) in the South African context is reinforced by the 
provisions of section 5(2)(d) which permit a further arrest or attachment of property in order to 
provide additional security for any claim. Once again there can be little doubt that the initial 
source of this provision lies in the qualification in Article 3(3) of the Arrest Convention that a 
further arrest, either of the particular ship or of a sister ship, can be maintained if there is good 
cause for doing so. The difference is that when these provisions were debated at the CMI 
conference the initial stance of the delegates appears to have been that an additional arrest merely 
because the security initially provided had proved inadequate was undesirable, but that where the 
value of the security had declined due to fortuitous matters over which the claimant had no 
control, such as a depreciation of currency46 this justified an exception to the ordinary rule. By 
contrast - and yet again demonstrating the consistent pattern in the Act of departing from the 
provisions of the Arrest Convention - section 5(2)(d) is directed at permitting a second arrest of 
property, whether or not the same property as that initially arrested, in order to obtain additional 
security. In adopting this approach the South African Act foreshadowed the conclusion of the 
International Convention on Arrest of Ships 199947. Article 5 of the 1999 Convention deals 
explicitly with the right of re-arrest and multiple arrest and reads as follows:- 
 
‘1.Where in any State a ship has already been arrested and released or security in respect 
of that ship has already been provided to secure a maritime claim, that ship shall not 
thereafter be re-arrested or arrested in respect of the same maritime claim unless:- 
(a) the nature or amount of the security in respect of that ship already provided in respect 
of the same claim is inadequate, on condition that the aggregate amount of the security 
may not exceed the value of the ship; or 
(b) the person who has already provided the security is not, or is unlikely to be, able to 
fulfil some or all of that person’s obligations; or 
(c) the ship arrested or the security previously provided was released either:- 
(i) upon the application or with the consent of the claimant acting on reasonable grounds, 
or 
(ii) because the claimant could not by taking reasonable steps prevent the release. 
                                                 
46 Or, it is submitted, if the security was furnished in the form of a guarantee, the insolvency of the guarantor a 
situation that occurred when a P&I Club went into liquidation some years ago. 
47 Hereafter the 1999 Convention. This Convention has not yet entered into force as insufficient States have acceded 
thereto. There is a convenient comparison of the text of the 1999 Convention with that of the 1952 Convention in 
Berlingieri, op. cit 455-467. 
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2 Any other ship which would otherwise be subject to arrest in respect of the same 
maritime claim shall not be arrested unless:- 
(a) the nature or amount of the security already provided in respect of the same claim is 
inadequate; or 
(b) the provisions of paragraph 1(b) or (c) of this Article are applicable.’ 
 
Under this Article the ship that was originally arrested can be re-arrested in order to obtain 
additional security, provided that the total amount of security so obtained does not exceed the 
value of the ship. However, a sister ship can be arrested for the purpose of obtaining additional 
security going beyond the value of the original vessel. In the result the international trend at least 
in this respect has been towards the model contained in the South African statute.   
 
(iv) Conclusion in regard to the effect of section 3(8) 
 
 In the result it is submitted that the impact of section 3(8) as read with section 5(2)(d) is 
relatively limited.  In the first place the section is only applicable where there has been an actual 
or deemed arrest in South Africa and security has been furnished to procure the release of the 
property arrested or to prevent its arrest. On the plain language of section 3(8) it appears to 
prohibit only the re-arrest of the property originally arrested where it was released against the 
provision of security. Even that limited constraint is itself constrained by the fact that the re-arrest 
of that property for the purpose of obtaining additional security is expressly permitted under 
section 5(2)(d). It is difficult to see why any claimant would seek to re-arrest property if it had 
already obtained an arrest, actual or deemed, and is adequately secured for its claim. If the 
claimant is fully secured there is no reason to countenance a second arrest, as it would constitute 
an abuse of the court’s process. If it is accepted that section 3(8) relates only to the property that 
is the subject of the original arrest, then an attempt to arrest other property can be dealt with as an 
abuse of process. Of course, if the purpose of the arrest is to obtain additional security and the 
claim for such additional security is justified then the further arrest is permissible in terms of 
section 5(2)(d), whether it is the original property or other property that is sought to be arrested. 
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Even if one gives section 3(8) a broader meaning as referring to all property
48
 then its sole effect 
is to preclude the commencement in South Africa of two actions in rem in respect of the same 
claim where that claim has already been fully secured by a previous arrest of property and the 
giving of security therefor as a precursor to the commencement of the first action.
49
 To the extent 
that the purpose of a second arrest is to engage in the type of procedural manoeuvring mentioned 
earlier section 3(8) precludes it. However outside these parameters the section has little operative 
effect and that is reflected in the few instances where it has received judicial consideration. 
 
(v) Section 3(8) and associated ships 
 
 On the approach to section 3(8) set out above it has no application as a ground for setting 
aside the arrest of the vessel either where the ship concerned has been arrested and it is thereafter 
sought to arrest an associated ship or where proceedings are brought against two or more 
associated ships in respect of the same claim. The reason is simply that the second vessel sought 
to be arrested will not previously have been arrested and security will not have been furnished for 
it. That has led to it being a standard provision of security furnished either in consequence of an 
arrest or to prevent an arrest that the claimant being furnished with the security should agree not 
to arrest not only the vessel in question but also any property owned by the same owner and any 
vessel in associated ownership. Such a provision is decisive of the question of re-arrest at least as 
far as any South African court is concerned. 
 
 The position would be different if the word ‘therefor’ is ignored in section 3(8) and it is 
interpreted as applying to all property and any prior arrest in consequence of which security has 
been furnished for the claim. In that event a prior arrest of one vessel would preclude the arrest of 
an associated ship or even the ship concerned if the original arrest was of an associated ship. 
                                                 
48 Thereby discounting the word ‘therefor’ in the section. 
49 It is unnecessary to mention the possibility of a further security arrest under section 5(3) of the Act as such a claim 
would inevitably founder on the basis that the claimant already held adequate security for its claim in the 
proceedings before an arbitration tribunal or some other court 
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However as already noted it is unclear why a claimant who is already fully secured for its claim 
should wish to go to the trouble and expense of seeking a further arrest. Perhaps the one practical 
situation would be where the security had been furnished by a party that subsequently went into 
liquidation as was the case in the Ivory Tirupati. That is a relatively unusual occurrence so the 
problem is not likely to crop up frequently. Overall the proper conclusion is that section 3(8) is 
not directed at the arrest of associated ships after there has been an arrest of the ship concerned.  
Nor is it directed at preventing multiple arrests of associated ships. If there is any such 
prohibition in the Act it must be found elsewhere.  
 
(d) Section 3(6) of the Act 
 
 Once the notion that section 3(8) of the Act applies in this situation has been refuted it is 
necessary to concentrate on those provisions of the Act that create the right to bring an action in 
rem against an associated ship in order to determine whether they limit a claimant to a single 
arrest of either the ship concerned or an associated ship. The critical provisions are section 3(5) 
and (6) which deal with the institution of an action in rem in the ordinary course and the 
institution of an action in re against an associated ship. It is as well at the outset to remind oneself 
of the language of these sections. They read as follows:- 
 
‘(5) An action in rem shall be instituted by the arrest within the area of jurisdiction of the 
court concerned of property of one of more of the following categories against or in 
respect of which the claim lies:- 
(a) the ship, with or without its equipment, furniture, stores or bunkers; 
(b) the whole or any part of the equipment, furniture, stores of bunkers;  
(c) the whole or any part of the cargo; 
(d) the freight; 
(e) any container, if the claim arises out of relates to the use of that container in or on a 
ship or the carriage of goods by sea or by water otherwise in that container; 
(f) a fund. 
(6) Subject to the provisions of subsection (9) an action in rem, other than such an action 
in respect of a maritime claim contemplated in paragraph (d) of the definition of 
‘maritime claim’, may be brought by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose.’ 
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‘It seems clear to me that, at least prima facie, the use of the word ‘instead of’ entails that 
a claimant may not arrest both the offending ship and an associated ship he may arrest 
either the one or the other, but not both. That is the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
‘instead of’. It cannot in its ordinary meaning be construed to mean ‘as well as’ or ‘in 
addition to’.  hus The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary has for ‘instead of’, inter alia :  
 
“in place of, in lieu of, in room of; for, in substitution for.’’’ 
 
In other words Thring J held that the words ‘instead of’ implied some kind of election on the part 
of the creditor to pursue its claim against either the ship concerned or an associated ship to the 
exclusion of the other. Although the point was not before him that conclusion indicates that a 
claimant who had elected to pursue a claim against associated ship A would thereafter be 
precluded from pursing the same claim, if unsatisfied, against associated ship B.  
 
 It is always dangerous in the process of statutory interpretation to start from the premise 
that the language used has a definitive grammatical meaning, particularly when that language is 
examined in isolation divorced from its context. The proper approach to interpretation is that 
stated by Wessels AJA
51
 when he said:- 
 
‘In my opinion it is the duty of the Court to read the section of the Act which requires 
interpretation sensibly i.e. with due regard, on the one hand, to the meaning or meanings 
which permitted grammatical usage assigns to the words used in the section in question 
and, on the other hand, to the contextual scene, which involves consideration of the 
language of the rest of the statute as well as the:- 
“Matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose and within limits, its background”. 
In the ultimate result the Court strikes a proper balance between these various 
considerations and thereby ascertains the will of the legislature and states its legal effect 
with reference to the facts of the particular case which is before it.’ 
 
 
                                                 
50 163H-I: 
51
 Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Limited v Distillers Corporation SA Limited and Another 1962 (1) SA 458 (A) at 
476E-G;Feldman v Migdin NO 2006 (6) SA 12 (SCA), para. [16]; Desert Palace Hotel Resort (Pty) Limited v 
Northern Cape Gambling Board 2007 (3) SA 187 (SCA), para. [8]. 
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The need to balance these two elements of language and context has been emphasised on many 
occasions by our Courts most recently by the Constitutional Court in a judgment of Sachs J
52
 
where he said:- 
 
‘[17] Since grammar and dictionary meanings are merely principal (initial) tools rather 
than determinative tyrants, I examine the context in which the word ‘may’ is used. The 
importance of context in statutory interpretation was underlined by Schreiner JA in Jaga 
v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 662G-H as follows:- 
“Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statements that the words and expressions used 
in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must 
be interpreted in the light of their context.  But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to 
the application of this principle.  The first is that ‘the context’ as here used, is not limited to the 
language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary, on the part to be 
interpreted.  Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose 
and, within limits its background.  The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting 
may be along either of two lines.  Either one may split the enquiry into two parts and concentrate, 
in the first instance, on finding out whether the language to be interpreted has, or appears to have 
one clear ordinary meaning, confining a consideration of the context only to cases where the 
language appears to admit of more than one meaning, or may from the beginning consider the 
context and the language to be interpreted together.” 
[18] Schreiner JA went on to point out that whatever approach is adopted, the Court must 
be alert to two risks. The first is that the context may receive an exaggerated importance 
so as to strain the language used.  The second is ‘the risk of verbalism and consequent 
failure to discover the intention of the law-giver’. He emphasised that ‘the legitimate field 
of interpretation should not be restricted as a result of excessive peering at the language to 
be interpreted without sufficient attention to the contextual scene.’’ 
 
 With respect to Thring J he fell into the second trap identified by Schreiner JA. The error 
was compounded by using an out of date edition of a dictionary and selecting only a part of the 
dictionary definition, without explaining why that part should have pre-eminence. At the time of 





                                                 
52 South African Police Service v Public Servants’ Association 2007 (3) SA 521 (CC), paras. [17] and [18] 
53
 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (4th ed, 1993) Vol. 1, 1382. Thring J does not explain why he selected 
the meaning that he did. The dictionary does not rank its definitions in order of preference, but in accordance with 
the date when the word in question was first used in that particular sense. Thus the range of meanings given for the 
first definition date back to the Middle English period between 1150 and 1349 CE, whilst the later definition is from 
the middle of the 17th century. In many cases a more recent meaning will be the more appropriate one to select.   
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‘1. Instead of, in place of, in lieu of, for, rather than ME 
 2. As a substitute or alternative M17.’ 
 
 Other leading dictionaries available at the time illustrate that the use of the 
expression ‘instead of’ conveys different meanings depending upon the context. Thus the Collins 
English Dictionary
54
 gave as the meaning of the prepositional expression ‘instead of’: 
  
‘In place of or as an alternative to’.
55 
 
This clearly illustrates that ‘instead of’ will sometimes posit an election, where the choice of one 
excludes the possibility thereafter of choosing the other, and sometimes provides several options 
or alternatives, to be pursued as the party in question deems appropriate. Whether the one or the 
other is intended in section 3(6) will depend upon context rather than any clear indication from 
the language used in the section as to which meaning is intended. 
 
 The context of section 3(6) within the Act is provided generally by section 3 and in 
particular by section 3(5). Section 3 is a section that deals with the form of proceedings in 
admiralty. Its purpose is to identify the forms of actions that are permissible in admiralty 
proceedings. That is apparent from the long title of the Act which identifies one of its purposes as 
being to specify the procedures applicable in those divisions of the High Court that have 
admiralty jurisdiction. Sections 3(1) to (4) deal with the action in personam. Then section 3(4) 
provides that:- 
 
‘Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to a claimant or to the rules 
relating to the joinder of causes of action, a maritime claim may be enforced by an action 
in rem:- 
(a) if the claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested; or 
(b) if the owner of the property to be arrested will be liable to the claimant in an action in 
personam in respect of the cause of action concerned.’ 
 
                                                 
54 3rd Ed. 1991, p801 
55 The current 6th edition, (2007) has the same definition. 
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The action in rem is accordingly a permissible form of proceeding in admiralty, although the 
range of instances where it may be available to a claimant will be narrower than in the case of an 
action in personam. 
 
 One then arrives at section 3(5). This is the primary section dealing with the institution of 
the action in rem and it requires that such an action ‘shall’ be instituted by the arrest of the ship or 
other property in respect of which the claim lies.
56
 This section lays down the procedure which 
must be followed in order to institute an action in rem.57 However, while the section says that the 
procedure is obligatory (‘shall be instituted’), which implies that it is the only manner in which 
an action in rem can be instituted, section 3(6) provides an alternative. An action in rem ‘may’ 
instead be brought by arresting an associated ship. When the two sections are viewed together the 
alternative created by the use of the words ‘instead of’ is seen to be an alternative in regard to the 
procedure to be followed in instituting an action in rem.58 A claimant wishing to pursue its claim 
by way of an action in rem may institute that action by arresting the ship concerned or an 
associated ship instead of that ship.  
 
 There is an important reason for using the words ‘instead of’ which has nothing to do with 
the claimant having to elect between the two potential ways of instituting an action in rem. It is 
that the associated ship arrest is only available in circumstances where the claimant might 
otherwise wish to bring an action in rem against the ship concerned.  It is not available as a 
permissible procedure in circumstances where any other property identified in section 3(5) is the 
target of an action in rem. There is no such concept in the Act as ‘associated property’ 
                                                 
56 If that provision had stood alone it would have reflected the English position in admiralty prior to 1956, which 
would also have been the South African position in regard to Courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction under the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. It flows from the judgment in The Beldis [1936] P51. 
57
 M.v. Jute Express v Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the m.v. ‘Jute Express’ 1992 (3) SA 9 (A). 
 58 It is submitted that this approach which views sections 3(5) and (6) as embodying in the first instance alternative 
procedures for instituting an action in rem is consistent with what was said in Euromarine International of Mauren v 
The Ship Berg 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) 712D. The fact that section 3(6) may have other effects that will be referred to 




 The use of the expression ‘instead of’ makes it clear that it is only in relation to the 
possibility of the arrest of the ship concerned that any alternative method of commencing 
proceedings is permitted. 
 
 It is a natural use of language to use ‘instead of’ to indicate that there is another way of 
instituting an action in rem apart from arresting the ship in respect of which the claim arises, 
particularly in the light of the peremptory language of section 3(5). To omit ‘instead of’ from 
section 3(6) would create an uncomfortable conflict between the peremptory language of section 
3(5) and the permissive language of section 3(6). Linguistic analysis suggests therefore that it is 
not a necessary or even the more natural conclusion from the use of the words ‘instead of’ in 
section 3(6) that it confronts the claimant with an election between mutually exclusive options as 
opposed to providing two alternative and complementary routes to reach the same goal, namely 
payment of the claim. Whether that is the effect of the language in this instance, depends upon a 
consideration of the broader context. What should be said at this stage is that the Court’s view of 
the natural meaning of these words in the Fortune 22 is not sustainable. In fairness to the judge it 
is not clear from the judgment to what extent his approach to the ordinary meaning of ‘instead of’ 
was challenged in argument. What is apparent is that he made little attempt to place section 3(6) 
in its statutory context with a view to ascertaining the meaning to be given to this expression. 
 
(e) The contextual factors relied on in the Fortune 22: 
 
 In the Fortune 22 the Court found support for its conclusion as to the ordinary meaning of 
the words ‘instead of’ in three places - the dictionary, the English law and the Arrest Convention 
- and rejected one argument that would have rendered the entire exercise academic. That 
argument was that, whatever constraints the language of section 3(6) may impose upon the power 
to arrest in rem in South Africa they are not applicable where the initial arrest of the ship 
concerned occurred in a foreign jurisdiction and it is thereafter sought to arrest an associated ship 
in South Africa. It is unnecessary in this regard to traverse in any great detail ground already 
                                                 
59Bradfield, ‘Guilt by Association in South African admiralty law’ [2005] LMCLQ 234. 
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covered earlier in this chapter. The Court’s approach to this issue was fundamentally flawed. 
Instead of asking itself why the legislature would have imposed such a limitation in favour of 
arrests in other countries, which would not be reciprocated in those jurisdictions, the Court 
started by asking itself why the South African legislature would permit an associated ship arrest 
after there had been an arrest of the ship concerned in another jurisdiction. The short answer to 
that question is that where the arrest of the ship concerned has not resulted in the creditor 
recovering payment or being secured for the debt sought to be pursued, the purpose of the South 
African legislation is to enable the creditor to turn to the associated ship with a view to obtaining 
payment of its claim. 
 
 This basic error of approach was compounded by the Court’s reliance on the English law as 
stated in The Banco, supra and indirectly on the provisions of article 3(3) of the Arrests 
Convention. As demonstrated above the underlying reasons why the states that are party to the 
Convention would not permit multiple arrests in different jurisdictions that adhere to the 
Convention are entirely inapplicable to the situation in South Africa, which does not adhere to the 
Convention. That is compounded by the fact that the associated ship arrest is a phenomenon that 
is distinctly different from the sister ship arrest of the Convention and serves a different purpose.  
Accordingly the Court’s reliance on these factors was misplaced and its rejection of this 
argument wrong. 
 
 Not only did the Court have regard to the decision in The Banco but it apparently thought 
that it was bound to follow it because of the provisions of sections 6(1) and (2) of the Act. This 
was a puzzling conclusion. These sections deal with the law to be applied by the Court in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction.60 They direct that the Court, in regard to any matter, where a 
                                                 
60The section reads as follows: 
‘(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained a Court in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction shall:- 
(a) with regard to any matter in respect of which a Court of Admiralty of the Republic referred to in the Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 of the United Kingdom, had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of 
this Act, apply the law which the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty 
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South African Court exercising admiralty jurisdiction would have applied English law prior to 
1983, to apply English law to such matter. Roman Dutch law is to be applied to all other matters.  
Prior to 1983 a sister ship arrest was not permitted nor was there an associated ship jurisdiction in 
South Africa.  It is entirely unclear therefore on what basis it can be thought that the English law 
should be applied to the interpretation of the South African statutory provisions governing 
associated ships
61
. The peculiarity of this approach is compounded by the fact that in English 
law, even to the present day, there is no associated ship jurisdiction.  How then is one to apply the 
English law to these questions? It is submitted that the reference to section 6 was entirely 
inappropriate. There is no reason why the associated ship jurisdiction must be interpreted in the 
light of English law on different questions nor why South African Courts should be bound in its 
approach to the associated ship by English decisions on those different questions. 
 
 One further comment should be made in regard to the approach adopted in the judgment.  
In dealing with the fact that the Mount Ymitos had been arrested in Hong Kong the Court said that 
there was no suggestion that the arrest was in any irregular or invalid or that the default judgment 
obtained by the respondent was open to attack. All of that is no doubt true. However, as the 
default judgment was obtained after the Mount Ymitos had been sold by way of a judicial sale it 
was not open to the respondent to rely upon that judgment for the purpose of arresting the 
associated ship. Accordingly it had arrested the Fortune 22 on the basis of its original claim for 
repairs undertaken to the Mount Ymitos. Had the default judgment been taken, prior to the sale of 
the Mount Ymitos, then at the time that maritime claim arose the Mount Ymitos would have been 
owned by the same party that owned the Fortune 22 at the time of its arrest in Saldanha Bay. In 
those circumstances it seems plain that the Fortune 22 could have been arrested in an action in 
                                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction would have applied with regard to such a matter, at such commencement, insofar as that law can be 
applied; 
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman Dutch law applicable in the Republic; 
(2)The provisions of subsection (1) shall not derogate from the provisions of any law of the Republic applicable to 
any of the matters contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection.’ 
61 The court would have been better guided by following the clear approach of the Federal Court of Australia in 
Tisand (Pty) Ltd and others v The Owners of the Ship MV ‘Cape Moreton’ (ex ‘Freya’) [2005] FCAFC 68; 
(2005)143 FCR 43 para [59] which unequivocally said that the interpretation of the Australian Admiralty Act was to 
be undertaken in accordance with the principles of Australian common law. See also Kent v SS ‘Maria Luisa’ (No 2) (2003) 
130 FCR 12, 27.   
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rem against it as an associated ship in order to enforce the maritime claim constituted by the 
judgment against the Mount Ymitos. Why then should it have been impermissible to arrest the 
same ship for the purpose of enforcing the underlying claim that had given rise to that judgment? 
This problem is not addressed but the fact that it exists further demonstrates that the approach 
adopted in the judgment in the Fortune 22 is incorrect. 
 
3 POLICY FACTORS IN FAVOUR OF MULTIPLE ARRESTS: 
 
 The policy which favours an interpretation of section 3(6) that permits a claimant to pursue 
a maritime claim against both the ship concerned and one or more associated ships lies with the 
underlying purpose of this jurisdiction, which is to assist the creditor to recover on that claim. It 
is the clear purpose of this jurisdiction to permit claimants to penetrate behind a screen of one-
ship companies to ensure that the person standing behind those companies takes responsibility for 
payment of the debt. The beneficiary of the ownership of a vessel, either directly or through the 
ownership or control of the shares in the company owning that vessel, is to be prevented from 
‘ring-fencing’ his or her interests in other vessels from liability for claims against the first vessel 
by resort to the registration of those other vessels in separate legal ownership. That being its 
purpose, an interpretation of section 3(6) that stultifies that purpose by excluding the jurisdiction 
where there has been an unsuccessful arrest is to be avoided. In simple terms the purpose of the 
jurisdiction is to enable the creditor to obtain payment. Although the expedient may seem a little 
clumsy - separate actions against a series of separate vessels that are associated ships, until 
payment is obtained - the practical reality is little different from the situation that would arise if 
the vessels were in common ownership. If the existence of the companies standing between the 
vessels themselves and those beneficially interested in those vessels could be stripped away, the 
claimant would be able to do precisely the same by way of execution against any vessel of a 
single judgment. The exercise here is more complex but the result is the same. 
 
 It is important to bear in mind that it has been authoritatively decided that an action in rem 
commenced by the arrest of an associated ship is not to be regarded as an action against the ship 
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concerned pursued by different means.
62
 The basis of the judgments in The Berg is that the action 
in rem against the associated ship is a different and separate action from the action against the 
ship concerned. An entirely different debtor is involved. Why then should the legislature be 
concerned to prevent a creditor from pursuing each debtor against whom it has a claim? In other 
situations where two or more debtors are either jointly or jointly and severally liable to a creditor 
our law will ordinarily permit the creditor to choose which debtor to sue and, if unsuccessful in a 
claim against one because of the latter’s impecuniosity, thereafter to pursue another. Why should 
this be any different in admiralty? The associated ship jurisdiction involves different defendants, 
different vessels and different corporate entities. By legislative fiat each of those corporate 
entities is liable for the debts of the other at least so far as their interest in the associated ships is 
concerned
63
. In the result one of the advantages that would ordinarily accrue to the person 
standing behind the different companies from the fact of registering each vessel in a fleet in 
separate corporate ownership has been removed by statute. It is entirely unclear why the 
legislature having chosen to do that and extend the scope of liability accordingly would at the 
same time have forced the unpaid creditor to choose which of a range of potential debtors it 
wished to pursue.
64
 The result of such a construction would be that the benefit that the legislature 
extended with the one hand would be largely removed with the other.     
 
 Once one accepts in principle that the purpose of the associated ship jurisdiction is to 
enable an unpaid creditor to pursue its claim not only against the ship concerned in an action in 
rem, but also against associated ships, it is difficult to see why that aim should be hampered by an 
approach that would compel the claimant to select from one of a number of vessels which one it 
will pursue, whilst recognising that if its choice is mistaken, because there are substantial claims 
against the other vessel that rank in preference to its claim, they will lose not only their claim 
against the ship concerned, but also their claim against other associated ships. This has 
                                                 
62
 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) 655H-656A; Euromarine 
International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) 712C-E. 
63 There is no liability beyond the associated ship. See chapter 12. 
64 The result would be like a game of Blind Man’s Bluff. The unpaid creditor will rarely know which of the one-ship 
companies is most likely to generate a surplus sufficient to pay the creditor’s claim after paying preferent claims. 
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potentially serious implications. For example, if the claim is one that gives rise to a maritime lien, 
is the effect of unsuccessfully pursuing the claim against an associated ship
65
 that the maritime 
lien is discharged? If not, and the position is merely that the ship concerned cannot be arrested in 
South Africa because of the prior proceedings against an associated ship, leaving the creditor to 
pursue the ship concerned with the security of its maritime lien, the position is absurd. The 
claimant will be able to make a claim against an associated ship in South Africa, but that will not 
preclude it from arresting the ship concerned in another jurisdiction and enforcing its maritime 
lien. However, if the ship concerned is the first one to be arrested in a jurisdiction other than 
South Africa, then according to the judgment in the Fortune 22 it will not be permissible to arrest 
an associated ship in South Africa to enforce the claim. That is an absurd situation and cannot 
have been intended by the legislature. 
 
 There are other anomalies that arise from the approach adopted in the Fortune 22. South 
Africa exercises both an in personam jurisdiction under our common law, which is civilian in 
origin and structure, and an in rem jurisdiction arising from English admiralty law being 
transplanted to this country. Even on the interpretation given to section 3(6) in the Fortune 22 or 
a narrower interpretation prohibiting two arrests in this country, multiple proceedings cannot be 
entirely avoided. It is still open to a maritime claimant to attach the ship in respect of which the 
maritime claim arose in proceedings in personam against its owner and to arrest an associated 
ship.
66
 That possibility shows that the South African legislature has not set its face implacably 
against there being more than one action in this country in respect of the same maritime claim. 
 
 A further consideration that should be borne in mind is that in the ranking of claims under 
section 11 it is plainly contemplated that associated ship claims can be brought forward against a 
                                                 
65 ‘Unsuccessfully’ referring not to the action being unsuccessful but to an inability to obtain satisfaction of the 
resultant judgment. 
66 Shaw Admiralty Jurisdiction Practice in South Africa 37, footnote 12 mentions this possibility.  In m.v. La Pampa 
Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SNC v Tor Shipping 2006 (3) SA 441 (D) the court held that this could not possibly have 
been the intention of the legislature, but to arrive at a different conclusion involves a substantial re-writing of the 




 This produces a further range of anomalies if the approach in the Fortune 22 is correct.  
There seems to be no reason why a claimant could not pursue the same maritime claim against 
various funds constituted by the sale of several associated ships by arresting each fund in rem. 
The restriction that Thring J perceived in regard to arrests of associated ships is clearly not 
applicable in regard to the arrest of a fund. Nor would it matter if the claimant had already 
commenced an action in South Africa either against the ship concerned or against an associated 
ship. Once the fund was constituted it would be entitled to pursue its claim against that fund.  It 
seems insensible to have a situation where the creditor can pursue the claim against a number of 
funds constituted from the sale of vessels, but cannot do so by arresting the ships themselves, 
prior to their sale. There does not appear to be any practical reason why this should be so.   
 
4 PROTECTION AGAINST OPPRESSION: 
 
 The one possible reason for having a limit of this type is to prevent a litigant from being 
harassed in multiple suits.68 However, the associated ship jurisdiction involves different 
defendants, different vessels and different corporate entities. In no other circumstances would it 
be open to the different ship owning companies to complain that they were being harassed as 
litigants because several ships were subjected to simultaneous arrests in different jurisdictions 
where, for example, each ship owning company had given a guarantee for the payment of 
amounts outstanding in respect of the supply of bunkers to the fleet or had given cross-guarantees 
for amounts borrowed on mortgage for the acquisition of vessels. In any other situation the one-
ship owning companies would be asserting their separate corporate identity as a protective 
measure. It should hardly be open to them when they have invoked the advantages of separate 
corporate personality for other purposes to complain when the shoe pinches. 
 
                                                 
67 S11(11)(b). 
68 The problem of that occurring in multiple jurisdictions, which is the concern of the Arrest Convention, is not 
applicable in South Africa. 
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 In any event there are ample provisions in the Act and the common law to assist South 
African courts in preventing the abuse of this novel jurisdiction. It must be accepted that it is 
debatable whether the common law defence of lis alibi pendens or the statutory plea of forum non 
conveniens contained in section 7(1)(a) of the Act can be invoked to assist a defendant in this 
situation. This is because an associated ship arrest involves a different defendant from the debtor 
in personam or the ship concerned or any other associated ship. Accordingly there is not the 
identity of litigation that underpins the defence of lis alibi pendens nor are the proceedings the 
same as required by section 7(1)(a) of the Act.  In addition there seems to be no reason why the 
broad powers given to the Court under section 7(1)(b) of the Act could not be invoked to prevent 
abuse. There the Court may stay any proceedings ‘if for any sufficient reason the Court is of the 
opinion that the proceedings should be stayed’. That is a very comprehensive power and there 
seems to be no reason why the Courts should not invoke it if they are satisfied that proceedings 
are being pursued by way of multiple arrests in terrorem where it is unnecessary to do so.   
  
 Three other factors come into the equation. Where the arrest is an arrest for the purposes of 
obtaining security, it is clear from the authorities69 that an arrest will not be permitted where the 
claimant is already adequately secured in respect of the claim. Secondly, in terms of section 
5(2)(c) of the Act a Court is empowered to order that any arrest be subject to such conditions as 
to the Court appears just, whether as to the furnishing of security or the liability for costs, 
expenses, loss or damage caused or likely to be caused, or otherwise.
70
 Thirdly, in terms of 
section 173 of the Constitution the High Court in South Africa has the inherent power to protect 
and regulate its own process and to develop the common law taking into the interests of justice. 
In any case that power alone would suffice to enable the Court to deal with any situation of overt 
                                                 
69 Cargo laden and lately laden on board the m.v. Thalassini Avgi v m.v. Dimitris 1989  (3) SA 820 (A) 833A; mv 
Orient Stride: Asiatic Shipping Services Inc v Elgina Marine Co Ltd 2009 (1) SA 246 (SCA). 
70 S5(2)(c) of the Act. The power in question is broad and general and on proof that a litigant is seeking to abuse the 
jurisdiction of our Courts or harass its opponent could readily be invoked.  This was done in one case where the 
claimant had commenced litigation on the same claim in four courts in three countries and arrested vessels in each 
one. It then refused to release some of those vessels even though security had been furnished in full for its claim in 
South Africa. An application was brought under s5(2)(c) in the High Court in Durban and, before an order could be 
made, the claimant withdrew all of the arrests and accepted the security. 
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oppression. It is not, of course, oppression that multiple ships have been arrested.  The remedy 
will usually be close to hand in the form of either paying the debt or securing it adequately.  
 
 Finally, in regard to abuse, the Act expressly provides a remedy in damages for such 
conduct. This is to be found in section 5(4) which provides that:- 
 
‘Any person who makes an excessive claim or requires excessive security or without 
reasonable and probable cause obtains the arrest of property or an order of Court shall be 
liable to any person suffering loss of damage as a result thereof for that loss or damage.’ 
 
Most of the potential instances of abuse that can be imagined would result in a claim under this 
section. It is perhaps an indication that fears of abuse are exaggerated that very few cases have 




 Although there is much in the judgment of Smalberger JA in the Heavy Metal
72
 with which 
one can disagree there is no question but that he was correct when he said that:- 
 
‘The principal purpose of the Act is to assist the party applying for arrest rather than the 
party opposing it.’73 
 
That was made absolutely clear from the outset.  The Appellate Division (as it then was) accepted 
the explanation by the draftsman of the Act that:- 
 
‘...the purpose of the Act was to make the loss fall where it belonged by reason of 
ownership, and in the case of a company, ownership or control of shares.’
74
 
                                                 
71 There are three reported instances of cases involving claims under this section. I am aware of a handful of others 
where security has been sought or obtained for such claims but nothing has come of them. 
72
 M.V. Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine Limited v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA) 
73  P1106 
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To that end a novel and potentially controversial legal institution, the associated ship, was 
created. To many it was seen as trespassing too far upon the notion of separate corporate 
personality that underpins company law throughout the world. Be that as it may, the South 
African legislature took the plunge and introduced the associated ship arrest and the action in rem 
commenced by way of an action against an associated ship. No other jurisdiction has gone as far.    
 
 Having taken that bold step it is difficult to conceive of any reason of practice or policy 
why the legislature should then have set about very largely negating the chief benefit accruing 
from the associated ship jurisdiction, namely the ability to arrest additional vessels other than the 
ship concerned, by forcing the claimant to make an election between the ship concerned and an 
associated ship, and having made that election to be restricted by it. Of course, where the vessel 
arrested is of substantial value so that security is provided for the claim, nothing more need be 
said.  But in the one situation where multiple arrests would be a practical resort offering obvious 
benefits to claimants, it is suggested that the legislature withheld its assistance. That situation is 
most commonly the one where the particular fleet of vessels that are associated with one another 
are experiencing financial difficulties.75 In that situation if the unpaid claimant is compelled to 
choose between the ship concerned and one or other associated ships, in the knowledge that the 
choice is irrevocable, the purpose of giving claimants the right to arrest an associated ship 
becomes at best speculative and at worst a lottery. The unpaid creditor whose claim does not 
enjoy any particular precedence in the ranking of claims will have no means of knowing which 
vessel should be the target of its claim. There is no apparent reason why claimants should be 
placed in this dilemma. If they choose to target all possible vessels they do so knowing that in the 
distribution of a fund in terms of section 11 of the Act their claims will rank after the direct 
claims against the fund. Accepting that this will be their situation the rationale for their being 
entitled to advance such a claim is, if anything, strengthened. Nor is there any good reason why, 
                                                                                                                                                              
74 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) 712A-B. 
75 As in the case of the Eddie Steamship Group the collapse of which led to much litigation in the early stage of the 
Act. Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the fund comprising the proceeds of the sale of the m.v. 
Jade Transporter 1987 (2) SA 583 (A) 590I-J. 
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if one of the vessels in a fleet is sold and generates a surplus beyond the claims of direct 
creditors, creditors who are creditors on the basis of the associated ship should not be entitled to 
advance their claims. Indeed permitting them to do so serves the very purpose that the Act set out 
to achieve. 
 
 It is submitted that it would take very clear language indeed in those circumstances to 
justify the conclusion that a claimant is not entitled to pursue its claim both against the ship 
concerned and against any vessel that is an associated ship in relation to the ship concerned. The 
use of the words ‘instead of’ to describe an alternative procedure by way of an action in rem is 
not, it is submitted, a strong and sufficiently cogent indication that this was the legislature’s 
intention. The language used is not such as to demand that result and all indications of purpose 
and policy underpinning the associated ship jurisdiction point in the opposite direction. 
 
 At the commencement of this chapter it was suggested that there are three questions that 
fall to be answered in this regard. They are the following.  Firstly, can a claimant arrest both the 
ship concerned and an associated ship in order to obtain full security for its claim or even for the 
purpose of instituting actions in rem against both the ship concerned and the associated ship in 
respect of the same claim? Secondly can the claimant, for either purpose, arrest more than one 
associated ship? Thirdly is it permissible for claimants to seek payment from more than one fund 
established pursuant to sales of vessels that are associated or is the claimant confined to selecting 
a particular fund? It is submitted that the answer is that properly construed the Act does not 
preclude a claimant from arresting both the ship concerned and an associated ship in separate 
proceedings, nor does it preclude the arrest of multiple associated ships or the pursuit of claims 
against more than one fund. Of course, if security has been furnished for the claim that will 
provide a separate and independent reason for a further arrest to be refused. But where the claim 
is unsecured it is submitted that there is no reason in the language of the legislation or in reasons 
of principle and policy to prevent the creditor from pursuing each and every vessel that is 
available to be arrested, whether the ship concerned, or an associated ship. Only in that way can 
true effect be given to the underlying purpose of this special jurisdiction. 
 
 CHAPTER 9 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
 
1 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 Since the adoption of the Constitution
1
 it is well established that all law derives its force 
from the Constitution and all laws and all legal institutions are subject to constitutional scrutiny.
2
 
An early suggestion that the common law existed in parallel with the Constitution3 was decisively 
rejected by the Constitutional Court.
4
 It follows that no less than any other law the Act and the 
legal institution of the associated ship must be tested and measured against the Constitution. So 
must the interpretation given to the provisions of the Act that create the notion of the associated 
ship and dictate its application in practice. In undertaking this constitutional scrutiny one is 
concerned with the nature and extent of the powers of the High Court to order the arrest of 
vessels as associated ships. Existing authority has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court has 
its foundation in section 169 of the Constitution and accordingly that: ‘Any issue as to the nature 
and ambit of those powers necessarily raises a constitutional question.’
5
 Accordingly it is 
submitted that issues concerning the interpretation of the provisions of the Act dealing with the 
                                                 
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
2 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), where it was said in para. [44] : ‘There is only one system of law. It is 
shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law derives its force from 
the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.’ 
See also: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para. [38]. 
3
 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Limited: Commissioner of Customs and Excise v 
Rennies Group Limited t/a Renfreight 1999 (3) SA 771 (SCA) 
4 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, supra. 
5
 Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) para [17]; S v 
Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC) para [111]; Phillips and others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) 
SA 505 (CC) at para [31]; Sidumo and another v Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd and others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC)  
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associated ship and the jurisdiction of the courts to cause such vessels to be arrested raise a 
constitutional matter that can ultimately be determined by the Constitutional Court. Consequently 
all of the issues canvassed earlier in this work concerning the proper construction of these 
statutory provisions raise constitutional matters that could potentially come before that Court.
6
 
However for present purposes we are concerned with issues of constitutional compliance rather 
than general issues of interpretation important though those are and rather more likely to arise in 
practice. We turn then to scrutinise these provisions in the light of the Constitution.
7
   
 
 Such constitutional scrutiny occurs at two levels.  The first is whether, in accordance with 
the principle of legality that underpins the Constitution8 and the provisions of the Constitution the 
particular institution complies with the Constitution. The second is whether the institution as 
embodied in the relevant statute and construed by the courts infringes any of the constitutional 
rights conferred by the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, and if so, 
whether such limitation can be justified as being reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.9 
                                                                                                                                                              
para [51].   
6 I am not aware of any attempt to take any issue relating to the interpretation of the associated ship provisions to the 
Constitutional Court. 
7 This is not to say that there may not be other constitutional issues that may arise under the Act.  For example under 
Rule 4(2)(a) it is open to a claimant to approach the Registrar for the issue of a warrant of arrest without any prior 
intervention by a judge, although in appropriate cases the Registrar may refer the question whether a warrant should 
issue to a judge under Rule 4(2)(b). The question that arises from this is whether in issuing the warrant of arrest the 
Registrar is performing a judicial function that the Constitution reserves to the courts in terms of section 165(1) 
thereof. C/f Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and others 2006 (2) SA 264 (SCA) paras [23] and [24].  
However that question is not one that is peculiar to the associated ship jurisdiction and accordingly falls outside this 
study. 
8
 Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 (1) 
SA 374 (CC) paras. [56] to [58]. Although some of these principles were first articulated under the Interim 
Constitution - the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 - they remain applicable. 
9 S36 of the Constitution. The section reads as follows: 
‘1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including:- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
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 In construing any particular law that is subject to constitutional scrutiny there are rules of 
interpretation prescribed by the Constitution and construed by the Constitutional Court that must 
always be borne in mind. The constitutional prescript10 has two elements. The first is that in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights the court must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom having regard where 
appropriate to both international law and foreign law. The second is that in interpreting 
legislation the court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This latter 
provision has been given an interpretational gloss by the Constitutional Court in holding that a 
court should favour that construction of a statute that best gives effect to the rights protected by 
the Bill of Rights and should prefer a construction that gives constitutional validity to a provision 
to one that would render it constitutionally invalid. In a recent decision11 the Constitutional Court 
has restated these principles in the following terms:- 
                                                                                                                                                              
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2.  Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
10 In section 39 of the Constitution which reads as follows:- 
‘1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum:- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie and open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
11 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
[2009] ZACC8 
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‘[82] In Hyundai,12 we considered this approach under the Constitution and sketched it 
out as follows:- 
“The purport and objects of the Constitution find expression in s 1, which lays out the fundamental 
values which the Constitution is designed to achieve. The Constitution requires that judicial 
officers read legislation, where possible, in ways which give effect to its fundamental values.  
Consistently with this, when the constitutionality of legislation is in issue, they are under a duty to 
examine the objects and purport of an Act and to read the provisions of the legislation, so far as is 
possible, in conformity with the Constitution” 
[83] And in Daniels,13 we elaborated on this approach and said:- 
“Section 39(2) of the Constitution contains an injunction on the interpretation of legislation.  It 
requires courts when interpreting any legislation to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of the Rights.’ Consistent with this interpretive injunction, where possible, legislation must be 
read in a manner that gives effect to the values of our constitutional democracy.  These values 
include human dignity, equality and freedom. Thus where legislation is capable of more than one 
plausible construction, the one which brings the legislation within constitutional bounds must be 
preferred”’ 
[84] We cautioned, however, that an interpretation that seeks to bring a provision within 
constitutional bounds should not be unduly strained. With this caution in mind, we held 
that courts “must prefer the interpretation of [a provision] that will bring it within 
constitutional bounds over those that do not” and added “provided that such an 




2 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSOCIATED SHIP: 
 
 There is no reason to believe that the associated ship as a legal institution conflicts with any 
aspect of the underlying principle of legality in terms of the Constitution. It derives its force from 
an Act of the former Parliament, the validity of which is preserved by paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 
to the Constitution. The courts vested with jurisdiction under the Act retain that jurisdiction by 
virtue of paragraph 16(1) of the same Schedule. The provisions are reasonably precise and could 
                                                 
12
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Limited and 
Others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Limited and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), 
para.[22]. 
13 Daniels v Campbell and Others 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) para. [43] 
14 The Constitutional Court has used this approach to interpretation on a number of occasions with a view to avoiding 
having to strike down the provisions of a statute.  However the formulation poses certain problems of its own. It is 
reasonably straightforward to apply where the court is faced with a stark choice between a constitutional and an 
unconstitutional interpretation of a statutory provision. It becomes complicated however where one party contends 
for an interpretation that is constitutionally valid, whilst the other contends for an interpretation that would infringe a 
constitutionally protected right, but does so on the basis that the infringement is justified under a limitation analysis. 
In that situation the latter interpretation may be more consonant with the language used in the provision and both the 
intention of the Legislature and the social purpose of the legislation. It is fair to say that the Constitutional Court has 
neither identified this problem nor sought to grapple with it.  
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not be attacked on the narrow ground of rationality.15 Overall it is submitted that a constitutional 
attack on the validity of the associated ship provisions can only be brought on the basis that they 
infringe upon rights conferred by the Bill of Rights. 
 
 When one turns to the Bill of Rights the obvious provision to consider is section 25 which 
protects the right to property and provides:- 
 
‘(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’ 
 
The first issue that arises in relation to this provision is the general one that stems from the 
recognition in the early cases concerned the associated ship that the effect of these provisions is 
that one company may be held liable for the debts of another company.
16
 However, it is not 
limited to that situation. Even if, as a general rule, an associated ship arrest can pass 
constitutional muster, three cases that are sub-sets of the general situation may not
17
. These can 
be described as follows. 
 
 First, there is the situation where the ship concerned and the associated ship are owned by 
companies, both of which are controlled by the same individual, but where each company has 
minority shareholders and these are not common to both. In simple terms, the shares in company 
                                                 
15
 This is an aspect of the principle of legality.  It was expressed as follows in New National Party of South Africa v Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) para. [19] where it was said to require a:-‘Rational relationship 
between the scheme which it adopts and the achievement of a legitimate Government purpose.  Parliament cannot act capriciously 
or arbitrarily.’ 
See also Affordable Medicine Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para. [74]. 
16 Notionally the situation can arise where a company is liable for the debts of a natural person and vice versa but this 
is such an unlikely eventuality in practise that it can be ignored. It can never be the case that one natural person is 
held liable for the debts of another. 
17  There would be a fourth case if the approach adopted in Chapter 6, part 4(d), is incorrect and the commencement 
of the action for the purposes of effecting an associated ship arrest is (or can be) the date on which the summons is 
issued (or the papers in an application for a security arrest are issued) in which event there may be a lapse of time 
between the commencement date and the date of arrest during which the associated ship can pass into different and 
unrelated ownership so that at the date of its arrest there is no link between it or its owners and the ship concerned 
and its owners at the time the maritime claim arose. 
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A, that owns the ship concerned, are owned by X and Y with X being the controlling shareholder.  
The shares in company B, that owns the associated ship, are owned by X and Z with X again 
being the controlling shareholder. The constitutional question is whether it is open to Z in that 
case to complain that permitting the arrest of the associated ship in respect of the debts arising 
from the operations of the ship concerned, involves an arbitrary deprivation of his or her property 
interest in company B?   
 
 The second case flows from the decision in the Heavy Metal.18 Here the court held that if 
the same person is the sole shareholder and director of two ship owning companies, albeit that he 
is purely the nominee in each case of two entirely separate and distinct individuals with no 
decision-making powers of his own and removable at will, the vessels owned by the two 
companies would nonetheless be associated. This arose because of the Court’s construction of the 
deeming provision in section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act and in particular its construction of the 
expression ‘power, directly or indirectly, to control the company’ as embodying two distinct 
sources of such power. In this instance a vessel may be arrested as an associated ship even though 
the persons controlling the company owning the associated ship have no commercial connection, 
save for their choice of nominee shareholder and director, with the persons controlling the 
company that owns the ship concerned. 
 
 The third case flows from the presumption in section 1(3) of the Act that:- 
 
‘For the purpose of an action in rem, a charterer by demise shall be deemed to be, or to 
have been, the owner of the ship for the period of the charter by demise.’ 
 
The primary instance in which this presumption will apply is where the demise charterer has, 
during the currency of the charter, incurred debts relating to the chartered vessel. The 
presumption has the effect of rendering the chartered vessel liable to arrest in respect of those 
                                                 
18 M.V. Heavy Metal: Belfry Marine v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999 (3) SA 1083 (SCA) (hereafter ‘Heavy 
Metal’). The case is extensively discussed and criticised in Chapter 7, where the constitutional issue arising from the 
interpretation given by the majority of the SCA to the deeming provision in s3(7)(b)(ii) is mentioned. that issue is 
discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
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debts. To that extent it reflects the principle that for certain purposes the demise charterer is to be 
regarded pro hac vice as the owner of the vessel.
19
 However, the presumption
20
 goes further than 
that21 because it permits the arrest of the demise chartered vessel as an associated ship in respect 
of the debts of a ship owning company controlled by the demise charterer. Thus if X, the demise 
charterer, controls a company that owns vessel A, in respect of which debts have been incurred, 
and through another company demise charters vessel B, for the duration of the demise charter the 
latter vessel will be liable to arrest as an associated ship in relation to A. This is plainly a distinct 
situation from that which would arise if the chartered vessel is arrested for debts incurred in 
respect of its operation in the course of the charter. In that situation the owner is in receipt of 
charter hire in return for which it has placed its vessel entirely within the power and under the 
control of the charterer. There one can see a basis for permitting the arrest of the chartered vessel 
in respect of debts not incurred by its owner.
22
 However, where the chartered vessel is arrested as 
an associated ship that basis is absent.  Hence a constitutional problem exists.  
 
 Although section 25 of the Bill of Rights is the obvious provision that may have application 
in relation to the associated ship it is not the only one. In Chapter 5 the approach taken by our 
courts to the onus of proof of association in proceedings where it is sought to set aside the arrest 
of a vessel was discussed. Attention was drawn to the reluctance of our courts to order discovery 
or refer the question of association for the hearing of oral evidence or to trial. These are not 
matters embodied in the provisions of the statute and as such are not vulnerable to being struck 
down as unconstitutional. They reflect the court’s approach to procedural matters falling within 
its jurisdiction.  However, two related questions do arise in respect of them. The first is whether 
                                                 
19 D J Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 33, footnote 53 and the cases there cited. 
20 Inserted by section 10 of the Sea Transport Documents Act, 65 of 2000, with effect from the 20th June 2003. 
21 And further than the presumption in section 3(7)(c) which renders other ships owned by the demise charterer or 
owned by companies controlled by the demise charterer, liable to arrest as associated ships.   
22 The landlord’s tacit hypothec over the property of third parties situated on the leased premises provides some 
analogy.  Kerr, The Law of Sale and Lease (3rd ed.) 389 et seq. 
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the allocation of the onus (which is a matter of substantive law
23
) or the approach to the 
procedural issues of discovery and the taking of oral evidence, infringe constitutional rights. The 
second is whether they should be developed in such a way as to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights and, if so, in what respects should the present situation be altered. 
 
 It is necessary for the purposes of this enquiry to identify the other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights that are potentially applicable to these questions. Two. are suggested. The first is 
contained in section 34 of the Constitution, which provides that:- 
 
‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.’ 
 
The central issue is the impact of this provision in regard to the question of onus and the 
procedural issues of the court’s reluctance to order discovery or oral evidence. Does the present 
situation infringe the right to a fair hearing? Related to that is the question whether it infringes 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law under section 9(1) of the Constitution. 
 
 All of these issues are novel in the constitutional context. To that extent any answer 
proffered in what follows is necessary tentative and subject to revision. These are also in general 
terms areas of our constitutional jurisprudence that have received little attention from our courts 
and accordingly there are few signposts or beacons to guide the traveller in search of 
enlightenment. With that caution the journey must nevertheless be essayed. For the sake of 
convenience it is appropriate first to consider section 25 and the cluster of issues surrounding it. 
 
3 THE ASSOCIATED SHIP AND S25(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
 
 For all practical purposes the constitutional issues can be analysed on the basis that a 
constitutional challenge will emanate from the owner of an associated ship, or possibly a 
minority shareholder in the company owning the associated ship. Save for that latter instance the 
                                                 
23 Tregea v Godart 1939 AD 16 
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constitutional questions can be dealt with on the basis that the party raising the constitutional 
point will be a company that owns a ship that has been arrested as an associated ship. Almost 
certainly that company will be a peregrinus, that is, a company incorporated in a jurisdiction 
other than South Africa. The shareholders of the company will be persons who are not either 
citizens of South Africa or resident in this country. In most, but not all, instances the claimants 
will likewise be peregrini.  
 
 Turning specifically against that background to the provisions of section 25 an initial 
question is whether a company incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction is a bearer of rights for the 
purposes of this provision of the Bill of Rights. That involves two questions. The first is whether 
it is open to a juristic person such as a company to invoke the rights contained in section 25(1) of 
the Bill of Rights. The second is whether the answer to that question alters if the juristic person in 
question is a peregrinus.    
 
 The first question is to be answered in the light of the provisions of section 8(4) of the 
Constitution, which provides that: 
 
‘A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the 
nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.’ 
 
Are the rights conferred by section 25(1) available to juristic persons?  Fortunately that is not a 
question that requires elaborate consideration because the Constitutional Court has already 
answered it in the affirmative.
24
 It is submitted that this was an inevitable response to that 
question. If a juristic person is not entitled to the protection of the property clause in the Bill of 
Rights it is difficult to think of a provision that would be available to it.   
 
 The only possible doubt is whether that constitutional protection extends to a juristic person 
that is neither incorporated in South Africa nor conducts business in this country, save for the 
                                                 
24
 First National Bank of South Africa t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African  Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), paras. [41] to 
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fortuitous circumstance that the vessel that it owns has visited a South African port and thereby 
become vulnerable to arrest in this country? It is submitted that the answer to this question must 
be in the affirmative. There are two reasons why this is so, one textual and the other based on a 
broader policy understanding of the purpose of the right conferred by section 25(1).  
 
 The textual reason flows from the fact that section 25(1) expressly provides that ‘no one’ 
may be deprived of property except in a situation contemplated by that section. Not only is that 
language broad and extensive but it fairly recognises that in a developed economy such as that of 
South Africa there will be persons, both natural and juristic, who have interests in property 
located in this country but who are not either citizens or even resident in South Africa. The Bill 
of Rights is careful to distinguish between those rights that vest in ‘everyone’
25
 and those rights 
that are vested in citizens alone.26 The use of the word ‘no one’ is comprehensive and all-
inclusive and there does not appear to be any basis for distinguishing a juristic person that is an 
incola from one that is a peregrinus. 
 
 The broader reason flows from the nature of the property right. As was said in the FNB 
case
27
 companies are a universal phenomenon through which natural persons engage in a wide 
variety of legitimate activities. In today’s world it is difficult to conceive of meaningful business 
activity without the institution and utilisation of companies and to deny companies an entitlement 
to property rights would ‘lead to grave disruptions and would undermine the very fabric of our 
democratic State’. Those statements are as applicable to foreign juristic persons as they are to 
domestic juristic persons.  South Africa has the largest economy on the African continent and one 
of the larger economies in the world.28 It is heavily dependent on international trade and 
                                                                                                                                                              
[45].This will be referred to as the FNB case. 
25 For example, s9(1) 10, 11, 12(1), 14, 15(1), 16, 17 and 18 of the Bill of Rights.  
26 Such as political rights under section 19(1); the right to enter, to remain and to reside in the Republic in section 
21(3) and the right to choose a trade occupation or profession freely in section 22. 
27 Paras. [44] and [45] 
28 It is the only African country to be a member of the G20 group of countries having the world’s largest economies 
and producing 90% of global gross national product and 80% of world trade. See the official G20 website at 
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welcomes the involvement of foreign corporations in business in South Africa. Apart from 
international investors
29
 number of leading business enterprises in South Africa having a 
significant stake in the South African economy and generally regarded as South African 
businesses, are incorporated in other countries.30 Studies in recent years in the field of economics 
and law have demonstrated the importance for a country’s economic development of the Rule of 
Law and the appropriate protection of property rights. All of this supports a construction of 
section 25(1) that includes all juristic persons, whether they are incolae or peregrini.  
 
 Accepting then that section 25(1) is available to be invoked by the owner of an associated 
ship and that:- 
 
‘... ownership of a corporeal movable must - as must ownership of land - lie at the heart 
of our constitutional concept of property, both as regards the nature of the right involved 
as well as the object of the right and must therefore, in principle, enjoy the protection of 
s25.’31    
 
two questions then arise. The first is whether the arrest of the vessel as an associated ship 
involves a deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1). If that is answered in the affirmative 
the second is whether such deprivation is arbitrary. It is to these that we must now turn. 
 
(a) Is the arrest of an associated ship a deprivation of property? 
 
 A useful starting point is to consider the effect that the arrest of the vessel has insofar as its 
owner’s therein are concerned. Firstly, it places the vessel in the care and custody of the Sheriff32 
and the owner is thereby precluded from using the vessel, either for the purposes of trade or for 
the purpose of placing it on a charter. Whilst the owner is not liable for the expenses incurred by 
                                                                                                                                                              
www.g20.org.  
29  Virtually the entire motor industry in South Africa is foreign-owned albeit through South African subsidiaries. 
30 This is true of such well known businesses as Anglo American plc , SAB Miller plc, Old Mutual plc and SAPPI 
Limited, whilst BHP Billiton has substantial South African connections. 
31
 FNB, para. [51] 
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the Sheriff in keeping the vessel in his or her custody and preserving it
33
 the consequence of the 
arrest is that the vessel may potentially be sold in terms of section 9(1) of the Act. Not only 
would such a sale result in the owner losing its title to the vessel but in distributing the fund 
arising from such sale
34
 the claim by the Sheriff to recover his or her expenses is preferent.
35
 If at 
the time of its arrest the vessel is under charter or is carrying cargo the owner is likely to face 
claims from the charterer or from cargo interests. The only way in which the owner can avoid 
these consequences is by providing security for the claim, which security will be available for the 
purposes of execution if the action in rem commenced by the arrest of the vessel as an associated 
ship succeeds. Alternatively, if the arrest is a security arrest in terms of section 5(3) of the Act the 
security will be available for the purposes of execution at the instance of the claimant in the 
proceedings brought, either by way of action or by way of arbitration, against the ship concerned 
or its owner or charterer, once those proceedings reach finality. If the owner of the arrested vessel 
is unable to furnish such security the almost inevitable consequence is that, rather than permitting 
the vessel to lie in harbour under arrest, during which period its condition will deteriorate, an 
application for the sale of the vessel in terms of section 9(1) will be brought. Whilst the court has 
a discretion in regard to such a claim and it is one that is sparingly exercised  pendente lite and 
where there is a reasonable prospect that the owner will be able to show that it has a defence to 
the arresting party’s claim36, the risk that the vessel may be sold imposes a substantial burden 
upon the owner.  
 
 These consequences of the arrest of the vessel as an associated ship must be measured 
against the constitutional requirements for a deprivation of property. This was first dealt with in 
                                                                                                                                                              
32 Admiralty rule 21(1). 
33 MT Argun : Sheriff of Cape Town v MT Argun, her owners and all persons interested in her and others ; Sheriff of 
Cape Town and Another v MT Argun, her owners and all persons interested in her and another 2001 (3) SA 1230 
(SCA), para. [18] to [22] and [29] to 32]. 
34 S9(2) of the Act. 
35 S11(4)(a) of the Act 
36 The MT Tigr v Bouygues Offshore and Another 1998 (4) SA 206 (C); MT Argun, supra, para. [34]. 
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the FNB case. The court pointed out37 that the use of the expression deprivation may be 
misleading or confusing because it can create the impression that it inevitably refers to the taking 
away of property whereas that is not necessarily the case. Whilst the dispossession of all the 
rights, use and benefits that an owner enjoys in and to a corporeal movable is clearly an instance 
of deprivation it is not necessary to constitute a deprivation that the dispossession need go that 
far. In this sense deprivation is a far broader term than expropriation, which does involve a 
complete dispossession of the property expropriated. Whilst the FNB case did deal with a 
situation where the owner would be dispossessed entirely of its rights in and to the property 
concerned, it said that:- 
 
‘In a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in 
the property concerned.’38 
 
This suggests that the Court was inclined to give a broad meaning to the concept of deprivation 
thereby largely shifting the focus in each instance where the point arises to the question whether 
the deprivation in question is arbitrary. 
 
 The Constitutional Court developed the understanding of what constitutes a deprivation in 
Mkantwa v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality
39
. It expressed the general position in the 
following terms:- 
 
‘[32] In First National Bank (the FNB case) this Court held that the taking away of 
property is not required for a deprivation of property to occur.  Whether there has been a 
deprivation depends on the extent of the interference with or limitation of use, enjoyment 
or exploitation. It is not necessary in this case to determine precisely what constitutes 
deprivation. No more need be said than that at the very least, substantial inference or 
                                                 
37 Para. [57] 
38 Para. [57]. 
39 Mkantwa v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and another; Bissett and others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v MEC, Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng and others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 
(CC). 
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limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in 
an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation.’ 
 
It follows that not every interference with or limitation upon the power of an owner to deal with 
their property will amount to a deprivation for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
This recognises the fact that we live in a regulated society and part of the task of government is to 
regulate the exercise of rights by people in society in such a way as to it seems appropriate. The 
judgment in Mkantwa v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality recognises this fact and 
appears to exclude conventional restrictions on an owner’s right to use their property such as 
planning regulations or provisions designed to regulate relationships between people in the 
community, such as noise control or pollution regulations. It is only where the interference with 
property rights or the limitation upon the exercise of those rights goes beyond the normal 
constraints to be expected in an open and democratic society that they will amount to deprivation. 
 
 Fortunately the facts of that case provide some indication of what will constitute a 
substantial interference or limitation on rights of ownership going beyond those normally to be 
expected in society. It was concerned with the provisions of section 118 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. That section provides that before property 
situated in a municipal area can be transferred the transferor must obtain from the municipality 
what is commonly referred to as a rates clearance certificate, but is in fact is a certificate 
confirming that all rates and other charges due to the municipality during the two years prior to 
the application years have been paid. Absent such a certificate transfer cannot be effected and in 
substance the local authority is vested with a right akin to a lien over the property in question. 
The court held that the imposition of such a burden on the property constituted a deprivation for 
the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Its reasoning was as follows:- 
 
‘[33] It follows that owners cannot transfer their properties unless consumption charges 
due by people other than themselves and for which they are not liable have been paid.  It 
was correctly pointed out that these laws do not literally require the owner to pay 
outstanding charges. The reality is, however, that if the person liable for the debt does not 
or cannot pay, the owner who wants to effect transfer must … The payment must be made 
regardless of whether the owner is liable to pay. The provisions are not merely 
procedural. They are a substantial obstacle to alienation and constitute a deprivation of 
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property within the meaning of s25(1).’ 
 
This approach is consistent with that of the court in the FNB case. There the court was concerned 
with the entitlement of the Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, under section 114 of 
the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 to exercise a lien over motor vehicles in the possession of 
a customs debtor in terms of lease agreements or suspensive sale agreements where the financial 
institution retained ownership of the vehicle as its security for the amounts owing to it in terms of 
the agreement. Not only did the section empower the Commissioner to exercise such a lien but, if 
the debt owing by the customs debtor was not satisfied the Commissioner was empowered to sell 
the vehicles and appropriate the proceeds to payment of the customs debt. The court in the FNB 
case held that this constituted a deprivation of property. It seems to follow that in any situation 
where a statute creates the position that a person’s property may be forfeit or taken to secure or 
discharge an indebtedness there is a deprivation of property falling within section 25(1). This is 
so even if the purpose of the deprivation is not to dispossess the owner of the property but to have 
coercive effect on the owner to pay the underlying indebtedness. 
 
 Against the background of those authorities it is submitted that the arrest of a vessel as an 
associated ship involves a deprivation of the property of the owner of the vessel. Whilst one is 
not dealing with a statutory lien to secure payment to governmental institutions, as in those cases, 
the impact of an associated ship arrest is similar to the impact of such a lien. A vessel is detained 
in respect of a claim for which its owner bears no prior liability. Unless the person against whom 
the claim originally lies either pays the debt or provides security for the claim the owner of the 
associated ship is confronted with a choice between providing security itself or almost certainly 
losing the vessel. In one sense it goes further than the rights granted to municipalities under 
section 118 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, in that if the arrest is one in an 
action in rem against the associated ship it is that vessel and its owners who are rendered liable to 
pay a third party’s debt. There is more here than financial pressure to meet the claim. In an action 
in rem against the associated ship liability for the claim is asserted against the ship and its owner. 
Accordingly the effect of such an arrest is that the owner of the associated ship is deprived of its 
property within the meaning of that expression in section 25(1) of the Constitution. That satisfies 
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the first requirement for seeking constitutional relief. We turn then to consider the requirement of 
arbitrariness. 
 
(b) Is an associated ship arrest an arbitrary deprivation of property? 
 
 In FNB Ackermann J, who gave the judgment of the Court, pointed out that in certain 
contexts arbitrariness only attracts a low level of judicial scrutiny satisfied by nothing more than 
the absence of bias and bad faith40, but said that this was inappropriate to the consideration of a 
constitutional property clause. Ackermann J also rejected the notion that the question of 
arbitrariness in section 25 is limited to a consideration of whether the particular deprivation lacks 
rationality in the sense of there being no rational connection between means and ends.
41
 After 
engaging in a brief survey of international provisions he reached the following conclusion42:- 
 
‘Having regard to what has gone before, it is concluded that a deprivation of property is 
‘arbitrary’ as meant by s25 when the ‘law’ referred to in s25(1) does not provide 
sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair. 
Sufficient reason is to be established as follows:- 
(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means employed, namely 
the deprivation in question and ends sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law 
in question. 
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship 
between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected. 
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation in 
respect of such property. 
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a corporeal 
movable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving 
law to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than in the case when the property is 
something different and the property right is something less extensive. This judgment is 
not concerned at all with incorporeal property. 
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of 
ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than when the 
                                                 
40 Para. [62] 
41 Paras. [65] to [70]. 
42 Para. [100] 
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deprivation embraces only some incidents of ownership and those incidents only 
partially. 
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the 
property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be circumstances when 
sufficient reason is established by, in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship 
between means and ends; in others this might only be established by proportionality 
evaluation closer to that required by s36(1) of the Constitution. 
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to be decided 
on all the relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind that the enquiry is 
concerned with ‘arbitrary’ in relation to the deprivation of property under s25.’ 
 
 Helpful though this list may be in indicating in general terms what factors have to be taken 
into account in considering whether any particular deprivation of property is arbitrary, its terms 
are so general that they provide no more than an indication of the matters that must be 
investigated in order to answer that question. Three issues appear to be fundamental. Firstly there 
is the identification of the reason why the legislature has created the situation where the particular 
deprivation under consideration can occur and whether that deprivation properly fits that purpose. 
The second is the extent of the deprivation, the position being that the more extensive it is, the 
more compelling must be the justification therefor. Thirdly, where the deprivation arises from the 
existence of an indebtedness, and the party who stands to be deprived of their property is remote 
from that indebtedness, the nexus if any between that party and the indebtedness will be of 
fundamental importance. If there is no link between the indebtedness in question and the 
obligation to secure or pay that indebtedness failing which one may be deprived of property then 
it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the deprivation is arbitrary.  
 
 It is convenient to start with the second general enquiry because it is the simplest. To some 
degree the extent of the deprivation flowing from an associated ship arrest will vary depending on 
the response to the arrest. If it is a security arrest and security is provided promptly by or on 
behalf of the owner of the ship concerned, perhaps by a P&I Club, it may be minimal. For a short 
time the owner of the associated ship will be aware of constraints on its ability to use the vessel, 
although these may have little practical impact if the vessel is at the time in port, as will probably 
be the case, and discharging or loading cargo or taking on bunkers or some combination of 
similar activities. In those circumstances if security is provided by the owner of the ship 
concerned the vessel’s operations may not be affected at all and the owner of the associated ship 
 381
will suffer little, if any, loss. 
 
 However, the harm occasioned to the owner of the associated ship may be considerably 
greater than this. The vessel may be delayed and claims may arise at the instance of cargo owners 
against the owner of the associated ship as carrier of that cargo. If the vessel is under charter the 
charterer may have a claim based upon delay. In order to avoid these possibilities the owner of 
the associated ship may itself have to provide security and will have to do so if the arrest is 
merely the commencement of an action in rem against the associated ship. The provision of 
security invariably comes at a cost that is not ordinarily recoverable.  If disputes arise concerning 
the nature or amount of the security, the prejudice to the owner will increase accordingly.  In the 
most extreme case where security cannot be furnished the prejudice is enormous. The vessel will 
be detained in port under arrest and will cease to be a viable commercial asset. In that case it is 
almost certain that the vessel will be sold and the proceeds held as a fund in Court for distribution 
among creditors, both direct and those with claims on the basis of it being an associated ship in 
relation to another vessel or other vessels. If held as security for a claim being pursued either 
before a Court or by way of arbitration, once those proceedings are terminated with a judgment or 
award in favour of the claimant, the claimant will seek to realise their security by selling the 
associated ship. In situations such as these where the vessel is sold the owner of the associated 
ship will be deprived entirely of the vessel with little likelihood of recovering anything from the 
proceeds of its sale. 
 
 On what basis then should the matter be approached from a constitutional perspective? As 
questions of the constitutionality of legislation cannot depend on the extent of the harm 
occasioned to a particular litigant by the application of the provision in question to its peculiar 
circumstances, it is submitted that the proper approach must be to consider the ordinary range of 
potential consequences of the provision. In other words one disregards consequences occasioned 
by circumstances peculiar to the particular litigant that raises the constitutional challenge, as 
these may be extreme or unusual. Of course if the circumstances of the person raising the issue of 
constitutionality fall within the ordinary range then they are but an exemplar of it. The 
constitutionality of a legislative provision cannot vary from one case to the next and should not 
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depend upon extreme or unusual circumstances. Whilst those may be helpful for the purpose of 
highlighting aspects of the legislation the more appropriate approach is to consider the ordinary 
scope of the provision and its likely impact on those affected thereby. The question of 
constitutionality is then measured against those realities.  Extreme cases are either accommodated 
on the basis of the improbability that they will arise in practice or by way of interpretation and 
possible exception. They do not ordinarily dictate the overall constitutional legitimacy of a 
provision. 
 
 Following that approach the usual position in respect of the arrest of an associated ship is 
this. The arrest may be avoided entirely or may be lifted before there is any harm to the 
commercial operations of the vessel, but in some cases there will be commercial harm occasioned 
by delay while security is found. In other cases the arrest will continue because security cannot be 
established and almost invariably that will result in the vessel being sold. If the arrest serves the 
purpose of commencing an action in rem the owner of the associated ship will be liable for any 
judgment rendered against the vessel. If the owner provides security then that too will in 
commercial terms render it liable for any judgment, or where the arrest is a security arrest, for the 
judgment or award in respect of which security is sought.   
 
 There is therefore a range of potential consequences flowing from an associated ship arrest.  
Some may be relatively minor or even insignificant, but it is not unreasonable to approach the 
matter on the basis that the arrest of a vessel as an associated ship poses a significant risk to the 
owner of the associated ship that it will lose its vessel. In order to avoid that the owner is 
constrained to find or provide security for the indebtedness of a third party or procure that the 
third party secures the claim. An associated ship arrest therefore imposes potentially onerous 
burdens upon the owner of the associated ship including the risk of being deprived entirely of its 
property. In those circumstances cogent and substantial justification will be required if the 
deprivation inherent in the situation is not to be condemned as arbitrary. 
 
 That conclusion takes us back to the reasons for the enactment of the legislation; the goal 
sought to be achieved thereby and the connection between the legislation and the achievement of 
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that goal. It is here that the justification for the associated ship arrest discussed in Chapter 4 
assumes the greatest importance. Where it is sought to justify the associated ship arrest merely on 
the grounds that its purpose is to align South African maritime jurisprudence with the provisions 
of the Arrest Convention, whilst addressing by way of extension a problem occasioned by 
attempts on the part of ship owners to avoid the sister ship arrest provided for in the Convention, 
it can be demonstrated that this is fallacious. The single ship company was no novelty when the 
Arrest Convention was concluded and, even more importantly, there is almost nothing to suggest 
that it has burgeoned in the way that it has, as a means to avoid sister ship arrests. Equally to 
suggest that structuring the ownership of a fleet of vessels through a number of one-ship 
companies taints the formation and operation of those companies with dishonesty or impropriety, 
is likewise fallacious. There are far too many legitimate business reasons for using this corporate 
form and this general structure for the purpose of engaging in commercial shipping operations for 
that charge to be established. The reality is that ship owners worldwide have increasingly found it 
convenient from a business perspective, with few commercial disadvantages, to operate fleets of 
ships on the basis that the ownership of the vessels will vest in one ship companies. In doing so it 
seems likely that they have been supported by the financial institutions that provide the finance to 
acquire and operate vessels and which secure their own position by way of mortgages. By 
insisting that each vessel in respect of which they provide finance be owned and operated by a 
one-ship company these institutions effectively limit the range of creditors that may pursue 
claims against the vessels, especially those that may enjoy a ranking higher than a mortgage. At 
the same time the financial institutions usually have sufficient financial clout to secure their own 
claims not only by way of mortgages over the particular vessel, but also by way of cross 
mortgages over other vessels in the fleet and by personal guarantees from the persons standing 
behind the shipping group. In this way they are able to obtain the best of both worlds. Their 
security extends to people and assets going beyond the vessel and its immediate owner and other 
creditors do not enjoy the same advantage. 
 
 The earlier examination of the reasons for and justification of the institution of the 
associated ship reveals that its true foundation lies in a considered policy choice by the 
legislature. That policy choice in turn affords legitimacy to the legislative measure. The policy 
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question was whether those who secure to themselves the benefits of scale and other benefits 
flowing from the operation of a fleet of vessels, should at the same time, by housing each vessel 
in a discrete company, be able to limit the range of assets to which ordinary creditors may have 
resort in order to secure payment of their claims? In answering that question the legislature was 
entitled to make, and indeed did make, a range of subsidiary choices reflecting underlying policy 
values.  At the broadest level the policy it adopted was that it was desirable that creditors should 
be paid and that provisions should be put in place in the legislation that would facilitate their 
ability to procure payment. From the perspective of South African citizens and companies they 
are more likely to be claimants than debtors in relation to maritime matters and, as that is the 
case, it is legitimate for the South African legislature to assist them in recovering what may 
become owing to them. The legislature was entitled to ask whether the use of one-ship 
companies, where that corporate structure enables the owners of ships in respect of which claims 
arise to avoid liability for those claims, constitutes an exorbitant use of the advantages of separate 
corporate personality. 
 
 A consideration of the institution of the associated ship itself demonstrates that in 
introducing it the legislature adopted a firm policy stance in favour of claimants; in favour of the 
payment of claims and in favour of the view that the use of one ship companies, where the device 
of separate corporate personality results in claims not being paid by those who benefit from such 
separate corporate personality, is exorbitant and unacceptable. As the principal author of the Act 
put it in his submissions to the then Appellate Division in The Berg43, the purpose of the Act is to 
make the loss fall where it belongs by reason of ownership of the vessels, and in the case of a 
company, ownership or control of the shares of the company. With the amendments effected to 
the Act in 1992 this latter becomes control of the company itself, rather than control of its shares. 
Overall the underlying notion is that where there is a common locus of control of two or more 
vessels, whether directly or through companies, the person or persons who exercise that control 
should accept that any debts incurred in respect of any one of those vessels should be paid, failing 
which all such vessels will be available to claimants seeking to recover the amounts owing to 
                                                 
43




 It can hardly be questioned that this is a legitimate view for the legislature to take. Ever 
since the establishment of the company as an institution, legal systems have found it necessary in 
certain circumstances to place a limit on the ability of the shareholders to enjoy the benefits of 
corporate personality. In some instances this is to prevent fraud or similar cases of impropriety.  
In others, such as the consolidation of accounts in groups of companies, its purpose is greater 
transparency. In yet other cases its purpose may be greater efficiency in the collection of tax. 
Helping to secure that lawful debts are paid is clearly a legitimate governmental purpose. A 
measure directed at achieving that is legitimate.  It hardly seems possible to argue the contrary. 
 
 Flowing from this conclusion there can be little difficulty with the notion that the means 
chosen by the legislature to achieve the statutory purpose are well directed to that end. 
Experience with the associated ship jurisdiction shows that it has proved effective
44
, particularly 
as a means of obtaining security for otherwise unsecured claims. Whilst some vessels arrested as 
associated ships have been sold, in by far the majority of instances security is provided and the 
ship continues about its ordinary business.  No doubt within groups of ship owning companies 
inter-company adjustments are made that locate the indebtedness in the correct company or it is 
consolidated in group accounts. Sales of vessels arrested as associated ship most usually occur 
where a shipping group collapses. In that situation a sale of the vessels would in any event be 
likely to occur in the ordinary course irrespective of the existence of the associate ship 
jurisdiction. Whilst the existence of associated ship claims may notionally extend the list and 
amount of claims against a fund arising from the sale of a vessel, it is rare at the end of the day 
for such claims to receive any dividend. Put simply if the ship owning company is in a position to 
pay all its creditors and is trading successfully it is unlikely that its owners and mortgagees will 
permit it to be sold. If it is not then it is likely in any event that at some stage it will be arrested 
                                                 
44 The fact that a number of countries supported a variation on the associated ship arrest during the negotiations 
leading to the revisions of the Arrest Convention (Berlingieri, op cit 580-596) demonstrates it effectiveness as well 
as the extent of the perception that the one-ship company involves an exorbitant use of the legal concept of juristic 
personality and the separate corporate personality of companies irrespective of who owns or controls their shares. 
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and sold at the instance of direct creditors. 
 
 Overall therefore the means adopted by the legislature in pursuit of its policy goals seems 
to be well directed towards the achievement of those goals. In most instances they are unlikely to 
have the extreme result of the vessel being sold and the owner being deprived both of the asset 
constituted by the ship and the proceeds accruing from its sale. The deprivation constituted by the 
arrest will ordinarily result in a need to provide security for a claim - which may not necessarily 
be provided by the owner of the associated ship and may involve no financial disadvantage to it - 
and to that may be added such commercial disadvantage as may flow from any delay to the vessel 
occasioned by the arrest. On their face therefore the measures adopted by the legislature are 
reasonably proportionate to the achievement of its legitimate goals. 
 
 That brings us to the final question of the relationship or connection between the owner of 
the associated ship and the indebtedness incurred in respect of the ship concerned. In strict law, 
giving effect to the separate corporate personalities of the two ship owning companies, the 
answer would be that there is no connection. But the enquiry into arbitrariness goes beyond 
matters of strict legal form.  The court is entitled to examine economic and social connections 
that may exist between the owner of the ship concerned and the owner of the associated ship. 
This emerges from a consideration of the different conclusions in the FNB case and Mkwenta v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. In FNB the vehicles subjected to a customs lien were 
owned by a finance house having no connection at all with the customs debt sought to be 
recovered by the Commissioner, South African Revenue Service. That debt had not arisen from 
any activities to which the finance house was a party or from which it had benefited. The 
presence of the vehicles on the premises of the customs debtor was the factor that attracted the 
operation of the lien. The connection between the deprivation and the customs debt was therefore 
extremely tenuous and remote, if it existed at all. This is what led the Constitutional Court to hold 
that the deprivation was arbitrary. 
 
 By contrast in Mkwenta the charges in respect of which the municipality had the right to 
withhold a clearance certificate were in some instances, such as rates, liabilities of the owner of 
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the property, and in other instances related to services such as water reticulation, refuse removal 
and electricity supply provided to the property and its occupants. The provision of those services 
was accordingly intimately connected to the use of the property itself. Not only did the 
availability of these services enhance the value of the property but they may also have enhanced 
its rental value and thereby generated a direct financial advantage for the owner. The 
Constitutional Court held that these factors provided a direct link between the owner of the 
property and the right of the municipality to withhold a clearance certificate as an inducement to 
secure the payment of these charges. When taken in conjunction with the fact that the local 
authority acquired no direct claim against the property itself or its owner and that the clearance 
certificate could only be withheld in respect of debts less than two years old, the deprivation 
involved was held not to be arbitrary. 
 
 What then is the position in respect of the associated ship? The starting point is the 
conventional case of an associated ship where the vessel is part of a fleet of ships, large or small, 
all owned by one ship companies but under the ultimate control of a single individual. The three 
special cases identified at the outset of this discussion can be dealt with after considering the 
conventional paradigm. Indeed if the conclusion is that the deprivation involved in an associated 
ship arrest is arbitrary and thus unconstitutional the need to consider those cases separately will 
not arise. 
 
 In the conventional situation when one looks at the two companies as separate juristic 
persons distinct from their shareholders, which is the classic statement of corporate personality, 
they are of course distinct entities unrelated to one another. On that basis it is possible to say that 
there is no connection between the debts of the one and the existence and activities of the other. 
However, once one goes beyond that to an examination of the interests that benefit from the 
activities of the companies it transpires that they are necessarily the same, because the test for 
association is common ownership or control of the ships or ship owning companies. If both ships 
are owned by the same person, as in the classic sister ship situation, they are both assets of the 
same person and are, subject to issues of priority, equally vulnerable to the attentions of an 
unpaid creditor irrespective of which ship’s operations gave rise to the claim. The effect of the 
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associated ship provisions is to create the same situation as would arise if the two vessels were in 
the same ownership where they are each owned by a company owned or controlled by the same 
person. The associated ship arrest as an institution proceeds from the premise that companies are 
merely the vehicles through which an individual exercises rights in and to the vessels and that the 
person who owns or controls the ship-owning companies is ultimately the beneficiary in financial 
terms of their operations. Hence the common use of the term ‘beneficial owner’ to describe that 
person. 
 
 Once viewed from this perspective it is clear that there is a relatively close relationship 
between the debt owed by company A, that owns the ship concerned, and the imposition of 
liability and the attendant risk of arrest on the associated ship, owned by company B. The 
approach of the legislation is that the individual X, who controls both companies, is the one to 
benefit when A does not pay its debts. In many instances also this is the person who benefited 
from the provision of goods or services or other transaction that gave rise to the debt in the first 
instance and is the person who benefits from the commercial operations of the vessel owned by 
A. The legislation accordingly proceeds on the footing that it is equitable for the assets of 
company B, that likewise operates commercially for the benefit of X, to be available to satisfy 
claims arising in respect of the ship owned by A. 
 
 A consideration of the key factors identified by the Constitutional Court as central to the 
enquiry regarding arbitrariness leads to the following result. The legislation has a clear and 
legitimate purpose that reflects and seeks to address concerns that are reasonably widespread in 
the international maritime world about the operation of vessels owned by one-ship companies. 
The underlying policy is that it is desirable that such structures should not be used to enable those 
who benefit from the operations of the ship-owning companies to avoid liability for debts 
incurred in respect of one of those companies on the grounds that the debtor company is separate 
and distinct from the other ship-owning companies in the group. The measure taken to achieve 
that purpose is properly directed at its achievement and is reasonably proportionate to it so that it 
is unlikely to cause undue hardship. Whilst there is some risk that the owner may be permanently 
deprived of its vessel, this is most likely to arise in cases where it and those interested in it are 
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already in precarious financial circumstances. Although the juristic entities involved are distinct, 
those who benefit from their activities are the same so that there is a close connection between 
the underlying indebtedness and the imposition of liability by means of an associated ship arrest. 
Overall it is submitted that these elements combine to dispel the suggestion of arbitrariness and 
that in principle the institution of the associated ship passes constitutional muster.  
 
(c) Special cases 
 
 That conclusion requires that the three special instances identified earlier be considered 
taking each in turn. 
 
(i) Minority shareholders: 
 
 The general case we have been considering proceeds on the footing that the company 
owning the ship concerned and the company owning the associated ship are controlled by the 
same person. In their original form the provisions of section 3(7)(a)(ii) of the Act identified the 
requirement for association as being ownership or control of the shares of the two companies 
concerned and not ownership or control of the companies themselves. It was held45 that:- 
 
‘The plain meaning of the words ‘the shares in the company’ in ss7(a)(ii) is ‘all the shares 
in the company’. Some of the shares in a company, even if they be the majority, are not 
‘the shares in the company’. That interpretation accords with the policy of the Act 
regarding associated ships. An associated ship may be arrested instead of the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose and it then becomes liable to be sold in terms 
of s9 of the Act. The Legislature could never have intended that a person owning shares 
in the company which owns the alleged associated ship, but who is a stranger to the 
company which owns the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, should be 
deprived of his interest by its arrest as an associated ship.’(Emphasis added.) 
 
One of the curious features of this statement is that when it was made
46
 the legislature had 
                                                 
45
 Dole Fresh Fruit International Limited v m.v. Kapetan Leonidas 1995 (3) SA 112 (A) 119B-D 
46 In March 1995 
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already47 amended the section to bring about precisely the situation that the Court apparently 
thought could never have been its intention. That is now water under the bridge but the quoted 
passage does serve to identify the different dimension to the question of constitutionality that 
arises in the case of a minority shareholder who seeks to challenge the associated ship provisions 
as involving an arbitrary deprivation of her or his interest in the company owning the associated 
ship.  
 
 The point is not insubstantial. In a simple case one person, X, may control two ship owning 
companies, A and B, by way of ownership of 51% of the shares in each. The remaining 49% 
shareholding in the two companies is held by two entirely different people or groups with no 
overlap. By the arrest of the vessel owned by B as an associated ship in relation to the vessel 
owned by A, the minority shareholders in B are at risk of losing their interest in the vessel itself 
and effectively in the company B in its entirety. Such deprivation would arise in consequence of 
the debts of A in which they outwardly have no interest and with which they appear to have no 
connection. It is true that X controls both companies and is clearly connected to both the 
indebtedness of A and the vessel owned by B, but does that connection suffice to avoid a finding 
that the deprivation involved in permitting the arrest of B’s vessel as an associated ship is 
arbitrary in relation to the minority interests in B? If that question is answered in the negative 
then the associated ship arrest provisions must be read more narrowly as including only cases 
where the entire shareholding in both A and B is controlled by the same persons.  
  
 The answer to the constitutional query is by no means clear-cut.  It cannot be said that there 
is no connection between the indebtedness of A and the arrest of B’s vessel. Plainly there is in the 
form of X’s controlling interest in both companies. However, if the arrest is constitutionally 
permissible the minority shareholder or shareholders in B risk losing their interest in B and 
through it in the vessel it owns in consequence of a debt that on outward appearance may have 
been incurred without their knowledge or participation and the incurring of which does not enure 
for their benefit. Is this a hazard that they should be required to run as one of the risks attendant 
                                                 
47 From 1 July 1992. 
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upon being a minority shareholder? 
 
 As Ackermann J pointed out in FNB the question of arbitrariness requires one to explore a 
complexity of relationships. In that case it was a tripartite set of relationships, involving the 
existing debtor, the revenue service and the finance house that was the owner of the motor 
vehicles. The statutory obligation to pay the customs duties linked the customs debtor and the 
revenue service, but had no link to or connection with the finance house. In turn the finance 
house and customs debtor were linked in a contractual relationship by virtue of the provisions of 
the suspensive sale agreements in relation to the vehicles under which the finance house retained 
ownership of those vehicles. There was, however, no nexus at all between those agreements and 
the existence of the customs debt, nor were the vehicles an instrumentality in the creation of the 
customs debt. In the result there was nothing at all to link the deprivation imposed on the finance 
house to the obligation to pay the customs debt. 
 
 The web of relationships in the case at present under consideration in relation to an 
associated ship arrest is more extensive and more complex. Firstly there is the relationship 
between the creditor seeking the arrest and company A that owns the ship concerned. That may 
be contractual, delictual48 or statutory in origin. Secondly there is the relationship that X has with 
A by virtue of her or his majority shareholding in the company. That relationship entitles X to 
dictate the affairs of A and the activities of the vessel it owns, including the activities giving rise 
to the debt in question. In addition X will be the primary beneficiary of the successful 
commercial activities of the vessel and hence of A. There is thus a significant connection 
between X and the existence of the indebtedness that may be seen as creating a level of obligation 
on the part of X to secure the payment of A’s indebtedness to the claimant. Thirdly there is the 
similar relationship that X has with B in regard to its commercial activities. Very probably the 
fact that X is the majority shareholder in both A and B means that X will cause the vessels owned 
                                                 
48 Tortious in the terminology of the common law. 
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by A and B to operate in a way that produces cost advantages49 and where possible productive 
trading synergies.
50
 This may create an operational linkage between the two companies, A and B, 
apart from that provided by X’s common controlling shareholding. Fourthly there is the complex 
of relationships between the minority shareholders of B and B itself. These are unlikely to result 
in the minority shareholders having any significant say in the operations of the vessel owned by 
B or over matters such as the appointment of agents, the commercial activities of the vessel and 
the like. Lastly, there is the relationship between majority and minority shareholders, which may 
have its own regulatory scheme, such as a shareholders’ agreement, although experience suggests 
that this is not common.  
 
 Two points should perhaps be made at the outset. The first is that in principle the extent of 
the minority shareholding should not affect the question of constitutionality. There is a natural 
tendency to suggest that the deprivation is more likely to be regarded as arbitrary the greater its 
extent, so that a 49% minority shareholder is more likely to succeed in raising the constitutional 
issue than one holding only 1%. It is submitted, however, that this amounts to nothing more than 
a plea ad misericordiam and should be resisted. A deprivation of property does not become more 
arbitrary because the person deprived had a greater stake in the company nor does it become less 
arbitrary if their stake is small. The nature of the deprivation is the same in both cases even 
though the extent may differ. Of course in a situation where the court is considering a deprivation 
that is always relatively minor in extent the prospect of its being condemned as arbitrary will 
diminish. However, that is a different matter from the situation where the nature of the 
deprivation remains the same, but one person may lose a lot thereby and another a little. The 
matter can be tested by a situation where there are two minority shareholders, one owning a 45% 
                                                 
49 Cost advantages may accrue from common management, the use of the same agents in different ports, group 
entries with a P&I Club, simplification of crewing and maintenance activities, the use of the same chartering brokers 
and the exploitation of economies of scale. No doubt there are other examples. 
 50 Much here will depend upon the size of the fleet, the nature of the vessels and the nature of the commercial 
activities undertaken in respect of the ships.  However, it may mean that there is a substitute vessel is available when 
one is damaged or delayed or that great flexibility is feasible when charterparties are concluded on a ‘vessel to be 
nominated’ basis. The opportunities for trading synergies are greater where a liner or similar service is in operation 
and the larger the group of ships operated as part of a single fleet the greater the potential to achieve such trading 
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stake in company B that owns the associated ship and another 4%. It cannot make a difference to 
the question of the constitutionality of the deprivation suffered by the arrest of the vessel owned 
by B as an associated ship whether the challenge is raised by the shareholder owning 45% or the 
one owning 4%. 
 
 The second point is that one ship companies are invariably private companies
51
, so that 
where there is a diversity of shareholding it is unlikely that this will be constituted by people 
having little or no connection with one another save for their common shareholding in the 
company.
52
 This is a fundamental distinction between a private company and a public company. 
In practice where there is a diversity of shareholding that is usually due to one of three possible 
underlying sets of relationships. The first and the most common is a familial relationship where 
the family’s business interests lie in the shipping industry and have usually been built up over a 
number of years. There are many groups of shipping companies that were founded by a single 
individual or perhaps brothers, who brought his or their sons into the business, and then, in turn, 
the sons involved their own children. Of course there are variations where wives and cousins and 
other members of the family also become involved in what is in substance a family business. In 
those circumstances it is unusual for all the family to be active participants in the day to day 
management of the business, but it is not uncommon for them to have shareholdings to differing 
                                                                                                                                                              
synergies.   
51 Adopting the South African distinction between a private company, the membership of which must be limited to 
30, and a public company where the shareholding will run into hundreds if not thousands. 
52 I have encountered a single instance of this in the maritime world, in the context of an attempt to obtain an 
associated ship arrest, where a company acting as manager of a fleet of ships would, in its capacity as manager, not 
only operate the vessels but also decide what operations should be undertaken, which ships should be disposed of 
and which acquired and when such acquisition should be made. Each time there was an acquisition a new one ship 
owning company would be created. The manager would take a stake in that company, usually ranging between 9% 
and 15%, and would then actively seek out investors to acquire the remaining shares in the company. These investors 
would be people wishing to make an investment in the shipping industry but having no other means to do so were 
willing to entrust their investment to the ship manager. They were solicited by various means, usually through 
agents, on each occasion when a new vessel was acquired for the fleet and no particular connection existed among 
the investors. They were all passive investors seeking a return on their investment but having no active involvement 
in the operation of the vessels or the companies, all of which was firmly vested in the hands of the ship managers.  It 
is debatable whether in this situation the separate ships making up the fleet are associated ships within s 3(7) of the 
Act, but assuming that they are, this is a rare instance of the minority interests in the company owning the ship 
concerned and the minority interests in the company owning the associated ship having no connection or linkage 
with one another and as a result no link with the other ship-owning company. 
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extents in various ship-owning companies.53 The relationships will, however, be relatively close 
and the group of companies owning the vessels in the fleet will be operated as a single entity for 
the benefit of the family as a whole.  
 
 The second possible set of relationship is one where persons who are employed by a 
company responsible for managing the affairs of the fleet are given a small shareholding in some 
or all of the ship-owning companies as a reward for and inducement of loyal service. It is not 
uncommon for the group of ship-owning companies to be managed by a company forming part of 
the group and under the same overall control. Senior employees in the management company 
may then be rewarded for their services with small stakes in one or more of the ship-owning 
companies or may be assisted or enabled to acquire such stakes. In those circumstances the 
relationship between minority and majority shareholders remains largely one between employer 
and employee. Unlike the family situation the minority shareholder and employee will also be 
involved in the operation of the vessel and indeed in the operation of all the vessels in the fleet. 
 
 The third possibility is one where the majority shareholder involves selected business 
associates in the business as minority shareholders in the ship-owning companies. This is not a 
case of soliciting outside investors from the general public.  It is rather the involvement of 
outsiders, very often people within the majority shareholder’s circle of friends and business 
acquaintances, as participants in the business. Such situations usually reflect close personal and 
business relationships rather than remote investment participants.  It must be borne in mind that 
relationships such as these depend from the outset on the majority shareholder’s invitation to 
participate. If successful, over time the relationship may extend so that it arises in relation to the 
ownership of a number of different vessels. In the context of a private company such 
relationships can, as our courts have often pointed out, assume a form closely akin to partnership, 
                                                 
53 These shareholdings may represent what is perceived to be their own interest in the family business or may be 
nominee shareholdings on behalf of the family as a whole to be transferred as business interests may dictate. 
Identifying whether a shareholding is a genuine reflection of that person’s interest in the company or whether it is a 
nominee shareholding is usually impossible from the public records of the company. Since the advent of the 
associated ship jurisdiction there is anecdotal evidence among maritime lawyers in South Africa of ship-owning 
families deliberately adjusting the shareholdings of family members in different one-ship companies, with a view to 
 395
rather than the more remote involvement that minority shareholders have in, for example, a 
public company. 
  
 From the constitutional perspective there can be no doubt that it is how the court views this 
potential range of relationships that will be decisive of the claim by a minority shareholder that 
the arrest of the associated ship is an arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, deprivation of 
property. As said at the outset of this discussion the position cannot be said to be absolutely clear-
cut, but it is submitted on balance that such a constitutional complaint should fail.  There are four 
reasons for saying this. Firstly the existence or otherwise of minority shareholders does not affect 
the legitimacy of purpose of the arrest and in general the proposition that it is an appropriate, 
effective and proportionate means to adopt to achieve the purpose of ensuring that legitimate 
claims are met. Secondly there is a clear and indisputable nexus between the debt arising in 
respect of the ship concerned and the common majority and controlling shareholder in both 
companies. Thirdly it is reasonable to anticipate that in almost every instance the minority 
shareholding will have come into existence in one of the three sets of circumstances delineated 
above and in all of those there is a close connection between the minority and majority 
shareholders and a likelihood that the former may have an interest in the operation of the group of 
ship-owning companies as a whole and in the financial health of that group. Lastly, one of the 
accepted hazards of being a minority shareholder in a private company is that the risks attendant 
upon the operation of the company will be created by the decisions and actions of the majority 
shareholder. Unlike the case with public companies, particularly those listed on a stock exchange, 
where the minority shareholder is usually capable of disposing of their interest in the company, a 
minority shareholder in a small private company cannot easily exit the company if they dislike or 
disapprove of the business decisions of the majority shareholder. Generally speaking they find 
themselves restricted to persuasion and advice in regard to operational matters in the decision-
making processes of the company, rather than enjoying any substantial decision-making power.  
Accordingly by procuring and maintaining a minority share in a ship-owning company they 
necessarily bind themselves to accept the risk that the actions of the majority shareholder may 
enure to their detriment and the detriment of their investment. If they do not stipulate for 
                                                                                                                                                              
contending that they are not associated ships, albeit operated as part of a single fleet. 
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appropriate protection either through the founding documents of the company or by way of a 
shareholders’ agreement, it is not unfair that they should be burdened by the risks inherent in 
their position. 
 
 The question whether a particular deprivation of property is arbitrary involves the balancing 
of a variety of interests. Courts do not lightly condemn the activities of legislatures as arbitrary 
where they reflect policy decisions and reasonably proportionate steps to give effect to those 
decisions. Persons engaged in the shipping industry on an international basis are aware that in 
various jurisdictions there are differing rules in regard to the arrest of ships pursuant to claims. 
Accordingly minority shareholders are in a position to inform themselves of the legal position in 
regard to associated ship arrests in South Africa, which features prominently as a centre of 
maritime litigation. They will be aware that the vessel in which they have a stake operates as part 
of a fleet of other vessels and will also be aware that the majority shareholder in the company in 
which they hold shares also controls other ship-owning companies. Accordingly they have the 
means to inform themselves of the risks they run if any of those vessels visits South African 
waters. They have means to protect themselves by way of agreements with their majority 
shareholders. Having taken upon themselves the advantages accruing from ownership of the 
minority shares in the ship-owing company it does not seem arbitrary that they should also bear 
the risks attendant upon that situation and the absence of control over the company that it carries 
with it. For those reasons, it is submitted that a constitutional challenge to the associated ship 
arrest by a minority shareholder should fail. 
 
(ii) The Heavy Metal 
 
 It is unnecessary for the purposes of considering the constitutional dimension of this 
judgment to rehearse the facts of the case as they have been sufficiently discussed earlier in 
chapter 7. The key aspect from the perspective of the Constitution is the interpretation given in 
the majority judgment to the expression ‘power, directly or indirectly, to control the company’ as 
embodying two distinct sources of such power. The effect of this as the majority judgment 
acknowledges is that there may be situations in which there is in fact no commercial or business 
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connection between the two ship-owning companies. The only link will be the fortuitous one that 
the persons controlling those companies happen to have made use of the same nominees as 
shareholders and/or directors of the companies. On the basis of the majority judgment there will 
nonetheless be an association between the two vessels rendering the one subject to arrest in 
respect of the debts incurred in respect of the other. 
 
 It is submitted that the constitutional position in this situation is clearer and simpler than the 
case discussed in the previous section. In the absence of any commercial connection between the 
two companies as a matter of fact the justification for the entire institution of the associated ship 
is absent. As this is a key element in the constitutional analysis the absence of the central 
justification for the ability to arrest an associated ship immediately casts doubt on the 
constitutional validity of the construction adopted by the majority especially when there is a 
wholly plausible construction that avoids the problem and maintains that central reason for the 
existence of the institution. None of the reasons of policy that apply to the situation of the 
minority shareholder are of application in this situation. There is simply no link between the 
indebtedness incurred in respect of ship A by company X and ship B owned by company Y other 
than the common nominee shareholder and/or director. There can be no question in this case of 
making the loss lie where it ultimately belongs by virtue of ownership or control of the two ships 
because of the absence of any commercial link between them. It is a naked case of making A 
liable for the debts of B without any commercial justification for doing so. 
 
 The justification proffered by the majority judgment for its conclusion that this state of 
affairs did not affect its conclusion as a matter of interpretation is that if people seek to hide their 
involvement in corporate entities by having resort to nominee shareholders and directors then any 
problems occasioned thereby are as a result of their own activities and capable of being avoided 
by the expedient of ordering their affairs on a different basis
54
. However once it is accepted that it 
                                                 
54 Heavy Metal, para [16]  The judgment cites a passage from National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 
(1) SA 475 (A) 485C in support of this proposition but the passage in question identifies an inequity in permitting an 
associated ship arrest when the person controlling the ship-owning companies has gone to the trouble of arranging 
his affairs so that the vessels are not associated ships.  It provides no support for the proposition for which it is cited.  
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is permissible and entirely acceptable commercial practice for nominees to be used - and it is 
difficult to see on what basis of principle such a well-established and widely-used institution 
could be subjected to blanket condemnation and dismissed as impermissible - then it is not 
feasible for the shipowner wishing to register a vessel in a one-ship company using a nominee 
shareholder can ever be certain that there are not other vessels in relation to which it will be an 
associated ship. Indeed if the company is incorporated in one of the well-known jurisdictions for 
ship registration, such as Panama, Liberia or Cyprus, the probabilities are overwhelming that 
there will be other ship-owning companies that have the same nominee shareholders and possibly 
the same directors. In other words the belief that these problems can be avoided is ill-founded 
once resort is had to nominee shareholders.  
 
 Earlier in considering the effect of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in the FNB case the 
view was expressed that where the deprivation arises from the existence of an indebtedness and 
the party who stands to be deprived of their property is remote from that indebtedness, the nexus 
if any between that party and the indebtedness will be of fundamental importance. If there is no 
link between the indebtedness in question and the obligation to secure or pay that indebtedness 
failing which one may be deprived of property then it will be impossible to avoid the conclusion 
that the deprivation is arbitrary. It is submitted that the majority judgment in the Heavy Metal 
inevitably drives one to the conclusion that it contemplates with equanimity arbitrary 
deprivations of property. That is not to say that in all instances to which the judgment applies, or 
even on the facts of that particular case, there will be an arbitrary deprivation of property falling 
foul of the constitutional protection afforded by section 25 of the Constitution. As is apparent 
from the judgment of Marais JA, with which the majority agreed, there was much to be said for 
the proposition that the case could have been disposed of on the basis of its own facts without the 
need for the court to adopt the construction of the majority. However for the purpose of 
considering the interpretation of section 3(7)(b)(ii) of the Act the question must be approached on 
the basis of comparing an interpretation that cannot result in the arbitrary deprivation of property 
and one that can. The requirement that the court should favour an interpretation that leads to a 
constitutionally compatible result over one that is capable of leading to a result that infringes a 
right protected under the Bill of Rights leads inexorably to the conclusion that the construction of 
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this section favoured in the majority judgment is not constitutionally permissible. It is submitted 
that a challenge to this construction would be permissible even within the narrow limits imposed 
upon our courts by the stare decisis rule55. The rule cannot be permitted to perpetuate an 
erroneous construction in contravention of the Constitution
56
. There is no reason to believe that 
the error should be perpetuated on the grounds that people have ordered their affairs taking 
account of the erroneous interpretation. The proper construction is favourable to shipowners and 
would, if anything, ameliorate the stringency of the associated ship jurisdiction. 
 
(iii) The section 1(3) presumption. 
 
 A potential constitutional difficulty is occasioned by the presumption in section 1(3) of the 
Act that:- 
 
‘For the purpose of an action in rem, a charterer by demise shall be deemed to be, or to 
have been, the owner of the ship for the period of the charter by demise.’ 
 
The primary instance in which this presumption will apply is where the demise charterer has, 
during the currency of the charter, incurred debts relating to the chartered vessel. The 
presumption has the effect of rendering the chartered vessel liable to arrest in respect of those 
debts. To that extent it reflects the principle that for certain purposes the demise charterer is to be 
regarded pro hac vice as the owner of the vessel.57 However, the presumption58 appears on its 
                                                 
55 Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195 at 232, viz:‘The ordinary rule is that this Court is bound by its 
own decisions and unless a decision has been arrived at on some manifest oversight or misunderstanding, that is, 
there has been something in the nature of a palpable mistake, a subsequently constituted Court has no right to prefer 
its own reasoning to that of its predecessors - such preference, if allowed, would produce endless uncertainty and 
confusion. The maxim 'stare decisis' should, therefore, be more rigidly applied in this the highest Court in the land, 
than in all others. 
56 I leave aside for the present the question whether the stare decisis rule in this stringent form can itself survive 
constitutional scrutiny. It has been cited as an important element of the Rule of Law by the Constitutional Court itself 
in Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security [2009] ZACC 26, paras [58] to [62]. 
57 D J Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 33, footnote 53 and the cases there cited. 
58 Inserted by section 10 of the Sea Transport Documents Act, 65 of 2000, with effect from the 20th June 2003. 
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plain language to go further than that59 and to permit the arrest of the demise chartered vessel as 
an associated ship in respect of the debts of a ship-owning company controlled by the demise 
charterer. This occurs if the range of operation of the presumption is extended to sections 3(6) 
and (7) of the Act. Thus if X, the demise charterer, controls a company that owns vessel A, in 
respect of which debts have been incurred, and through another company demise charters vessel 
B, for the duration of the demise charter the latter vessel will be liable to arrest as an associated 
ship in relation to A. The difficulties that such a construction can create have been noted by one 
commentator60. He wrote:- 
 
‘In regard to demise charters, s1(3) of the Act provides that for the purposes of an action 
in rem, a charterer by demise shall be deemed to be, or to have been, the owner of the 
ship for the period of the charter by demise. Having regard to the wide wording of this 
section, the deemed ownership of a ship would appear to be applicable not only to the 
ship concerned but also to the issue of association. Unless s1(3) is restrictively construed 
to apply only to claims in rem against the ship concerned in respect of which the charterer 
is liable, the section has far-reaching results. Thus on a literal construction, the real owner 
of the ship who charters it by demise runs the risk of it being arrested by reason of the 
charterer having at some stage, possibly even before the conclusion of the charter, having 
attracted liability in respect of another ship, either owned or chartered by demise by the 
charterer.  It seems unlikely that this was contemplated.’ 
 
 The section has been considered by a court in an unreported decision61. The judgment does 
not go beyond citing the passage from Hofmeyr’s work quoted above and agreeing that to apply 
the presumption in section 1(3) in the context of an issue of association would have far-reaching 
results probably not contemplated by the legislature. In the result the court construed the 
provision of the section as applying only to the case of an action in rem against the chartered 
vessel consequent upon a debt incurred by the demise charterer during the course of the charter. 
The judge also agreed with the proposition that had it been intended that this presumption should 
                                                 
59 And further than the presumption in section 3(7)(c) which renders other ships owned by the demise charterer or 
owned by companies controlled by the demise charterer, liable to arrest as associated ships.   
60 G. Hofmeyr, Admiralty Law and Practice in South Africa, 74. 
61
 MV ‘Pacific Yuan Geng’: KP7 International SA and others v Glory Wealth Shipping (Pte) Ltd, AC 30/2009 (WC) 
Shipping Cases of South Africa C 176. This judgment was followed with a rather fuller analysis in The 
Chenenbourg: Lauritzen Bulkers A/S v The Chenenbourg: The Cape Gulf: Maple Maritime Inc v E.A.S.T 
International Ltd Shipping Cases of Southern Africa C183. 
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apply in relation to issues of association that would have been said expressly or some amendment 
would have been effected to sections 3(6) and (7) of the Act to make it clear that the presumption 
was applicable in that context as well. Accordingly the arrest of the demise chartered vessel as an 
associated ship as security for a claim against the demise charterer in respect of another vessel 
was set aside. 
 
 The reasoning of the court in that case was relatively terse, no doubt because of the urgency 
of the matter. However, its conclusion seems to be correct. There are two reasons for this, the one 
being that it accords with the result of a conventional process of interpretation and the other being 
that the alternative construction offends against the constitutional prohibition on the arbitrary 
deprivation of property. First the issue of interpretation. This takes place against the background 
that section 3(7)(c) of the Act already contains a presumption that the charterer or sub-charterer 
of a ship shall be deemed to be the owner of the ship concerned in respect of any relevant 
maritime claim for which the charterer or the sub-charterer is alleged to be liable. If section 1(3) 
is construed as applying in the context of the associated ship then, in relation to a demise 
chartered vessel, it overlaps with the presumption in section 3(7)(c) in circumstances where the 
chartered vessel is the ship concerned. This overlap gives rise to a number of difficulties. 
 
 The first difficulty is that section 1(3) applies only to a charter by demise, whereas section 
3(7)(c) applies to time and voyage charters as well. That immediately suggests that the two 
presumptions are directed at different situations. Secondly, the presumption in section 3(7)(c) is 
clearly directed at the question of association in that it deems the charterer to be the owner of ‘the 
ship concerned’ that is the ship in respect of which the maritime claim that forms the subject of 
the action arose. Its purpose is therefore to provide a foundation for the arrest of another ship.  By 
contrast the presumption in section 1(3) is designed to enable the demise chartered vessel to be 
arrested. Thirdly, the presumption in section 3(7)(c) is confined to maritime claims for which the 
charterer or sub-charterer, and not the owner of the vessel, is alleged to be liable.  No such 
limitation is embodied in section 1(3). Fourthly, there is the constraint that the deeming in section 
1(3) applies only to the period of the charter by demise. That seems to be a narrower time frame 




 These differences and potential contradictions between the two deeming provisions, as well 
as the fact that section 3(7)(c) is located in the statute as part and parcel of the associated ship 
provisions, whilst section 1(3) stands in the preliminary section of the Act and deals generally 
with an action in rem, without reference to an associated ship, suggests that the two presumptions 
are directed at different ends. In order to discern those ends it is necessary to have regard not only 
to the ordinary meaning to be attached to the wording of the presumption but also to the context 
in which they appear and the apparent purpose that section 1(3) serves when viewed in the light 
of the Act as a whole. However, as has been stressed in other cases, words cannot be taken in 
isolation but must be read in the light of the subject matter with which they are concerned and it 




 There can I think be little doubt that section 1(3) is patently intended to deal with the 
situation where a demise charterer incurs debts in respect of the operation of the demise chartered 
vessel. The effect of a demise charter is that the charterer is responsible for the operation of the 
vessel. It will appoint the master and the crew and be responsible for provisioning the vessel, 
supplying bunkers, appointing agents and all matters relating to the operation of the vessel. In 
those circumstances it is relatively easy for persons making supplies to the vessel to be left with 
the impression that they are dealing with the vessel’s owner. However, if their claims are not paid 
they will not ordinarily be able to have resort to an arrest of the chartered vessel in order to 
pursue their claims. Section 1(3) alters that situation.   
  
 The proper question is whether section 1(3) goes any further than rendering the demise 
chartered vessel subject to arrest in respect of claims against the demise charterer arising during 
the period of the charter by demise. If the question of interpretation is posed on that basis the 
answer is that there is no compelling reason either of policy or in the structure of the Act itself 
                                                 
62 University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council and Another 1986 (4) SA 903 (A) 941D-E; Bastian Financial 
Services (Pty) Limited v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1(SCA) paras. [18] and [19]. 
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that requires the presumption in section 1(3) to be applied not only to that situation but also so as 
to render the demise chartered vessel susceptible of arrest as an associated ship. Accordingly a 
consideration of the context of the provision in the light of the Act as a whole favours a 
construction section 1(3) does not apply in the context of the associated ship provisions of section 
3(6) and (7). In other words it applies to an action in rem brought under section 3(5) of the Act 
but not to an action in rem brought by the arrest of an associated ship in terms of section 3(6) of 
the Act. 
 
 Consideration of the constitutional problems posed by the alternative construction of 
section 1(3) puts the issue beyond doubt. If the ‘literal’ meaning is pursued to its ultimate 
conclusion the situation that it creates is the same as that which arises by virtue of the judgment 
in the ‘Heavy Metal’ discussed in the previous section. The owner of the demise chartered vessel 
will find that their vessel is subject to arrest and potential sale consequent upon debts incurred by 
the charterer in relation to some other vessel with which the owner of the demise chartered vessel 
has no connection whatsoever. The only link between the owner of the demise chartered vessel 
and the debt will be the fortuitous one that it has chartered its ship to the person responsible for 
that debt.  However, the commercial connection between them arises from the demise charter and 
not from any interest or relationship that the vessel’s owner may have with the vessel in respect 
of which the claim arose. For the reasons already expounded earlier that construction is in 
conflict with the constitutional bar on the arbitrary deprivation of property. That necessarily leads 
to the conclusion that the narrower construction of section 1(3) as applying only to claims against 
the demise charterer in respect of the demise chartered vessel is correct. Only in that way can the 
constitutional difficulty be avoided. 
 
 The constitutional position is different when section 1(3) is applied in relation to claims 
against the demise charterer arising from its operation of the vessel pursuant to the charter. True 
it has the effect that a vessel X, owned by A, can be arrested in respect of the debts of B. 
However, the context in which those debts arise is that B has complete control over the operation 
of vessel X and the debts have been incurred in the course of those operations. At the same time 
A has benefited from the trading activities of B in respect of the vessel in that it has received the 
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hire in terms of the demise charterparty. In those circumstances there is a close commercial link 
between the benefit accruing to A and the activities that led to the debt being incurred by B.  A’s 
position in that situation bears some similarity to the position of the minority shareholder 
discussed earlier. Having regard to the purpose of the presumption and the nature of the 
relationship between owner and demise charterer it is suggested that section 1(3) will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny if it is confined to this narrower sphere of operation. 
 
4 PROOF OF ASSOCIATION, FAIR HEARING AND EQUALITY. 
 
 In Chapter 5 the difficulties confronting a claimant seeking to arrest an associated ship in 
proving the association were dealt with in some detail. In summary the courts have held that it is 
necessary to prove an association on a balance of probabilities. This confronts the applicant for 
an arrest with a need to establish in their application papers the facts demonstrating the 
association. This is so even though the fact of association is an integral part of their cause of 
action and hence their claim when the arrest is sought in order to commence an action in rem 
against the associated ship. If anything it is the most vital element of that claim as it is 
determinative of the existence of liability on the part of that ship and its owners.  The task of 
proving the association is complicated by the relative inaccessibility of the key information 
required to demonstrate the identity of the person or persons who control the two ship-owning 
companies. This would matter less if the courts were willing to permit discovery or to refer 
applications for the hearing of oral evidence or to trial. However, the overwhelming balance of 
authority is hostile to the court adopting that course. In the circumstances an applicant for arrest 
is confronted with the heavy burden of proving a disputed matter on a balance of probabilities on 
the papers when it has no direct access to the relevant information and may well be confronted 
with the withholding of information, disingenuousness and downright dishonesty. What needs to 
be considered is whether this raises a constitutional issue and if so under what head and with 
what consequences. 
 
 The starting point is the onus of proof imposed upon the applicant for arrest. This can raise 




 a case involving a forest fire in the context of the presumption in section 84 of the 
Forest Act64 that where in any action the question of negligence in respect of a forest fire arises 
‘negligence is presumed, until the contrary is proved’. The challenge was based solely upon the 
equality provisions of the Interim Constitution that have their equivalent in section 9 of the Bill 
of Rights under the Constitution and in particular the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. It is important to note this at the outset as it served to limit the enquiry undertaken by the 
Court. The majority judgment
65
 expressly said that the Court was not concerned with the question 
whether there is a constitutional right to a fair civil trial and, if so, whether an onus provision 
such as that provided for in section 84 of the Forest Act might infringe such right.
66
 That 
statement was made in the light of the fact that the Interim Constitution’s equivalent to section 34 
of the Constitution
67
 did not guarantee the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum, but merely guaranteed the right of access to a court 
or other tribunal. The court was accordingly not concerned with the potential interplay between 
that right and the right to equality embodied in section 9, whilst that is now important in 
considering the possible constitutional questions that can arise in relation to an associated ship 
arrest. 
  
 Reverting simply to the incidence of the onus and the issue of equality before the law the 
majority judgment drew attention to the distinction between the onus of proof in civil and 
criminal cases, and cited with approval a decision
68
 which pointed out that in criminal cases the 
presumption of innocence demands that the burden of proof should rest on the prosecution to 
                                                 
63 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) 
64 Act 122 of 1984 
65 A judgment of Ackermann, O’Regan and Sachs JJ. 
66 Para. [9] at 1019E. 
67 S22 of the Interim Constitution. 
68
 Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A) 872G-H. 
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prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt:- 
 
‘But in civil law … considerations of policy, practise and fairness inter partes may 
require that the defendant should bear the overall onus of averring and proving an excuse 
or justification for his otherwise wrongful conduct.’69 
 
There is no golden thread running through the civil law that fixes immutably the onus of proof 
and the position is that:- 
 
‘… all rules dealing with the subject of the burden of proof rest ‘for their ultimate basis 
upon broad and undefined reasons of experience and fairness.’’ 70 
   
Accordingly the majority held that so long as the rules relating to onus are rationally based no 
constitutional challenge could arise in terms of the equality provisions of the Constitution. 
 
 The question of the onus of proof was dealt with in rather more detail in the separate 
concurring judgment of Didcott J. He cited
71
 the following passage from Wigmore on Evidence:- 
 
‘Is there any single principle or rule which will solve all cases and afford a general test 
for ascertaining the incidents of this risk? By no means. … The truth is that there is not 
and cannot be any one general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy and 
fairness based on experience in the different situations. …  There is … no one principle, 
or set of harmonious principles, which afford a sure and universal test for the solution of a 
given class of cases. The logic of the situation does not demand such a test; it would be 
useless to attempt to discover or to invent one; and the state of the law does not justify us 
in saying that it has accepted any. There are merely specific rules for specific classes of 
cases, resting for their ultimate basis upon broad reasons of experience and fairness.’ 
 
Didcott J endorsed that general statement as being applicable in the South African context and 
went on to say72:- 
                                                 
69 Quoted in para. [37] of the majority judgment. 
70 Pillay v Krishna and Another 1946 AD 946 at 954. 
71 In para. [55]. 
72 In para [56]. 
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‘In our adversarial system of civil litigation one side or the other has to bear the onus of 
proof.  Differentiation between the parties in that regard is thus inevitable. So is the 
disadvantage under which the side carrying the load often labours. Its location for specific 
issues depends not on doctrinaire considerations, but on wholly pragmatic ones.’ 
 
The equality challenge in that case was based on the simple proposition that a defendant facing a 
claim for negligence based upon a forest fire bore the burden of disproving negligence whereas in 
conventional delictual cases the onus would rest on the plaintiff to prove the presence of 
negligence. The contention that this raised equality issues was rejected on the basis that there 
were reasonable grounds for imposing the burden in that way in cases of that type. That sufficed 
to dispose of the issue in that case. However Didcott J did leave open certain broader questions 
that might impact upon the burden of proof. These he expressed as follows:- 
 
‘The right to equality and the prohibition against unfair discrimination may well have an 
impact on the civil onus of proof in the highly imaginary situation where a class of 
litigants is generally saddled with or freed from the burden on account of their personal 
identities, and with no regard to the exigencies of any particular litigation or to the 
equipment for such of those persons or institutions. A civil onus may also be vulnerable 
to attack outside the perimeters of that right and prohibition, and on grounds laid 
elsewhere by the Bill of Rights, once its incidence impedes the enforcement or defence of 
any other right entrenched there.’73 
 
 This judgment was concerned with the incidence of the onus rather than with the extent of 
the burden imposed upon a particular litigant. These are discrete issues although they may raise 
similar problems in the context of affording litigants a fair trial. The extent of the onus and the 
degree of proof that has to be tendered in a case may have as great an impact upon a litigant as 
does the imposition of the burden of proof in the first place.   
 
 To impose upon a person seeking to arrest an associated ship the evidential burden of 
establishing that the vessel that it wishes to arrest is an associated ship in relation to the ship 
concerned is not particularly controversial. It is consistent with the first general rule in allocating 
                                                 
73 Para. [57]. 
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the burden of proof namely that the person who alleges must prove the allegation.74 It is pertinent 
to note that in principle both judgments in the Constitutional Court took the view that the 
allocation of the burden of proof to one of other party in litigation will not in general be 
susceptible to constitutional challenge provided the allocation is based on reasonable grounds. 
The decision to impose the burden of proving association on the applicant for an arrest can hardly 
be characterised as unreasonable particularly as it is consistent with the treatment of all other 
litigants. A challenge to the incidence of the burden of proof is not therefore open to an applicant. 
 
 The debatable issue from the perspective of the Constitution is rather the extent of the 
burden in the context of proceedings dealt with on application, where disputes of fact are almost 
invariably to be resolved in favour of the respondent.75 The decision by the Constitutional Court 
does not bear directly upon that problem. However similar principles are likely to apply in regard 
to the extent of that burden, that is, in the case under consideration, whether it should be 
necessary to establish the association on a balance of probabilities or only on a prima facie basis. 
Unless it can be said that the allocation or extent of the burden of proof is unreasonable it is 
unlikely to be susceptible to a constitutional challenge.  
 
  That is a substantial hurdle to surmount, as the constitutional test for reasonableness is 
whether the decision in question is one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach.76 It would 
be difficult on the grounds of reasonableness alone to condemn the decision of the Appellate 
Division77, applying certain existing principles that an applicant for an associated ship arrest 
needed to prove the association on a balance of probabilities. Although that view can be 
questioned, as it has been in Chapter 5, it can hardly be condemned as unreasonable. On its own 
therefore an equality challenge to the jurisprudence in regard to the onus of proof of association 
                                                 
74
 Pillay v Krishna and Another, supra p951. The principle is one that can be traced back to the Digest (D 22.3.21). 
75
 Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) 634E-635C. 
76 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Limited v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC), para. [44], 
p513A-B. 
77
 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Limited 1994 (2) SA 563 (A). 
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would not succeed. Nor could it be challenged in principle as unreasonable in relation to a fair 
trial challenge. However a more nuanced challenge based on fair trial rights may have greater 
prospects of success. That requires an exploration of the extent to which the Constitution 
guarantees a civil litigant a fair trial.  
 
 Under the Interim Constitution whilst there was a right of access to courts it was limited to 
a right ‘to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial forum’.78 The effect of this was considered by the Constitutional Court 
in Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO
79
 where the appellants, who were being 
subjected to an enquiry under sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act80, claimed that such an 
enquiry infringed their right to fairness in civil litigation. The Court
81
 said this raised a ‘crucial 
issue’ of whether the Interim Constitution had constitutionalised civil procedure, wholly or in 
part. The appellants’ contention was that the right of access to a court of law implied more than 
simply the right to engage formally in a judicial process. The claim was that in order for that right 
to have substance and be meaningful it must imply the right of access to a fair judicial process. 
Accordingly, so the argument ran, this right guaranteed everything necessary to ensure a fair civil 
trial.  On that basis it was contended that a fair civil trial was a protected right.  
 




‘No one would dispute that civil procedure ought to aim at fairness between contending 
parties. That is, however, not the issue. The question is whether the Constitution enacts 
such a norm as an entrenched right. Over the years our Courts 
“have consistently adopted the view that words cannot be read into a stature by implication unless 
the implication is a necessary one in the sense that without it effect cannot be given to the statute 
as it stands” 
                                                 
78 S22 of the Interim Constitution. 
79 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
80 Act 61 of 1973, as amended. 
81 Per Ackermann J. 
82 Para. [105]. 
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It must be necessary in order ‘to realise the ostensible legislative intention or to make the 
Act workable’. It is also necessary to bear in mind that we are not construing a 
Constitution which was framed centuries ago, but one which came into force on 27 April 
1994. The Constitution as a whole, and s22 in particular, appears to be workable and to 
realise the ostensible legislative intention, without the implication the applicants seek to 
rely upon. When s22 is read with s96(2), which provides that ‘(t)he Judiciary shall be 
independent, impartial and subject only to this Constitution and the law’ the purpose of 
s22 seems to be clear. It is to emphasise and protect generally, but also specifically for the 
protection of the individual, the separation of powers, particularly the separation of the 
Judiciary from the other arms of the State. Section 22 achieves this by ensuring that the 
courts and other fora which settle justiciable disputes are independent and impartial. It is 
a provision fundamental to the upholding of the rule of law, the constitutional State, the 
‘regstaatidee’ for it prevents legislatures, at whatever level from turning themselves by 
act of legerdemain into ‘courts’.’ 
 
 
Justice Ackermann then drew attention to the fact that detailed fair trial procedures were 
contained in the Interim Constitution in regard to criminal proceedings but not in regard to civil 
proceedings. He accordingly held that the Interim Constitution did not create any constitutional 
right to fairness in civil litigation. 
 
 The Constitution now goes further than did section 22 of the Interim Constitution in that 
section 34, which deals with the right of access to courts, explicitly states that everyone has the 
right to have any dispute decided in ‘a fair public hearing’. Does this achieve what Ackermann J 
said was not embodied in the Interim Constitution? To some extent the answer must be in the 
affirmative but to precisely what extent is not entirely clear. There is a cautious reference to the 
possibility that section 4 embodies a right to a fair trial and to fair justice in Lane and Fey NNO v 
Dabelstein and Others.
83 However, the challenge sought to be raised in that case was based on a 
contention that the SCA had failed to consider crucially important evidence in arriving at its 
decision. The Constitutional Court said that even if the SCA had erred in its assessment of the 
facts that would not constitute the denial of the constitutional right to a fair hearing. Its pithy 
view was that:- 
 
‘The Constitution does not and could hardly ensure that litigants are protected against 
                                                 




That stance is one that the court has repeated.84 
 
 Rather more assistance is obtained from a case concerning the requirements of notice to be 
given to ratepayers before a local authority could pursue procedures to recover rates. The 
complaint was that the relevant notices had not come to the attention of the ratepayer and hence 
that a sale of the property pursuant to the statutory recovery procedures was invalid and fell to be 
set aside. The contention was that certain provisions of the Provincial Ordinance, in which the 
procedures to be followed in the recovery of outstanding rates were set out, infringed the right to 
a fair hearing in terms of section 34 of the Bill of Rights.85 
 
 Yacoob J delivered the judgment of the court and undertook some analysis of the fair 
hearing component of section 34. He said the following:- 
 
‘[11] This s34 fair hearing right affirms the rule of law, which is a founding value of our 
Constitution. The right to a fair hearing before a court lies at the heart of the rule of law.  
A fair hearing before a court as a prerequisite to an order being made against anyone is 
fundamental to a just and credible legal order. Courts in our country are obliged to ensure 
that the proceedings before them are always fair. Since procedures that would render the 
hearing unfair are inconsistent with the Constitution courts must interpret legislation and 
Rules of Court, where it is reasonably possible to do so, in a way that would render the 
proceedings fair. It is a crucial aspect of the rule of law that court orders should not be 
made without affording the other side a reasonable opportunity to state their case. ‘ 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
This and other remarks in the judgment related specifically to the question of giving notice to the 
person against whom an order was being sought. However, that does not mean that they are 
inapplicable to other situations and other circumstances. As Yacoob J said86 ‘the hearing itself 
must also be fair’. He did, however, stress that fairness is a matter of the process whereby the 
                                                 
84 Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Limited 2002 (4) SA 317 (CC), para. [14]. 
85
 De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council and Others (Umhlatuzana Civil 
Association Intervening) 2002 (1) SA 429 (CC). 
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court arrives at its decision not a question of the fairness of the substantive law applicable to the 
dispute or the relief that may be granted by the court.    
 
 It seems from this decision that the incorporation in section 34 of the Bill of Rights of a 
right to a fair hearing does impact upon the continuing validity of what was said by the 
Constitutional Court in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Bernstein and Another v Bester and Others 
NNO. Both those decisions were handed down under the Interim Constitution that did not 
guarantee a fair hearing in regard to the determination of justiciable disputes. They cannot 
therefore be taken to be determinative of what will constitute a fair hearing under the 
constitutional guarantee to such a hearing now embodied in section 34 of the Bill of Rights. That 
does not mean that the statements in Prinsloo v Van der Linde concerning the allocation of the 
onus are necessarily to be disregarded. There does not seem to be anything unfair in allocating 
the onus of proving the association on which an applicant for an arrest relies upon that applicant. 
The difficulty is occasioned by the fact that this onus has to be discharged on a balance of 
probabilities on affidavit in circumstances where the courts have exhibited considerable 
reluctance to require discovery by the respondent or to refer disputed matters for the hearing of 
oral evidence or to trial. If there is a constitutional difficulty it lies in the combination of those 
two factors and not with either of them in isolation. Thus there is no difficulty in the applicant for 
an arrest bearing the burden of proving association on a balance of probabilities if in disputed 
cases the matter is not simply resolved by an application of the Plascon-Evans rule but could be 
referred for the hearing of oral evidence or to trial on the same basis as would be done in other 
applications
87
. Equally there would be no difficulty in the court being reluctant to refer such 
matters to evidence or trial if the onus of proof only required to be discharged on a prima facie 
basis, as with the merits of the claim. Any constitutional difficulty it is occasioned by a 
combination of the two matters not by either of them seen in isolation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
86 Para. [14]. 
87  In accordance with the principles in Kalil v Decotex (Pty) Ltd 1988 (1) SA 943 (A) at 979B-980A and 981D-
982D. 
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 Civil cases in South African law are decided on a balance of probabilities. That is a 
universal rule to which there are limited exceptions. Thus in an attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem it is sufficient for the applicant to show that they have a claim 
against the respondent whose property they seek to attach on a prima facie basis only
88
.  
Similarly an applicant for relief by way of an interim interdict merely has to demonstrate the 
existence of a prima facie case, albeit open to some doubt.
89
 However, these are limited 
departures and the only basis upon which it can be contended that there should be a similar 
relaxation of the ordinary rule in the case of an associated ship arrest would be that the existence 
of the association is as much a part of the existence of the cause of action as it is a matter of 
identifying property that is susceptible to arrest. The same is true when one is dealing with a 
security arrest because that is a special right of action and right to claim relief existing only under 
the Act and not generally available in other jurisdictions. However it is correct that the arrest 
itself will be merely preliminary to proceedings in another forum and probably in another 
jurisdiction. Unlike the case of an action in rem where the issue would be dealt with and 
determined in accordance with the ordinary rule in regard to the extent of the onus in civil 
proceedings there will be no further hearing or consideration of the issue and the grant of the 
security arrest will afford final relief. It does not seem right or appropriate to grant final relief on 
the basis of such a low level of proof. It also seems inappropriate to allow the question of the 
onus in proceedings to set aside an arrest to vary depending on whether the arrest is pursuant to 
an action in rem in South Africa or a security arrest where the main claim will be adjudicated 
elsewhere. Accordingly whilst there are reservations about the reasons by which the courts have 
reached the conclusion that the onus falls to be discharged on a balance of probabilities it cannot 
be said that this is a view that could not reasonably be held. For those reasons it does not seem 
that a constitutional challenge to the extent of the burden of proof in these matters will succeed. 
From a constitutional perspective therefore it is perhaps better to concentrate on the consequence 
                                                 
88 The same rule applies to proof of the existence of a claim in an arrest in admiralty but the courts have overlooked 
that the claim in an action against an associated ship includes the fact of association and therefore applied a different 
burden of proof to this issue in one context to that which is applied in another.  Association has to be proved prima 
facie in order to show that the applicant has a claim and on a balance of probabilities to justify the arrest of the ship. 
This is an  Alice in Wonderland situation. 
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of applying that rule in regard to the extent of the onus of proof in cases that fall to be determined 
on affidavit. 
 
 South African civil procedure essentially recognises two forms of proceeding. The one is 
by way of action where the disputes between the parties are defined by pleadings and disputes of 
fact are resolved in a trial where oral evidence is heard and where the rules of civil procedure 
permit discovery to be obtained and the production of evidence to be compelled. The second 
form of procedure is on application where the issues are defined and the evidence placed before 
the court in the affidavits deposed to by the parties. This form of procedure is suitable in cases 
where legal issues are clearly defined and no disputed factual issues need to be resolved in order 
for the court to determine the case. Where it is necessary for the proper determination of the case 
to resolve factual issues that are in dispute on the affidavits the ordinary course if for the court to 
refer such disputes for the hearing of oral evidence or to trial. There are instances where the court 
will simply dismiss the application on the basis that the disputes of fact were so extensive and so 
foreseeable at the time the proceedings were commenced that it was inappropriate to make use of 
application proceedings. In principle the court will also refuse to send applications to evidence if 
there are not satisfied that there is a prospect that the hearing of oral evidence may disturb the 
balance of probabilities as it emerges on the papers. However, it is becoming rare in practice for 
the courts to adopt that stringent approach and it is always difficult to tell in advance whether oral 
evidence may make a difference to the outcome. The usual course in application proceedings 
where disputes of fact need to be resolved is to refer those disputes for the hearing of oral 
evidence or to refer the entire matter to trial. This is particularly so where the one party has 
difficulty in obtaining access to the evidence necessary to support its case and where there is a 
reasonable possibility that the production of documentary evidence as a result of the process of 
discovery may cast light on the issue in dispute.   
 
 The one class of case where this approach is not adopted in practice (although lip service is 
sometimes paid to the principle) is applications for the arrest in rem of associated ships, whether 
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 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227. 
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those arrests are for the purpose of pursuing an action in rem in South Africa or for the purpose 
of obtaining security for a claim that is almost invariably being pursued before another forum in 
another jurisdiction. In those instances our courts have repeatedly declined either to refer the 
dispute of fact for the hearing of oral evidence or, in cases where the arrest was for the purpose of 
commencing an action in rem in South African, to refer to dispute to trial as one of the issues in 
the action. The cases in this regard have already been canvassed and there is no need to repeat 
them.
90
 The question is whether this approach infringes the fair hearing rights of applicants for 
associated ship arrests, whether alone or in conjunction with their right to the equal protection of 
the law.   
 
 It is appropriate to start by pointing out that whether the arrest of an associated ship is 
effected in order to commence an action in rem against the ship or whether it is an arrest in order 
to obtain security, the claimant is seeking to take advantage of a substantive right given to them 
by the Act. If the arrest is the first step in an action in rem the claimant is seeking to enforce a 
right of action and a cause of action that exists only in South Africa. The judgments in The Berg91 
clearly hold that an action in rem against an associated ship is a separate action from an action in 
rem against the ship in respect of which the claim arises. Not only is the action directed at a 
different vessel but the ultimate responsibility for the claim will lie with a different person in the 
form of the owner of the associated ship, as opposed to the owner of the ship concerned. Whilst 
the owners will either be the same people or will be controlled by the same people that link must 
not be permitted to obscure the fact that, unless one is dealing with sister ships, different juristic 
persons are ultimately going to bear the liability for a successful claim. This is of fundamental 
importance in litigation. If a party sues the wrong juristic entity it will lose its action and no 
amount of protesting that there were connections between the party sued and the party liable will 
avail it.92 There is no reason to treat the case of the associated ship any differently.  
                                                 
90 Chapter 5 footnotes 134-138. 
91 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N); Euromarine International of Mauren 
v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1986 (2) SA 700 (A). 
92
 Associated Paint & Chemical Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Albestra Paint and Lacquers v Smit 2000 (2) SA 789 
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 A second factor concerning actions in rem against associated ships is relevant as 
background to the consideration of the constitutional issue. It is that in terms of section 7(1)(a) of 
the Act a court may decline to exercise its admiralty jurisdiction in any proceedings instituted or 
to be instituted if it is of the opinion that another court or tribunal will exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of the proceedings and if it is more appropriate that the proceedings be adjudicated upon 
by such other court or tribunal.93 This introduces a different situation in admiralty proceedings to 
that which prevails in conventional proceedings before South African courts where the rule is that 
if a court has jurisdiction it has no general power to decline to exercise that jurisdiction.94 The 
mechanism provided by the Act to prevent inappropriate proceedings being pursued in South 
Africa is by way of the mechanism of a stay in terms of section 7(1)(a). By permitting a challenge 
to the arrest on the basis that the arrested ship is not an associated ship in relation to the ship 
concerned the Defendant is afforded an opportunity to avoid the jurisdiction of the South African 
court without submitting to a trial on the question of association. That overlooks the fact that, 
apart from the power to stay proceedings under section 7(1)(a), the jurisdiction of the South 
African court is established as of right. More importantly the fact that the remedy of a stay is 
available to prevent proceedings from being pursued in this country that should more 
appropriately be pursued elsewhere is a complete answer to the oft-expressed judicial reluctance 
to entertain cases involving foreign litigants and  arising out of foreign causes of action. Such 
reluctance, to which further reference will be made below, is simply inconsistent with the policy 
in regard to such cases that emerges from the Act itself.  
 
 Turning to the case of the security arrest of an associated ship it is again of fundamental 
importance to note that the right to obtain security is a substantive right given to claimants by and 
on the terms of section 5(3) of the Act. It is not in any way dependent upon the proceedings in 
                                                                                                                                                              
(SCA); Blaauwberg Meat Wholesalers CC v Anglo Dutch Meats (Exports) Limited 2004 (3) SA 160 (SCA); Four 
Tower Investments (Pty) Limited v André’s Motors 2005 (3) SA 39 (N) para. [21] - [29].  
93
 Mt Tigr: Bouygues Offshore SA and Another v Owners of the MT Tigr and Another 1998 (4) SA 740 (C); 
Weissglass NO v Savonnerie Establishment 1992 (3) SA 928 (A) 939 B-E. 
94
 Longman Distillers Limited v Drop Inn Group of Liquor Supermarkets (Pty) Limited 1990 (2) SA 906 (A) 914E-
G; Goldberg v Goldberg 1938 WLD 83 at 85-86; Standard Credit Corporation Limited v Bester and Others 1987 (1) 
SA 812 (W). 
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which the secured claim will be pursued or the outcome of those proceedings. It is not even 
logically prior to those proceedings as the application for security may be made at any stage. It is 
true that the right to obtain security is ancillary to the existence of those proceedings, but it 




 The position is therefore that whether one is considering the arrest of an associated ship in 
the context of an action in rem to be pursued in South Africa against the associated ship or its 
arrest for the purpose of obtaining security under section 5(3) of the Act one is concerned with 
the exercise of substantive rights conferred upon litigants by the legislature. This has two 
consequences. Firstly, it is not appropriate to treat the rights as being purely of a procedural 
nature because that is an incorrect characterisation. Although they clearly have a procedural 
aspect they are rights of substance. Secondly, it is inappropriate for the courts to exhibit a 
reluctance to afford to litigants the rights that the statute has given them. There are cases, as has 
been pointed out, where our courts have expressed views that suggest a reluctance to give effect 
to these rights because the beneficiaries are usually foreign litigants.96 The judicial reluctance to 
entertain litigation involving foreign litigants and foreign causes of action that is manifest in 
statements such as these is, with respect, to be deprecated. The policy embodied in the Act is 
clearly one that vests our courts with jurisdiction to entertain claims by foreign litigants 
(peregrini) against other foreign litigants on foreign causes of action. For the courts to exhibit 
reluctance to give effect to this policy is inconsistent with the policy of the Act and amounts to a 
judicial rewriting (or even repudiation) of that policy. That was always impermissible but is even 
more so in a constitutional democracy based upon a separation of powers. Whilst we are dealing 
with pre-constitutional legislation there has been no indication in the time that has passed since 
1994 of any inclination on the part of the legislature to limit or restrict the jurisdiction conferred 
upon our courts by the associated ship arrest provisions of the Act It is well to heed the warning 
                                                 
95
 Shepstone & Wylie and Others v Geyser NO 1998 (3) SA 1036 (SCA) 1042B-F. 
96
 Katagum Wholesale Commodities Co. Ltd v m.v. Paz 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) 263H and 270D; m.v. Snow Delta : 
Serva Ship Limited v Discount Tonnage Limited 2000 (4) SA 746 (SCA), para. [14] p755E-F; the passages from two 
earlier decisions cited in Siemens Limited v Offshore Marine Engineering Limited 1993 (3) SA 913 (A) at 922A-B 
and 926A-C and Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Limited, supra,  586E-F citing with approval the view of 
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of Langa CJ that:- 
 
‘We must be careful as a court not to substitute our preferred policy choices for those of 
the legislature. The legislature is the democratically elected body entrusted with 
legislative powers and this court must respect the legislation it enacts, as long as the 
legislation does not offend the Constitution.’ 97 
 
 There is a further practical reason why the courts should respect the policy choices 
embodied in the Act that give foreign litigants the power to approach South African courts to 
bring about the arrest of associated ships either for the purpose of pursuing their claims in this 
country or for the more limited purpose of securing security for those claims whilst they are 
being pursued elsewhere. It is that it is by no means clear that the exercise of such an expansive 
jurisdiction is detrimental to the interests of South Africa although that is advanced as a reason 
for caution in respect of such matters. The jurisdiction has been in existence for over twenty-five 
years. During the course of time South African trade has ebbed and flowed but there is nothing to 
indicate that the existence of the associated ship jurisdiction has been detrimental to trade or has 
resulted in foreign shipowners being reluctant to allow their vessels to call at South African ports 
or traverse South African waters. The implementation of the policy has enabled South Africa to 
become a recognised centre of maritime litigation and has undoubtedly brought business to our 
shores. The same considerations are true of other centres for maritime litigation amongst which 
London has become pre-eminent as a centre for the resolution of international commercial 
disputes by way of litigation in the English courts or arbitration. There has been no reluctance on 
the part of the English courts to exercise jurisdiction in relation to matters between foreigners on 
foreign causes of action nor has there been any indication that this has been detrimental to 
English trade. On the contrary it is something that is actively promoted. Before judges in South 
Africa express reluctance to involve South African courts in such international litigation they 
should perhaps reflect that the legislature may have taken account of matters such as these in 
adopting and sustaining the policy decision to vest our court with jurisdiction to deal with such 
claims and to afford foreign litigants the particular benefits attaching to the ability to arrest 
                                                                                                                                                              
the court below. 
97
 Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) para. [174]. 
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vessels as associated ships. 
 
 It is submitted that the starting point for a consideration of the constitutional issue must be 
that the people who seek to arrest associated ships have a right to do so that is not simply a 
procedural (or interlocutory) matter but one that confers tangible substantive benefits upon them. 
The legislature has seen fit to confer these benefits and notwithstanding the enormous changes 
that have occurred in South Africa since this legislation came into operation it has given no 
indication that it intends to limit or remove such rights. Nor has there been a wave of 
international condemnation that should give a South African court pause for thought before 
permitting a foreign litigant to exercise these rights. For these reasons it is submitted that 
applicants for an associated ship arrest should not be treated as a special class of litigant whose 
presence in our courts is to be tolerated but if possible avoided. Procedural obstacles should not 
be placed in the way of such litigants that are not placed in the path of other litigants. The fact 
that they are foreign or that the defendant is owned by a foreign company or that the claim arose 
outside South Africa should be regarded as entirely irrelevant to the question whether an 
application for an arrest, or more probably an application to set aside an arrest already effected, 
should be referred for the hearing of oral evidence on a disputed issue of association. Not only is 
this accord with the policy of the Act it is also consistent with the recognition that in maritime 
matters courts are inevitably seized of issues that are international in regard to both the substance 
of the dispute and the parties thereto. The Act clearly accepts and indeed welcomes that 
international dimension. In giving effect to rights conferred by the Act Courts should do so as 
well.  
 
 Although it has been said by the Appellate Division (as it then was) that the ordinary rule in 
regard to the discretion to allow oral evidence in applications applies also in relation to disputes 
of fact in an application for the security arrest of an associated ship
98
, the court in that case also 
                                                 
98 Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Limited, supra, 587F-G. In fairness it should be borne in mind that the 
issue in regard to which the dispute of fact arose in that case was not the issue of association but the question 
whether a reasonable need for security had been established. That raised a more complicated issue in regard to the 
identification of the issues to be referred for the hearing of oral evidence than would be the case in a dispute over 
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endorsed the view that the arrest proceedings were interlocutory99 and that this, together with the 
fact that the proceedings were between foreigners and the dispute between them was unconnected 
with South Africa, were important factors in the court’s refusal to refer the application for oral 
evidence. It is respectfully submitted that in both respects the court erred.  An interlocutory order 
is one usually of a procedural nature that is ancillary to the main issues arising in a case.
100
 The 
arrest of the associated ship, whether pursuant to an action in rem or a security arrest, is not 
interlocutory in this sense. In the one instance it is the necessary point of commencement of the 
litigation but central to the fundamental issue of liability.  In the other it is the entire substantive 
claim. The refusal to grant such orders or the setting aside of an arrest after it has first been 
obtained, is final and definitive of the claim in the one instance
101
 or the substantive right to 
security in the other. As such both claims are recognised as having the quality of finality in 




 As regards the question of the litigation being between foreigners it has already been 
submitted that at a policy level this should be irrelevant. From the perspective of constitutional 
rights the effect is to treat applicants for the arrest of associated ships as falling in a different 
category from other applicants for relief from our courts. That is precisely the situation that 
Didcott J regarded as improbable in the reservations that he expressed in Van der Linde v 
Prinsloo namely the situation where ‘a class of litigants is generally saddled with or freed from 
the burden on account of their personal identities, and with no regard to the exigencies of any 
particular litigation or to the equipment for such of those persons or institutions.’ There can be no 
                                                                                                                                                              
association where the issue can be identified fairly simply.  
99 For tactical reasons relating to the submissions in regard to the extent of the onus, that is, its contention that this 
should be prima facie proof only and not on a balance of probabilities this was accepted by the appellant’s counsel, 
erroneously in my view. 
100
 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Limited v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Limited 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) 
549G-H. 
101 The claimant will still be able to pursue a claim for the amount in question against the original debtor but the 
refusal or setting aside of the arrest of the associated ship will be definitive of the claim against the associated ship 
itself. 
102 This is subject to the question of mootness that may arise if security has not been given and the vessel leaves the 
 421
doubt that overwhelmingly the applicants for the arrest of vessels as associated ships are 
foreigners, usually companies incorporated in some other jurisdiction. In adopting a special 
procedural approach to their claims that is posited on the fact that they are foreigners it is 
reasonably arguable that they are being denied the right to equal protection and benefit of the law 
conferred upon everyone, both citizens and foreigners, by section 9(1) of the Bill of Rights. This 
is consistent with the view taken by our courts that discrimination on the basis of citizenship is an 
analogous ground to those listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution and amounts to 
discrimination.103 There is of course a difference between the case of natural persons who are 
citizens and those who are not, and the case of juristic persons incorporated in South Africa and 
those that are incorporated in other jurisdictions. However, it is unnecessary for present purposes, 
to contend that the foreign corporation is being discriminated against in terms of section 9(3) of 
the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that in adopting a more stringent approach to references to 
oral evidence in the case of foreign litigants seeking to enforce statutory rights to arrest 
associated ships given to them in South Africa, the courts are treating one class of litigant 
differently from all other litigants and in so doing they are denying them the equal protection and 
benefit of the law. 
 
 It is submitted that the effect of these considerations is that the constitutional guarantee of a 
fair hearing, taken in conjunction with the guarantee to everyone of equal protection of the law, 
militates strongly against the court taking into account against an applicant for an associated ship 
arrest the fact that they are a foreigner (peregrinus), that the other party to the litigation is also a 
foreigner or that the issues in dispute are issues not having an immediate and direct connection 
with South Africa other than via the arrest of the associated ship. Taking those factors into 
account against people who have statutory rights in South Africa that are only enforceable in this 
country and before the courts of this country, denies them their constitutional right to a fair 
hearing and the equal protection of the law. 
                                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction before an appeal can be heard. 
103
Larbi-Odam and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and Another 
1998 (1) SA 745 (CC); Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v 
Minister of Society Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras. [70] and [71]. 
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 As the cases already discussed in Chapter 5 reveal, the refusal of applications to refer 
questions of association for the hearing of oral evidence has become virtually routine. The 
approach adopted by the courts is that such an order should only be granted in rare cases.  It is 
submitted that not only is the foundation for that approach unsound for the reasons already 
canvassed in Chapter 5, but that the constitutional imperatives discussed in this section likewise 
indicate that such an approach is impermissible. That is not to say that the court may not in 
appropriate cases, where there is little likelihood of oral evidence or discovery disturbing the 
balance of probabilities, refuse such an order. That is the usual rule applicable to all litigants. Nor 
does it suggest that the court should not take account of questions of convenience and 
inconvenience, particularly if an arrested vessel were to remain under arrest for a protracted 
period whilst the issue of association was under consideration. However, ordinarily the proper 
way to deal with this, if in other respects a reference to evidence is appropriate, is to make 
appropriate arrangements to dispose of the case in a way that will limit or mitigate any such 
prejudice, not to refuse a reference to evidence. It is submitted that there is no foundation in fact 
or policy for the courts to treat requests for the hearing of oral evidence by foreign claimants 
seeking the arrest of an associated ship any differently from the way in which they would treat 
any other application for a reference to oral evidence in a case where there is a dispute of fact on 
the papers. To do so is, it is submitted, to infringe the constitutional rights enjoyed by all 




 In general the institution of the associated ship raises relatively few constitutional 
issues. However the discussion above reveals that there are some constitutional issues that need 
to be borne in mind in any application for the arrest of a vessel as an associated ship. It can be 
anticipated that these issues will come to the fore in future as the realisation dawns that the 
Constitution is as relevant to this aspect of our law as it has already proved to be in the more 










 It has not usually been necessary to distinguish in the discussion thus far between the 
situation where the associated ship arrest has been effected for the purpose of commencing an 
action in rem and where it is arrested in terms of section 5(3) of the Act for the purpose of 
providing security. Thus references to the arrest of an associated ship have generally 
encompassed both situations.  However, it is necessary to note is that it is strictly incorrect to 
speak of an associated ship arrest as a single general concept. The reason is that associated ships 
as defined can be arrested for two clearly distinct purposes. In practice they are most frequently 
subject to arrest or the threat of arrest for the purpose of obtaining security for a claim in respect 
of another vehicle that is being or is to be pursued in a court in another jurisdiction or before an 
arbitration tribunal, almost invariably foreign. This is the right afforded a claimant in terms of 
section 5(3) of the Act. The other instance of an associated ship arrest is where the claimant 
intends to pursue proceedings in South Africa to recover its claim by way of an action in rem 
against the associated ship. The two proceedings are fundamentally distinct
1
 and have different 
consequences. They must therefore be considered separately. 
 
2. ASSOCIATED SHIPS AND SECURITY ARRESTS: 
 
 A security arrest in terms of section 5(3) of the Act is an independent right conferred on 
                                                 
1 Unlike the provisions of sections 19 and 29 of the Australian Admiralty Act 1988 where security can be obtained 
by the expedient of commencing an action in rem against the ship concerned or a surrogate ship - a concept 
essentially similar to the sister ship of the Arrest Convention - and then seeking a stay of the proceedings on 
condition that the ship or other property is retained as security for the award in the arbitration or judgment in the 
litigation, as the case may be. Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping (Pty) Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, 
para. 59. The approach that has been given statutory recognition in Australia appears to be similar to that developed 
in England as described by Brandon J in The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All ER 641 (PDA) at 645 but not available in 
respect of arbitrations until the passing of s 26 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. 
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claimants by the Act in the following terms:- 
 
‘A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction order the arrest of any property 
for the purpose of providing security for a claim which is or may be the subject of an 
arbitration or any proceedings contemplated, pending or proceeding, either in the 
Republic or elsewhere, and whether or not it is subject to the law of the Republic, if the 
person seeking the arrest has a claim enforceable by an action in personam against the 
owner of the property concerned or an action in rem against such property or which 
would be so enforceable but for any such arbitration or proceedings.’ 
 
The section provides that security may be obtained for arbitration proceedings either in 
South Africa or elsewhere. It also contemplates that security may be obtained for court 
proceedings either in South Africa or elsewhere but that is in general terms an anomaly.  Any 
such proceedings would be proceedings in respect of a maritime claim and such claims are only 
cognisable by the court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction.2 That is subject to a qualification – 
itself something of an anomaly - because when a question arises whether a claim is a maritime 
claim a court is obliged to decide that issue summarily and its decision is then final and binding. 
If it erroneously holds that a claim is not a maritime claim then provided it has jurisdiction on 
conventional grounds it is required to hear and determine the dispute.3 Apart from this unusual 
situation, however, a maritime claim is litigated before a court exercising admiralty jurisdiction 
and those proceedings will be pursued, either in personam after an attachment to found and 
confirm jurisdiction or in rem after an arrest or deemed arrest. In those circumstances the scope 
for a security arrest in relation to proceedings in South Africa is extremely narrow and I have 
never encountered one. 
 
The requirements to obtain such an arrest are a prima facie claim, that is a maritime claim 
in terms of the Act that is enforceable by an action in personam against the owner of the property 
concerned or by an action in rem against such property being other the ship concerned or an 
                                                 
2 Section 7(2)(a) of the Act. 
3 The Wave Dancer: Nel v Toron Screen Corporation (Pty) Ltd and another 1996 (4) SA 1167 (A) at 1176F-1177A. 
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associated ship and a genuine and reasonable need for security in respect of the claim.
4
 The 
requirements for establishing that a vessel is an associated ship are the same as those applicable 
where the arrest is sought for the purpose of commencing an action in rem. But there the 
resemblance ends.  The reason is that the security arrest serves an end in itself as opposed to 
being the starting point of a continuing proceeding before the South African courts. Once the 
arrest has been obtained and maintained against any challenge the proceedings under section 5(3) 
are complete. The claimant has obtained the security it sought and can then proceed with the 
contemplated litigation or arbitration with the advantage of being secured in respect of the 
outcome of those proceedings. 
 
 The section contemplates that the ship arrested will itself serve as security for the claim. In 
practice that is not ordinarily the case as it is usual for the owner of the arrested ship to provide 
security for the claim in the form of a P&I Club letter of undertaking or a bank guarantee. This 
enables the ship to sail and indeed probably releases it from any question of liability in that the 
security will ordinarily be furnished at the instance of the owner of the ship concerned and relate 
specifically to the liability of that owner and that vessel rather than to any liability attaching 
under the Act to the associated ship or its owner. 
 
 Once security has been furnished and the vessel sails that is normally in practice an end to 
the matter although it has been held that the South African court retains jurisdiction, at least in 
matters relating to the security on the basis that there is a continuing deemed arrest of the 
arrested vessel in terms of section 3(10)(a)(i) of the Act.5 The exercise of that jurisdiction may 
however not be readily capable of enforcement as the facts of that case demonstrate. The vessel 
had been arrested as an associated ship as security for claims arising out of the purchase of two 
                                                 
4
 Cargo laden and lately laden on board the m.v. Thalassini Avgi v m.v. Dimitris 1989 (3) SA 820 (A).  As to the 
requirement of a genuine and reasonable need for security see Bocimar NV v Kotor Overseas Shipping Limited 1994 
(2) SA 563 (A); United Enterprises Corp v STX Pan Ocean Co. Ltd [2008] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) and m.v. Orient 
Stride: Asiatic Shipping Services Inc. v Elgina Marine Co Ltd 2009 (1) SA 246 (SCA). 
5
 M.V. Alam Tenggiri: Golden Seabird Maritime Inc and Another v Alam Tenggiri SDN  BHD and Another 2001 (4) 
SA 1329 (SCA). 
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other vessels. It had been released against the provision of P&I Club letters of undertaking but in 
the contemplation that these would be replaced by other guarantees. This in fact happened after 
the vessel had sailed and the original guarantees were replaced by guarantees issued by a bank in 
Nova Scotia but provided that they would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the High 
Court in London. There was accordingly nothing left in South Africa against which the South 
African court could exercise jurisdiction and the guarantees that now stood as security for the 
claims in respect of the other two vessels were explicitly subject only to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign court. Nonetheless the South African court held that it continued to have jurisdiction by 
virtue of a continuing deemed arrest of the m.v. Alam Tenggiri and this entitled it to deal with the 
validity of the original arrest.
6
 All one can say in regard to this situation is that the jurisdiction 
retained by the South African courts as a result of the deemed arrest is somewhat vestigial. The 
position will of course be different if the guarantees are enforceable in South Africa,
7
 but for 
practical reasons that will sometimes not be the case as the arresting party may prefer to obtain 
and the other party will prefer to furnish a guarantee enforceable in the jurisdiction where any 
ultimate judgment or arbitration award will be enforced. In some instances therefore once 
security is put up for the release of an associated ship the matter will lose its connection with this 
country entirely. 
 
 Where no security is put up for the release of the arrested vessel it will either be held under 
arrest pending the outcome of the proceedings in respect of which it was arrested or, more 
probably in the light of the costs consequent upon such an exercise, sold and the proceeds 
constituted as a fund in court in terms of section 9 of the Act. This is likely to render its value as 
security problematic because the ordinary reason for security not being furnished is financial 
                                                 
6I am not aware of what happened thereafter and whether the Nova Scotian guarantees were surrendered in 
consequence of the setting aside of the South African arrest. Quite what the South African court could have done 
had the claimant refused to release the guarantees is unclear. Presumably relief could only have been obtained by 
approaching a court in England and asking it to recognise the order setting aside the arrest. 
7 Anecdotal evidence gathered from attorneys having significant maritime practices is that in most instances security 
is given by way of P & I Club letters of undertaking or guarantees issued by South African banks that in turn have 
obtained back to back guarantees from a foreign bank.  
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inability to provide or obtain such security.
8
  If that is indeed so and the owner of the arrested 
vessel is unable to provide or obtain security to secure its release the probability is that the owner 
will be in precarious financial circumstances and that other creditors will come to the fore 
seeking to protect their own interests. Thus the sale of the vessel and the creation of a fund in 
court ordinarily prompts creditors having direct claims against the arrested vessel to arrest either 
the vessel itself or the fund
9
 and thereafter seek an order for the distribution of the fund in terms 
of section 10 of the Act by the usual means of obtaining the appointment of a referee to advertise 
for and receive claims and to report to the court on the proper distribution of the fund.  In any 
such distribution claims against the fund on the basis that the arrested vessel was an associated 
ship will rank last.
10
 It is improbable in a situation where the owner of the arrested vessel is 
unable to provide security for the claim in respect of which it has been arrested but the sale of the 
vessel under section 9 will generate a fund sufficiently large to satisfy all direct claimants as well 
as the claim of the arresting creditor. 
 
 All of these consequences of the arrest of a vessel for security under section 5(3) are 
applicable whether the vessel is the ship in respect of which the claim arose or an associated 
ship. In other words in the case of a security arrest there is no ground for differentiating between 
the ship concerned and an associated ship insofar as the consequences of the arrest are 
concerned. The effect is the same and the consequences that follow, other than practical ones 
where the ship is sold, will also be the same. 
  
 It will I think be apparent from the fact that the security arrest is a special institution under 
the South African Act that it is inappropriate to speak of a security arrest, whether of the ship 
concerned or of an associated ship, as a proceeding in rem or as a proceeding in personam, at 
                                                 
8 I know of one case where the mv ‘Lady East’ was arrested as security and thereafter sold where the arresting 
creditor had its expenses paid and received full security from the price, which was very high in the light of market 
conditions at the time. However this appears to have been an isolated instance and where the security arrest is of an 
associated ship it is likely that it will prove to be a brutum fulmen.     
9In terms of s 3(5)(8) of the Act. 
10s11(11)(b). 
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least insofar as those expressions convey meaning in regard to different forms of action in 
admiralty proceedings in South Africa.
11
 It is correctly described as a ‘stand alone’ procedure 
unconnected, unlike similar provisions elsewhere, from any action before the South African 
court.
12
 The security arrest under section 5(3) is a procedure whereby property can be arrested 
and detained and ultimately, if no alternative security is provided, sold to satisfy a claim. In that 
sense it is more closely akin to the process of execution than it is to any form of action. It serves 
either to provide the means by which a judgment or arbitration award may ultimately be enforced 
where alternative security is provided to enable the arrested vessel to be released or where the 
vessel is sold and a fund created (although for the reasons mentioned above this may not in the 
end result to secure payment) or it will itself be available for the purpose of execution. It is in 
rem only in the sense that it is directed at a particular asset but that is hardly a reason to describe 
it in a way that can only lead to confusion. It is also wrong to say that it does not serve to bring a 
person before the court. Quite clearly as it is directed at particular property it serves to bring the 
owner of the arrested ship before the court to defend its property. The fact that the owner is not 
named cannot disguise the true position. The effect of the arrest is to compel the owner to ensure 
that security for a claim is provided either by itself or by or on behalf of the party personally 
liable in respect of that claim at the risk of losing its vessel if it fails to do so. 
 
 The effectiveness of security arrests as a means of inducing the provision of security 
through more conventional means is best illustrated by the fact that there are no reported cases 
dealing with the distribution of funds in court where the fund has arisen from the sale of a ship 
arrested as security under section 5(3) of the Act. That means that our courts have not had to 
                                                 
11  In The m.v. Zlatini Piasatzi : Frozen Food International Limited v Kudu Holdings (Pty) Limited and others 1997 
(2) SA 569 (C) 574G-H, Conradie J said that: ‘An arrest under s5(3) is a proceeding  in rem.  I believe that this 
emerges clearly from the history of the provision discussed in Katagum Wholesale Commodities Company Limited v 
The mv ‘Paz’ 1984 (3) SA 261 (N).’ With respect however it is unclear on what basis he thought that the latter case 
supported this conclusion.  The only procedure in rem recognised by the Act is an action in rem and a security arrest 
is not such an action.  When he went on to say that a security arrest ‘retains … the characteristics of an arrest in 
pursuance of an action in rem’ (at 575C-D) the judgment becomes even more inscrutable. Other than the fact that a 
ship is arrested a security arrest has none of the characteristics of the arrest to commence an action in rem as will 
become clear when those characteristics are discussed below.    
12 The expression is that of Professor Hare and was cited with approval in MV Rizcun Trader (4) MV Rizcun Trader 
v Manley Appledore Shipping Ltd 2000 (3) SA 776 (C) at 785G. 
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grapple with the question of the process by which a ship arrested as security for a claim 
becomes the means whereby a judgment or arbitration award can be satisfied.  Two routes 
suggest themselves. The first would be to cause the vessel to be sold in terms of section 9 
thereby creating a fund in court lodging the judgment or arbitration award as a claim against the 
fund.
13
 This of course raises the spectre of other claimants emerging to the detriment of the party 
that obtained the arrest. The second would be to arrest the vessel again in an action in rem on the 
judgment or award14 and having obtained a judgment on that claim to proceed to execution in the 
conventional way.    
 
 Whilst the associated ship is frequently the target of a security arrest in terms of section 
5(3) of the Act its consequences are no different from those that follow from the arrest of the 
ship concerned for the same purpose. As the security arrest is a separate and special procedure, 
neither an action in rem nor an action in personam, the problems attendant upon an associated 
ship arrest to commence an action in rem do not arise. In practice most of the problems that such 
arrests generate arise in the context of the entitlement to arrest rather than the consequences of 
the arrest itself. For that reason it is fair to say that the security arrest has been a successful legal 
innovation, whether directed at an associated ship or otherwise. It presents few difficulties in 
practice beyond the conventional problems relating to the issue of whether a particular vessel is 
an associated ship in relation to the vessel in respect of which the claim arose. Once the right to 
arrest has been established the claimant will ordinarily obtain security in as simpler and more 
conventional form that enables the disputing parties to address their dispute in their chosen 
forum in the knowledge that a successful claim will be paid. It is to that end that section 5(3) was 
enacted and it is an end it generally serves.  
 
 In summary where the associated ship is arrested for the purpose of providing security for a 
claim the nature of the proceedings is defined by that purpose and the consequence is that the 
vessel stands a security and may potentially be the means of satisfying the claim if no alternative 
                                                 
13 This was apparently the approach adopted in the ‘Lady East’ mentioned in footnote 6. 
14Both of which are themself maritime claims in terms of s1 (1) of the Act sv ‘maritime claim’, para. (aa). 
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security is provided either by its owner or by or on behalf of the person that is personally liable 
in respect of the claim giving rise to the arrest. The security is established by the fact of arrest 
and the association must exist at the time when the order of arrest is granted.  No issue relating to 
maritime liens is pertinent. If the claim in respect of which the arrest is effected is one 
underpinned by a maritime lien that lien over the ship concerned remains intact. If the arrested 
vessel is subject to a maritime lien that lien remains unaffected by the arrest unless the vessel is 
sold in which event it is discharged by the sale
15
 and falls to be pursued as a preferent claim 
against the fund arising from the sale. The juristic problems occasioned by associated ship arrests 
arise elsewhere in the context of the action in rem against an associated ship that forms the 
topic for consideration in the next chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
15 S9(3) of the Act. 
 
 CHAPTER 11 
 
THEORIES OF THE ACTION IN REM  
 Having dealt separately with the arrest of an associated ship for the purpose of obtaining 
security one can turn to the action in rem against the associated ship. Before that can be 
addressed, however, one must first look more generally at the nature of an action in rem in South 
African law and then see how that is affected by the concept of an action in rem against an 
associated ship. The stated intention of the South African Law Commission was to preserve for 
South Africa the action in rem
1
 that it had derived from England in consequence of the 
application in this country of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890. Because this was the 
intention it is suggested that the starting point for any analysis of the nature of the action in rem 
in this country should be the action in rem as it has been developed in English law. Its evolution 
was traced in Chapter 3 and what falls for consideration at this stage is the manner in which it 
has been characterised by English courts.  
 However before that is essayed there is a prior question of principle that must be 
addressed, namely whether there is scope for the view that there is a South African concept of 
the action in rem or whether the statute merely imports from England the concept of the action in 
rem, as it is known and implemented in that jurisdiction, so that our understanding is not 
domestic nor formed by the currents of South African law but is dependent upon England and 
the decisions of its courts, with perhaps some occasional input from other jurisdictions standing 
in the same historic tradition of admiralty jurisdiction. In other words do we examine the English 
law because it tells us what the nature of an action in rem in South Africa is, or do we look there 
only for historic background and guidance where appropriate on the interpretation of our Act and 
the nature of the institution in this jurisdiction?   
 
                                                 
1Para. 6.4 of the SA Law Commission report on the review of the law of admiralty recommends that the existing 
admiralty law should be the basis of reform and that this would have the advantage of retaining the benefits of the 
action in rem and the maritime lien. 
 432
1 IS THERE A SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION IN REM? 
 The question arises from those provisions of the Act that deal with the law to be applied by 
the South African court in regard to matters that come before it in the exercise of its admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
 Section 6(1) of the Act provides that: 
‘(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained a 
court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall— 
with regard to any matter in respect of which a court of admiralty of the Republic 
referred to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, of the United Kingdom, 
had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act, apply the law 
which the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction would have applied with regard to such a matter at such 
commencement, in so far as that law can be applied; 
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the 
Republic.’ 
In relation to the maritime lien, another institution of our admiralty law that has its origin 
in England, it has been said that the effect of this section is to compel a South African court to 
follow the English rules governing that particular institution.2 In the Andrico Unity the court held 
that the matter in issue was whether certain arrests under the Act were properly made or should 
be set aside, on the ground that the arresting party did not have a maritime lien over the arrested 
vessel. One would have thought that the question whether arrests made under a 1983 statute 
were properly made was a question arising under that statute but the court held that it was ‘pre-
eminently a matter over which a pre-1983 South African court would have had jurisdiction’ 
under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act because the jurisdiction of that court included a 
jurisdiction in regard to actions in rem based upon a maritime lien. According to the court: 
‘The issue relates to the right of the claimant to pursue a certain remedy, viz an action in 
rem, rather than the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit.  And even if the result of 
the Court deciding that no maritime lien exists can be regarded in effect as a denial of 
                                                 
2 Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and others Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others 1989 (4) SA 
325 (A) 334H-335D. 
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jurisdiction, a Court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’3   
With respect it is difficult to follow this reasoning. Whilst the claimants clearly had a maritime 
claim to recover the price of bunkers supplied, that claim could only be pursued and the 
jurisdiction of the South African court invoked, if it were permissible to bring either an action in 
rem or an action in personam in this country. As the bunkers had been supplied on the order of a 
demise charterer the owner of the vessel was not personally liable on the claim and it could only 
be pursued in rem if the claimant had a maritime lien over the vessel. It is accordingly not 
correct to say that the issue related to the right to pursue a particular remedy and not to the 
jurisdiction of the court. The two are inseparable. A court does not have jurisdiction merely 
because in entirely different circumstances it would be possible to pursue the claim before it 
against another party by different means. It can only have jurisdiction if both the claim and the 
named defendant are properly before it. In other words it has jurisdiction because a claim is 
pursued by a person entitled to do so against a defendant properly brought before the court by 
means of procedures that it recognises.   
As to the second part of this passage the fact that a court has jurisdiction to determine its 
own jurisdiction is neither here nor there. The issue was whether the claimant had a maritime 
lien over the vessel and therefore was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court by way of 
an action in rem. The Act says that a maritime claim can be brought in that way if the claimant 
has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested. That raises a question of the proper 
interpretation of the Act, namely, what is meant by a maritime lien in the section in question. 
Until that question is answered the court would not know whether it had any matter before it, 
much less a matter that required it to have resort to the provisions of section 6 in regard to the 
law to be applied by the court ‘in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction’.  
Whether an arrest could be granted by a South African court exercising its admiralty 
jurisdiction under the Act was clearly not a matter that a South African court sitting as a 
Colonial Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction to decide. Practical reality, if nothing else, meant 
that it could not have interpreted the jurisdiction conferred upon a South African court by a 
                                                 
3  335B-C. 
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South African statute passed 93 years after the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, (which 
defined the jurisdiction of those courts in different terms) and one that repealed that Act so far as 
it applied in South Africa. The jurisdiction of a South African court sitting in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction is defined by the Act and relates to those claims defined as maritime 
claims.
4
 The manner of exercising that jurisdiction is by way of an action in personam or an 
action in rem under the Act. If it is impermissible to arrest a vessel in an action in rem, because 
there is no maritime lien recognised by South African law over that vessel, then the court lacks 
jurisdiction in the case. The point is well made by Professor Jackson who describes the rules 
governing the bringing of an action to enforce a maritime claim as constituting the jurisdictional 
aspect of the enforcement of maritime claims.
5
 This is not to say that the court was wrong in that 
case in looking to the English law regarding maritime liens in order to determine the question 
whether the arresting parties had maritime liens in respect of their claims – indeed it was invited 
to do so by all parties - but that was for entirely different reasons.  
The concern to which this gives rise in the present context is that if the approach is 
adopted that the action in rem was a matter in respect of which a court of admiralty in South 
Africa had jurisdiction before the commencement of the Act and therefore that the court is 
obliged to apply the law of England and Wales in terms of section 6(1)(a) of the Act in regard to 
its nature and consequences there is little point in a separate South African exploration of this 
theme. We can simply read the leading English texts on admiralty and apply the English cases. 
However, in my view this approach is fundamentally flawed. The action in rem in South Africa 
is the creation of a piece of South African legislation that falls to be interpreted in the light of the 
Act itself and having regard to its history and its present context including the Constitution. A 
court can only ‘exercise admiralty jurisdiction’ in respect of ‘a matter’ under section 6(1) once it 
is properly seised of that matter by way of the procedures prescribed by the Act, of which the 
action in rem is one. The existence of the action and its proper invocation is accordingly 
necessarily anterior to the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of a matter after the commencement 
                                                 
4 s2, read with s1(1) sv ‘maritime claim’. 
5  D C Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims, (4th Ed, 2005) 1. 
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of the action. It follows that the determination of the character of the action is likewise not a 
matter falling within section 6(1)(a). Put differently a determination of the characteristics of the 
action in rem under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 was not a matter in 
respect of which a court of admiralty operating in terms of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 
1890 had jurisdiction before the commencement of the Act. The reason for that is that the Act 
and its action in rem, including the vitally important action against the associated ship, did not 
then exist and were accordingly not within that court’s jurisdiction. 
For reasons already discussed the Act charted new paths in regard to various aspects of 
admiralty law and jurisdiction, having regard to history and to developments in the maritime 
sphere since 1890. It introduced new institutions such as the associated ship and new procedures 
such as the security arrest.  t seems inconceivable that it was the intention that in determining so 
important a matter as the nature of the actions for which the Act provided South African courts 
would be bound in a straitjacket of a foreign law that did not have the same institutions or 
procedures. That is reinforced by the fact that the basis for jurisdiction in South African law has 
always been recognised to be a matter of substantive law, whereas in England and Wales it is a 
matter of procedure, its exercise being dependent on the ability to serve the party against whom 
or which the proceedings were to be brought. The action in personam under the Act is in part 
dependent upon the ability to attach property ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem in 
accordance with our common law. Maritime law has, as I have endeavoured to show in chapters 
2 and 3, civilian roots that are the same as those of our Roman Dutch common law. Against that 
background it is submitted that it is highly improbable that it was intended to confine our 
understanding of the action in rem to that of the English courts that may at any time, as The 
Indian Grace (No 2) shows, alter its own settled principles in response to new circumstances. It 
is my contention that our courts are free (as the courts of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, that were also previously Colonial Courts of Admiralty, are also 
free) to evolve our own distinctive concept of the action in rem in South African law and 
practice. The choice is between following slavishly and passively the English courts or having 
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our own ‘vibrant and evolving admiralty jurisdiction’.6. My view is that the latter is what the Act 
contemplates and South Africa needs. It is also the only approach consistent with the principle 
that the Constitution is the source of all law in South Africa. 
On that basis the approach that should be adopted is that the action in rem is a statutory 
concept within an Act that is in many respects novel and innovative. It exists alongside an action 
in personam that is largely based upon the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem of the Roman Dutch law, the roots of which are essentially the same as those of 
the action in rem. Those common roots should assist in informing our understanding of the 
action in rem in South Africa. The impact upon the institution of the Constitution and the novel 
idea of an action in rem being commenced by the arrest of an associated ship should also play a 
role in our understanding of the action. The background is however the action as it came to these 
shores from England and was for many years known here in its English garb. A convenient 
approach is therefore to consider it in that form and to assess the extent to which the same rules 
and principles govern the action in this country. Where factors peculiar to this country indicate 
that the action in its English form should be adapted to better meet our conditions those factors 
can be identified and their role described. Where there is no good reason to depart from what we 
inherited that should remain the South African approach. Accordingly it is submitted that the 
identification of a distinctive South African concept of the action in rem, and in particular the 
action in rem against an associated ship, will recognise the provenance of that action as lying in 
the English admiralty law and practice imported to this country through the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty Act, 1890. Our starting point is therefore the characterisation of the action in rem in 
English law. 
 
2 THE NATURE OF THE ACTION IN REM IN ENGLAND   
 
  The different views taken by courts in England and elsewhere, principally the United 
States, in regard to the nature of the action in rem have conveniently been described as being 
                                                 
6 SC Derrington & J M Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) 6 para. 1.17 
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underpinned by theories of procedure and personification. More pertinently the issue is 
whether the action in rem is merely a procedure for commencing action in a particular and 
peculiar form against the owner of a ship, or whether it has a substantive content that results in a 
subtle alteration of its nature and requires separate and special treatment so that it can be said 
that the action lies against the vessel alone? It is easy to say that a ship is not a person and 
accordingly is incapable of being a litigant and that the action in rem is a recognised form of 
procedure in the admiralty court and is therefore to be regarded as a matter of procedure. But 
that conceals more than it reveals about the action. Most importantly it raises the question of the 
identity of the party sued in the action. If it is not the ship, as the personification theory 
maintains, then who is the party against whom the action is brought and what are the 
consequences of that party being sued? If it is the owner then why is service dispensed with save 
on the vessel? If it is the owner how does one explain those maritime liens that do not depend for 
their existence upon any liability of the owner? If the purpose of the action is to sue the owner 
why does it suffice to issue a writ (now a claim form7) and from that stage to say that the 
claimant enjoys a statutory right to proceed against the vessel notwithstanding a change in 
ownership prior to its arrest? Why does the existence of a judgment in an action in rem not 
operate to preclude a subsequent action in personam? What happens to the action if the owner is 
sequestrated or, being a company, placed in liquidation before the action is concluded? These 
questions must be borne in mind before accepting a too facile statement that the action in rem is 
merely a form of procedure against the owner of the vessel.  
 
(a) The procedural theory  
 
From the early Nineteenth Century the English courts drew a clear distinction between an 
action in rem and an action in personam.
8
 An apparently firm foundation linking the action in 
                                                 
7 N Meeson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (3rd Ed, 2000) 125, para 4.1. 
8 The Hope 1W. Rob 154, 166 ER 531; The Volant 1W. Rob 383 388, 166 ER 618 
 438
rem to the maritime lien emerged in The Bold Buccleugh9 where, in the classic statement of the 
nature of a maritime lien, Sir John Jervis CJ said:  
 
‘A maritime lien is well defined...to mean a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried 
into effect by legal process...that process to be a proceeding in rem. … this claim or 
privilege travels with the things into whosoever’s possession it may come. It is inchoate 
from the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and, when carried into effect by legal 
process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first attached.’ 
 
He went on to say that: 
 
‘A maritime lien is the foundation of the proceeding in rem, a process to make perfect a 
right inchoate from the moment the lien attaches; and while it must be admitted that 
where such a lien exists a proceeding in rem may be had, it will be found to be equally 
true, that in all cases where a proceeding in rem is the proper cause there a maritime lien 
exists.’ 
 
As subsequent writers have pointed out, however, there are considerable historical difficulties in 
suggesting such a close link between the action in rem and the maritime lien. Not least of these, 
as Marsden wrote in the balance of a passage quoted in chapter 210, is that: 
 
‘Scarcely a trace appears of the modern doctrine of arrest being founded upon a maritime 
lien; the fact that goods and ships that had no connection with the cause of action, except 
as belonging to the defendant, were subject to arrest, points to the conclusion that arrest 
was mere procedure and that its only object was to obtain security that judgment should 
be satisfied. The form of the article upon first decree shows that the defendant was always 
cited ‘at’ - apud - the goods or ship arrested, and that if he did not give bail to satisfy 
judgment the suit proceeded against him in his absence as well as against the res.’ 
                                                 
9 Harmer v Bell: The Bold Buccleugh 7 Moo. PCC 267, 13 ER 884 (PC). 
10 Chapter 2, footnote 72, supra. An electronic search of the English Reports reveals that the expression ‘maritime 
lien’ was used for the first time in the report of a court in the United Kingdom in The Bold Buccleugh. The South 
African Law Commission Report on the Review of the Law of Admiralty erroneously says in paragraph 4.4 that: 
‘Because of the existence of the maritime lien the Admiralty Court recognised a procedure against the ship by way 
of an action in rem’. In Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) 653 E-F and in 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation Limited 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) 560. the passage from 
Halsbury, which is still contained in the 4th Ed (2001 Reissue) Vol l, para 305, ascribing the origins of the action in 
rem to the concept of the maritime lien is quoted, but it is hoped that when our courts are called upon to consider the 
nature of the action they will avoid this historical error. In an article by H Staniland, ‘‘Roman Law as the origin of 
the Maritime Lien and the Action In Rem in the South African Admiralty Court’, (1996) 2 Fundamina 285 the links 
between either of these maritime institutions and the Roman Law is examined and found to be fairly tenuous. 
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In addition proceedings for possession or restraint, neither of which have anything to do with a 
maritime lien, were proceedings in rem
11
. Whilst the concept of hypothecation of the vessel was 
not novel and indeed central to claims such as that under a bottomry bond, as appears from 
Browne’s discussion of them12, the expression ‘maritime lien’ to describe the rights attaching to 
certain forms of claims seems to have its origin in judicial usage in the judgment of Justice Story 
in The Nestor13 in 1831. Even if one accepts that this was eagerly taken up by the civilian 
lawyers of Doctors’ Commons and was cited as accepted wisdom in The Bold Buccleugh it is not 
a basis upon which it is possible at this stage of the law’s development and having regard to a 
fuller consideration of the historical material to construct our understanding of the action. Put 
bluntly to suggest that the action in rem is in some way an outgrowth of the maritime lien or that 
the two developed in tandem ignores history and this view appears increasingly to be accepted 
by writers in this field.  
 
 Since 1892 and the judgment in The Dictator14 the approach in England has been to treat 
the action in rem as procedural in origin serving the primary purpose of impleading the owner of 
the vessel by arresting the vessel for the purpose of providing security for the claim and thereby 
compelling the owner to appear in order to defend the claim. In this sense it bears a close 
resemblance to the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem of the Roman 
                                                 
11 Coote, op cit, 3 
12 Browne, op cit, 195-8. He does not use the expression ‘maritime lien’ in his work. 
13
 The Nestor 18 Fed. Cas 9 (No. 10126) (CCMe 1831); 1 Sumner 73. Justice Story referred to the Roman Law tacit 
hypothec and suggested that the privilege for necessaries may have had its roots there although he himself 
recognised that this was more a borrowing from the language rather than the institutions of the Roman Law. He 
started from the tacit hypothec that a supplier of necessaries had for so long as they remained in possession of the 
goods and pointed out that this would be a pointless remedy if the lien lapsed when the vessel sailed. He was 
particularly concerned that in the absence of such a lien it would be necessary for a master unable to pay for 
necessaries to raise money on the security of a bottomry bond, a course he regarded as unbusinesslike and unduly 
costly. He used the expression maritime lien in his judgment but may have derived it from Lord Tenterden’s work 
Abbott on Shipping (of the American edition of which he was the editor). Unfortunately no edition of that work 
predating the decision by Justice Story is available to me so I cannot verify the source. 
14 The Dictator 1892 P 304, 7 Asp MLC 251. 
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Dutch law, which as explained in chapter 2 evolved as a remedy to compel the appearance of the 
defendant, which in the maritime context meant the owner of the vessel in respect of which the 
claim arose, and that person’s submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion in The 
Dictator was based primarily upon the history of prohibition, which ultimately had the effect of 
restricting the Admiralty Court to claims based on the arrest of the vessel or the giving of a 
stipulation or bail so that the action was always taken to be one against the res, and the 
description of the old practice which Jeune J set out as follows: 
 
‘In all actions in that court, the respondent if he appeared had to find bail for the amount 
in which the action was instituted, or go to prison, and then the action proceeded against 
him in personam, and if judgment went against him he was monished to pay the amount 
ordered...or if he failed to do so his bail … the consequence of default being attachment 
… If he did not appear … his appearance could be enforced by seizure of any ship or any 
goods belonging or supposed to belong to him within the admiralty jurisdiction, the real 
owner being able to intervene and claim them. If after such seizure he appeared and gave 
bail … the ships or goods were delivered over to him and the case proceeded ut in actione 
instituta contra personam debitoris. It would seem clear that the arrest in such cases was 
not limited to any particular property of the defendant on the seas; that the object of the 
arrest was to secure appearance and bail or provide a fund for securing compliance with 
the judgment and that, whatever was the value of the property or the amount of the bail, 
the defendant would be liable to pay and liable to be attached if he did not pay the full 
amount of the sum decreed against him. No doubt the main object of arrest whether of 
person or property, was to secure that bail should be given to satisfy the judgment.’
15 
                                                 
15
 The Dictator, supra, 311. This description was taken (although if Browne is correct not entirely accurately) from 
Clerke’s Praxis Curiae Admiralitatis Angliae a work written by an admiralty proctor in the period of the Restoration 
and first published in 1667, with a second edition in 1743 and a number of editions thereafter. Whilst Clerke’s 
Praxis is the subject of the criticism quoted by both Hebert P M, ‘The origin and nature of maritime liens’ (1929-
30) 4 Tulane Law Review 381 392, fn 62 and Wiswall F L, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Practice since 1800 (1970), 160 it has always been cited by English courts and writers as being authoritative. See 
Roscoe, op cit, 2 fn (c). Holdsworth, op cit, Vol XII, 628-9 describes Clerke’s work as a very important book.  
Wiswall’s primary criticism (op cit 165-16) is that the procedure described by Clerke is not the procedure in an 
action in rem but a procedure of maritime attachment similar to the action in rem but undertaken in execution of a 
judgment. The criticism is dependent upon the action in rem being linked to the maritime lien, which in my view is 
not historically correct, and the belief that there was in addition to and separate from the action in rem an admiralty 
attachment in an action in personam, which I also believe to be mistaken. (See Chapter 2, footnote 85, supra.) It is 
hardly a legitimate criticism, to complain that Clerke does not mention an expression used for the first time by an 
American judge many years after he wrote. Browne, op cit, in chapter IX dealing with the practice of the court relies 
extensively on the 5th edition of Clerke’s Praxis, which suggests that he accepted it as an authoritative guide to the 
admiralty practice. In Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, Vol 1, (14th Ed Gould, 1896) 380, fn (c) Chancellor 
Kent says: ‘For a knowledge of the admiralty practice, I would refer the student to Clerke’s Practice of the Court of 
Admiralty in England, which is a work of undoubted credit; and in 1809 a new edition was published in this 
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Two points need to be made about this decision. The first is that it was reached in 
response to a contention that in a claim for salvage, where judgment had been entered for more 
than the amount claimed and more than the amount of the bail to secure the release of the vessel, 
the judgment was only effective up to the amount of the bail and no more. In other words it was 
a case where the owner of the vessel had intervened to defend the claim and bail had been given 
to secure the release of the vessel. Accordingly it was not a situation where the owner of the 
vessel had not participated in the litigation. The second is that as with so many other judicial 
decisions, Jeune J’s adoption of the concept that the action in rem is procedural in origin appears 
from the judgment to be motivated not least by an underlying sense of practicality. As he points 
out in the closing paragraph of the judgment: 
 
‘I should have regretted if I had been unable to accede to the present motion, because, as 
it is clear that if plaintiff’s claim is not satisfied by one kind of action, he can resort to 
another…[T]he only result of refusal would be to drive the plaintiffs to bring another 
action. But for the reasons I have given I think the present application may be granted in 
order to enable the plaintiffs to issue execution in the present action for the full amount of 
the decree which they have obtained.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
country.  I would also refer to the 2d volume of Brown’s (sic) Civil and Admiralty Law …’ Similarly the editors of 
Fleetwood and Hale, op cit, cxxxii-cxxxiii, say: 
‘The other source is the description of the steps in an Admiralty suit set out in Francis Clerke’s Praxis. There seems 
no reason to doubt that an Elizabethan proctor in Admiralty knew what he was writing about, yet his description has 
baffled many readers. He starts with the process of personal arrest to procure appearance which is elaborately 
described, but it is not until we reach Title 24(28) of the Praxis that he turns to process in rem, writing that if the 
defendant could not be arrested, as being out of the kingdom or having absconded, then a warrant could be had to 
arrest goods or such ship belonging to the defendant debtor in whose hands soever they were, and upon that 
attachment the defendant was to be cited. That the in rem procedure seems accorded such a secondary and 
subsidiary role has surprised many, and it has been explained not as the ‘action in rem’ but as an Admiralty 
attachment to advance an action which is properly in personam. But such an explanation leaves Clerke’s description 
as lacking an originating process in rem.’ [I would add that it is inconsistent with Browne who specifically relies on 
Clerke in describing the action in rem.]  The editors then continue: 
‘The simplest and (it is submitted) more satisfactory, solution of this puzzle is to recall that in Admiralty there were 
no forms of action and no categories of procedures; there was a single ordo or form of action, though that form 
contained variants. It is clear from the warrants that Elizabethan plaintiffs in Admiralty might start with arrest of 
ship and goods; they not infrequently took out warrants in the same suit against both person and property. What 
Clerke describes is not an intermediate attachment where the defendant has absented himself nor an initial process 
available only where the plaintiff is absent despite his unfortunate language suggesting that arrest of the res was 
available only against absentees. Probably he intended only to indicate its obvious value and indeed necessity when 
the defendant was absent. The warrants make it perfectly plain the ship and goods could be arrested irrespective of 
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This passage illustrates the basic reality known to all practising lawyers that by and large courts 
prefer practical solutions to problems to fidelity to an abstract jurisprudential principle
16
. 
Provided the practical result can be achieved by an acceptable process of judicial reasoning a 
court is most likely to follow that route. Thus in The Dictator Jeune J could see no reason to 
compel the plaintiffs, who had obtained a judgment for £7500 on a claim for salvage, to institute 
a separate action to recover £2 500 of this amount, merely because when the ship was initially 
arrested it was released against the furnishing of bail in an amount of £5000.  
 
 The judgment in The Dictator was subjected to virtually immediate criticism by text 
book writers such as the editors of Williams and Bruce
17
, who wrote in 1902 that: 
 
‘In former editions of this work a clear distinction was drawn between actions in rem and 
actions in personam, and it was stated that the remedy afforded by proceedings in rem 
cannot extend beyond the property proceeded against. That view was in accordance with 
the practice of the Court of Admiralty, and the generally expressed opinion of those 
familiar with admiralty procedure. But some recent decisions which appear to impeach 
that view render it necessary that the law affecting admiralty proceedings in rem should 
be carefully reconsidered.’ 
 
However, the English courts have repeatedly endorsed its central premise, that the action in rem 
is procedural in nature.18 Nonetheless in regard to some aspects there were lingering traces of the 
notion of personification such as the principle that unless the owner entered appearance the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the availability of the defendant personally. It was an alternative form of procedure, not a separate form of action.’    
16 This is consistent with modern approaches to law. As Robert Fisher QC notes in his article ‘The Purpose of 
Admiralty Law’ (2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 14: ‘The modern trend is to place less emphasis upon formalism and 
more upon an articulation of the purposes for which a law exists.’ 
17Williams and Bruce op. cit 18. Mayers E C, Admiralty Law and Practice in Canada (1916) 11-24. Similar 
criticism, from an American perspective, is to be found in Hebert op. cit and Wiswall op. cit. It will be apparent that 
I regard much of this criticism as misconceived and dependent on a process of reasoning that starts with an 
assumption of a link between the action in rem and the maritime lien which history does not warrant. It also 
erroneously seeks to separate the action commenced by way of the arrest of the vessel from the action commenced 
by the arrest of other property. An examination of the historical record gives no indication that the two were 
separate actions 
18
 The Gemma [1892] P 285, 8 Asp MLC 585 (CA); The Dupleix [1912] P 8, 12 Asp MLC 122; The Tervaete 1922 
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action proceeded against the ship alone. Most recently, however, in the case commonly 
known as The Indian Grace (No. 2),19 the procedural view of the action reached its apotheosis 
when Lord Steyn said: 
 
‘The procedural theory stripped away the form and revealed that in substance the owners 




‘The role of fictions in the development of the law has been likened to the use of 
scaffolding in the construction of a building. The scaffolding is necessary but after the 
building has been erected scaffolding serves only to obscure the building. Fortunately the 
scaffolding can usually be removed with ease… The idea that a ship can be a defendant in 
legal proceedings was always a fiction. 
But before the Judicature Acts this fiction helped to defend and enlarge admiralty 
jurisdiction in the form of an action in rem. With the passing of the Judicature Acts that 
purpose was effectively spent. That made possible the procedural changes which I have 
described. The fiction was discarded. 
It is now possible to say that for the purposes of s34 [section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act, 1982] an action in rem is an action against the defendants from the 
moment that the Admiralty Court is seized with jurisdiction.’(My insertion) 
 
A brief consideration of the issue in The Indian Grace (No 2) and the reasoning of Lord 
Steyn, with whom the other members of the House agreed, is appropriate. The case concerned a 
shipment of munitions to India. There was a fire during the voyage and a small part of the cargo 
was jettisoned. On arrival and discharge at Cochin a claim was pursued for the loss occasioned 
by the short delivery of the jettisoned cargo and judgment was obtained in favour of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
P 259 270, 16 Asp MLC 48 (CA) 55.   
19 Republic of India v India Steamship Company Limited (Indian Grace)(No. 2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL). 
Confusingly in the All England Reports it is reported as The Indian Endurance (No. 2), Republic of India and 
another v India Steamship Company Limited (1997) 4 All ER 380 (HL). This is consistent with some earlier 
statements of the position.  Thus in Morgan v Castlegate Steamship Company: The Castlegate 1893 AC 38; 7 Asp 
MLC 284 (HL) 288 Lord Watson said: ‘...every proceeding in rem is in substance a proceeding against the owner of 
the vessel’. In The Tervaete, supra, Scrutton LJ remarked that:  ‘In my view it is now established that the procedure 
in rem ... is the means of bringing the owner of the ship to meet his personal liability by seizing his property.’ In 
saying this he was reiterating a view that he had put forward unsuccessfully as counsel in The Burns [1907] P 137, 
10 Asp MLC 424, a case that will require reconsideration in the light of The Indian Grace (No 2). See to like effect 
The Deichland [1989] 2 All ER 1066 (CA). 
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claimant. Thereafter an action in rem was brought in England claiming that all of the munitions 
delivered in Cochin had been damaged by the fire and rendered useless. The question considered 
by the court was whether this claim could be pursued in the light of section 34 of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982 that prohibited a further action where a judgment had 
already been given in favour of the claimant on the same cause of action in proceedings between 
the same parties or their privies before a foreign court.   
 
Lord Steyn held that the action in rem was between the same parties and therefore that the 
claim was barred.
20
. Fundamentally the reasoning of the court was that whatever its outward 
form an action in rem is from inception an action against the owner of the vessel. In reaching 
that conclusion reliance was placed on the form of the writ and in particular on the sovereign 
immunity cases of The Cristina
21
 and The Parlement Belge
22
 in both of which it was held that 
bringing an action in rem against a vessel owned by a foreign sovereign impleaded that foreign 
sovereign and infringed their sovereign immunity. There has been some attempt by critics of the 
decision to explain this on the basis that the members of the House in The Cristina used the word 
‘impleaded’ in a special sense as meaning only that the sovereign state is by the writ called upon 
to sacrifice either its ship or its independence
23
 but this is impossible to reconcile with the clear 
statement by Lord Atkin at the beginning of his speech that a foreign sovereign is impleaded 
when it is ‘made against his will a party to legal proceedings, whether the proceedings involve 
process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property and damages.’ 
(Emphasis added.) None of the other Law Lords expressed any reservations about the 
                                                 
20 The same question had been raised in The Bold Buccleugh and the Privy Council held that the action in rem in 
England in that case, based on a maritime lien and pursued after a change in ownership of the vessel, was a different 
action from the earlier action against the original owner of the vessel that had been pursued in Scotland. The case 
can only be distinguished on the ground that a maritime lien was in issue. It seems from a reading of the judgment, 
which is extremely terse on this aspect, that the Privy Council simply accepted that the claim in rem is against the 
ship itself because of its foundation in the maritime lien and that this serves to distinguish it from a claim in 
personam against the owner. It is only possible to reconcile this reasoning with the notion that proceedings in rem 
are from inception proceedings against the owner of the vessel on the basis that because the claim was based upon a 
maritime lien the new owner of the vessel had acquired it subject to the charge created by the lien and was therefore 
liable on the claim even though there was no personal liability. 
21 Cia Naviera Vascongada v Cristina, The Cristina [1938] 1 All ER 719 (HL); 19 Asp Mar Cas.159 (HL) 
22
 Parlement Belge, The  (1880) 5 PD 197 (CA); 4 Asp MLC 234. 
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correctness of this statement and a fair reading of the judgments suggests that they agreed 
with it. This passage seems destructive of the suggestion by Derrington and Turner24 that the 
owners may have been impleaded but ‘did not become parties to the proceedings until they 
entered an appearance’. 
 
 This approach, that the action lies against the owners from the outset as opposed to being 
against the vessel from the outset and against the owners only once they enter an appearance to 
defend, is clearly controversial, with one commentator saying that: 
 
‘Lord Steyn...said that the orthodox analysis of the action in rem put forward by 
successive Admiralty judges and others over the last century can no longer be supported. 
Whilst the House of Lords purported to follow and apply the decision of the Admiralty 
Court in The Dictator, the House in fact failed to apply that decision and ignored the 
manner in which the action in rem has been understood by the courts for over a century. 
Many procedural questions affecting the action in rem have long been settled. They may 
now be open to debate.’25 
 
On the other hand Jackson says of the decision that ‘the House of Lords took a large step in 
recognising reality in analysing the action in rem.26 It is submitted that not only is this 
undoubtedly correct but it should help to dispel the clouds of mystification with which maritime 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Nigel Teare QC ‘The admiralty action in rem and the House of Lords’ [1998] LCMLQ 33 at 39. 
24 Derrington & Turner, op cit, 27. This view had been expressed by Clarke J in the court of first instance. The 
Indian Grace (No 2) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 331 at 335. 
25 Teare, op cit. See also the comment by F. Rose ‘The nature of admiralty proceedings’, [1998] LCMLQ 27.  
West M, Arbitrations, Admiralty actions in rem and the arrest of ships in the Hong Kong SAR: in the twilight of the 
Indian Grace (No 2), [2002] LMCLQ 259. The reader will notice the similarity between these criticisms and the 
judicial ones that followed that the settled understanding of the action in rem has been disturbed and the views of 
Williams and Bruce in regard to the effect of the decision in The Dictator. The approach taken by the court in The 
Indian Grace (No 2) would appear to require a reconsideration of the correctness of the result of the decision in 
Harmer v Bell: The Bold Buccleugh, supra ; The City of Mecca (1881) 5 P 106;  4 Asp MLC 412; The Longford 
(1889) 14 PD 34 (App), 6 Asp MLC 371 and The Burns [1907] P 137, 10 Asp MLC 424. Derrington &Turner, op 
cit, 24-30, paras 2.35 –2.47 are equally critical of the judgment although they accept in para 2.48 the central premise 
that the ship cannot be a party to litigation. That leaves unanswered the question addressed by Lord Steyn, namely, 
if the ship is not the defendant party to the litigation, who is? 
26  Jackson (4th Ed), op cit 259, para 10.15. He says, quoting Teare’s article, that the step ‘was bemoaned by some’.  
Brian Davenport QC in his note  ‘End of an Old Admiralty Belief’ (1998) 114 LQR 169 welcomes the change and 
says that the fiction had outlived its usefulness although its abandonment leaves a number of questions to be 
answered. He correctly says that ‘…the fiction was always difficult to understand if not faintly absurd.’ Derrington 
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lawyers have been content to surround the action in rem. The effect of the decision will be to 
compel a clearer analysis of the substantive aspects of the action and its links to the maritime 
lien and the statutory lien (as it is commonly known) arising from the invocation of the court’s 
jurisdiction in respect of one of the claims that founds such an action without giving rise to a 
maritime lien. There is no indication in the judgment that Lord Steyn was disposed to alter or 
abolish any of the ‘substantive’ consequences of the action in rem. His purpose was the simpler 
one of dispelling the notion that the action lies against anyone other than the owner of the vessel 
at the time of its arrest. Like Jeune J’s decision in The Dictator, a strong practical spirit infuses 
the views of Lord Steyn concerning the nature of the action in rem. Rather than bemoan the 
decision it may be better to accept that the time has come to put an end to the fictions 
surrounding the action in rem and to accept the reality that if one arrests a vessel and makes it 
both the means of security for a claim and the means of satisfying that claim then one is in 
reality advancing a claim for which the owner of that vessel is being made liable. That approach 
will, as the discussion below indicates, require that hallowed aspects of the action in rem be 
revisited and their conceptual foundation re-examined, but if that leads to a clearer and more 
realistic concept of the action in rem the exercise will be valuable.  
 
One of the questions to which it will be necessary to return is whether the action in rem 
constituted and recognised under the South African Act has the characteristics laid down in cases 
prior to The Dictator, as contended by writers such as Hofmeyr, who refers to it as restoring the 
logic of the early English admiralty law in relation to the nature of the action in rem and 
proceeds to describe it in the terms of personification,
27
 or those characteristics recognised in 
The Dictator and those cases that followed it, or whether the view of the action taken in the 
Indian Grace (No 2) is applicable in this country. For the present we can accept that the above 
reflects the current view of English courts on the general nature of the action in rem although its 
implications have not been the subject of further judicial consideration in England and it has 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Turner, op cit, para 2.47, fn 125 cite the article but are strongly critical of the reasoning that led Lord Steyn to his 
conclusion. 
27 Hofmeyr G, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in South Africa (2006) 51-53.   
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.   
 
Although further debate may alter this view, at present it appears that once the history is 
explored these statements of the basis of the action in rem in England have never departed from 
its original civilian foundation and when the status of the court was reaffirmed and its 
jurisdiction extended and secured both the forms and the rules reverted largely to their ancient 
origins and the ancient understanding of the proceedings in admiralty as being against a 
particular person, fortified by the arrest of that person’s property. When Jeune J came to 
consider this in The Dictator he endorsed the understanding of the action in rem as a procedure 
whereby the owner of the vessel was brought before the court to answer a claim for which the 
owner was liable. That approach has in turn been viewed through a modern prism in The Indian 
Grace (No 2) and taken to a new but apparently logical conclusion. It is the implications of that 
approach for the substantive law consequences attributed to the action that have in the past led to 
debate concerning the nature of the action in rem and its relationship to the maritime lien and the 
decision in The Indian Grace (No 2) has revived that debate. 
 
(b) The substantive aspects of the action in rem 
 
 Both Thomas31 and Jackson 32argued before the decision in The Indian Grace that the 
action in rem has substantive elements. As such Thomas said it is ‘patently distinct’
33
 from the 
action in personam although Jackson’s views were more pragmatic than dogmatic, drawing 
attention to flaws in the approach of both dominant theories of the action. Closer inspection 
                                                 
28 The ‘Irina Zharkikh and Ksenia Zharkikh’ [2001] 2 NZLR 801; [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319. 
29 Kuo Fen Ching and Another v Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR 721; [1999] 
SGCA 95 
30 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping (Pty) Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192. 
31 D R Thomas, Maritime Liens (1980) 38-41. 
32 Jackson D C, The Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 2nd Ed. (1996) 381-5. He now appears to favour the approach 
in The Indian Grace as a step towards a more logical approach to the action in rem. 
33 Thomas, op cit, 39. The cases of The Longford and The Burns on which he relies in asserting this difference will, 
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suggests that in many if not most instances the distinction between the two forms of action is not 
clear-cut or even readily apparent and where the vessel is either not arrested or released from 
arrest against the provision of security it is virtually non-existent. In practical terms, save for any 
benefit flowing from the advantage of timing, there is little outward difference between a 
judgment in personam followed by the sale in execution of the vessel and a proceeding in rem 
where the vessel is arrested at the outset and is available to be sold either immediately or once 
judgment has been obtained. Participation by the owners in the litigation does not alter the 
consequences for the owner of a judgment and the sale of the vessel. In either an action in rem or 
an action in personam if the owner of the vessel is unable to mount a successful defence to the 
claim or to satisfy the judgment once given the ship will be sold and the judgment executed 
against it subject always to the existence of other claims and questions of priority.   
 
The principal advantage of proceeding in rem as opposed to proceeding in personam is 
that one’s claim becomes secured in advance of the litigation
34
 and that the security once 
established protects the claimant against subsequent changes in ownership. That is an advantage 
that will influence the choice of procedure but is not itself a matter of substantive law attaching 
to the procedure itself as opposed to a procedural advantage that has been recognised in both 
England and South Africa.35 Far be it for me to discount that advantage (which may prove 
ephemeral if other prior claims come forward before judgment or distribution of the proceeds of 
the sale of the vessel) but it does not mean that an action in rem is not procedural in nature. It is 
erroneous to identify the security with the procedure adopted to obtain that security. Nor, with 
respect to those who suggest otherwise, is it correct to say that the procedure becomes 
                                                                                                                                                             
as pointed out earlier, have to be reconsidered in the light of The Indian Grace (No 2).  
34 An advantage recognised by Coote, op cit, 131-2 when he says that: ‘… no prudent person will hesitate to 
proceed in rem if the res be within the jurisdiction of the Court, so a personal proceeding is never adopted unless the 
res be inaccessible to arrest.’ 
35 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd; The Spiliada [1986] 3 All ER 843 (HL) 854-856; [1987] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 1.; Mt Tigr:Bouygues Offshore SA and Another v Owners of the MT Tigr and Another 1998 (4) SA 740 
(C) 744. 
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substantive because the action is the only means available to enforce a maritime lien
36
, or 
because once it is instituted in respect of a statutory claim in rem the claimant has a secured 
claim, or because it is only the vessel itself that can be arrested in an action on a maritime lien or 
a claim in respect of ownership, possession or mortgage. That ignores the reasons why those 
effects flow from its invocation for those purposes. Noting that the distinction between what is 
procedural and what is substantive is notoriously slippery,
37
 it is of more assistance to identify 
the aspects attendant upon the institution of an action in rem that are said to involve matters of 
substance and to try and place them in an appropriate juridical context in the light of the 
provisions of the Act. In this way it may be possible to identify whether and, if so, where the 
procedural theory of the action creates difficulties or overthrows accepted rules or whether these 
can now be viewed in a new and clearer light. 
 
It is one thing to say that in order for a claim to enjoy certain consequences that claim must 
be pursued by a specific procedure and an entirely different thing to say that the procedure is 
itself a matter of substantive law. In South Africa law an application to perfect a pledge or a 
notarial bond or a cession of book debts in securitatem debiti is undoubtedly a proceeding in 
personam (in the sense used in Admiralty in England in that it is one pursued against a named 
party) but it is directed at establishing a security interest in specific things and results in the 
attachment of substantive law rights to the claim. It seems erroneous and unnecessary to detach 
the substantive consequences from their underlying source in contract and the consequent claim 
and attach them to the procedure by which the creditor pursues the claim. The substantive 
consequences arise from the contract and attach to the claim and benefit the claimant. They are 
not part of the procedure although that procedure may have to be followed in order to secure the 
                                                 
36 Which is not the case in South Africa where a maritime lien can be enforced by in personam proceedings where 
the owner of the vessel is personally liable on the claim giving rise to the lien. 
37 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) 710G-H quoting the judgment of the 
Board in Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara [1982] 3 All ER 833 (PC) 836. Mokgoro J described it as an illusory 
distinction in Veldman v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2007 (3) SA 210 (CC) 
paras 34 and 49. Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and others Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and 
others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A) 348H-349E. 
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benefits in question.38 Similarly the statutory classification of a claim as a maritime claim clears 
the way for the claimant to pursue the claim by way of an action in rem with the advantage of a 
statutory lien but it is wrong and unnecessary to ascribe the advantage afforded a claimant by the 
lien to the form of proceedings rather than to the statute from which it is derived. If a clear 
distinction is maintained between the underlying claim and the advantages attaching to a claim 
of that type from whatever source they may arise, and the procedure that must be used in order 
to secure those advantages, this may enable us to undertake an analysis that is no longer 
dependent on outdated and artificial concepts such as the personification of the vessel and to 
give effect to practicalities, without sacrificing the advantages that have always flowed from the 
action in rem. 
  
The adoption of a similar approach in the light of The Indian Grace (No 2) leads Professor 
Jackson to say the following:- 
 
‘17.40 Focus on the action in rem rather than the lien has led to confusion in English law 
between provisional measure (arrest), jurisdiction to consider a claim (through the action 
in rem), the interest being enforced (lien) and enforcement (judicial sale).  Part of the 
confusion is the linking of jurisdiction to the type of action rather than the type of claim. 
Just as in truth the action in rem is the method of enforcement of the maritime lien 
attached to specific claims, so it should be recognised as having an identical function for 
claims attracting a statutory lien in Admiralty. The focus would then be on the 
characteristics of the claim assessed as being one to which a security interest is attached.  
Priorities could then be allocated according to the claims.    
17.41 A considerable step towards recognition of the nature and role of the action in rem 
was taken by the House of Lords in 1997 in The Indian Grace (No. 2) that the time had 
come to discard the fiction that an action in rem was not against the owners of a ship but 
against the ship. But a perceived possible problem in the enforcement of some maritime 
liens against the ship without liability of the owner in personam or despite a sale was 
simply set aside as not relevant to the case.   
17.42 With respect it surely was as relevant to the principle on which reliance was placed 
                                                 
38 Scott LJ in The Tolten, supra, says: ‘The positive principle of the automatic attachment to the ship of the 
creditor’s lien upon it is … indubitably a rule of substantive law in Admiralty.’ The lien is that of the creditor but it 
requires to be enforced by a particular procedure. Even that is debatable in South Africa where the order of priorities 
is statutory and where, even if a person enjoying a maritime lien had initially proceeded in personam, they would be 
entitled to claim a preference on distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel on the basis of the existence of 
their maritime lien. 
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as explicable. Once the claim and not its method of enforcement takes centre stage there is no 
problem - simply differing characteristics of different claims. A liability in respect of a 
proprietary interest simply because of that interest is hardly novel. While it was not 
relevant to the precise circumstances of the claim in the case it surely is desirable for a 
court fundamentally analysing a fundamental concept to indicate how apparent 
inconsistencies with that concept are to be approached.  It is unfortunate that not only did 
the House put maritime liens on one side, but also took no account of the enforceability of 
a statutory lien in Admiralty despite the sale of a ship.  In that context it may be that an 
action in rem (other than a maritime lien) may result in ‘liability’ despite there being no 
liability in personam.  So the next step is to give the action in rem and the lien their 
appropriate roles.’ 
 
 It is interesting for the lawyer operating in a civilian system, where such a distinction 
between the rights attaching to a particular type of claim and the procedures by which they are 
enforced is by no means unknown, to compare Jackson’s exposition of the effect of the decision 
in The Indian Grace (No 2) with the original statement of the nature of a maritime lien in The 
Bold Buccleugh. In both critical passages from the judgment of Sir John Jervis CJ quoted above 
a clear distinction is maintained between the maritime lien as a right of security attaching to 
particular property and the procedure whereby that right is given effect. There is no reason why 
the same analysis should not be undertaken in relation to the right of security accruing from the 
institution of an action in rem in respect of a maritime claim that does not carry with it a 
maritime lien. Had that analysis been maintained perhaps much of the confusion regarding these 
concepts (and much of the mystique) would have been dispelled a long time ago.   
 
The analysis by Jackson seems undoubtedly correct in the light of the decision in The 
Indian Grace (No2) and it is indeed unfortunate that the court did not go a little further to spell 
out the consequences of its views in relation to matters such as the maritime lien rather than 
putting that on one side as a special case. If the action in rem is separated from the claims in 
respect of which such an action lies and any special rights attaching to those claims, whether by 
way of a maritime lien or otherwise, many of the criticisms addressed to the characterisation of 
the action in rem as being procedural fall away. If the maritime lien and the action in rem are 
taken to be distinct then there is no reason why the lien should not be indelible and travel with 
the vessel irrespective of any change in ownership. That, as Tetley points out, is merely a 
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characteristic of such a privilege or lien. Nor does it necessarily follow, as has been suggested,39  
that if the action in rem is purely procedural the plaintiff should be allowed to institute such an 
action by arresting other property of the owner within the jurisdiction. That approach 
presupposes that every procedure available for the purposes of litigation of one type should 
automatically be available in other cases but this involves a relentless logic in civil procedure 
that is rarely present. One can equally argue that because in admiralty one can commence 
proceedings by arresting a vessel one should, in any case where there is a foreign defendant, be 
able to arrest any property of the defendant in order to commence the action. That was the 
original position in English admiralty proceedings and is the position in Roman Dutch law in 
terms of the attachment ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem. It was also the position 
in Continental jurisdictions in maritime matters prior to the Arrest Convention. However in 1855 
Dr. Lushington noted that the procedure of arrest of the person of the debtor had become 
obsolete (he could not recall an instance later than 1780).40 After the arrest of person or goods 
other than the vessel had fallen into desuetude and not been used for over 150 years it would 
have taken more than logic in the area of civil procedure to persuade the Court of Appeal in The 
Beldis
41 to revive them. The Court’s view of the practicalities of the situation appears to have 
influenced the judgment as indicated by the statement of Sir Boyd Merriman P that he was: 
 
‘... not prepared to ‘reopen the floodgates of Admiralty jurisdiction’ upon the public, 
especially when that public is an international public, and I can see that the innovation 
would be disastrous to the prestige of the court.’ 
  
The difficulties with the characterisation of the action in rem as a form of procedure arose 
in the first instance from statements that tied the action in rem to the substantive rights attaching 
to a claim that was said to give rise to a maritime lien. In those countries, such as the United 
State of America, where this linkage is held to be important the result has been that by statute the 
                                                 
39  Price G, Law of Maritime Liens (1940)14-15. 
40 The Clara (1855) Sw 1, 3, 166 ER 986. 
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status of maritime liens has been conferred upon claims which did not previously enjoy that 
status and do not universally enjoy that status. By contrast in England where the procedural 
theory has been adopted there is a history
42
 of making the action in rem available for the purpose 
of pursuing claims which do not enjoy the attributes of a maritime lien.43 The primary 
consequence of these different approaches has been that courts have had to struggle with a 
consideration of the proper characterisation for the purposes of their domestic law of privileges 
or maritime liens afforded by the law of a foreign country.44 The potential dilemmas occasioned 
by the action in rem falling into one of four different categories
45
 do not appear to have 
occasioned any particular problems in practice. This is largely because in cases where security is 
furnished and judgment is obtained the claims are paid and secondly because there is no 
endeavour in such proceedings to attribute immutable substantive law consequences to the 
action. Rather, as Professor Jackson points out the action in rem has been viewed with 
‘subjective pragmatism’.
46
 That approach is likely to commend itself to a South African court 
faced with the task of identifying the nature of the action in rem, particularly when it lies against 
an associated ship, where resort to previous characterisations are unlikely to provide definite 
answers.  
                                                                                                                                                             
41
 The Beldis [1936] P 1, 51. 
42 Commencing with the Admiralty Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. c. 65) and the Admiralty Act, 1861(24 Vict. c. 10) that 
extended the admiralty jurisdiction to additional claims without conferring a maritime lien.  This is equally true of 
the position in South Africa. 
43 The Heinrich Björn 11AC 270, 285-6; 6 Asp MLC 1 (HL). 
44 See for example The Colorado [1923] P 102, 16 Asp MLC 145; Todd Shipyards Corporation v Altema Compania 
Maritima SA and the ship ‘Ioannis Daskelalis’ [1974] 1 LL L Rep 174 (Can Ct); Bankers Trust International Ltd v 
Todd Shipyard Corporation: The Halcyon Isle [1980] 3 All ER 197 (PC). 
45 Wiswall, op. cit 195-196. Thomas, supra, para 66, 42-3 notes that in cases where security is furnished there may 
be no arrest at all and the resemblance of the action to the ‘traditional’ concept of an action in rem becomes remote. 
46 Jackson (2nd Ed) op. cit 384. Whilst maintaining the approach that there are necessarily substantive elements to 
the action in rem Jackson pointed out that the American personification theory ‘is destroyed by common sense in 
that in the end those who have interests in the ship (especially the owners) suffer through any enforcement of claims 
against the ship. Particularly is this so when the ship is liable to forced sale.’ This seems to be the very point made 
by Lord Steyn in The Indian Grace, supra and endorsed by Jackson in the later editions of his book. He rightly 
draws attention to the policy elements that underpin judicial decision-making in this field. It is suggested that policy 
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 (c) The problem with personification 
 
 The origin of the notion that the action in rem can be explained on the footing that there is 
a deemed personification of the vessel so that the court is not concerned with the persons who 
stand behind the vessel as its owners lies in the history of the conflict between the admiralty 
courts and the common law courts in England and the endeavour by the latter to restrict and 
restrain the jurisdiction in admiralty proceedings. As the noose of prohibition tightened, the 
response of the admiralty court was increasingly to assert that the action was only against the 
vessel, a form of proceedings not available in the common law courts, and the old Roman Law 
classification of proceedings as being either in rem or in personam was called in aid, 
inaccurately as already explained, to describe the form of the action. However, as pressure from 
the common law courts waned and the jurisdiction was put upon a statutory footing the action 
became available in a broader range of cases. Understandably the endeavour was made to 
accommodate the new claims within the old framework and new theories were devised to 
explain that framework.  In devising these theories the civilian roots of the action were explored 
and an endeavour made to explain the action and its attributes within that legal tradition. The 
framework proved conceptually acceptable on the basis of the claim being against the vessel 
until it became necessary to go behind that concept to address new problems arising from the 
application of old legal rules. That is what happened in The Dictator and it forced the beginning 
of a revision of the underlying concept, conveniently labelled as a procedural theory of the 
action and contrasted with the notion of personification. That set the stage for a century of 
theoretical contestation that still continues. 
 
 As will be apparent the principal puzzle created by English courts stressing to the 
procedural nature of the action in rem flows from the undoubted fact that in a number of ways 
the consequences of invoking the procedure are either to confirm or to confer substantive rights 
upon the claimant party. That is most notably the case in the classic statements of the nature of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
and practicality will always trump principial purity in this area of the law. 
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maritime lien quoted above. Notwithstanding the fact that the lien so described manifestly 
affords substantive rights to the holder of the lien, both as to the ability to recover on the claim 
giving rise to the lien and in the ranking of that claim in competition with other claimants, it too 
has been held to be procedural in nature.47 It is hardly surprising that people are puzzled when 
the courts say that both the action in rem, that must be invoked in order to give effect to a 
maritime lien, and the maritime lien itself are procedural, when the latter so clearly affects the 
substantive rights of the claimant. 
 





 did not have the effect of creating new maritime liens,
50
 although 
there was a perception that they had done so. Nonetheless the statutory claims were held to vest 
claimants with substantive security rights in that once the writ in rem is issued and the 
proceedings commenced the claimant is entitled to pursue its claim against the vessel by 
arresting it and if need be by its sail, notwithstanding a change of ownership after the issue of the 
writ.
51
 This is so even if service has not been effected and the change in ownership occurred 
without knowledge of the claim. 
 
 In both these instances the substantive security rights
52
 flowing to the claimant from the 
invocation of the in rem procedure are created by the invocation of the process although it has 
been said that they flow from the process itself.
53
 On this basis it is then said that it is impossible 
                                                 
47 Bankers Trust International Limited v Todd Shipyard Corporation : The Halcyon Isle [1980] 3 All ER 197 (PC). 
48 Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. C65) 
49 Admiralty Court Act, 1861 (24 Vict. C10). 
50 The Heinrich Bjorn 11 AC 270 6 Asp. MLC1 (HL) 
51 The Monica S [1967] 3 All ER 740 (QBD). 
52 Or ‘property rights’ as they are known in English law. 
53 SC Derrington & J M Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) 15, para. 2.16. The authors 
ascribe the same view to D C Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims (4th ed. 2005) para. 17.36 but with respect 
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to characterise them as procedural in nature albeit that they arise from procedural steps attendant 
upon the commencement of litigation. The answer perhaps lies in the observation by a South 
African judge that the cases that hold simply that the action in rem is a form of procedure are at 
best guilty of over-simplification.
54
 On the other hand as Jackson remarks ‘focus on the action in 
rem instead of the lien is to focus on the method of enforcement of an interest rather than the 
interest being enforced’.55 It seems that in The Indian Grace (No 2) Lord Steyn was so 
concerned with seeking to dispel once and for all the romantic notion that invested a ship not 
only with a life of its own but with a personality and the status of a litigant in courts of law, that 
he underplayed the consequences of this analysis. The fact that he did not deal with the 
important substantive consequences of instituting an action in rem left his analysis incomplete 
and less than satisfying. That needs to be borne in mind as South African courts seek to define 
for this jurisdiction the concept of the action in rem in admiralty, both as a conventional action in 
rem and as an action in rem against an associated ship. 
 
 The reference in the previous paragraph to a ‘romantic notion’ will readily convey that I 
regard the personification theory adopted by United States courts as a jurisprudential cul-de-sac. 
Whilst it may be doubted whether a modern court, as opposed to one at the turn of the twentieth 
century, would express itself in the following terms:- 
 
‘Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron - an ordinary piece of 
personal property … In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from the 
moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and become a subject of admiralty 
jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own; becomes competent to contract, and is 
individually liable for her obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, 
and be sued in her own name.’56 
                                                                                                                                                             
that does not appear to be a completely accurate reading.  
54
SA Boatyard CC (t/a Hout Bay Boatyard) v The Lady Rose (formerly known as the Shiza) 1991 (3) SA 711 (C). 
55 Jackson, op cit, para 17.38, p 467. 
56
Tucker v Alexandroff (1902) 183 US 424, 438. I am indebted to Derrington & Turner, op. cit. para 2.28 for the 
quotation.  In 1960 the United States Supreme Court cited the following statement from O W Holmes, The Common 
Law: ‘A ship is the most living of inanimate things. Servants may sometimes say ‘she’ of a clock, but every one 
gives a gender to vessels. And we need not be surprised, therefore, to find a mode of dealing which has shown such 
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the personification theory continues to hold sway in US courts. There are however indications 
that if confronted with the type of problem that came before the House of Lords in The Indian 
Grace (No 2) the court may find it necessary to depart from theory and to examine more closely 
the nature of the action. In Continental Grain Co v Barge FBL-585 et al57 it was confronted with 
an application to transfer certain proceedings brought both in personam against the owner of the 
barge and in rem against the barge itself from New Orleans (where the barge was when security 
was given to prevent its arrest) to Memphis, where the incident giving rise to the claim had 
occurred and where the barge owner had commenced proceedings against Continental Grain for 
damage suffered by the barge as a result of negligence in loading the barge. Under the relevant 
provision the proceedings could only be transferred if they could originally have been brought in 
the transferee court. It was argued by Continental Grain that they could not have brought the in 
rem proceedings in Memphis, because the barge was not present there and this precluded an 
order to transfer the proceedings at all. 
 
 The majority of the Court, in a judgment by Justice Black, rejected this contention based as 
he said upon ‘a long-standing admiralty fiction that a vessel may be assumed to be a person for 
the purpose of filing a lawsuit and enforcing a judgment.’
58
 It cited cases dealing with the 
limitation statute in which it had been said that: 
 
 ‘To say that an owner is not liable, but that his vessel is liable, seems to us like talking in 
riddles.  In the matter of liability, a man and his property cannot be separated.’59  
 
and: 
‘The riddle after more than half a century repeated to us in a different context does not 
appear to us to have improved with age. There could be no practical exoneration of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
extraordinary vitality in the criminal law applied with even more striking thoroughness in the Admiralty. It is only 
by supposing the ship to have been treated as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of 
the maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once become consistent and logical.’ The 
analogy is dated and probably no longer correct even in houses that have the benefit of servants and the custom of 
referring to ships in the feminine is also diminishing. 
57 364 US 19 (1960). 
58 And citing the passage from Holmes quoted in footnote 72. 
59 The City of Norwich 118 US 468, 503. 
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owner that did not at the same time exempt his property.’60 
 
Flowing from this Black J said that a commonsense approach would be adopted and concluded 
that: 
‘Although the action in New Orleans was technically brought against the barge itself as 
well as its owner, the obvious fact is that, whatever advantages may result, this is an 
alternative way of bringing the owner into court. And although any judgment for the 
cargo owner will be technically enforceable against the barge as an entity as well as its 
owner, the practical economic fact of the matter is that the money paid in satisfaction of it 
will have to come out of the barge owner’s pocket – including the possibility of a levy 
upon the barge even had the cargo owner not prayed for ‘personified’ in rem relief.’61 
  
 The view of the majority was the subject of a powerful dissent by Whittaker J (concurred 
in by Douglas J) in which he asserted the traditional view that: 
 
‘This court has consistently held that an admiralty proceeding in rem is one essentially 
against the vessel itself as the debtor or offending thing; and, in such an action, the vessel 
itself is impleaded as the defendant, seized, judged and sentenced.’   
 
It is difficult to know what to make of this. Is it to be regarded as merely an incidental decision 
on a matter of procedure and statutory interpretation having no general application or does it 
signal that US courts will follow the practical inclinations of the House of Lords, when 
confronted with unacceptable practical consequences of the personification of the vessel as 
litigant? For one not steeped in the niceties of admiralty proceedings in the USA it is difficult to 
tell.
62
 However it is interesting to note that even in the jurisdiction that most firmly adheres to 
the notion of personification there are instances where its impractical extremes become 
unacceptable. 
 
                                                 
60 Consumers Import Co v Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo 320 US 249, 253-254. 
61 At 26. 
62 The judgment is cited by Force et al, Admiralty and Maritime Law as placing a question mark against the 
personification theory. On the other hand Sharpe D J and Berns P A in their contribution to Vol 5 of Benedict on 
Admiralty entitled Practice and Procedure – Maritime Arrest  say: ‘While personification has been criticized by 
United States judges and commentators, neither United States courts nor the Congress seem inclined to abandon the 
doctrine …’   
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 It is in my view impossible in the real world to avoid Lord Steyn’s strictures on this 
approach that personification is a mere fiction concealing the real identity of those who are in 
fact the targets of actions brought in rem against a ship. Whether in dismantling the fiction - the 
scaffolding surrounding the building as he described it - he overlooked the fact that in some 
respects the edifice of the action in rem still required its support, is the interesting question. Most 
commentators on the decision in The Indian Grace (No 2) seem to suggest that it does. However, 
that of itself is an insufficient reason to maintain a fiction that all concerned recognise is just 
that. To do so is not conducive to clarity of thought about legal problems and inevitably leads to 
difficulties when practical realities in a changing world confront ancient doctrine cloaked in the 
language of fairytales. 
 
3 THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
 Fortunately in view of the lack of analysis in either the cases or the academic writing on 
the topic, South African courts have not yet made a commitment to either theory
63
 although there 
are some Cape cases that have, rather formulaically said that the action in rem ‘is an action 
against the ship itself’.64 These statements were, however, made rather in passing and without 
any attempt to analyse the background issues or to explore the consequences of these statements 
for the nature of the action itself. It is submitted that they do not preclude South African courts 
from charting their own course in this area. In doing so it is submittd that the starting point 
should be those provisions of the Act that relate to the action in rem. These place the action 
                                                 
63 Milne JP wisely declined to choose between the procedural and personification theories in the ‘Berg’ (NPD), 
supra, 654G-655C. 
64The m.v. Zlatni Piasatzi: Frozen Foods International Limited v Kudu Holdings (Pty) Limited and Others 1997 (2) 
SA 569 (C) at 575B where Conradie J said that ‘the security arrest, like the arrest under s3(5) is a device for 
bringing a res - and not a person - before the Court.’ This view was endorsed in the m.v. Rizcun Trader (3) Manley 
Appledore Shipping Limited v m.v. Rizcun Trader 1999 (3) SA 966 (C) at 975A. A more measured view is that of 
Scott J in SA Boatyards CC (t/a Hout Bay Boatyard) v The Lady Rose (formerly known as the Shiza) 1991 (3) SA 
711 (C) at 716B where he quoted with approval Professor Jackson’s view of the action in rem as having a ‘curious 
hybrid nature’ and said that whatever the true nature of the action in rem: ‘… it is at least clear that the action 
cannot be regarded as simply an action against a res without reference to the owner or person having an interest 
therein.’ In the result he held that the action lay sufficiently against the owner of the vessel to entitle that owner not 
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squarely within the realm of procedure. Section 3 containing the associated ship provisions is 
headed “Form of Proceedings”. Two modes of bringing suit are identified – the action in 
personam and the action in rem. The provision that introduces the associated ship is section 3(6) 
providing that an action in rem may be brought by arresting an associated ship instead of the 
ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose. Arrest, like attachment, is a procedural issue 
and a prerequisite for the commencement of the action in rem unless security is given to prevent 
an arrest, in which event there is a deemed arrest of the vessel in terms of section 3(10) of the 
Act. Overall the structure of the Act suggests that an action in rem is a form of procedure 
without addressing any of the issues surrounding that approach. 
 
 The logic of saying that an action in rem lies against the owner of the ship because the 
owner will ultimately suffer the loss if the action succeeds is apparent and appealing. The 
difficulty with it and the ground for criticism of the procedural theory is that it fails to provide an 
explanation for a number of disparate features of the action and in particular fails to explain or 
justify those situations, such as the maritime lien or (in England and elsewhere) the rule that the 
statutory lien attaches when the writ is issued and not when service occurs, so that if there is a 
change of ownership the new owner is burdened with the statutory lien, where the owner of the 
vessel may not be personally liable for the claim giving rise to the action. Nor does it explain 
other features of the action that are well-settled in practice and have never been questioned such 
as the fact that service on the owner is unnecessary or that the claim does not merge with the 
judgment in rem and may found a separate action against the party personally liable, or that, if 
the owner is personally liable in respect of the claim but does not enter an appearance to defend 
the action, the judgment is limited to the value of the res. Whether and to what extent all these 
features attach to the action in rem in South Africa will be discussed in the next chapter, but for 
the present they will be taken at face value as presenting a stumbling block to the procedural 
theory of the action in rem. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
only to defend the proceedings but also to bring his own claim in reconvention against the plaintiff. 
 461
 A problem with the criticism of the procedural theory is that it seeks to impose a 
construction on the notion of the action being a procedure to implead the owner that it was never 
intended to bear. It is debatable whether the courts responsible for propounding this view of the 
action in rem were particularly concerned to enunciate a broad ranging theory providing a 
comprehensive explanation of the nature of the action. A careful reading of the decisions in The 
Dictator and The Indian Grace (No 2) suggests that their purpose is more modest and can more 
appropriately be described as an exercise in characterisation of the action within the context of 
the broad conceptual distinction between procedural and substantive law, elusive though that 
distinction may be. Both judgments address a basic question of the identity of the party being 
sued rather than making any attempt to propound a general explanation of the nature of the 
action. That was the relevant question in The Dictator, because the issue was whether judgment 
could be entered for the full amount of the debt when the owner of the vessel was before the 
court. It was also the relevant question in The Indian Grace (No 2), where the issue was whether 
the proceedings instituted in England were between the same parties as the proceedings already 
pursued to completion in India. It is for that reason that it has already been suggested that the 





 and The Burns67 all of which depended in the result on the 
court holding that an action in rem is fundamentally different and distinct from an action against 
the owner of a vessel.   
 
 If the procedural concept of the action in rem – a more modest but also a more accurate 
description of the actual decisions in the cases under discussion - is accepted as a starting point 
in approaching and explaining the action then the existence in certain circumstances of an 
entitlement to pursue a claim in this form notwithstanding the absence of any personal liability 
on the part of the owner must find its explanation and its justification in the creation of the 
security interest underpinning the claim. Similarly the limitations upon the scope of the action 
must be found in historical reasons and potentially in practical reasons concerning the 
                                                 
65 Harmer v Bell: The Bold Buccleugh 7 Moo PCC 267; 13 ER 884 (PC). 
66 (1889) 14 PD 34 (App) 
67 [1907] P 137. 
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enforcement and enforceability of judgments rather than in some intrinsic quality of the action in 
rem that distinguishes it from other forms of procedure. It is unnecessary then to speak of the 
action in its ‘pure’ form or to try to explain all of the consequences of such an action within a 
single grand theory, an exercise that like the physicists search for a theory of everything
68
 may 
prove elusive and possible ultimately fruitless. One can understand the desire to provide a 
comprehensive explanation and theoretical base for an institution of such significance and it may 
be helpful conceptually in addressing new problems as they arise. However in the ultimate 
analysis issues of policy and practicality intrude and it is rare for a judge or lawyer to decide a 
case purely on the basis of a theoretical exposition of basic principle. As Tetley says ‘theories 
are nothing more than a skin or covering which their proponents have attempted to place around 
an already formed body of law’.69 They are helpful as analytical tools that enable us to identify 
potential problems or flaws in reasoning and perhaps can assist in addressing new problems, but 
ultimately any theory is likely to prove inadequate to describe all elements of a legal institution. 
 
 A more helpful approach is to take as a starting point the fact that we are dealing with a 
form of action available in respect of a defined and therefore limited class of claims, itself 
subject to alteration by the legislature, and carrying with it certain advantages and limitations 
that have their origin in history but are moulded in South Africa by the terms of our own statute 
interpreted in the light of the common law, with its civilian roots and its own procedure for 
founding or confirming jurisdiction by way of the attachment of property. Overall the 
understanding of the nature and effect of the action in rem will have to be shaped by the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the construction of the Act will in material respects 
be affected by the provisions of the Constitution and limits imposed by the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. It is unnecessary for that purpose for South Africa to resort to a fictional construct of a 
                                                 
68 See Stephen W Hawking, A Brief History of Time (1988), Chapter 10. In the forward to his subsequent book The 
Universe in a Nutshell (2001) he said that what had appeared to be ‘just over the horizon’ in 1988 had receded 
although physics had advanced a long way since 1988. In 1995 in a lecture entitled Gödel and the end of Physics to 
be found on his website at http://www.hawking.org.uk/index.php/lectures/publiclectures/91 Professor Hawking 
expressed doubt whether such a theory would ever be found and said ‘our search for understanding will never come 
to an end’. 
69 William Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims 35. 
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procedure available in our courts in respect of a certain class of claims anymore than it is 
necessary for us to say that provisional sentence is an action against a liquid document as 
opposed to saying that it is a useful procedure for enforcing claims founded on a liquid 
document. 
 
 It is therefore submitted that in viewing the action in rem in South Africa, including the 
action as it lies against an associated ship, the correct approach is to follow the lead given by 
Lord Steyn in The Indian Grace (No 2) and to say unequivocally that the action in rem is a form 
of procedure by which the owner of a vessel is, from the inception of the action, brought before 
our courts in respect of certain claims. That is so whether one is dealing with an action in which 
the ship concerned is arrested or deemed to be arrested or one where an associated ship is 
arrested or deemed to be arrested. The difference between the two is that the owner is different 
and hence the person against whom the action is brought is different. This approach is in 
accordance with the fundamental principle enunciated in The Berg70 that the action against an 
associated ship is an action against a different defendant and hence distinct from the action 
brought against the ship concerned. As Miller JA put it the action against the associated ship is 
‘creative of new liabilities or obligations in owners of ships’. That recognised a reality that Lord 
Steyn was to articulate a dozen years later. It is submitted that it is the correct approach to 
the action in rem in South Africa.
                                                 
70  The Berg (AD), op cit.712D; In MV Yu Long Shan: Drybulk SA v MV Yu Long Shan 1998 (1) SA 646 (SCA) at 
654 Marais JA made the same point that the associated ship jurisdiction ‘render liable persons who would not have 
been liable in similar circumstances’.  Again there is a recognition that the action lies against a person 




THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION IN REM 
 
 The conclusion that the action in rem is a form of procedure is only the starting point for a 
consideration of its nature and effect.  In attempting to state the latter it is sensible to identify the 
key features that are said to flow from the invocation of that form of action and from there to see 
if a statement of principle can be derived that reflects these different facets. To some extent this 
is the approach adopted by Derrington and Turner
1
 in their endeavour to describe the modern 
action in rem. They identify the characteristic incidents of the action (on the basis that these are 
left unaffected by the decision in The Indian Grace (No 2)) as being that:- 
 
‘(1) once a claim form in rem has been issued, a change in ownership in the vessel will be 
ineffective to prevent the action proceeding against it, an effect known colloquially as the 
‘statutory lien’. 
(2) in the absence of statutory permission, an action in rem lies only against the vessel in 
connection with which the claim arises. 
(3) if the owners of the ship appear and defend the action (or at any rate submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court), the action proceeds thereafter as if it had also been commenced 
in personam with the result that if the res itself proves insufficient to meet the claimant’s 
claim, the owner’s other assets will be available for enforcement purposes. 
(4) conversely, if the owners do not appear, the claimant is limited to such of the 
realisable value of the res which is available once those whose claims rank in priority 
have been satisfied.  Any balance may be recovered in a subsequent action in personam.  
(5) participation in in rem proceedings is not confined to the claimant and to the owners 
of the res; others may intervene in the proceedings in order to assert or protect their own 
rights or the priority accorded to them.  Such participation neither requires nor brings 
with it any personal liability to the claimant. 
(6) a cause of action in rem does not merge in a judgment in personam.  
(7) the claimant in an action in rem may procure the issue of a warrant of arrest, after 
judgment as well as before judgment. 
(8) once arrested, the ship may be sold by the court, in which event  all outstanding 




 This list needs both qualification and supplementation in the context of South Africa and 
                                                 
1Derrington and Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters. 11 - 12, para. 2.07 
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the action in rem embodied in the Act, whether we are dealing with an action in rem against 
the ship concerned or an action against the associated ship. In what follows each of the points 
raised by the authors will be dealt with in turn in the particular context of South Africa. The 
point of principle will first be considered in relation to an action in rem against the ship 
concerned and then in the light of the conclusions drawn from that analysis the situation in 
regard to an associated ship will be considered. In contradistinction to the authors the approach 
adopted will proceed on the basis that the action in rem is a form of procedure and that it is 
directed at impleading the owner of the vessel subjected to arrest. 
 
1 THE FEATURES OF THE ACTION IN REM  
 
(a) The statutory lien and The Monica S. 
 
 The proposition that once the summons in the action in rem has been issued2 a change in 
ownership of the vessel is ineffective to prevent the action proceeding or to defeat the statutory 
lien over the vessel even though service has not been effected, has not been tested in South 
Africa. This was the conclusion insofar as English law is concerned of Brandon J in The Monica 
S
3
 although as the judgment shows there are significant passages in the authorities that support 
the proposition that it is only after the arrest of the vessel that this is the position. Hofmeyr4 
appears to accept that the decision of Brandon J is applicable in South Africa. He takes the view 
that once process has been issued the claimant is protected, even against a bona fide purchaser, if 
there is a change in ownership. However, he says that the claimant is only protected against the 
consequences of insolvency or a judicial management order once the vessel has been arrested or 
security furnished to prevent the arrest. His principal point is less about the applicability of The 
Monica S, which he accepts as applicable, and more about whether the views expressed therein 
                                                 
2 Admiralty rule 2(1)(a) 
3 [1967] 3 All ER 740 (QBD). 
4 Admiralty Jurisdiction Law and Practice in South Africa, 62-63. 
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are consistent with the finding in The Indian Grace (No 2) that from its commencement the 
action in rem is an action against the owner of the vessel named in the summons. The point he 
makes5 is that, if the action is from its inception an action against the original owner of the 
vessel, but there is a change in ownership before the vessel is arrested, then this is contrary to the 
principle in The Monica S that upon the issue of the writ (now known in England as a claim 
form) a right of security is created against the vessel that is undisturbed by a change in 
ownership.   
 
 If the action is viewed as an action against the owner of the vessel then the effect of suing 
the owner is to establish the right of security against the vessel. This does not give rise to a 
problem if the same person is the owner at the time of arrest. The conceptual problem lies with 
the situation where at the time of the vessel’s arrest it has a new owner. Does the action now 
mutate into an action against the new owner or does it remain one against the original owner and 
if so what are the consequences of that in terms of executing any judgment? The rule in The 
Monica S is that a purchaser, even a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the claim, 
acquires the ship subject to the pre-existing burden arising from the issue of in rem proceedings 
against it. If the characterisation of the action as being one from its inception against the original 
owner of the vessel is not to alter or remove that consequence there needs to be an explanation 
for that result insofar as the new owner is concerned. It is possible in the case of a maritime lien 
and a change in ownership of the vessel before action commences to explain the position on the 
basis that the new owner has acquired the vessel subject to a prior charge and is nonetheless the 
person impleaded by the action, but the principle in The Monica S, if maintained, seems to mean 
that an action commenced against A becomes an action against B if there is a change in 
ownership of the vessel between the issue of process and the service thereof. Whether this is a 
problem in the South African context depends on whether the principle of The Monica S is 
applicable in the case of actions in rem in this country. 
                                                 
5 Nigel Teare QC ‘The admiralty action in rem and the House of Lords’ [1998] LCMLQ 33 at 41 raises the same 
concern and asks rhetorically ‘… if the action in rem is in substance an action in personam why would [the right 




 took the view that the problems raised by The Monica S of a change in 
ownership of the vessel between the date when the summons is issued and the date of arrest of 
the vessel did not arise in South Africa under the Act because of the provisions of section 3(5) of 
the Act that the action in rem is instituted by the arrest of the property.7 However, that view is 
inconsistent with the subsequent decision in The Jute Express,
8
 where it was held that an action 
in rem, under the Act as it then stood, is instituted by the issue of the summons. Accordingly it is 
possible in South Africa for ownership of the vessel against which an action in rem is instituted 
by the issue of a summons to be transferred before the vessel is arrested.   
 
 A more significant point of construction of the Act is whether, having instituted an action 
in rem by issuing a summons, it remains permissible to arrest the vessel after a change in 
ownership. As a matter of construction of the relevant sections of the Act it is doubtful whether 
it is. The key holding in The Jute Express is that it is an essential requirement for an action in 
rem that the property against which the action is directed should be arrested, either actually or by 
way of a deemed arrest under section 3(10)(a) of the Act. Section 3(4) says that a maritime claim 
may be enforced by an action in rem in two situations. The first is where the claimant has a 
maritime lien over the property to be arrested, where ownership of the vessel is immaterial. The 
second is where the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an 
action in personam in respect of the maritime claim. This is the important case as far as the 
statutory lien is concerned. Whilst the action may be instituted without an arrest having occurred 
the provision is clear in stating that the owner of the property to be arrested must be personally 
liable on the claim. If at the time of the arrest of the vessel the owner is not so liable then there is 
                                                 
6 Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 33 
7 This would include its deemed arrest by virtue of s3(10)(a)(i) of the Act.  
8 M.V. Jute Express v Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the m.v. Jute Express 1992 (3) SA 9 (A). It is also 
inconsistent with the subsequent amendment of s1(2) of the Act to provide, consistent with that judgment, that the 
action commences by the issue of an process for its institution irrespective of whether the process is or has been 
served. The action lapses if it is not served within twelve months of the issue of the process in question.  
s1(2)(b)(iii).  M.T. Cape Spirit: Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the m.t. Cape Spirit v m.t. Cape Spirit 
and Others 1999 (4) SA 321 (SCA). 
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much to be said, at the level of interpretation of the section, for the proposition that the vessel 
may not be arrested. In other words that properly interpreted the section requires the owner of 
the property to be personally liable both at the time of institution of the action and at the time of 
the vessel’s arrest. It is noteworthy that the section is couched in language of futurity (‘if the 
owner of the property to be arrested would be liable’) as opposed to present liability (‘if the 
owner of the property to be arrested is liable’). This approach also resolves the problem of the 
action mutating from one against the original owner to one against the new owner. The action as 
instituted is against the original owner, which is also the party personally liable in respect of the 
claim. Once there is a change of ownership the vessel cannot be arrested and the action cannot 
continue because the essential requisite of arrest becomes unobtainable. 
 
 Apart from that textual consideration, which at the very least shows that this is an open 
question in South African law, it is submitted that there are other reasons why it cannot be 
accepted that The Monica S is good law in South Africa. There is no difficulty with the 
proposition that once the summons has been served and the vessel arrested the claimant obtains a 
security interest in the vessel that survives a subsequent change in ownership. That accords with 
the basic principles of the Roman Dutch law - which it hardly needs noting is a civilian system - 
that gives effect to the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure9 and holds real rights in 
property to have priority over personal rights. Where summons has been served and the vessel 
arrested that is notice to the world of the claimant’s prior right in rem against the vessel and a 
subsequent purchaser, whose claim to delivery of the property is purely a personal right against 
the previous owner, would necessarily take the property subject to the accrued real right.
10
 
Whilst there is no difficulty with the notion that the arrest of the vessel named as the defendant 
in an action in rem creates a security interest vesting in the claimant and exercisable 
notwithstanding a change in ownership of the vessel subsequent to its arrest, the concept of a 
security interest giving a real right arising without notice to the party affected thereby or to the 
                                                 
9That which is prior in time is prior in law. 
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world by some public act is unknown to South African law. Until the vessel has been 
arrested there is no public act that would proclaim the existence of the right of security. In South 
African law the entitlement to obtain such security would be characterised as a personal right 
against the owner of the vessel in the same way as the right of a creditor who has taken a cession 
in securitatem debiti is a personal right that remains inchoate and ineffective as security until 
notice is given to the debtors of the existence of the cession. A pledge of movables or a notarial 
bond over movables is likewise ineffective until the necessary legal steps have been taken to 
perfect the security by way of an order of court, service of that order and attachment of the 
goods subject to the pledge or notarial bond.11 Why should the position be different in admiralty 
where a summons may be issued and lie fallow, not served, for twelve months? That is a lengthy 
period during which it is readily imaginable that a change of ownership may occur. The new 
owner is likely to have no connection to the claim that gave rise to the right to proceed in rem 
where that claim arises from the personal liability of the previous owner of the vessel.   
 
 This brings us back to the discussion of the constitutionality of interpreting a provision of 
the Act in a way that can bring about the situation where the owner of the arrested ship finds that 
the ship is liable for a claim in respect of which the current owner has no connection. We are not 
here concerned with the situation of a maritime lien, because the existence of such a privileged 
claim is an internationally accepted feature of maritime commerce and serves an invaluable 
purpose in providing a means of recovery and a preference in respect of a limited class of claims. 
That feature is so well-known and accepted as a potential hazard of being a shipowner that it 
should survive constitutional scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that it may result in the owner of 
a ship discovering that the ship is subject to security rights vested in creditors even though the 
owner itself has no connection with the underlying claims that lead to the creation of those 
rights. There are a few such situations known to our law such as the landlord’s tacit hypothec, or 
the statutory preference given to a municipality in respect of its charges and the maritime lien 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The right so obtained is similar to the pignus judiciale obtained by way of attachment of property in execution. 
See Dream Supreme Properties 11CC v Nedcor Bank Ltd and others 2007 (4) SA 380 (SCA), para [14]. 
11
Development Bank of Southern Africa Limited v Van Rensburg and Others NNO 2002 (5) SA 425 (SCA); 
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falls in a similar category of being well-established and therefore a risk against which the 
purchaser of a ship can guard when purchasing the vessel. However vesting a security interest in 
the vessel as a result of nothing more than the issue of a summons in rem stands on a different 
footing entirely. The range of maritime claims that can permit of such an action is broad and 
open-ended.
12
 The issue of the summons is not a matter of public knowledge nor is there any 
reasonable way to ascertain whether such a summons has been issued.  The capacity to safeguard 
against that eventuality is limited. Lastly to impose a security interest in those circumstances is 
inconsistent with the principle that people should only be liable for their own debts unless they 
have consented to accept liability for the debts of others. For all those reasons it is submitted that 
it the principle in The Monica S should not be applied in an action in rem in South Africa against 
the ship concerned. 
 
 The position in regard to an associated ship is an a fortiori case. If the submissions in 
chapter 6 are correct in regard to the date upon which the action commences for the purposes of 
an associated ship arrest (as opposed to other relevant purposes), then it must follow that the 
principle in The Monica S does not apply to an associated ship arrest to commence an action in 
rem against the associated ship. The reason is simply that in the case of an associated ship one is 
already dealing with a situation where the vessel being arrested is not owned by the owner of the 
ship concerned. What is crucial in that situation is the time when the association must exist, a 
matter determined by the question of when the action is commenced. It was submitted in chapter 
6, in part for the same constitutional reasons adverted to above, that the date of commencement 
of the action is the date of service, which goes hand in hand with arrest or the date of furnishing 
security, which obviates the need for an arrest. If that is correct there is no room for the 
operation of the principle in The Monica S in relation to an associated ship arrest commencing an 
action in rem. It is submitted that the constitutional reasons for so interpreting the question of 
commencement of the action for the purposes of determining association are so compelling that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contract Forwarding (Pty) Limited v Chesterfin (Pty) Limited and Others 2003 (2) SA 253 (SCA), paras. [4] to [6]. 
12  See sub-para (ee) of the definition of maritime claim in s1(1) of the Act. The fact that the range of maritime 
claims recognised in South Africa is wider than in many other jurisdictions has already been noted. 
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the other possibility cannot be accepted. If that is so then it provides a further reason for 
holding that The Monica S does not apply in South Africa even in relation to the arrest of the 
ship concerned. It is highly desirable that so far as possible the action in rem against the 
associated ship should have the same characteristics as the conventional action in rem or the 
action in rem against property other than a ship. This can be achieved by holding that in South 
Africa the statutory lien arising in respect of maritime claims, other than maritime liens, only 
arises on the arrest or deemed arrest of the vessel or property in question and not on the mere 
issue of a summons. Such a conclusion does, however, immediately serve to distinguish the 
action in rem in South Africa from its English counterpart. It also means that this at least poses 
no obstacle to the acceptance in South Africa of Lord Steyn’s view in The Indian Grace (No 2). 
An action in rem in South Africa, whether against the ship concerned or an associated ship, can 
be viewed as one that impleads the owner of the vessel or property arrested.  
 
(b) In the absence of statutory authority the action lies only against the ship concerned. 
 
This statement is presumably intended to enshrine, or at least reflect, the decision 
in The Beldis.13 Whilst accurate insofar as it goes however it does not seem to add anything to 
our understanding of the nature of the action in rem. Apart from anything else the fact that it has 
to be qualified by the words ‘in the absence of statutory authority’ reveals its weakness, because 
it illustrates what is well-known, namely that in many countries around the world
14
 the arrest of 
a vessel other than the ship concerned is something that is and has, since the Arrest Convention, 
been permissible. The fact that it is not a widespread occurrence is due to the fact that very few 
shipowners choose to place their vessels in common ownership, preferring to make use of one-
ship companies instead. Thus the sister ship arrest provisions of the Arrest Convention15 are to a 
large measure a dead letter. In South Africa however, as a result of the associated ship the 
exception is very important because of the vibrant existence of the associated ship and the 
capacity to commence an action in rem by arresting an associated ship. Having said that however 
                                                 
13 Beldis, The 1936 P 51; 18 Asp MLC 598 (CA); 53 Ll. L. Rep. 255 
14 But not the United States of America. 
15 And corresponding provisions such as the surrogate ship arrest in Australia. 
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its significance is not that it affects the basic nature of the action in rem but that the invocation of 
the action by way of the arrest of an associated ship may have different consequences from those 
that normally flow from such an action.   
 
Of more significance is perhaps that the existence of sister ship arrests in other 
jurisdictions and the associated ship arrest in South Africa highlights the fact that the jurisdiction 
to proceed in rem in this country and in others that also recognise the action in rem is a 
jurisdiction the nature of which is determined by statute in our case the Act rather than by any 
historical inheritance from English admiralty law. The extent to which that historical legacy is 
relevant will depend on the construction of the Act when viewed in the light of our own legal 
principles. The differences among different jurisdictions also demonstrate that there is no 
inherent logic in the scope or extent of the in rem jurisdiction that dictates that any particular 
limit or extension of the jurisdiction should have application. This is further illustrated by the 
fact that in South Africa an action in rem can be brought not only against a ship but also against 
the whole or part of its equipment, furniture, stores or bunkers; the whole or part of the cargo; 
freight; any container, if the claim arises out of or relates to the use of that container in or on a 
ship or the carriage of goods by sea or by water other than in the container or against a fund in 
court. The extension of the scope of the action in rem is therefore extensive but it is unclear in 
what way that changes the essential nature of the action.  It remains a procedure commenced by 
the arrest of property and capable of being pursued by the claimant without intervention by the 
owner of the property with the benefit of a security interest once the property has been arrested. 
 
The most important aspect of this is that it shows that the action in rem does not 
have any inherent content beyond that determined by the legislature in each country, at least 
insofar as the extent of its application is concerned. In England it originally related only to a 
limited range of claims that had survived the process of prohibition and were associated with the 
notion of a lien over the vessel. That changed with the extension of the ability to bring claims by 
way of proceedings in rem by the 1840 and 1861 Admiralty Court Acts. It has been further 
altered by the extension of the list of permissible maritime claims and the introduction of the 
 473
sister ship arrest after the United Kingdom’s accession to the Arrest Convention and the 
passing of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956 and the Supreme Court Act, 1981. The 
entitlement to proceed in rem and the identification of the property against which such a claim 
may be brought are in turn inextricably linked to the class of claims in respect of which such a 
proceeding is permissible. Whilst in English practice it remains largely true (particularly with the 
arrest of a sister ship being relatively academic) that it is the ship concerned that will be the 
principal target of the action in rem the position may be different in other jurisdictions where the 
action in rem is a feature of admiralty practice depending upon the statutory regime in force in 
that jurisdiction. South Africa is such a jurisdiction. 
 
All this leads one to wonder on what basis the proposition that the action lies 
against the ship concerned, save to the extent that statutory authority otherwise provides, is 
helpful in identifying the content or nature of the action itself. The fact of the matter is that the 
availability of the action is inevitably something that is inherently susceptible to legislative 
interference. In most jurisdictions, which have English admiralty law and practice as the source 
of their own jurisdiction, the scope of the action is delineated by legislation that links the action 
with a list of claims and the identification of the property that may be the subject of arrest as a 
basis for commencement of the action. How then does it help to state that the action will 
ordinarily arise in relation to the ship concerned in the absence of statutory authority? Indeed it 
is submitted with respect that the statement itself is misconceived in that it presupposes an action 
in rem against the ship concerned divorced from the legislation governing such procedure, which 
is simply not possible. In other words the action against the ship concerned is as much derived 
from statutory authority as is the action against the sister ship in England, the surrogate ship in 
Australia and the associated ship in South Africa.  
 
It is submitted that the proper statement, although not particularly illuminating, is 
that the action is available in all those circumstances where the legislature has made the action 
available to a particular claimant. That is so whether the claim is one in respect of which the 
action was ‘traditionally’ available or whether it is a novel claim to which the availability of the 
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action has been extended. In all cases the legislature has determined that the claim in question is 
one that can be pursued by these means and thereby conferred on such claims the advantages, 
including the advantages in respect of security of the claim, that accompany the right to bring an 
action in this way. This is true for South Africa and it is submitted for other jurisdictions having 
similar roots insofar as the action in rem is concerned that have now enshrined their admiralty 
jurisdiction in statutes. Whilst history inevitably plays a role in the interpretation of those 
statutes at the end of the day it is the terms of the statute itself that are decisive. So in South 
Africa the legislature originally provided that a certain range of claims would be cognisable 
before the court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction and that those claims would in general be 
capable of being pursued by way of an action in rem against an associated ship. In 1992 it 
extended the list of claims that could be entertained by the court exercising admiralty jurisdiction 
and in various respects extended the scope of the associated ship arrest. It drew no distinction 
between those claims that historically had fallen within the admiralty jurisdiction of our courts 
under the predecessor to the Act and those that were novel. All are treated the same (save in 
respect of the law applicable thereto) and by and large all enjoy the same advantages as a result 
of being capable of being pursued in this way. There seems to be little point then, at least in a 
South African context
16
, in seeking to postulate a general rule that is historically based but is 
neither accurate in its description of present reality nor helpful in advancing our understanding 
of the action in rem as it exists and operates at present. It is more realistic to accept that the 
action has become a creature of legislation extending to such claims as the legislature chooses 
and pursuable in the manner and against such property as the legislature has determined. That 
will often be the ship in respect of which the claim arose, but that is not because of the inherent 
nature of the action in rem but because in practical terms it is likely to be most convenient, in 
respect of the majority of claims, to pursue the claim on that basis. As far as the nature of the 
action in rem is concerned it is suggested that the identification of the claims in respect of which 
the Act confers the right to proceed in rem, either against the ship concerned, or against an 
associated ship or against other property, does not affect the nature of the action itself.  
                                                 
16  Whether the comments made here are applicable elsewhere will depend upon their own legislation and the 
jurisprudence developed by their courts. 
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Accordingly, in the South African context this suggested property of the action in rem can 
safely be jettisoned. 
 
(c) Appearance or submission to the jurisdiction by the owners of the ship means that 
the action proceeds as if it had also been commenced in personam. 
 
 This is the rule in The Dictator17 confirmed in a number of subsequent cases.18 In The 
August 8
19
 Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said: 
 
‘'[b]y the law of England, once a defendant in an Admiralty action in rem has entered an 
appearance in such action, he  has submitted himself personally to the jurisdiction of the 
English Admiralty Court, and the result of that is that, from then on, the action continues 
against him not only as an action in rem but also as an action in personam … '. 
 
It is by no means clear that if the owner is not personally liable in respect of the claim, as for 
example, where the claim is based on a maritime lien and the vessel has changed hands in the 
meantime, that this means that the owner incurs personal liability for the entire claim as opposed 
to liability up to the value of the vessel. When the rule was first enunciated in The Dictator 
Jeune J was careful to say that he was dealing with a situation where a personal action would 
have lain against the owner of the vessel.
20
 The adoption of the rule in later cases also appears to 
have been in situations where the personal liability of the owner was not in issue.21 The 
arguments under consideration were to the effect that in an action in rem judgment could not be 
given and executed upon for more than the value of the ship, not that an owner who defended 
                                                 
17 [1892] P 304. 
18 The Gemma [1892] P 285; The Dupleix [1912] P8; The August 8 [1983] 2 AC 450 (PC) 456. 
19 [1983] 2 AC 450 (PC) at 456. 
20 At 310, 313, 315 and 319.  At 310 he posed the question under consideration in the case as being: ‘It is necessary 
to consider whether, in an action in rem, when a personal action would lie against the owners, judgment can be 
enforced for more than the value of the res.” (My emphasis.) 
21 In The Gemma, supra, there is a reference at 29 to ‘ persons … [who] think fit to appear and fight out their 
liability’. In The Dupleix, supra, 15 Evans P referred to ‘an appearance not merely to secure release of property 
arrested, but also for the purpose of attempting to obtain a judgment freeing defendants from all liability for a 
collision.’ In The Jupiter[1924] P 236 at 243 Scrutton LJ expressed the firm view that the object of an action in rem 
is ‘to make the man appear so that he might be a personal defendant’. None of these cases seem to go so far as to 
hold a person not otherwise personally liable, liable merely by virtue of having entered an appearance to defend.    
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such an action assumed a liability that would otherwise not attach to them. In its broadest 
expression however, such as the passage quoted from The August 8, supra, it may be construed 
as holding that the effect of an owner entering an appearance to defend is to render the owner 
liable in personam for the debt that is the subject of the action, irrespective of whether they are 
personally liable, and that is certainly an understanding that has influenced debate in South 
Africa over the rule and its operation in this country. For present purposes it will be accepted 
that this is the effect of the rule without engaging in a lengthy analysis of the English cases to 
assess whether that is indeed the case. That task is best left to someone else. 
 
 Shaw criticised the rule in its broader sense, when he wrote: 
 
The entry of appearance is a submission to the jurisdiction not an acceptance of 
liability.”22 
 
The matter is dealt with in South Africa under Admiralty Rule 8(3), (formerly rule 6(3)), which 
provides that: 
 
‘A person giving notice of intention to defend an action in rem shall not merely by reason 
thereof incur any liability and shall, in particular, not become liable in personam, save as 
to costs, merely by reason of having given such notice and having defended the action in 
rem.’  
 
Our courts have not considered in any detail the precise effect of this rule.  On the few occasions 
on which it has been the subject of mention the assumptions by the parties and the judges leaves 
the impression that its purpose is to reverse in its entirety the English rule referred to above so 
that no question arises of personal liability attaching in consequence of an action in rem.
23
 
However, it is by no means clear that this is so and there has been no attempt to examine the rule 
in any depth. An initial comment is that the background to the rule must lie not only in the 
                                                 
22 D J Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 31. 
23 Bouyges Offshore and another v Owner of the MT Tigr and another 1995 (4) SA 49 (C) at 67D-J; SA Boatyard 
CC (t/a Hout Bay Boatyard) v The Lady Rose (formerly known as the Shiza) 1991 (3) SA 711 (C) at 715-716; MT 
‘Argun’ v Master and Crew of the MT ‘Argun’ claiming under case number AC 126/99 and others 2004 (1) SA 1 
(SCA), para [26]. This is how it is understood by Derrington & Turner, op cit, 12, fn 7. 
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decision in The Dictator and the cases that have followed it, but also in the principle 
recognised in admiralty that, in proceedings in rem, parties other than the owner of the vessel 
arrested may intervene to defend their interest in the property arrested and if they do so they do 
not incur any personal liability in respect of the claim, but only a liability for costs.  In addition 
the ability to commence an action in rem by way of the arrest of an associated ship adds a 
different dimension to the issue. The reference to “a person” in the rule clearly includes an 
owner that enters appearance to defend in order to protect its ownership of the vessel; a charterer 
or mortgagee, which enters appearance in order to protect its particular interest in the vessel and 
the owner of an associated ship, which enters appearance to defend in order to defend its interest 
in that ship. Those are three different scenarios yet the same rule applies to all three. In each 
instance its impact, on the basis of the assumption referred to above, will differ as emerges from 
what follows. 
 
 Where one is dealing with the ship concerned and its owner the effect, so it has been 
said, is to reverse the rule in The Dictator, even where the owner is in any event personally 
liable for the claim, so that any such personal liability is not established in the proceedings and 
any judgment does not operate in personam. Where one is dealing with a mortgagee or charterer 
or other third party, apart from the owner, the effect on the other hand is to maintain the 
traditional rule that such persons may intervene and defend the proceedings without incurring 
any personal liability, save in respect of costs. There has been no consideration of the impact of 
rule 8(3) on the owner of an associated ship. Is the effect that whilst their ship may be arrested 
they are not personally liable for the entire debt if they defend the action? That is not clear and it 
may be difficult to reconcile with judicial statements that the effect of the action against the 
associated ship is to create a new liability on the part of the owner of that vessel. In effect the 
meaning of the rule varies depending upon the circumstances. That is an unusual situation and 
suggests that the original assumption may not be well-founded. A closer examination of the rule 
is justified. 
 
A good starting point is the language of the rule itself. It says that a person will not 
 478
“merely by reason of having given such notice and having defended the action” incur any 
liability, and in particular, any liability in personam. The use of the word ‘merely’ is significant.  
It indicates that the operation of the rule is narrowly confined to the consequences of entering an 
appearance to defend an action in rem. Its plain meaning is that the entry of appearance on its 
own does not have the effect of attaching any liability, other than a liability for costs, to the 
person entering an appearance. That person does not thereby become liable in personam on the 
claim. However, it by no means follows from this that an action in rem cannot be the vehicle for 
determining the personal liability of the owner of the vessel, nor that a judgment in such an 
action cannot serve to found execution against the property of the owner including the ship 
itself. In other words there is room to think that the extent to which Rule 8(3) circumscribes the 
rule in The Dictator may be limited.  
 
 Rule 8(3) does not say that if the person is already liable for the claim that such liability 
will be affected by the entry of appearance to defend. It says that a liability in personam does not 
arise merely by entering appearance to defend. That seems to leave open the possibility that the 
pre-existing personal liability, in conjunction with the appearance to defend and the nature of the 
action in rem itself, may result in liability in personam. It also leaves open the possibility – 
simply as a matter of language - that other circumstances, apart from the entry of appearance to 
defend, may result in a personal liability attaching to a person who defends a claim. That raises 
the possibility that a person who provides security for the claim and submits to the jurisdiction 
of the court, and then delivers notice of intention to defend, will be liable in personam whether 
or not they are personally liable on the claim. A further possibility is that the entry of appearance 
in conjunction with something else will give rise to such liability, but then it does not spell out 
what that something else will be. To say that one does not incur liability “merely by reason of” 
giving notice of intention to defend suggests that one can incur such liability, either for some 






 Let us start by considering the case where the owner of the ship concerned is personally 
liable for the claim so that the existence of such liability precedes the arrest of the vessel and 
giving notice of intention to defend the action. In terms of section 3(4)(b) of the Act an action in 
rem can be instituted if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant 
in an action in personam in respect of the cause of action concerned. There is an important 
reason for making the action in rem available in these circumstances, namely that otherwise the 
property in question could simply be attached ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem in 
an action against the owner. In other words these are alternative procedural approaches to 
pursuing a single claim before a single court. This is not the position in England and would not 
have been the position in South Africa either under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, which 
did not recognise such an attachment as a basis for the commencement of proceedings, nor under 
the common law, which imposed restrictions on the ability to obtain such an attachment in 
proceedings between peregrini and did not know the action in rem. (It must be remembered that 
the parochial court and the colonial court of admiralty were, notionally at least, separate courts.) 
That situation has now been altered by the Act, which confers a choice upon the claimant 
whether to proceed in rem or in personam. It would be surprising if, having done that in the Act, 
the rules then created a situation where the choice between the two forms of proceeding can 
create problems insofar as the pre-existent personal liability of the owner is concerned.
25
 The 
wording of rule 8(3) does not convey any intention to exclude or disregard the pre-existing 
                                                 
24 See the similar reasoning of Holmes JA and Miller JA in Cornellisen NO v Universal Caravan Sales (Pty) Ltd 
1971 (3) SA 158 (A) at 174A and 179C-D respectively. That case dealt with a provision referring to “only by virtue 
of”. That seems to be to the same effect as the words “merely by reason of” in rule 8(3). 
25 There is already a problem in that where a vessel is attached ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem the 
owner can only secure its release by putting up security for the entire claim. Yorigami Maritime Construction 
Company Limited v Nissho-Iwai Co Limited 1977 (4) SA 682 (C) at 697E-698G. Admiralty Rule 4(7)(a)(ii) 
provides that a person can secure the release of their vessel by furnishing security ‘on the giving of security in a sum 
representing the value of the property or the amount of the claims of the person who has caused the arrest to be 
effected.’ Whilst the rule does not use the expression ‘whichever is the less’ conventional interpretation suggests 
that this is what is intended because otherwise the reference to the value of the vessel would simply be omitted as 
redundant. The result is that the amount of security that can be obtained by proceeding against a particular vessel 
will depend upon which form of procedure is adopted.  This does not appear to be a rational result and may be 
subject to constitutional challenge. 
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liability of an owner whose vessel is arrested in an action in rem.  It simply says that a particular 
procedural step will not create a liability for the party taking that step. To construe it as 
precluding the enforcement of a liability that already exists or is constituted by other means 
seems to go beyond its natural purpose. 
 
If rule 8(3) is taken as revoking in its entirety for South African purposes the rule 
in The Dictator and the cases following it in its entirety, the effect is startling at least insofar as 
the pre-existing liability of the owner is concerned. We continue with the situation where a 
vessel is arrested in proceedings in rem in respect of a claim for which its owner is personally 
liable. The owner unsuccessfully defends the proceedings and a judgment is entered. The vessel 
is sold but does not realise sufficient to discharge the judgment debt in full, perhaps because 
creditors with claims ranking higher than that of the successful claimant participate in the 
distribution of the proceeds. In terms of The Dictator the judgment creditor would be entitled to 
attach the vessel or attach other property of the owner in an endeavour to obtain satisfaction of 
the claim. The judgment could be taken to another jurisdiction and enforced as a judgment 
without having to prove the claim afresh.  If that is no longer the position as a result of rule 8(3) 
the creditor must commence fresh proceedings on the same cause of action against the owner, 
either in South Africa or elsewhere, as opposed to having the advantage of a judgment and 
enforcing it. Other fundamental questions arise if that is the position.  For example, if the owner 
is not taken as being a party to the proceedings and it does not determine their liability in 
personam, then it would seem that the judgment obtained cannot be used either to found a 
contention that the question of liability is res judicata or to raise an issue estoppel against the 
recalcitrant debtor. In other words the entire action would potentially be subject to being 
litigated afresh, either in South Africa if other property can be attached or in another jurisdiction. 
That would be a wholly unsatisfactory situation and indeed would be the very unsatisfactory 
situation that at the end of his judgment in The Dictator, Jeune J expressed relief at not having to 
hold existed in England. The problem could presumably be circumvented by the expedient of 
both arresting the vessel in rem and attaching it ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem 
at the same time so that the action could proceed as a hybrid action, both in rem and in personam 
 481
at the same time. However, that seems to be an unnecessary and utterly wasteful exercise in 
litigation gymnastics, when the whole basis for the litigation is that the owner is personally 
liable and the owner has resisted that conclusion and lost.     
 
 This takes one to the underlying reason for the rule in The Dictator namely the proposition 
that by entering appearance to defend the owner of the vessel who is personally liable submits to 
the jurisdiction of the court. That is important in England where the question of jurisdiction is 
procedural and accordingly the ability to serve the defendant is crucial to the court exercising 
jurisdiction over that person. One of the perceived advantages of the action in rem is that it is 
possible to pursue the claim and have security for it without the need to find and serve directly 
the person personally liable in respect of the claim. Where there is a submission to the 
jurisdiction these problems are overcome. In South Africa, as explained earlier when the origins 
of the attachment to found jurisdiction were explored, the underlying notion of the attachment 
was that if the person’s goods were or their person was attached this would serve as a spur to 
them accepting the jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of the litigation. In other words the 
attachment of property was directed in part at least at procuring the owner’s submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court and thereby rendering the judgment of the court effective, not only 
against property attached but against the defendant personally, because a judgment based on the 
voluntary submission of the defendant is internationally recognised and enforceable. This 
proposition underpins the principle that a prior voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the 




 It is worth asking whether in accordance with conventional principles relating to 
submission to the jurisdiction of a court the conduct of the owner of a vessel in giving notice of 
intention to defend an action in rem would constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the court 
and, if not, whether the conduct of a defence on the merits, perhaps in conjunction with other 
conduct such as the furnishing of security in order to have the vessel released, constitutes a 
submission to jurisdiction. The well-established test in this regard is whether the party in 
                                                 
26 Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA), paras [24] to [26].  
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question has unequivocally indicated by words or conduct that they accept the jurisdiction of the 
court to decide the dispute or do not timeously object thereto, this will be taken to be a 
submission.27 As it was put by van Heerden J: 
 
‘Submission to the jurisdiction of a court is a wide concept and may be expressed in 
words or come about by agreement between the parties. Voet 2.1.18. It may arise through 
unilateral conduct following upon citation before a court which would ordinarily not be 
competent to give judgment against that particular defendant. Voet 2.1.20. Thus where a 
person not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of a court submits himself by positive act 
or negatively by not objecting to the [jurisdiction] of that court, he may, in cases such as 
actions sounding in money, confer jurisdiction on that court. Herbstein and Van Winsen 
The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa 3rd ed at 30; Pollak The South 
African Law of Jurisdiction at 84 et seq.’28         
 
A person who defends litigation, without objecting to the jurisdiction of the court up to the stage 
of litis contestatio, will be held to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction.
29
 It is 
permissible to enter an appearance to defend, without that being construed as a submission to the 
jurisdiction, provided that the defendant thereafter challenges the jurisdiction of the court. It is 
only where the matter proceeds to litis contestatio without a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction 
that the actions of the defendant in defending the case are taken to constitute a submission to the 
court’s jurisdiction. Thus there is authority that merely furnishing an address for service (which 
is required by Admiralty Rule 4(6) when a person gives security under section 3(10) to prevent 
an arrest) does not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction because our rules provide no basis 
for giving a qualified notice of appearance to defend.30 
 
 Applying these principles in the case of an action in rem where the owner is personally 
liable the entry of appearance would not as such and without more constitute a submission to the 
jurisdiction. However, if the case was thereafter defended, without any challenge to the 
                                                 
27 Du Preez v Philip-King 1963 (1) SA 801 (W) at 803C-804H. 
28 Mediterranean Shipping Co v Speedwell Shipping Co Ltd and Another 1986 (4) SA 329 (D) at 333E – G quoted 
with approval in Purser v Sales; Purser and another v Sales and another 2001 (3) SA 445 (SCA), para [13]. 
29 Lubbe v Bosman 1948 (3) SA 909 (O) at 914; William Spilhaus & Co (MB)(Pty) Ltd v Marx 1963 (4) SA 994 (C) 
at 996D-H 
30 Malcolmess and Co. Ltd v Allkin & Co. Ltd. 1914 CPD 519. 
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jurisdiction being raised and without an application for a stay or for the court to decline 
jurisdiction, on ordinary principles that would amount to a submission to the jurisdiction. The 
provision of security alone would probably not amount to a submission as it would be seen as a 
matter of commercial necessity rather than a voluntary submission and in most cases the terms 
of the security reserve the right to challenge the arrest or deemed arrest. A failure to do so, 
however, in conjunction with a defence of the action would ordinarily constitute a submission to 
the jurisdiction. Why should this not be the position in an action in rem with an owner who is 
personally liable? In that case the ship could have been attached ad fundandam et confirmandam 
jurisdictionem to found and confirm jurisdiction over the owner. Why should the choice of an 
action in rem, instead of an action in personam, determine whether the court has personal 
jurisdiction over the owner and whether its judgment binds the owner? And why should a rule of 
procedure be taken to alter or reverse such a well-established and practical legal rule? That 
seems to be a very far-reaching construction. 
 
 When the owner chooses to enter the lists and defend the claim, which involves defending 
its personal liability for that claim, every reason of convenience suggests that to treat that as 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of the adjudication of that claim is 
appropriate. It is submitted that there is nothing in the language of the rule to suggest that the 
principles of submission do not apply to an owner defending an action in rem. All that the rule 
says is that the mere fact of entering an appearance to defend does not create a liability and 
particularly a liability in personam. Assuming that this broad language extends to the creation of 
a liability in the sense of being liable to be regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction of 
our courts, it goes no further than the existing approach of our courts to questions of submission 
to the jurisdiction. Accordingly the rule does not appear to go further than and indeed reflects 
existing practice insofar as entering an appearance to defend is concerned.
31
 This is a necessary 
provision in the light of the fact that the Act allows a party to enter an appearance to defend the 
proceedings and to raise by way of a declinatory plea the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act 
                                                 
31 Apparently that was also the previous general  position in England (D Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 
2nd Ed, 177) but that position may have changed as a result of the changes in civil procedure in English courts in 
recent years (D Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 4th Ed, paras 9.58 to 9.60.) 
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the defence of forum non conveniens or to seek a stay of the proceedings under section 7(2) 
pursuant to an arbitration clause or an exclusive jurisdiction clause. There does not appear to be 
a good reason for taking it any further than that.  
 
 It may be objected that the actions of the owner in defending an action in rem after 
entering an appearance to defend and after reaching the stage of litis contestatio cannot amount 
to a submission to the jurisdiction in personam, because the proceedings being in rem they do 
not lie against the owner but only against the vessel and hence the owner’s actions cannot 
amount to a submission in its personal capacity. However, that contention forces us to confront 
the nature of the action in rem and the question whether such an action is, whatever its outward 
form, always from the outset an action against the owner of the vessel that is the subject of the 
action. If it is correct for South Africa, as Lord Steyn has held is the position in England, and as I 
have suggested that the action in rem is merely a procedure by which the owner of a vessel is 
brought before the court, then there can be no objection to treating the owner’s conduct in regard 
to those proceedings as a submission in personam to the jurisdiction of the court.  
 
 One further example illustrates the problems inherent in construing rule 8(3) as meaning 
that once an action in rem has been instituted it is always treated as not in any way determining 
the liability of the owner of the defendant vessel in personam. It is permissible under Admiralty 
Rule 10 for any person who has given notice of intention to defend to bring a claim in 
reconvention, thus embodying in the rules the judgment in The Lady Rose.32 Take the case where 
the owner takes advantage of this to bring such a claim, for example, a claim under section 5(4) 
of the Act. It transpires that in doing so it was unduly optimistic in regard to its ability to resist 
the plaintiff’s claim and that claim, based upon the owner’s personal liability succeeds and the 
claim in reconvention is dismissed. There can be no question about the fact that the owner was 
before the court and submitted to its jurisdiction. Van Heerden J said in the case already 
mentioned,
33
 where the facts were the converse of those described: 
                                                 
32 SA Boatyard CC (t/a Hout Bay Boatyard) v The Lady Rose (formerly known as the Shiza) 1991 (3) SA 711 (C). 
33 Mediterranean Shipping Co v Speedwell Shipping Co Ltd and Another 1986 (4) SA 329 (D) at 334A. 
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‘Anyone who invokes the jurisdiction of this Court for relief under the Act must be taken 
- and can hardly be heard to contend otherwise - to have submitted to that jurisdiction …’ 
 
For the court then to say to the successful plaintiff that the judgment in its favour was operative 
only against the named vessel or the security given to procure its release and not against the 
owner who had unsuccessfully resisted the claim (and counter-claimed thereby invoked the 
jurisdiction of the court in an endeavour both to have the claim rejected and to procure an award 
in its favour) is, to say the least, a very unattractive proposition.  
 
 It is submitted that the proper interpretation of the rule is this.  It embodies the traditional 
approach of our courts that giving notice of intention to defend does not without more constitute 
a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It therefore narrows the potential34 range of 
operation of the rule in The Dictator by saying that merely giving notice of intention to defend 
does not attract liability in personam beyond a liability for costs. If my reservation regarding the 
true scope of that rule is correct and the case is not to be construed as imposing any liability on 
an owner, not otherwise personally liable in respect of a claim, then rule 8(3) is consistent with 
the application of the principle laid down in The Dictator. In South Africa it is submitted that if 
the owner is personally liable on the claim and enters appearance to defend rule 8(3) provides no 
reason not to apply the principles of The Dictator, especially if Lord Steyn’s approach in The 
Indian Grace (No 2), is a correct reflection of the nature of the action in rem as fundamentally a 
procedural means for impleading the owner of the vessel. Indeed the principles in The Dictator 
and those in The Indian Grace (No 2) become mutually reinforcing. Equally if the owner 
submits to the jurisdiction of the South African court in some other way as for example by way 
of an express submission in furnishing security to prevent an arrest under section 3(10) of the 
Act
35
 or by furnishing security and then defending the action through to the stage of trial and 
judgment it is submitted that there is nothing in the language of rule 8(3) to indicate that the 
                                                 
34 I have already drawn attention to the fact that this may be an unduly broad understanding of the decision in that 
case. 
35 As I am informed by a senior attorney with many years of experience with such matters is the common practice. 
Others equally experienced tell me that this is not necessarily so. 
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principle in The Dictator should not apply, provided the owner is personally liable on the claim. 
 
 Why then have our courts, when considering the rule given the impression of adopting a 
different view and what is the binding force of those expressions of view? One starts with the 
case of The Tigr.
36
 It was a case in which confirmation of an attachment ad fundandam et 
confirmandam jurisdictionem was sought. That was opposed on the basis of a contention that the 
owners of the tug had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. That contention was 
founded on the fact that the MT Tigr had already been arrested in an action in rem and the owner 
of the tug had given notice of intention to defend that action. It was first contended that Rule 
6(3) did not apply because the owner was in any event liable in the action in rem because its 
property stood to be sold in satisfaction of the claim. That contention was rejected on the basis 
that the liability of the owner was limited to the value of the res. The second contention was that 
if the rule applied it was invalid because it purported to reverse the substantive law in regard to 
the liability of the owner of a vessel arrested in an action in rem and was not purely procedural. 
This was rejected on the basis that in English law the nature of the action is procedural. The 
position was said37 to be the following: 
 
‘The liability of the owner in the present case is in no way affected by the provisions of 
the Rule. If judgment were to be given in the action in rem it would only be because the 
Court was of the view that first respondent was liable. If applicant were not to obtain 
satisfaction from the proceeds of the res it could sue first respondent in personam for the 
balance. All that the Rule does is to provide the manner in which first respondent's 
liability can be procedurally enforced. In this regard it must be remembered that the 
action in rem is regarded as a procedural device and that the procedural theory of the 
action in rem is the theory which has prevailed in English admiralty law: see, for 
example, The MV Andrico Unity (supra at 353D). On this basis Rule 6(3) is concerned 
with a matter of procedure, that is to say the effect of an entry of appearance in an action 
in rem, and is accordingly not ultra vires 
It follows from what I have said that Rule 6(3) applies to an owner who enters an 
appearance in an action in rem. By our procedure, as set forth in the Rule, such an 
owner is not regarded as having submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of the 
Court.’  
                                                 
36 Bouyges Offshore and another v Owner of the MT Tigr and another 1995 (4) SA 49 (C) at 67D-J. 
37 At 68G-H. 
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There are some difficulties that flow from this statement, such as the proposition that all that the 
rule does is to provide the manner in which the owner’s liability is to be procedurally enforced. 
It is unclear what this means as the rule does not deal with that topic. However, it is unnecessary 
to try and resolve this for present purposes. The judgment does not reject the principle 
determined in The Dictator as explained above and is consistent with the notion that the action 
in rem is procedural, although it is not clear whether the judgment on this point is dealing with 
the action as embodied in the Act or with the position under English law. Be that as it may it is 
not inconsistent with the construction I have given to Rule 8 (3). The final statement that entry 
of appearance does not amount to a submission to the jurisdiction is correct provided it is 
understood as applying to an entry of appearance standing on its own.  
 
 The second case in which rule 8(3) was considered is The Lady Rose.38 That involved the 
question whether the owner of a vessel proceeded against in rem could bring a counterclaim. It 
was argued that as the action lay only against the vessel; that the rule reversed the principle in 
The Dictator so that if the owner entered appearance to defend it was not the defendant under the 
then wording of Admiralty Rule 8,
39
 and accordingly the owner was not entitled to bring a 
counterclaim. The court (Scott J) rejected this contention in the following terms: 
 
The effect of the Rule would seem to be to re-establish the position which prevailed in 
England prior to The Dictator (cf Thomas Maritime Liens para 92) and the Rule is 
probably the result of criticism levelled at the extension of the owner's liability which has 
occurred since the last decade of the previous century (cf Jackson Enforcement of 
Maritime Claims at 59; Shaw (op cit at 31))40. It does not follow, however, that merely 
because the owner defending an action in rem does not incur personal liability (save for 
costs) he is necessarily to be regarded as being a stranger to the suit and not entitled to 
counterclaim. The arrest of a maritime res and the institution of an action in rem has the 
inevitable consequence of involving the owner in the proceedings. Indeed, as pointed out 
by Goff J in I Congresso del Partido [1978] 1 All ER 1169 at 1191, 'he (the owner) must 
either fight the case or surrender his ship'. The question whether the true nature of the 
                                                 
38 SA Boatyard CC (t/a Hout Bay Boatyard) v The Lady Rose (formerly known as the Shiza) 1991 (3) SA 711 (C) at 
715G – 716E 
39 Now rule 10. 
40 Such criticism as is embodied in these texts is fairly muted and not directed at the case where the owner is already 
personally liable and the consequences of such an owner participating to contest that liability. 
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action in rem is an action lying against a thing or against a person or persons having an 
interest in the thing, is one which has been the subject of much debate. Historically, in 
rem proceedings were used as a means of compelling appearance (The Father Times 
[1979] 2 Lloyd's LR 364 at 368); but it is probably an over-simplification to regard the 
action merely as a procedural device to compel the owner or other interested party to 
enter an appearance, as is sometimes suggested. The action undoubtedly focuses on a 
maritime res 'against or in respect of which the claim lies' (s 3(5) of the Act). On the other 
hand, it does not totally ignore the person or persons having an interest in the res (see for 
instance the provisions of s 3(6) and 3(7) relating to associated ships) and has been 
appropriately described by Professor Jackson as having a 'curious hybrid nature' (Jackson 
(op cit at 85)). For the present purpose, however, it is unnecessary to have to decide upon 
the true nature of the action in rem. Whatever that may be, it is at least clear that the 
action cannot be regarded as simply an action against a res without reference to the owner 
or person having an interest therein. This is particularly so where, as in the present case, 
the action is dependent upon the existence of a claim in personam against the owner (s 
3(4)(b) of the Act). Even where the claim is founded upon a maritime lien, the owner, of 
course, remains involved to the extent that he is compelled, in the absence of payment, to 
defend the action or lose his ship or other maritime res. In these circumstances, to regard 
him, for the purpose of Admiralty Rule 8, as being someone entirely different from the 
defendant, viz the maritime res, and therefore unable to counterclaim, would be to adopt 
an approach which, in my view, is unnecessarily technical and could not have been what 
was intended.’ 
 
The statements in this judgment in regard to the purpose of rule 8(3) and the nature of the action 
in rem are plainly obiter dicta as the basis upon which the court resolved the case was that, 
whatever the nature of the action, it would be unduly technical to construe the relevant rule as 
precluding the owner who had entered appearance in an action in rem from bringing a claim in 
reconvention. As already mentioned rule 8, now rule 10, has been amended to reflect that the 
judgment correctly reflects the position. In doing so it fortifies the notion that to ignore an owner 
which is defending proceedings in rem is impractical and unrealistic. Accordingly this judgment 
also does not stand in the way of the construction of rule 8(3) advanced above.  
 
 That leaves the decision in The Argun.41 The issue in that case was whether an action in 
rem brought by members of the crew had lapsed as a result of the lapsing of the original arrest of 
the vessel at their instance. It was argued that the effect of rule 8(3) was to reverse ‘the rule in the 
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English case of The Dictator’. Having set out, but not approved this argument, the court dealt 
with and rejected an argument based on the decision in The City of Mecca42 and after quoting the 
passage cited above from The August 8 said: 
 
‘[26] If the present case had been heard in England, therefore, on the lapsing of the arrest 
of the vessel the actions would at the very least have continued as actions in personam 
against the vessel's owner. That that is not our law is clear from Rule 8(3), the material 
provisions of which are quoted in para [20] of this judgment.’ 
 
On the facts of the case the owner of the vessel was not personally liable for the claims and it 
was not submitted to the jurisdiction or assumed liability in some form. The only basis for the 
action in rem was accordingly the maritime lien that the claimants enjoyed over the vessel. In 
that situation it is by no means clear, for the reasons already discussed, that in England the 
owners would have incurred personal liability on the claims by entering an appearance to defend 
the action in rem. However, in South Africa the position would undoubtedly be that they would 
not incur personal liability and to the extent that the position might have been otherwise under 
English law, rule 8(3) does indeed make it clear that this is not the position in this country. 
 
In my view therefore the South African cases, notwithstanding some apparently wide 
statements about the impact of rule 8(3) on the principles laid down in The Dictator, do not 
construe that rule in a fashion that renders those principles inapplicable in South Africa. Nor is 
there any reason of principle or practicality that suggests that the decision in that case, 
formulated at as being confined to a situation where there is a pre-existing liability on the owner 
of the arrested vessel, should not apply in this country. If that is a correct approach to rule 8(3) 
that in dealing with the situation where the owner is personally liable it does not alter the 
liability of the owner, but where the owner has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by 
defending the action without challenging the jurisdiction of the court it has no application, there 
is no reason not to follow The Dictator in those cases. It is the wider construction of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 MT ‘Argun’ v Master and Crew of the MT ‘Argun’ claiming under case number AC 126/99 and others 2004 (1) 
SA 1 (SCA), para [26] 
42 The City of Mecca (1879) 5 P 28. 
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principle in that case that gives rise to potential difficulties. In South Africa it is submitted that it 
is unnecessary to debate the matter in great detail because a wider imposition of liability would 
founder on the constitutional principles discussed in chapter 9. The imposition of liability where 
none would otherwise exist, merely by virtue of the person concerned having sought to defend 
their ownership of the vessel, would result in an arbitrary deprivation of property in the broad 
sense that has been given to that expression by the Constitutional Court. To permit a judgment, 
capable of being executed against all of a person’s property, to be entered against a person where 
they have no personal liability for the debt giving rise to that judgment would in my view clearly 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
The situation of the owner of a vessel arrested as an associated ship is more complex.  
Firstly it must be borne in mind that there are two types of associated ship – the sister ship and 
what has been referred to in this work as the true associated ship. In the case of a sister ship 
where the owner is personally liable and enters appearance to defend there seems to be no reason 
of principle or convenience that would exclude the operation of the rule in The Dictator to that 
owner. Although the action has commenced and proceeds against the associated ship (and if the 
owner does not intervene the claimant is limited to the value of that vessel) where the owner 
does intervene it is defending its own personal liability in just the same way as would be the case 
if the action had been brought against the ship concerned.  It is submitted that it should have the 
same consequences. The position in regard to the true associated ship is however different. 
 
It has been argued in chapter 9 that the institution of the associated ship is one that can 
survive constitutional scrutiny because of the close links that must exist between the companies 
that own the ship concerned and the associated ship. In other words it is constitutionally 
permissible for ship X to be arrested and proceeded against in rem in respect of a claim arising 
from the operations of ship Y, provided the requisite link between the ship-owning companies, 
in the form of common control on the relevant dates, is established. That link continues to exist 
whether the liability is viewed as a liability against the vessel or a liability of its owner. The 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court does not appear to rule out circumstances where 
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personal liability is imposed on A for the debts of B. The question will always be whether 
the connection between A and B is sufficiently close for that imposition of liability to be 
arbitrary. Thus it is improbable that the Constitution outlaws the long-standing power of courts 
to pierce the corporate veil in circumstances of fraud or other dishonesty and impose personal 
liability on a controlling shareholder instead of or in addition to that of the company that is 
primarily responsible for the wrong in question. Similarly it was argued that the connection 
created by common control of the ship-owning companies is such as to justify the attachment of 
associated ship liability. Whilst in the case of one-ship companies the issue of any liability 
beyond the vale of the ship itself is largely academic, it seems to be straining at a gnat, having 
swallowed a camel, to exclude personal liability on the part of the owner of an associated ship if 
the owner enters the fray beyond attempting to establish that the association is ill-founded or 
seeking a stay or that the court decline jurisdiction. In other words there seems to be no practical 
reason for treating the owner of the associated ship any differently from the owner of the ship 
concerned. 
 
The argument against this approach is one of construction of the Act itself in the 
provisions in respect of associated ships. Those provisions do not say that the owner of the 
associated ship is liable for the debt, but that the associated ship may be arrested in an action in 
rem in respect of a claim against the ship concerned. In other words the statute does not speak of 
any personal liability on the part of the owner of the associated ship, although as pointed out 
above such liability may exist in the case of sister ships. In that sense to impose such personal 
liability in the case of the true associated ship as a consequence of the owner seeking to defend 
their vessel goes beyond the provisions of the Act itself. It must be borne in mind that the 
liability of the associated ship is a creation of the legislation and it would be a strange situation 
were procedural steps by the vessel’s owners to result in the imposition of a more extensive 
liability than that contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act, by virtue of a concept of 
the action in rem not attuned to or formulated in the light of this development. Even if one 
accepts a theory of the nature of the action in rem that recognises it as a procedural means of 
impleading the owner of a vessel, so that the true associated ship arrest is seen as a means of 
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suing a person other than the person liable for the debt, which is consistent with what was said in 
the judgments in The Berg,
43
 it does not necessarily follow that the intention of the legislature 
was that the liability of that owner would extend beyond the vessel itself. The point can be 
illustrated with the simple, albeit factually improbable, example of a company owning the 
associated ship that is also possessed of other substantial assets. The Act provides that the 
associated ship can be arrested in proceedings in rem in respect of a maritime claim arising in 
respect of the ship concerned.  It does not say or even suggest that the other assets of the owner 
of the associated ship will be placed at risk by the recognition of the action against the associated 
ship. Any such liability would not therefore arise form the terms of the Act but from the 
application of a rule pronounced in the context of the personal liability of the shipowner at a 
time when an institution such as an associated ship was not even contemplated. 
 
Overall it is submitted that the argument from the construction of the Act must prevail, 
however odd that may seem in practical terms. It is accordingly submitted that the principle in 
The Dictator does apply in South Africa, but only in the case of the owner of either the ship 
concerned or a sister ship who is also personally liable for the maritime claim that is the subject 
of the action. Where there is no such liability, or in the case of the owner of the true associated 
ship, neither the entry of appearance to defend nor the conduct of the defence amounts to 
anything more than a submission to the jurisdiction in respect of those matters (including 
obviously costs) for which the intervening owner is personally liable and no more. That is not to 
say that there is no submission to the jurisdiction. It merely says that Shaw is correct in the 
comment quoted above in saying that a submission to jurisdiction does not give rise to a liability 
for the claim. Any such liability must flow from other factors. 
 
The implication of this conclusion is that the characteristic of an action in rem under 
consideration falls to be formulated more narrowly insofar as this country is concerned.  It is 
suggested that the proper formulation for South African purposes is the following.  Giving notice 
                                                 
43
 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N). and Euromarine International of 
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of intention to defend an action in rem does not attract any personal liability save in respect 
of costs. Where the person giving such notice is personally liable on the claim and defends it up 
to the stage of litis contestatio, without challenging the jurisdiction of the court or asking the 
court to decline jurisdiction or stay the proceedings, that constitutes a submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court in respect of the claim and the judgment constitutes a final and binding 
determination against such person of their liability in respect of that claim. The consequence of 
this from a procedural point of view is that the pleadings could be amended and judgment sought 
jointly against the vessel and such person as has long been the practice in England. To that 
extent the principles of The Dictator are still applicable in South Africa and we have not 
reverted to some previous and probably mythical ‘pure’ form of the action in rem 
  
(d) If the owner does not appear the claimant is limited to the realisable value of the 
res. 
 
 This rule is well-established.
44
 It is also very ancient having its roots in the procedures 
adopted in maritime courts discussed in chapter 2. Those procedures, which were, as already 
established, common to a number of mercantile courts, were based on a theory of contumacy. 
Where they were commenced by the arrest of property and there was no appearance the courts 
would after a period of time and the making of three demands adjudge the property to the 
claimant.  Accordingly the claimant would only be able to recover in those proceedings an 
amount represented by the value of the goods. That is the position in admiralty and it was 
reinforced in England by issue of writs of prohibition as the common law courts sought to 
suppress the Admiralty Court and the civilian lawyers responded by claiming that the action lay 
only against the res, a form of proceeding not recognised in the common law courts. In 
substance it means that the owner chooses to abandon the vessel rather than seek to protect its 
interest. That will usually be because the owner is either not in a position to defend the vessel or 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1986 (2) SA 700 (A). 
44 The Banco [1971] 1 All ER 524 (PDA and CA) at 53. Its continuing operation was however queried by Brandon J 
in J H Pigott & Sons Ltd v Owners of the Conoco Britania (The Conoco Britannia) [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 342.  
However nothing appears to have come of that query and for present purposes the position is as stated in the rule.  
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is satisfied that there is no purpose in doing so. Whether there is anything to be said for the 
notion that this principle may have its roots in the concept of noxal surrender as suggested by 
Shaw45 it is hardly helpful in the present day and age and perhaps an improbable characterisation 
even to the civilians practising in admiralty. The principle is consistent with the provision in 
Admiralty Rule 4(7)(a) that the release of the arrested property may be obtained by giving 
security for the claim or the value of the property. 
 
 In many ways the rule is a matter of commonsense. If the only thing before the court is 
the ship that has been arrested and the owner is absent and has not submitted to the jurisdiction, 
there is little point in a court pronouncing for a greater liability than can be recovered by selling 
the ship. A judgment pronounced against an absent defendant, which has not been served, will 
not be recognised internationally and is contrary to the basic principle that courts should only 
exercise jurisdiction over a person within its jurisdiction or who submits tot that jurisdiction or 
who is in some other way connected with that jurisdiction so that it is appropriate to exercise that 
jurisdiction. The mere presence of property within the jurisdiction does not ordinarily satisfy 
these criteria, but there is no practical reason for the court not to exercise jurisdiction on the 
basis that its judgment will be limited to what can be recovered by the sale of that property.  
 
 The critics of the judgment in The Indian Grace (No 2) contend that the notion that the 
action in rem is procedural is inconsistent with the fact that where the owner does not enter the 
lists to defend the action a claimant is limited to the value of the res. If the action is in truth, 
notwithstanding its outward form, an action against the owner of the vessel then there is no 
reason, so it is argued, for the effect of the judgment to be limited to the value of the vessel. The 
judgment is a judgment against the owner and there is no reason why it should be limited in this 
way forcing the claimant to seek recovery of the balance due by way of a separate action against 
the owner. Accordingly it is said that the action must be one against the vessel and judgment is 
                                                 
45 D J Shaw, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa, 31. Holmes J in the United States also suggested 




 so that to say it is against the owner is incorrect.  
 
 The difficulty with this argument is that by framing the question in this fashion the 
answer necessarily follows. The underlying presumption is that if the action is against the owner 
then it should lie for the full amount of the debt and to limit it to the value of the res necessarily 
conveys that its characterisation is incorrect. However, if the question is framed differently it 
leads to a different result. Thus it could be asked why, if the judgment is not one against the 
owner of the vessel, it should then lead to the owner losing its vessel in satisfaction of the claim?  
Such loss flows directly from the judgment itself and it is cold comfort to the owner of the vessel 
to be told that the action did not lie against them but against their vessel. As the United States 
Supreme Court said; ‘To say that an owner is not liable, but that his vessel is liable, seems to us 
like talking in riddles.  In the matter of liability, a man and his property cannot be separated.’47 A 
judgment resulting in a person losing their property can only be justified on the basis of the 
personal liability of the owner or on the basis of the owner being bound to submit to the 
existence of a security interest over the res. To say therefore that the action is against the vessel 
is merely a shorthand way of saying that it is against the owner of the vessel but the amount of 
the claim is limited for reasons of substance or procedure. Denying or ignoring the real effect of 
the action does not assist in understanding the restriction on the extent of the owner’s liability. It 
is suggested that it is better to look at the reason for the restriction rather than to use the 
restriction to espouse a different explanation of the nature of the action. 
 
 The effect of the limitation is that the court can only give judgment for the value of the res. 
The roots of this lie in history and early practicality, when enforcement of judgments obtained in 
one court in another court would have been less easy than it is today, rather than in any point of 
principle concerning the identity of the defendant. It has already been noted that from the 
perspective of international comity in the enforcement of the judgments of foreign courts many 
countries do not recognise a jurisdiction founded upon the attachment of property regarding that 
                                                 
46 Teare, op cit, 34. 
47 The City of Norwich 118 US 468, 503. 
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jurisdiction as exorbitant. One can start with the Roman Law where the principle actor sequitur 
forum rei applied and progress to the various procedures developed by mercantile courts to 
secure jurisdiction over traders by arrest of person or goods, which as already noted was initially 
designed to induce a consent to the local jurisdiction, to see the origins of the reluctance to 
recognise jurisdiction founded upon arrest alone. In its form as developed in Roman-Dutch 
practice it is described by no less an authority than Wessels as ‘a peculiar and unusual’ 
practice.
48
   
 
 It is hardly surprising therefore that in its English manifestation as developed in the 
Admiralty Court the courts limited the scope of their awards to the value of the res or the bail 
where bail had been given to secure the release of the property arrested.  Until the changes 
brought about by the Judicature Acts the enforcement of a judgment in admiralty for an amount 
exceeding the value of the res would have been problematic. The Admiralty Marshall would 
have been able to realise the vessel or other property arrested but even in England itself no 
mechanism existed for enforcing a judgment beyond that. Hence the acceptance of the rule that 
the judgment of the Admiralty Court was restricted to the value of the res or the bail. In The 
Dictator there was a partial escape from this straitjacket in circumstances where an owner 
personally liable entered an appearance to defend the action. However, no similar escape route 
lay open where the owner did not appear. In essence the action, even if characterised as an action 
impleading the owner from the outset, was one where the court’s jurisdiction was founded upon 
arrest and a judgment against the owner where jurisdiction is based solely upon the arrest of the 
vessel or other maritime property suffers from the same difficulty as a judgment based upon an 
attachment of property ad fundandam et confirmandam jurisdictionem.   
 
 The rule can therefore be justified on pragmatic grounds relating to the enforceability of 
the ultimate judgment granted by a court in in rem proceedings. The action is always one in 
                                                 
48 Wessels J H, History of Roman Dutch Law, 687.  Article 3.2 of the European Jurisdiction Regulation apparently 
prohibits the founding of jurisdiction on the seizure of property with an exception being made for an arrest pursuant 
to the Arrest Convention.  See Derrington & Turner, op cit, 23.  
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which the owner of the vessel is impleaded from the outset, but where the sole foundation for 
the court exercising its jurisdiction is the arrest of the vessel without any action by its owner 
constituting a submission to the court’s jurisdiction the court will refrain from granting judgment 
for an amount greater than the value of the res, leaving the claimant to pursue the balance of the 
claim by such other means as may be available. It can be characterised as an exercise of judicial 
restraint by the court seised of the action. The question in South Africa would be whether similar 
restraint should be exercised by our courts in actions in rem bearing in mind that at common law 
we do recognise a jurisdiction based upon attachment of property as providing a proper 
foundation for the court both to exercise jurisdiction and to grant a judgment against the owner 
of the property for the full value of the claim, leaving it to the claimant to enforce that judgment 
elsewhere if it is able to do so. 
 
 In dealing with this issue it is submitted that the role of history becomes important. When 
considering other aspects of the action in rem earlier in this chapter the basis for departing from 
any established view of the nature and consequences of the action have been found in the 
language of the Act or the impact of the Constitution or the basis for the associated ship arrest or 
a combination of those elements when seen in the light of our civil law heritage. Otherwise due 
credit has been given to the stated intention of the Law Commission that it aimed to preserve for 
South African admiralty proceedings the action in rem derived from England via the Colonial 
Courts of Admiralty Act.   
 
 There is some incongruity in a situation where if a claim is pursued by way of an action in 
personam and the attachment of a ship, it will result in a judgment against the owner irrespective 
of whether the owner defends the action, but if the same claim is pursued in rem commencing 
with the arrest of the same ship any judgment will be limited to the value of the res but it is 
submitted that this provides an insufficient basis for departing from the existing rule. It has 
already been mentioned that there is a difference between an attachment to found jurisdiction 
and an arrest insofar as the ability to secure the release of the vessel by furnishing security is 
concerned. That may result in due course in an equality challenge or a rationality challenge 
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under the Constitution, but it is difficult to predict what the outcome of such a challenge would 
be. There does not appear to be any convincing constitutional reason for favouring the common 
law rule over the admiralty rule or vice versa so this must be taken as speculative until such a 
challenge is brought. One can only predict that the challenge is likely to come from a shipowner 
whose vessel has been attached rather than one whose vessel has been arrested in rem as the 
latter enjoys the more favourable regime as far as security is concerned. In addition as 
attachments are increasingly rare because of the extensive in rem jurisdiction it may be some 
time before this issue is raised if it ever is. 
 
 Returning then to the principle that where the owner does not appear judgment is limited 
to the value of the res there does not seem to be any good reason why in South Africa that 
should not be adhered to. Nor is there any reason why it should be altered or adapted in any way. 
It can be applied as easily in relation to an associated ship as to the ship concerned and if 
anything the case for its application in that instance is stronger, because the associated ship 
jurisdiction imposes a unique liability on the owner of the associated ship. Accordingly it is 
accepted that this principle continues to apply to in rem proceedings in South Africa. 
 
(e) Persons other than the owner may enter appearance in order to defend their interest 
in the vessel. 
 
 Again this rule is well-established. It gives recognition to the fact that when a vessel is 
arrested a number of separate interests may be involved. If the vessel is under charter the 
charterer may be affected. If there is a risk that the vessel may be sold that will affect he interests 
of the mortgagee. Both the vessel and its cargo are likely to be insured and their interests could 
be affected by an arrest. The effect of the rule is that they are free to intervene in the action to 
defend it in order to protect their own interests even if they are not personally liable for the 
claim. If they choose to intervene then they incur a liability for costs but no personal liability in 
respect of the claim itself. 
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 However unusual the operation of this rule may seem in the context of civil 
proceedings in England – a matter on which I make no comment – it does not seem to be in any 
way unusual or odd in South Africa, where our courts have in other instances exercised their 
power to regulate their own proceedings in such a way as to ensure that parties having legitimate 
claims or defences are afforded an opportunity to have those claims or defences advanced on 
their behalf. Thus in cases where distance and problems with communication or the advent of 
war prevented a party from commencing action when the failure to do so with expedition might 
lead to the claim being lost the court has authorised intervening parties having no direct 
connection with the litigation to bring such proceedings in the name and on behalf of such 
persons.
49
 Where the fact that a country had been overrun by Hitler’s army in World War 2 
meant that it was probable that a company being sued in South Africa would be unable to defend 
an action brought against it by a former director, the court authorised a South African associated 
company to defend the proceedings on its behalf.
50
 In terms of section 173 of the Constitution 
the High Court has inherent power to protect its own process and to develop the common law 
taking account of the interests of justice. In terms of section 34 of the Constitution everyone has 
a right of access to courts. These powers are extensive and enable the courts to ensure that 
parties having an interest in proceedings can be properly represented before them.51 
 
 Against that background the rule that parties having an interest in or affected by the arrest 
in rem of a vessel are entitled to intervene in and defend the proceedings without incurring any 
liability other than one for costs is consonant with the basic principles recognised by our courts 
and is certainly applicable to an action in rem in South Africa, whether against the ship 
concerned or against an associated ship. If anything the latter jurisdiction would highlight the 




                                                 
49 Ex parte Hattersley 1904 TH 258; Abroms v Minister of Railways and Harbours 1917 WLD 51. 
50 Ex Parte Skodaworks S.A. (Pty.), Ltd.; In Re Gompels v Skodawerke, Prague 1941 TPD 29. 
51 See the recent analysis of this power in Manong v Minister of Public Works (518/2008) [2009] ZASCA 110 
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(f) A cause of action in rem  does not merge in a judgment in personam. 
 
 In the Court of Appeal in The Indian Grace (No 2)52 Staughton LJ described this principle 
in the following terms: 
 
 ‘It is well established since the time of Dr. Lushington that a plaintiff who has an 
unsatisfied judgment in personam can proceed by an action in rem. (Presumably there 
would be no advantage in doing so unless there had been a change in ownership of the 
vessel; otherwise the plaintiff could employ ordinary methods of execution53…) Similarly 
a plaintiff who has proceeded in rem, recovered judgment against the vessel, and is left 
with it only partially satisfied, may start a second action in personam." 
 
In saying this Staughton LJ was highlighting a possible anomaly in regarding the action in rem 
as being purely procedural and directed against the owner of the vessel from the outset. The 
point is that if the case was always one against the vessel’s owner then any judgment should also 
be a judgment against the owner and should preclude any further action on the same claim. This 
follows from the rule in England that once a judgment has been delivered in an action the cause 
of action is merged in the judgment and can no longer be the subject of a further claim.
54
 The 
anomaly would arise from allowing two actions against the same person on the same claim.  
 
 Lord Steyn brushed this anomaly aside by suggesting
55
 on the basis of counsel’s agreement 
that the rule was established in cases involving maritime liens and ‘is an ancient and strange rule 
                                                 
52 The Indian Grace (No.2) [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 12 (CA). 
53 This being so the practical application of the rule would be limited to cases where the claim gave rise to a 
maritime lien otherwise the change in ownership would prevent the claimant from proceeding against the vessel in 
rem. Derrington and Turner, op cit, 34 make the same point but extend it to the situation where the proceedings 
have been issued and there is then a change in ownership of the vessel, in other words the situation encompassed by 
the decision in The Monica S. However, for reasons set out above that latter principle is not applicable in South 
Africa. 
54 As to the merger rule see Jackson D C, Enforcement of Maritime Claims (4th Ed), 647-8. In Comandate Marine 
Corp v Pan Australia Shipping (Pty) Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, para 118 the fear is expressed that the adoption of the 
approach that the action is always one against the owner of the vessel will render the choice of procedure a lottery 
by precluding an action in rem after an unsuccessful action in personam. For my part I am unable to see why the 
acceptance that the claim is against the owner requires a merger of the cause of action in the judgment and that 
would not appear to be required by South African law.  
55 Incorrectly as pointed out by Young J in The ‘Irina Zharkikh and Ksenia Zharkikh’  [2001] 2 NZLR 801; [2001] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 319. 
 501
which I would not wish to extend beyond the limits laid down by authority’. Critics of his 
decision have pointed out that the problem cannot be avoided quite as easily as that56. Viewed 
from a South African perspective however it may be that what Lord Steyn regarded as strange is 
perfectly acceptable because in our law there is no automatic merger of a cause of action in a 
judgment on that cause of action. The approach of the Roman-Dutch law is to treat (by way of a 
fiction according to Voet
57
) a judgment or arbitration award as a form of novation on the theory 
that the parties have agreed to be bound by the judgment. However, it is not a conventional 
novation, which is a voluntary contractual arrangement between the parties, but a compulsory 
novation (novatio necessaria) the effect of which is not to extinguish the debt on which the 
claim is based but to strengthen and reinforce the right giving rise to the claim.
58
 The right to sue 
is ordinarily replaced by a right to execute but the original obligation on which the claim was 
founded is not extinguished.59   
 
 At most therefore in South African law a judgment on a maritime claim may found a 
contention that the exceptio rei judicatae is available. However in the present context that is 
hardly a defence that the owner of the vessel would wish to raise as it would involve a 
concession that the judgment was one given by a competent court in proceedings between the 
same parties in respect of the same claim.
60
 The inevitable result of such an approach would be 
that the claimant would seek an order to execute upon the judgment.  In any event in the context 
of an action in rem where the owner had not intervened in the proceedings the answer to that 
                                                 
56 The ‘Irina Zharkikh and Ksenia Zharkikh’ op cit; West M, Arbitrations, Admiralty actions in rem and the arrest 
of ships in the Hong Kong SAR: in the twilight of the Indian Grace (No 2), [2002] LMCLQ 259. Again the 
arguments in this regard revolve around the merger of the claim in a judgment or arbitration award. A particular 
problem to which they draw attention is the problem of mandatory stays of proceedings arising out of arbitration 
clauses where a vessel is arrested in rem in order to obtain security and any application for a stay of proceedings is 
resisted unless it is made a condition of the stay that alternative security be provided for the arbitration proceedings. 
See The Rena K [1979] 1 All ER 397 [QB (Adm Ct)]; [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545 [QB (Adm Ct)]. These problems 
do not arise in South Africa by virtue of the provision for a security arrest in section 5(3) of the Act. Accordingly 
this is not a concern in South Africa insofar as the characterisation of the action in rem is concerned. 
57 Voet 46.2.1. 
58 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Dhooma 1970 (3) SA 304 (N) at 308B-310F; Swadif (Pty) Ltd v Dyke NO 1978 (1) SA 
928 (A) at 940E-944H. 
59 Zygos Corporation v Salen Rederierna AB 1984 (4) SA 444 (C) at 453B-455H. 
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proposition would presumably be that as the judgment in rem is confined to the value of the res 
the claim has not been fully and finally determined and is not exhausted by the previous 
proceedings. Conversely if a claim in rem is sought to be pursued after a judgment in personam, 
which as already pointed out would only be necessary where the claim gave rise to a maritime 
lien and the person personally liable for the debt was not, or no longer, the owner of the vessel in 
respect of which the claim arose, the answer would be that the claim lies against a different 
person, namely the owner of the vessel burdened by the lien and the security right given by the 
maritime lien had not been considered or exhausted by the judgment.   
 
 For those reasons therefore it is submitted that the traditional rule in regard to actions in 
rem that the underlying maritime claim does not merge with the judgment in such an action and 
similarly that a judgment in personam does not preclude a subsequent action in rem is in any 
event consistent with basic legal principles concerning the effect of a judgment in South African 
law. The anomaly that troubled Staughton LJ appears to arise from a different approach to the 
effect of a judgment on the existence of the underlying claim and does not pose any obstacle or 
create any anomaly in South Africa whether as to the application of this principle to actions in 
rem or to understanding the action as a procedural device directed at the owner of the vessel. In 
the case of an action in rem against an associated ship the same principle applies a fortiori. After 
all the judgment against the associated ship is not on any basis one against the party personally 
liable in respect of the maritime claim and a contention that res judicata applied would be met 
with the retort that an entirely different person was involved as defendant in the action.  
 
(g)     The claimant in an action in rem  may procure a warrant of arrest after judgment. 
 
 In England this now flows from a provision of the Civil Procedure Rules and gives effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 National Sorghum Breweries Ltd (t/a Vivo African Breweries) v International Liquor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2001 
(2) SA 232 (SCA) at 239, para [2]; Yellow Star Properties 1020 (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Development 
Planning and Local Government, Gauteng 2009 (3) SA 577 (SCA), paras [21] and [22]. 
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to the decision of the High Court in Singapore in The Daien Maru No 18.
61
 There the vessel 
was under charter and the owners arrested her in proceedings to recover possession from the 
charterers. Various members of the crew entered a caveat against the vessel’s release and then 
commenced proceedings against the owners for wages, subsistence and expenses for returning 
home. After summary judgment had been entered in their favour they sought and obtained the 
arrest of the vessel. Their right to do so was challenged but upheld on the basis that provided 
there had been no prior arrest and bail had not been given for the claim such an arrest was 
permissible. 
 
 This attribute of an action in rem in other jurisdictions is not a feature of the action in 
South Africa because in terms of section 3(5) of the Act an arrest of the vessel (or a deemed 
arrest in terms of section 3(10(a) of the Act) is a necessary pre-requisite to the bringing of an 
action. The section provides that an action in rem  ‘shall be instituted by the arrest’ of property 
against or in respect of which the claim lies. The effect of that section has been the subject of 
authoritative interpretation in the case of The Jute Express
62
 where it was submitted and 
accepted that the purpose of this section is to lay down as a matter of procedure in such an action 
in South Africa that an arrest of the vessel or other property in respect of which the claim lies is 
necessarily required. Such an arrest could either be an actual arrest or a deemed arrest under 
section 3(10(a) of the Act. According to Howie AJA giving the judgment of the Court the 
primary purpose of an arrest is to give the action utility and effectiveness by affording the 
claimant pre-judgment security. That purpose is achieved by making an arrest, actual or deemed, 
an essential requirement for pursuing such an action.63 It is ‘an essential element of the process 
whereby an action in rem is to be brought to court’.
64
 That has not been altered by the 
subsequent amendments to the Act. 
 
 It follows that the procedure followed in The Darien Maru No 18 could not have been 
                                                 
61 The Daien Maru No 18 [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 387; [1984] SGH C 43.  
62 MV Jute Express v Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the MV Jute Express 1992 (3) SA 9 (A). 
63 At 17J-18C. 
64 At 18H-I. 
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followed in South Africa. The crew members could have entered a caveat against the release of 
the vessel from arrest, as they did in Singapore,
65
 but they would either have to have obtained 
security for their claims or themselves arrested the vessel in order to pursue an action. 
Accordingly the problem dealt with in that judgment and now addressed in England under the 
Civil Procedure Rules does not arise in South Africa and an action in rem in this country lacks 
this feature. What is of greater significance about this point is that it illustrates the truth of the 
point made earlier in this chapter that the action in rem is no longer, if it ever was, purely a 
creation of the courts and some stream of maritime and mercantile law, but is a creation of 
statute and rules that will determine its scope and effect and thereby identify its nature and 
consequences. 
 
(h)    Once arrested the vessel may be sold in which event claims are transferred to the fund 
in court.  
 
It is unnecessary for this principle to be discussed in any detail because in South Africa the 
power of the court to order the sale of a vessel or other property arrested in terms of the Act is 
wholly statutory and embodied in section 9 of the Act. That section provides that a court may at 
any time in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction order the sale of property arrested under the 
Act and when it does so the proceeds accruing from the sale constitute a fund to be held in court 
and dealt with in accordance with the rules. The court may in terms of section 10A make an 
order with regard to the distribution of the fund and it is customary in practice to refer the matter 
to a referee to receive claims and report to the court on the distribution of the fund having regard 
to the claims received and the priorities attaching to those claims in terms of section 11. Where 
claims are brought against the fund on the basis that the vessel sold was an associated ship 
special provision is made in respect of the ranking of such claims. 
 
 
                                                 
65 Admiralty Rule 4(4)(a). The property can then only be released from arrest if security is given for the claim of the 
person entering the caveat (Admiralty Rule 4(7)(b)(ii)).    
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(i)Service on the owner is not required in an action in rem  
 
This is not listed as a separate feature of the action in rem by Derrington & Turner, 
although they mention it as a unique feature of the admiralty jurisdiction that a claim form in an 
action in rem is served upon the ship and not its owner.
66
 However if the action is one that lies 
against the owner of the vessel the usual rule would require that there be some form of service 
upon the owner. Technically that is undoubtedly correct but in this modern era of easy 
communication where courts frequently permit service to be effected other than personally by an 
officer of the court this departure from the norm is of little practical significance and is rightly 
not elevated to a feature of the action in rem. After all it would take only a minor alteration in 
the rules governing service to require that a copy of the warrant of arrest and summons be served 
personally upon the owners in any of the various ways in which process is served in foreign 
jurisdictions under the rules of court. That would not alter the nature or effect of the action in 
any way.  Accordingly this can be disregarded.   
 
2 THE FEATURES OF AN ACTION IN REM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This comparison between the features of the action in rem in England and other countries 
that take their lead from it and the provisions of the Act in regard to such actions, when 
construed in the light of the Constitution and our common law reveals that whilst there is 
substantial correspondence between the South African version of the action in rem and its 
counterparts elsewhere there are also significant differences. By and large those differences 
make it easier to regard the action in South Africa as procedural in nature and directed against 
the owner of the vessel that is the subject of arrest. Most of the problems that concern writers on 
the topic in other jurisdictions do not arise here in part because, as argued above, rules such as 
those in The Monica S and, in its more extreme expression, The Dictator are not compatible with 
the Act and the Constitution. Others are viewed from a different perspective in this country 
                                                 
66 Derrington & Turner, op cit, 10. Under Admiralty Rule 6(2)(a) service of the summons and the warrant of arrest 
is effected by affixing a copy to the mast or any suitable part of the ship and handing a copy to the Master or other 
person in charge of the ship.  
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because of our common law rules. One can therefore seek to distil the features that characterise 
the action in South Africa and then move on to a closer examination of those features in the 
context of the associated ship. 
 
It is suggested that the following features of the action can be identified. First it is a form 
of procedure aimed at bringing the owner of the vessel before the court either because of the 
owner’s personal liability for the maritime claim or because the vessel is burdened with a charge 
in the form of a maritime lien67 of which South Africa recognises the six classic liens of English 
law namely (1) salvage, (2) collision damage, (3) seaman's wages, (4) bottomry, (5) master's 
wages and (6) master's disbursements.
68
 Second where a claim is pursued on the basis of the 
personal liability of the shipowner in respect of a claim not giving rise to a maritime lien the 
claimant acquires a statutory lien over the vessel at the time of its arrest. Such an arrest, whether 
actual or deemed, is an essential feature of an action in rem. Accordingly no action can be 
brought in the absence of an arrest. Because the date of arrest is the significant date as far as the 
accrual of the statutory lien is concerned the position cannot arise that the action proceeds 
against a person other than someone personally liable for the claim and the action remains from 
its commencement an action that is expressed in the form of an action against the vessel, but is 
in fact an action against its owner. Third and because the action is one in which the owner of the 
vessel is impleaded, notwithstanding its outward form, if the owner intervenes to defend the 
proceedings or so conducts itself as to convey that it is submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the 
court any judgment granted is effective as a judgment against the owner and it would be 
permissible, subject to appropriate amendment of the summons and pleadings, for the court to 
give judgment in personam against the owner. 
 
                                                 
67 Section 3(4) of the Act. 
68 Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and others Grecian-Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and others 1989 (4) 
SA 325 (A).  According to the judgment in that case a maritime lien referred to in section 3(4)(a) of the Act does not 
include a maritime lien according to the governing law of the debt, that is, the proper law of the contract, delict or 
statutory obligation.  It must follow that the maritime liens referred to in para (y) of the definition of maritime claim 
in section 1(1) of the Act are confined to the traditional maritime liens recognised in South Africa and do not 
include foreign maritime liens. recognised by the law of other jurisdictions.   
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Turning from matters that principally revolve around the identity of the defendant and 
the characterisation of the action to matters relating to the extent of the relief available to a 
claimant in an action in rem, where the owner of the vessel does not intervene and defend the 
action any judgment will be limited to the value of the vessel. This is so even where some other 
party, such as a charterer or mortgagee, intervenes to oppose and protect their own interest in the 
vessel as they are entitled to do. The only liability incurred by such persons is a liability in 
respect of the costs incurred consequent upon their intervention. The claimant acquires a right on 
arrest to approach the court for an order for the sale of the vessel in terms of section 9 of the Act. 
If the claimant successfully invokes that right it is entitled to pursue its full claim against the 
fund so created but its right to recover will be limited to the value of the fund. However to the 
extent that the claimant is unable to recover in full it is entitled to pursue its claim by way of a 
further action in personam against the party personally liable although in a world of one-ship 
companies that may not be particularly valuable. Conversely where the claim has initially been 
pursued by way of proceedings in personam against an owner personally liable for the debt those 
proceedings do not constitute a bar to an action in rem to the extent that the claimant has failed 




Next it is necessary to deal with the security interests that can be obtained or pursued by 
means of an action in rem. These are the maritime lien and the statutory lien (as it is called70) 
arising from the arrest of a vessel in an action in rem. One starts as always in this field with the 
statement by Sir John Jervis CJ in The Bold Buccleugh that: 
 
‘A maritime lien is well defined. to mean a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried 
into effect by legal process…, that process to be a proceeding in rem.…This claim or 
privilege travels with the thing into whosoever's possession it may come. It is inchoate 
from the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and, when carried into effect by legal 
process by a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first attached.'   
 
                                                 
69 Where the party personally liable is not the owner the claim must be one on a maritime lien in order to proceed in 
rem and there could then be no question of those proceedings being barred by proceedings against a party bearing 
personal liability for the debt.  
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This statement, hallowed by oft quotation, tends to be regarded as having the status of Holy Writ 
in admiralty law (or lore). However close scrutiny suggests that it may be subject to the same 
difficulties of interpretation as any Biblical counterpart. Although the lien is described as ‘a 
claim or privilege’ this is surely wrong. It is not itself independent of some underlying claim and 
indeed the existence of such a claim is a necessary pre-requisite for the existence of a maritime 
lien. It is better therefore to say simply that it is a privilege or right of security (to use more 
familiar terminology) that attaches to various types of claim. In the conventional language of the 
classification of rights into real and personal rights it would be described as a real right because 
it attaches to a corporeal thing and survives a transfer of ownership.
71
 What did Jervis CJ mean 
when he said that it is ‘inchoate’, that is, not fully formed, from the moment it attaches? Neither 
the nature nor the extent of the right alters between the date upon which the claim to which it is 
linked arises and the date when proceedings are brought to enforce the lien. Perhaps he had in 
mind that unlike other real rights no notice to the world is given of the existence of the right by 
way of registration such as occurs with ownership or, in the case of security, a mortgage. Lord 
Diplock, in a passage from his judgment in The Halcyon Isle,
72
 says that this refers to the fact 
that no right of property is created by the maritime lien. If so it is an obscure way of saying it 
and there is nothing in the judgment of Jervis CJ that indicates that this was his concern. In a 
South African context it must be borne in mind that it reflects the very different approach to real 
rights of security between English and South African law. Also the fact that as Lord Diplock 
stated the security interest of a maritime lien may not be recognised in some jurisdictions and 
may be subject to procedural handicaps, such as the need to bring suit within a limited period of 
time, in others does not subtract from it or render it ‘evanescent’. It simply means that the ability 
to enforce the lien will vary from place to place, which is precisely the situation in England as a 
result of Lord Diplock’s majority judgment in The Halcyon Isle. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
70 Professor Jackson prefers ‘statutory lien in admiralty’. The Enforcement of Maritime Claims 4th Ed, para 17.37, 
p467. 
71 Which I understand is not the case in certain European jurisdictions where it is treated as a personal right against 
the owner of the vessel.  
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 There is substance in Jackson’s criticism that the distinction between ‘an “inchoate” 
right depending for its substance on the taking of legal proceedings and a right of substance 
which, if necessary, has to be enforced by legal proceedings’ is purely semantic. He rightly asks 
whether the maritime lien is any more ‘inchoate’ (and I would add ‘evanescent’) than any 
substantive right, prior to its enforcement.
73
 A person with knowledge of the underlying claim 
would say that the ship was as clearly burdened by the security given by a maritime lien as by a 
registered mortgage. It is the fact of the claim seen in the light of the legal consequences 
attached to such a claim by many, but by no means all, legal systems, that creates the security. 
The justification for the existence of any maritime lien lies in questions of policy not in the fact 
that it is capable of enforcement by way of an action in rem. The fact that different jurisdictions 
attach widely differing consequences to different claims, particularly in regard to priorities, and 
also vary widely in their enforcement of claims to maritime liens illustrates the fact that there is 
no settled international position in this regard and the failure to arrive at a broadly acceptable 
international convention in this regard demonstrates the impossibility of suggesting that the 
maritime lien and the action in rem are in some way inextricably linked. It is undoubtedly 
preferable to treat the two as separate, the one related to substantive rights of security over 
vessels and the other relating to the procedures to be followed in the enforcement of maritime 
claims.   
 
 Fortunately it is not necessary for present purposes to explore any further all the niceties of 
maritime liens. South Africa recognises a limited class of liens and provides for them to be 
enforced by an action in rem although there is nothing to prevent a creditor having the benefit of 
such a lien from proceeding in personam and if not paid executing against the vessel and 
claiming a preference based upon the lien. This follows from the fact that the order of priorities 
in ranking claims, whether against a fund in court or on execution after judgment, is prescribed 
in section 11 of the Act and the ranking of those claims depends more upon the nature of the 
claim than upon the existence of a maritime lien. Thus the claims are not defined on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                             
72 Bankers Trust International Ltd v Todd Shipyard Corporation: The Halcyon Isle [1980] 3 All ER 197 (PC) at 
203a-g 
73 Jackson D C, The Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 4th Ed, paras 18.22 and 18.23, p481. 
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whether they attract a maritime lien but according to their inherent character and the question of 
whether a claim enjoys a maritime lien is only relevant to the matter of priorities under section 
11(4)(e) of the Act, where maritime liens not already dealt with earlier in the section are ranked 
after mortgages, hypothecation, rights of retention and other charges over the ship, and master’s 
disbursements but before ‘any other maritime claim’, that is, any concurrent claim having no 
claim to any preference whatsoever. As it is rare in a case of compulsory sale for there to be any 
balance in the fund after discharging any mortgage over the vessel this is relatively academic. 
Accordingly in South Africa the prime importance of a maritime lien lies in the fact that the 
underlying claim to which the lien attaches can be pursued notwithstanding the sale of the vessel 
in which event the proceedings will have to be by way of an action in rem.   
 
 This advantage, that a security interest arises that is enforceable against a subsequent 
purchaser of the vessel, is likewise the principal feature of the statutory lien afforded a claimant 
in a maritime case in consequence of the arrest of the vessel. As in England it is accepted that a 
sale of the vessel after the security interest arises does not affect the right to continue the action 
to judgment and to seek to satisfy the judgment from the proceeds of the sale of the vessel. 
Unlike in England, where the statutory lien arises on issue of the summons, in South Africa it is 
submitted that it only arises on the arrest of the vessel at a stage when the owner thereof is a 
party personally liable in respect of the underlying maritime claim. The source of this lien is the 
maritime claims specified as such in section 1(1) of the Act although not all such claims can give 
rise to a statutory line, because by their very nature they are incompatible with such a lien. Thus 
one cannot speak of a statutory lien arising in relation to the arrest of a ship in a claim to 
ownership of the vessel or for possession or delivery of the ship. Nor does one acquire a 
statutory lien over a fund in court as a result of proceedings in rem against the fund. Difficulties 
may also be experienced in respect of some other claims
74
 and the nature of the relief being 
sought will also be a relevant factor. However, where the claim is one sounding in money the 
                                                 
74 There are some maritime claims such as a claim to limit liability in terms of sub-para (w) of the definition of 
‘maritime claim’ in section 1(1) of the Act and claims under policies of marine insurance that can probably only be 
pursued in personam. 
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effect of arresting a ship in an action in rem in South Africa is to give rise to a statutory lien 
over the vessel from the time of its arrest. The extent to which South African law affords such 
rights to a claimant is determined by the legislative decision in regard to the claims capable of 
being pursued in this way. Even that is not wholly clear because the legislature has seen fit to 
compound the existing situation that a maritime lien is a secret lien by providing that ‘any other 
matter which by virtue of its nature or subject matter is a marine or maritime matter’ is a 
maritime claim.75 The result is that one cannot be certain in advance of any attempt to arrest 
property in rem under this heading whether it will be susceptible to arrest and accordingly attract 
the statutory lien. It is as well in those circumstances that the lien should not arise before arrest. 
The existence of such a lien has no effect on questions of priority 
 
 To sum up on this aspect of matters in regard to the nature of the action in rem it seems 
that the correct statement of the position in South Africa is not that the action in rem is the 
means for enforcing the maritime lien nor that it creates the statutory lien. It is rather the position 
that the action in rem provides a means of enforcing a maritime lien, where such exists under our 
law, and if such an action is brought in respect of a claim sounding in money it will from the 
time that the property in question is arrested attract a statutory lien. In the case of the maritime 
lien this means that from the time the lien arises, which is when the claim arises, a transfer in 
ownership does not affect the claimant’s security interest in the vessel as the ship will already be 
burdened with the security interest constituted by the lien. In all other cases it is only a transfer 
of ownership after arrest that results in the new owner receiving a vessel burdened with a 
security interest. However, once the security interest has been secured by way of arrest it is in all 
other respects identical. The security interest enforced upon the arrest of property in an action in 
rem will, however, be discharged on the sale of the vessel. Thus section 9(3) of the Act provides 
that any sale in terms of that section is one free of any mortgage, lien, hypothecation or any other 
charge whatsoever.   
 
                                                 
75 Section 1(1) of the Act sv ‘maritime claim’ para (ee). 
 512
3 THE ACTION IN REM AGAINST THE ASSOCIATED SHIP 
 
Having identified the characteristics of the action in rem in South Africa it is time to 
consider those characteristics in relation to the action in rem against the associated ship to see 
which of them have to be altered to take account of the special nature of that jurisdiction. In The 
Berg
76 Milne JP said in regard to the action against an associated ship: 
 
‘It is true that the cause of action, but for one important difference, remains the same.  
The mere fact that the applicant elected to arrest the Pericles instead of the Berg could 
not affect the nature, amount or enforceability of the applicant’s claim. It is 
inconceivable, for example, that the Legislature could have intended to deprive the 
owners of the Berg of any defence that would have been open to the owners of the 
Pericles.’ 
 
Although as a general proposition in regard strictly to questions of liability and the defences 
available to the owner of the associated ship that may be broadly correct as a statement of the 
effect of an action in rem against the associated ship as opposed to one against the ship 
concerned it is not entirely accurate. As we will see there are slight differences between the two 
that may affect these matters. 
 
The starting point is one that drives us back to the debate over the nature of the action in 
rem itself and the question whether it is appropriate to describe it as solely a form of procedure. 
The Act does not say that the owner of the associated ship is liable for the debt, merely that the 
action in rem otherwise available to a maritime claimant may be instituted by arresting an 
associated ship instead of the ship concerned. However as the judgments in The Berg 
demonstrate this entitlement renders a person other than the owner of the ship concerned liable 
in respect of the claim. In both courts the suggestion that the associated ship arrest provisions 
were procedural in character was rejected. It was accepted that this afforded a new remedy to 
maritime claimants but in invoking the remedy it attached liability to a person not otherwise 
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 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship ‘Berg’ 1984 (4) SA 647 (N) at 655D-E. 
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liable in respect of the claim. The underlying principle expressed by the architect of the Act 
and accepted by the appeal court was that the purpose of the provisions was to make liability fall 
where it belonged by reason of ownership or where the vessel was owned by a company by 
reason of ownership or control of the shares of that company. Other than that the amendments 
have the effect that it is control of the company rather than control of its shares that now forms 
the foundation for the associated ship arrest that remains the position. 
 
Does this necessitate a reconsideration of the proposition that the action in rem, at least 
insofar as it lies against an associated ship, is a form of procedure? It is submitted not.  Certainly 
it provides no foundation for a resort to the notion of personification as the underlying basis for 
the associated ship arrest is that one is dealing with a vessel other than the vessel in respect of 
which the claim arose. Accordingly it is impossible to treat the associated ship as in some way 
the ‘wrongdoer’ in respect of that claim. It is submitted that by making the associated ship 
susceptible to arrest the legislature has done two things. In the first instance it has created a 
potential liability attaching to all owners of ships that, by virtue of the fact that they are 
appropriately connected with the owner or company owning the ship concerned, are liable to be 
arrested as associated ships in South Africa. That liability comes into existence at the same time 
as the maritime claim itself arises and continues thereafter for so long as the claim is enforceable 
but unpaid, provided the association continues. The fact that the statutory provisions are 
understood as creating a liability on this basis is illustrated by the fact that in practice fleet 
owners and operators seek advice from South African lawyers on how to structure their fleets in 
such a way as to avoid that liability.   
 
The second aspect of these provisions is that they create a remedy appropriate to the 
enforcement of the liability thus established. That remedy is the action in rem against the 
associated ship.  It is submitted that the provisions have two separate and distinct aspects namely 
a substantive attachment of liability to all owners of ships that are or may become associated 
ships in relation to the ship concerned whilst the debt remains enforceable and a procedural 
provision instituted in order to give effect to that liability. The substantive liability comes into 
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existence when the maritime claim arises or at any later stage when a vessel comes into the same 
ownership or under the same control as the ship concerned at the time when the claim arose. 
That liability is real and substantive and exists before the arrest of the vessel in proceedings in 
rem in South Africa. The reality will be testified to by many maritime practitioners who have 
advised ship owners of the risk of bringing their vessels into a South African port because of its 
susceptibility to arrest as an associated ship in this jurisdiction. 
 
The substantive liability necessarily exists prior to the arrest of the associated ship 
although it can only have effect upon arrest. This is because the underlying maritime claim will 
arise and become enforceable by way of either an action in rem under section 3(4) of the Act 
against the ship concerned or by way of an action in personam against the party personally 
liable, but also becomes available. From that point, even if the underlying claim is not 
enforceable against the ship concerned by way of an action in rem, it will be enforceable by way 
of an action in rem against the an associated ship. It is submitted that it is unrealistic to say that 
the liability has not attached until there is an arrest. All that means is that until there is an arrest 
there is no practical basis for enforcing the claim. In principle that is no different from any other 
situation where the inability to sue the person liable in respect of a claim means that the claim is 
not in practical terms recoverable. Thus it is not correct to say that because a peregrinus is not 
present in South Africa and has no property in this country therefore they are not substantively 
liable in respect of a debt owed to an incola. The correct position is that they are liable but that at 
present that liability is not enforceable in the courts of this country. It can make no difference in 
principle that in this instance the liability is one that can only arise in South Africa. 
 
It is suggested that it is appropriate to maintain this conceptual distinction between the 
liability imposed by these provisions on the owners of associated ships and the procedure by 
which that liability is enforced. One can then properly consider the underlying policy 
implications of the associated ship. These considerations are relevant to questions already 
debated at an earlier stage of this work such as the question whether it is permissible to arrest 
more than one vessel as an associated ship discussed in chapter 8. It is also relevant to questions 
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such as the extension of liability achieved by deeming a charterer to be the owner of the ship 
concerned so that there can be an associated ship arrest and an action in rem against the 
associated ship even when there could be no action in rem against the ship concerned and only 
an action in personam against the charterer as the party personally liable in respect of the claim. 
In substance the effect of this is to make property not owned by the party personally liable 
available to be arrested in rem. At the same time that party can be sued in an action in personam. 
If that is permissible why should it not be possible to commence the in personam action by way 
of an arrest of ‘associated property’, a question that has been debated in South Africa.
77
 
Confusing the liability accruing from the ability to arrest an associated ship with the procedure 
of arrest and the subsequent action is as unhelpful as suggesting that the basis for the arrest is 
either an extension of the sister ship provisions of the Arrest Convention or a form of piercing 
the corporate veil. By obscuring the true position it can mislead and hamper debate as a matter of 
principle on the future scope of the associated ship. That would be unfortunate at a time when 
there are signs of renewed international interest in the concept.  
 
It is accordingly submitted that the action in rem against the associated ship is a mode of 
procedure to enforce maritime claims. It impleads the owner of the associated ship for the 
reasons already advanced in considering the nature of the action in rem against the ship 
concerned.  As with that action arrest is an essential component of the action either by way of an 
actual arrest or by way of a deemed arrest under section 3(10)(a) of the Act. Once such an arrest 
has taken place a statutory lien attaches to the vessel so that the action can be continued to its 
conclusion and the vessel sold to satisfy any judgment notwithstanding a sale to a third party 
after the arrest. If the owner is personally liable for the debt as in the case of a sister ship arrest 
then the rule in The Dictator applies and the owner’s personal liability will be established in 
those proceedings if the owner enters appearance to defend, without challenging the jurisdiction 
of the court, or otherwise submits to the jurisdiction. If the owner is not personally liable, which 
will be the case in any instance of a true associated ship, or there is no appearance to defend 
irrespective of personal liability, then the claimant can only recover up to the value of the vessel 
                                                 
77 Bradfield G, ‘Guilt by association in South African admiralty law’ [2005] 2 LCMLQ 234. 
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and no more. Third parties having an interest in the associated ship may enter an appearance to 
defend and defend the action without incurring any personal liability save that in respect of 
costs. 
 
For the obvious and basic reason that one cannot regard the action against the associated 
ship as involving the same parties as the parties to the original maritime claim there can be no 
suggestion that the effect of a judgment against an associated ship is to bring about a merger of 
the original claim in the judgment. In principle therefore there is no reason why an action in rem 
against an associated ship should not be followed by an action in personam against the party 
personally liable on the claim or vice versa. It is also submitted that the fact of judgment against 
one of a number of associated ships should not affect the entitlement to pursue either the ship 
concerned or another associated ship. If there are constraints in that regard, which for the reasons 
set out in chapter 8 it is submitted there are not, they must be found elsewhere than in the 
characteristics of the action against the associated ship. 
 
It will be sent therefore that the action in rem against an associated ship in general has the 
same characteristics as an action against the ship concerned. The differences relate to the scope 
of the owner’s personal liability and to the consequences of a judgment on the underlying claim, 
but these are relatively small. Fundamentally the owner of the associated ship is in the same 
position as would be the owner of the ship concerned had that vessel been arrested in an action 
in rem. Greater differences emerge if one examines the notion inherent in the comment by Milne 
JP quoted above that the associated ship and its owner stand in all respects in the shoes of the 
ship concerned and its owner. These important issues have not been explored in the cases but 




THE ASSOCIATED SHIP – PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES 
 
 Although the associated ship has now existed for a quarter of a century and has been the 
subject of many arrests and many actions there remain a number of questions that have not yet 
been addressed or resolved. Some have arisen in practice and others perhaps not. No 
consideration of the associated ship would however be complete without some attempt to 
address those questions and to suggest the possible solutions to them. Five suggest themselves as 
requiring consideration and two of those can be dealt with together. The five are (1) the effect of 
an arbitration clause in the underlying agreement, usually a bill of lading or charterparty; and the 
ability of the owner of the associated ship to rely upon such clause; (2) the effect of a clause 
providing that disputes are to be referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court; (3) the 
ability of the owner of the associated ship to rely upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens as 
embodied in section 7(1)(a) of the Act; (4) whether and, if so, on what basis the owner of the 
associated ship can rely upon tonnage limitation to limit the amount of the claim and (5) what 
impact a judgment against the associated ship has on a maritime lien over the ship concerned.  
The first two can be considered together. 
 
1 ARBITRATION AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSES 
 
 Many agreements in the maritime field, particularly charterparties and bills of lading, 
contain clauses that either refer disputes in terms of the agreement to arbitration or provide that it 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of a particular court. The general enforceability of 
such clauses is specifically recognised in the Act in section 7(1) which provides that: 
 
‘(a) A court may decline to exercise its admiralty jurisdiction in  
any proceedings instituted or to be instituted, if it is of the opinion that any other court in 
the Republic or any other court or any  
arbitrator, tribunal or body elsewhere will exercise jurisdiction in respect of the said 
proceedings and that it is more appropriate that the proceedings be adjudicated upon by 
any such other court or by such arbitrator, tribunal or body.  
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(b) A court may stay any proceedings in terms of this Act if it is agreed by the parties 
concerned that the matter in dispute be referred to arbitration in the Republic or 
elsewhere, or if for any other sufficient reason the court is of the opinion that the 
proceedings should be stayed..’  
 
There is no doubt that these provisions are aimed at arbitration clauses and exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses.  Both have been held to apply to foreign jurisdiction clauses. An English choice of law 
and jurisdiction was dealt with under section 7(1)(a)
1
 and a Greek one under section 7(1)(b) on 
the basis that whilst it refers only to arbitration clauses an exclusive jurisdiction clause is taken 
as constituting ‘any other sufficient reason’ for the purposes of the section.
2
 Where a party 
establishes the existence of such a clause covering the matters in dispute it is for the other party 
to show good cause why effect should not be given to the agreement.3 
 
 Where a maritime claimant is happy to give effect to an arbitration clause or exclusive 
jurisdiction clause there is no difficulty or need to commence an action in rem in South Africa 
because of the availability of the security arrest in terms of section 5(3) of the Act. If security is 
not available and a reasonable need for such security can be demonstrated then the associated 
ship can be arrested for that purpose alone. The problem arises where the claimant does not wish 
to give effect to such provision for whatever reason as may be the case where the claimant fears 
that proceedings will be unduly delayed in the chosen forum or where the identity of the tribunal 
gives rise to concerns that it may have a bias, actual or unconscious, towards the defendant. In 
those circumstances the claimant may choose to invoke the jurisdiction of a South African court 
and cause an associated ship to be arrested with a view to resisting any attempt to stay the 
proceedings in terms of the arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
 
 The problem that this raises is that the owner of the associated ship is not a party to the 
arbitration agreement or choice of a foreign court as the one to have exclusive jurisdiction over 
any dispute arising from the contract. On what basis then can it claim to have the proceedings 
                                                 
1 MV Spartan Runner v Jotun-Henry Clark Limited 1991 (3) SA 803 (N). 
2 MV Achilleus v Thai United Insurance Company Limited 1992 (1) SA 324 (N) at 327. 
3 MV Spartan Runner at p 806; MV Achilleus at p 334.  
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stayed or ask the court in this country to decline to exercise its undoubted jurisdiction? If it 
refers the dispute to arbitration the arbitrator may properly say that it is not a party to the 
arbitration agreement. As it is the defendant it has no interest in the commencement of court 
proceedings in another jurisdiction and it would be entitled to resist such proceedings on the 
footing that it bore no liability for the claim save that imposed in South Africa by virtue of the 
associated ship jurisdiction in this country. 
 
 As noted in discussing the case of The Berg at an earlier stage
4
 this issue was raised in the 
course of argument and dismissed out of hand as being dependent on the result of a case 
distinguishable on its facts. However, whilst the distinction existed it was not a distinction in 
regard to the principle at present under consideration and it is pertinent to the proper resolution 
of that problem. The case involved a claim by cargo interests for damage to cargo carried on 
board a vessel. Three parties were cited. Two were the parties said (in the alternative) to be the 
carriers of the cargo under the bill of lading. The third was the agent of the carrier cited in terms 
of the then provisions of section 311(4) – now repealed - of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 
1951. The bill of lading contained an arbitration clause and the agent brought proceedings under 
the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 to have the action stayed pending an arbitration to resolve the 
question of liability on the claim. That claim was rejected on the basis that the agent was not a 
party to the arbitration agreement, being neither an immediate party nor the representative of 
such a party within the meaning of that expression in the definition of ‘party’ in section 1 of the 
Arbitration Act and only a party was entitled under that Act to seek a stay for the purposes of 
enforcing an arbitration agreement. 
 
 The case is relevant because it identifies the basic problem facing the owner of an 
associated ship in seeking a stay of an action in rem properly instituted in South Africa by way 
of the arrest of an associated ship. Such owner is not a party to the arbitration agreement (or the 
contract embodying the exclusive jurisdiction clause) and the problem it faces is therefore that it 
its situation is not encompassed by the language of section 7(1)(b), because it has not been 
                                                 
4 Chapter 5, supra. 
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agreed ‘by the parties concerned’ that they will submit their dispute to arbitration or to 
determination by another court. Section 7(1)(a) is also unhelpful because it is a necessary 
element of a claim for relief under that clause that the court is satisfied that ‘any other court or 
any arbitrator, tribunal or body elsewhere will exercise jurisdiction in respect of the said 
proceedings’. That requirement cannot be satisfied because no other court or tribunal will 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of the claim against the associated ship or its owner and the effect 
of the judgments in The Berg is that such proceedings are separate and distinct from proceedings 
in rem against the ship concerned and a fortiori distinct from proceedings in personam against 
the owner or charterer of the ship concerned.   
 
 This seems to be a less than satisfactory situation. There is authority in England that an 
insurer acting under rights of subrogation or that has taken an assignment of the insured’s claim 
stands in the shoes of the insured insofar as the obligation to submit to arbitration is concerned5 
but this appears to be by virtue of a statutory provision equivalent to the definition of ‘party’ in 
the South African Arbitration Act and is therefore of little assistance in the situation under 
consideration. However, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion, however 
unsatisfactory, that by bringing an action in rem against an associated ship a claimant can defeat 
the provisions of both an arbitration clause and an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract 
underlying the claim.  
 
2 FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
 
 The purpose of section 7(1)(a) of the Act is to introduce in South Africa6 the doctrine of 
                                                 
5 Schiffahrtsgesellenschaft Detlev von Appen GmbH v Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 279 
(CA) at 286; Hatzl v XL Insurance Co Ltd [2009] 3 All ER 617 (CA), paras [66] to [69]. 
6 Where the availability of the principle is debatable, see Liberty Life Association of Africa v Kachelhoffer 2001 (3) 
SA 1094 (C) at 1109H-1110B. Several cases have recognized that this is the effect of section 7(1)(a). Katagum 
Wholesale Commodities Company Limited v The mv ‘Paz’ 1984 (3) SA 261 (N) at 266H; Mediterranean Shipping 
Co v Speedwell Shipping Co Ltd and Another 1986 (4) SA 329 (D) at 334H; Great River Shipping Inc v Sunnyface 
Marine Limited 1992 (4) SA 313 (C) at 316C-E;Weissglass N.O. v Savonnerie Establishment 1992 (3) SA 928 (A) 
at 939C; MT Tigr:Bouygues Offshore SA and Another v Owners of the MT Tigr and Another 1998 (4) SA 740 (C) at 
741. 
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forum non conveniens that has its origins in Scottish principles
7
 and has been adopted in 
England.8 The question is not one of convenience but the appropriateness of the court exercising 
its jurisdiction in an action or declining to do so on the basis that the case may more 
appropriately be determined by another court or tribunal. Our courts have adopted the English 
approach that the party seeking the stay must show that there is another available forum 
competent to exercise jurisdiction that should more appropriately determine the dispute. 
 
 It is here at the threshold issue that the problem arises for the owner of the associated ship. 
How do they establish that there is another court or tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the claim 
if the claim is one that lies as a separate claim against the associated ship and its owner and not 
against the ship concerned and its owner? But this is the effect of the decision in The Berg that 
the action against the associated ship is separate and distinct from the action against the ship 
concerned. That being so it would not be feasible for the owner of the associated ship to show 
that there is another forum that would exercise jurisdiction in respect of the claim against the 
associated ship. Unless it can be said that the claim against the associated ship is in some way to 
be identified with the claim against the ship concerned there is no claim in the sense of a claim 
by A against B that is cognisable by any tribunal other than the court in South Africa seized of 
the action in rem against the associated ship. It appears therefore that the owner of an associated 
ship cannot invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens to persuade a South African court not 
to exercise its jurisdiction in an action in rem against an associated ship. 
 
 As with arbitration clauses and exclusive jurisdiction clauses this is an unsatisfactory 
conclusion because it not only compels a South African court to deal with a matter that should 
more appropriately be dealt with by another forum elsewhere, but it enables the maritime 
claimant to circumvent the rights of the other party by invoking the associated ship jurisdiction. 
It would not seem to be a way of overcoming the problem for the owner of the associated ship, 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
7
 Société du Gaz de Paris v Société Anonyme de Navigation des Armateurs Francais 1926 SLT 33; 1926 SC (HL) 
13 at 21. 
8 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd; The Spiliada [1986] 3 All ER 843 (HL). 
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with the co-operation of the owner of the ship concerned, to procure that the latte consent to the 
relevant foreign jurisdiction and offer appropriate security for the claim in that jurisdiction. If 
that offer is not accepted the dilemma remains that the action before the court is one in rem 
against the associated ship and nothing more. Perhaps fortunately the issue is not one that so far 
as I am aware has ever been raised or given rise to difficulties but it is an unfortunate by-product 
of the characterisation of the action against an associated ship as distinct from that against the 
ship concerned. Certainly in the three respects discussed it is not so that the owner of the 
associated ship is in the same position as the owner of the ship concerned. 
 
3  TONNAGE LIMITATION 
 
 Section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951 contains the statutory provisions 
governing the question of tonnage limitation in South Africa.  The relevant portion of the section 
reads as follows: 
 
1) The owner of a ship, whether registered in the Republic or not, shall not, if any loss of 
life or personal injury to any person, or any loss of or damage to any property or rights of 
any kind, whether movable or immovable, is caused without his actual fault or privity— 
(a)if no claim for damages in respect of loss of or damage to property or rights arises, be 
liable for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury to an aggregate amount 
exceeding  206,67 special drawing rights for each ton of the ship’s tonnage; or 
(b) if no claim for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury arises, be liable for 
damages in respect of loss of or damage to property or rights to an aggregate amount 
exceeding  66,67 special drawing rights for each ton of  the ship’s tonnage; or 
(c) if claims for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury and also claims for 
damages in respect of loss of or damage to property or rights arise, be liable for damages 
to an aggregate amount exceeding 206,67 special drawing rights for each ton of the ship’s 
tonnage: … 
(2) The provisions of this section shall extend and apply to the owners, builders or other 
persons interested in any ship built at any port or place in the Republic, from and 
including the launching of such ship until the registration thereof under the provisions of 
this Act. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall apply in respect of claims for damages in respect 
of loss of life, personal injury and loss of or damage to property or rights arising on any 
single occasion, and in the application of the said provisions claims for damages in 




The section has only twice been considered by our courts and then not in any respect relevant for 
present purposes.9 However questions of limitation have arisen on a number of occasions in part 
because of South Africa’s continued adherence to the 1957 Limitation of Liability Convention
10
 
under which the ability to break limitation is substantially easier than under the 1976 Limitation 
of Liability Convention.11 Thus the issues of the appropriate jurisdiction in which to hear the 
claims arising from the stranding of The Bos 400 revolved in large measure around the question 
of the appropriate limitation regime and the recognition of limitation decrees obtained in another 
jurisdiction.
12
 The particular issues raised by associated ship arrest have been the subject of 
consideration and advice but thus far have not been put tot the test in litigation. 
 
 The immediate questions that arise in the context of the associated ship are firstly whether 
the owner of the associated ship can rely upon limitation at all and secondly, if it can, on what 
basis is limitation to be determined and a limitation fund established. Hardly surprisingly the 
wording of the sections is not attuned to providing easy answers to these problems. It is couched 
on the basis that the owner of the vessel will also be the person liable in respect of the claim.  If 
one takes the words literally the owner of the associated ship can always say that the damage in 
issue was not caused by its actual fault or privity and would always be entitled to limit liability. 
However that would be an anomalous situation and the anomaly would be compounded by the 
fact that in that event the limitation figure would be calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the 
associated ship and not on the basis of the tonnage of the ship concerned. Thus the situation 
could arise where loss of life is occasioned by the wilfully reckless misconduct of the owner of 
the vessel in sending an unseaworthy vessel to sea resulting in the vessel concerned being lost in 
the incident. That might well leave the dependents of the crew in the position where the arrest of 
an associated ship would be their only means of pursuing claims for damages. However, because 
they arrested an associated ship their claims would be subject to limitation, which would not be 
                                                 
9
 Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Unterweser Reederei GmbH of Bremen 1986 (4) SA 865 (C); Nagos 
Shipping Ltd v Owners, Cargo lately laden on board the MV Nagos, and another 1996 (2) SA 261 (D). 
10 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-going Vessels, 1957. 
11 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, London, 1976 
12 Bouyges Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461 (CA). 
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the case if they had pursued the ship concerned. That does not seem right nor in accordance with 
the purpose of limitation regimes.    
 
 The converse situation can also give rise to difficulties as where a vessel is lost while 
carrying cargo the value of which substantially exceeds the amount of any limitation fund.  No 
question of breaking limitation arises in the circumstances of the loss so that the owners of the 
ship concerned can expect their liability to be limited. Can the cargo claimants (and their 
insurers) circumvent the calculation of the amount of the fund by arresting a much larger 
associated ship and then claiming that the owner of the associated ship can only invoke 
limitation on the basis of the tonnage of the associated ship thereby increasing the recoverable 
amount substantially?   
 
 Asking these questions leads one on to other potential areas for argument. Thus it is 
conceivable that it could be argued that no right of limitation can be invoked by the owner of the 
associated ship on the basis that properly construed the language of section 261 is only directed 
at an owner that is personally liable for the loss in question or whose vessel is subject to a 
maritime lien in favour of the claimants, which could be the case in a collision damage situation. 
However it was not the intention of the associated ship provisions to enable claimants to 
circumvent or avoid entirely an internationally recognised institution such as limitation.  Indeed 
the Act specifically recognises this as a maritime claim.
13
 An alternative argument that 
recognised limitation would be to say that it is a remedy personal to the owner of the vessel that 
is the subject of the action in rem and accordingly the right to limit is given to the owner of both 
the ship concerned and the associated ship, with each owner being entitled to establish a separate 
limitation fund, with claimants being entitled to pursue their claims against multiple funds until 
fully satisfied. However that creates a situation not contemplated by the associated ship 
jurisdiction of it being used to recover more than could be recovered from the owner of the ship 
concerned. 
                                                 
13 Sub-para (w) of the definition of ‘maritime claim’ in section 1(1) of the Act. 
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 The range, scope and complexity of the issues potentially arising in trying to apply the 
statutory provisions in regard to limitation in the context of the associated ship are such as to 
deter all but he stout-hearted from venturing into the field and probably explains why it is – in 
conjunction with the fact that South Africa continues to apply a fault and privity regime that 
enhances the prospects of breaking limitation – that although a number of cases have arisen in 
which these issues have been raised there has thus far been no attempt to resolve any of them by 
way of litigation.
14
 The suggestion that follows is accordingly at best tentative and possibly 
foolhardy. It is submitted that the only sensible way of marrying the concept of limitation to the 
associated ship jurisdiction is to treat limitation as a substantive defence available to a shipowner 
for the purpose of restricting their liability in respect of certain classes of claims. Accordingly it 
should be treated as a defence in the same way as a cargo claim can be resisted on the basis of 
the defences available under the Hague Rules
15
 or statutory manifestations of those rules in 
different countries. Accordingly the owner of the associated ship does not acquire a separate and 
distinct right to invoke limitation on the basis that it is to be treated as an ‘owner’ under section 
261, but acquires the right to limit derivatively on the basis of the entitlement of the owner of the 
ship concerned to limit its liability. That would mean that the amount of the limitation fund 
would be calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the ship concerned and the issue of breaking 
limitation would depend on whether the loss in question was occasioned by actual fault or 
privity on the part of the owner of the ship concerned.   
 
 That approach raises certain other questions, some of a procedural nature, that are of 
considerable importance. The first relates to the setting up of a limitation fund.  Should that be 
set up in the name of the owner of the ship concerned or in the name of the owner of the 
associated ship or jointly by both of them? If it is set up in South Africa by the owner of the ship 
concerned does that amount to a submission to the jurisdiction for the purpose of in personam 
proceedings against that owner? This is more than academic. A judgment in personam may be a 
                                                 
14 In all fairness the issues surrounding the international application of limitation are so complex that there are 
relatively few cases dealing with the topic. 
15 Or once they obtain wider acceptance and application the Rotterdam Rules. 
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basis for claiming to recover from the hull insurer or the proceeds of the hull insurance and if 
those proceeds have been dissipated the possibility of a tracing remedy could be explored. Even 
if it gives no prospect of direct relief it may simplify proceedings by affording rights of 
discovery and inspection that might be resisted by the owner of the associated ship. 
Substantively will a limitation decree from a South African court be recognised in other 
jurisdictions? To answer these would require a far more detailed analysis of the law relating to 
limitation than is justified by the present work. It suffices for present purposes to identify in 
broad detail the general nature of the difficulties posed by the application of tonnage limitation 
in the context of the associated ship. The answer to the problems it poses will have to be worked 
out over time. A modest suggestion is that if the approach set out above is thought generally 
desirable it could without undue difficulty be imported into the present legislation by way of 
amendment. 
 
4 DOES AN ASSOCIATED SHIP ACTION IN REM DISCHARGE A MARITIME 
LIEN?      
 
 The link between the action in rem and the maritime lien is founded on the proposition that 
the lien is executed by way of the action in rem. Accordingly the effect of such an action against 
the ship burdened by the lien is to discharge the lien either because the claim is dismissed or 
because, after judgment is obtained the vessel is sold and it is well-established that such a 
judicial sale is one free of all liens and encumbrances.16 There are other means of discharging a 
maritime lien
17
 but they are not relevant for present purposes. The question is whether an action 
against an associated ship on a maritime claim giving rise to a maritime lien results in the 
discharge of the lien even though the result of the action is that the underlying claim is not fully 
paid. 
 
 Once again the question is not one that has been addressed. However, once it is accepted 
                                                 
16 It is so provided in section 9(3) of the Act. 
17 See Jackson, op cit, paras 18.91 to 18.119 
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that the claim against the associated ship is distinct from that against the ship concerned one 
must accept that the effect of arresting the associated ship is to give rise to a statutory lien over 
the associated ship. That has been held to be the case with a sister ship arrest in England
18
 and 
there seems to be no reason why it should not apply equally to the true associated ship as with 
any other claim. After all claims giving rise to a maritime lien against the ship concerned ate 
themselves maritime claims for the purpose of the Act and as already discussed the effect of the 
arrest of an associated ship in an action in rem is to give rise to a statutory lien. 
 
The arrest of the associated ship does not operate to transfer the maritime lien 
itself to the associated ship. That has never been suggested to be the case and there is no warrant 
for it in the Act itself. Accordingly the maritime lien will continue to exist in relation to the ship 
concerned after the arrest of an associated ship. The question then is whether the lien is lost if 
the action succeeds and the associated ship is sold but the claimant does not succeed in 
recovering the full amount of its claim. The sale of the associated ship is one free of mortgages, 
liens and encumbrances, but that relates to mortgages, liens and encumbrances over the 
associated ship not over another vessel entirely. That much is clear from the fact that a sale 
under section 9 only relates to a vessel that has been arrested and accordingly the subsequent 
provisions of that section dealing with the consequences of a sale must be likewise construed as 
relating to the ship that was under arrest and has been sold. 
 
Once again any answer to the question can only be advanced on a tentative basis. 
It is submitted that the answer is that the action against the associated ship does not affect the 
existence of the maritime lien over the ship concerned unless it results in the underlying claim 
being fully paid. This flows from the separate character of the associated ship claim and the 
absence of any provision of the Act that suggests an opposite conclusion. To arrest an associated 
ship in an action in rem is not a procedural means for suing the ship concerned in an action in 
rem. In other words the action is not to be construed as lying against the ship concerned. That 
being so it is difficult to see on what basis, absent specific statutory provision, it could be held 
                                                 
18 The Leoborg (No 2) [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 380. 
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that its effect is to discharge a lien over an entirely different vessel. That is reinforced by the 
character of the maritime lien itself as one arising in relation specifically to a particular vessel 
and adhering to it until discharged notwithstanding any change in ownership of that vessel. A 
similar view is expressed by Wiswall in regard to the sale of sister ships.
19
 It is submitted that 
this is correct. One further implication is that this reinforces the position already espoused that 
the Act does not bar a claimant from arresting both the ship concerned and an associated ship. It 
would be slightly surreal to say that this was impermissible but that the maritime lien over the 
ship concerned was unaffected by the action against the associated ship. 
 
5 PEERING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL – THE FUTURE OF THE ASSOCIATED 
SHIP. 
      
   After twenty-six years it is time to take stock. The associated ship has undoubtedly been a 
popular and successful institution as far as maritime claimants are concerned. It has brought a 
substantial body of maritime work to South Africa and should continue to do so. It is perhaps 
surprising that something as novel has not generated more legal controversy. Some of the 
jurisprudence surrounding the institution has been controversial but perhaps because of the 
commonsense and restraint of practitioners it has created fewer problems than might otherwise 
have been expected. A major concern at present is a practical one of the reluctance of courts to 
address firmly the situation where improbable factual cases are advanced to resist an associated 
ship arrest and it is to be hoped that a change of stance will come about in the future. Otherwise 
it will be necessary to revisit the suggestion made by Friedman J in the early days of the Act that 
some kind of factual presumption should be incorporated in the Act to deal with this. It is not 
good for the reputation of South African courts to be seen to be too easily taken in by this type of 
tactic.  
 
 Apart from the practical day to day issues of arrest, security an the pursuit of claims there 
                                                 
19 F L Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800 at 171. Jackson, op cit, para 
18.14 mentions this without comment. 
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are unresolved questions concerning the associated ship that are likely at some stage to rear 
their heads. However, in general litigation concerning associated ships has primarily been about 
the fact of association rather than anything beyond that such as the questions explored in this and 
the preceding chapter. That illustrates that it is in large measure a practical innovation addressed 
to a specific situation that in day to day practice serves its intended purpose reasonably well.  
That is likely to mean that other jurisdictions will from time to time re-examine the South 
African model to see whether it can be of assistance in addressing the problem of unpaid claims 
in the world of maritime trade. Whether they will adopt some variant of the associated ship 
model is as discussed a matter of maritime policy having international implications that I have 
not sought to explore.  For the present it is a unique contribution by South Africa to international 
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